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Abstract.
This study attempts to examine the development process in which social
security provisions have been established, and to expose factors related to
the rise and development of social security programmes in developing
countries. The dynamics involved in the evolution of social security
programmes in developing countries are not merely pale reflections of the
processes promoting such developments in hegemonic centres. Rather, they
were deliberately adopted according to their needs and according to the
circumstances of the countries. In this analysis, therefore, we explore some
of the factors affecting social security policy development which play
particularly important roles in policy-making in developing countries in order
to establish the most suitable pattern of the social security policy. As the
major social security programme in Korea, the National Pension programme
provides the focal point of analysis, from its enactment in 1973 to its much
postponed implementation in 1988
In order to ascertain how the National Pension programme was adopted
and what directed its development, four theories of social security policy
development have been considered. The first focuses on the role of socio¬
economic developments in providing the impetus for and constraints on
social security policy development. The second centres on the role of
pressure groups in urging the development of these programmes. The third
interpretation emphases the impact of an authoritarian political elite, which
act in an entrepreneurial fashion to promote certain state interests and
preserve system stability. Finally, the impact of international policy diffusion
from hegemonic centres to periphery nations and among geographically
contiguous nations, is considered.
This study has drawn several conclusions which are expected to throw
some light on the future study of social security development in other
developing countries.
First of all, the central motivation for the adoption of the National Pension
programme came less from economic trends and characteristics than from
the needs and interests of a key political elite. This study provides much
substance to the authoritarian-corporatist interpretation of social security
policy development in Korea.
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Two other factors played supportive, although less important, roles in this
process— policy diffusion influences from advanced industrial nations and
socio-economic developments. However, this study discovered that the
relationship between socio-economic development and the National
Pension programme was ambiguous, mainly because the industrial
development process in Korea was different from that in the industrialised
countries.
The study suggests that development of social security programmes in the
developing countries do not necessarily replicate those in the developed
ones and that factors, like political ideology, cultural values, and the
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Chapter 1. An Introduction to Policy-Making in Korea.
1.1. Purpose of the Study.
The modern state has become increasingly involved in regulating social
interactions and distributing resources to its people. One of the most
important functions which the state has come to perform is the provision of
social security services for its populace. Most of the countries in the world
have some type of social security programme.
There are numerous studies in the area of social policy, especially on the
development or evolution of the social security system. Most of the studies
done on this topic fall into one of two categories. There have been several
broad, cross-national, statistical studies which, of necessity, capture only the
most general forces affecting social security policies. Whilst these studies
have offered some important insights into the processes affecting social
security policy development, they suffer from their unavoidably abstract
character and from a tendency to oversimplify complex realities. On the other
hand, numerous case studies exist which capture these dynamics and
provide an invaluable supplement to the cross-national studies. Most of
these studies covering one or a small number of countries have focused on
the social security policies of advanced industrial nations. In some ways, this
is understandable. Those nations tend to have the oldest and most
extensive programmes, and they have frequently been innovators in this
policy field. Thus, analysis of these programmes can be very rich and
rewarding.
Unfortunately, however, the social security programmes of the developing
countries have generally not received this type of sustained and systematic
scholarly attention. The assumption that, as Rimlinger mentioned, the latter
systems are reflections of the programmes which existed in the advanced
industrial nations earlier in this century constitutes a central reason for this
neglect. Rimlinger points out that:
"The developing countries are in a special situation. They can borrow
from a wide range of patterns of social protection that have proved
successful in countries that industrialised earlier. The developing
1
countries their problem is one of choosing the most suitable
pattern."1
Assuming that the development of social security programmes in
developing countries basically follows in the footsteps of programme
development in advanced industrial nations, and that their future
development will constitute a replication of patterns currently evolving in the
industrialised centres, the analysis of these systems has been deemed less
rewarding. In our judgement, this assumption is fallacious. The dynamics
involved in the evolution of social security programmes in developing
countries are not merely pale reflections of the processes promoting such
developments in hegemonic centres. Rather, they were deliberately adopted
according to their needs and adapted to the circumstances of the countries.
In this analysis, therefore, we will attempt to explore some of the factors
affecting social security policy development which play particularly important
roles in policy-making in developing countries in order to establish the most
suitable pattern of the pension policies.
In this study, I have chosen to focus my analysis on the development of the
Korean National Pension scheme. The Korean government enacted the
National Welfare Pension Law in 1973 in order to institutionalise a more
comprehensive and universal pension programme. The purpose of this
system was "to contribute to the protection of the secure life and welfare of
the people" by providing protection to workers and their families against loss
or stoppage of earnings resulting from retirement, death, or disability.
However, even though its necessity has always been affirmed, the
implementation of the scheme had been postponed several times. On 1st of
September, 1986, the government at last announced that a new National
Pension system would go into force in 1988. This programme would provide
retirement pension, sickness and survivor's benefits. The National Pension
system has been chosen for a detailed account of the policy-making process
in Korea, because social insurance can be regarded as the ultimate
determinant of distribution patterns only in the formal sense that it has
established the legal framework within which social, economic, and political
1 Gaston V. Rimlinger(1971), Welfare Policy and Industrialization in Europe. America, and Russia. New
York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., p. 334.
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factors interact. Further, Korea was selected not only because of my own
experience, but also because of its ability to contribute theoretically to this
discussion for the following reasons.
First, as we identified, the theme of the development of social welfare is
that the level of social security development in a society is closely related to
the level of industrialisation and the effect of industrialisation on other social
institutions. Korea has had one of the fastest industrial economic growth
rates in the Third World since the early 1960s, making it an economic
success story worthy of analytic attention. Various economic aggregate
indicators show that the social structural changes that have happened in
Korea since 1960 constitute a 'miracle' in the most positive sense of the
word. From the early 1960s to the 1980s, the country adopted the rationale
of the 'trickle down' effect to encourage involvement of the people in this
state-initiated economic development. The logic of 'trickle down' has often
been promoted to support the pattern of government activities described as
a 'growth first, distribution later' policy. Flowever, the 'distribution later' part is
still especially problematic. Recent political turmoil in Korea is based on the
problems associated with this lagging distribution of the already increased
wealth, having pursued a consistent policy giving priority to economic
development planning over social policy development. Many Korean people
now believe that this may be attributed primarily to the fact that the benefits
of growth were unevenly distributed and failed to reach the poor. They argue
that growth without redistribution results in the concentration of wealth in the
hands of the few and in the exclusion of the poor from development. They
believe also that entrenched inequality hinders economic development. This
characteristic facilitates a careful and realistic analysis of the impact of
economic expansion on social security policy development in developing
countries.
Secondly, the Korean political culture has been and still is molded by
historic residues of the heritage of Confucianism and by a high degree of
ethnic homogeneity that, eventually, disposes most Koreans, especially the
masses, to a submissive authoritarian political psychology that tends to
legitimize the moral authority of the upper strata. During the period of
economic development, the authoritarian government implicitly promised
redistribution to the people who were involuntarily thrown into the process of
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rapid societal change. This promise implies that the degree of responsibility
felt by the government and by the people in Korea should be different from
that of the society's. This distinctive characteristic of the paternalistic
government and its state-induced industrialisation will form a unique feature
of political development surrounding the issues of equality and social
welfare in Korea.
Thirdly, the historical contexts of social security policy performances in
Korea differ greatly from the European's modernisation approach and the
Latin American's of dependency perspective. Various specific cultural and
historical factors form the unique social situations in Korea. Historical
experience, religious ideologies, and dominant cultural values are
embodied in individual lives, prescribing patterns of interactions among
individual, family, community, and nation. Those factors and the resulting
situations might not have existed or might not be similar to those in the
Western experience of social upheaval during industrial revolutions.
Without understanding these factors of Korean social change, it is difficult
to apply existing theories of social changes and social security development,
theories which derived from social environments very different from Korea, to
the Korean situation. In order to make them more applicable to Korean
society, those foreign born theories will be more clearly examined in chapter
three.
Fourthly, social insurance will receive most attention since it is widely
regarded as the most useful type of programme2 today for a number of
reasons. The first is its' sheer size. Government sponsored pension
schemes constitute the largest and most expensive income maintenance
programmes provided under the social security systems of the advanced
capitalist democracies. Secondly, pension policy has potentially important
implications for redistribution. Pension policy plays a prominent role in the
distribution of resources to the elderly. Government retirement pensions
comprise the bulk of financial resources available to this portion of the
population. It is a clear case of a situation where political decisions rather
than market forces may be the major determinant of the standard of living for
2 James Midgley(1984), Social Security, Inequality, and the Third World, New York: John Wiley and
Sons. p. 84.
4
a given group of individuals. Moreover, pension policy contains within it the
potential for redistribution both across age groups, i.e., between the elderly
and the rest of the population, and across classes within the elderly
population. Finally, and perhaps of most importance is the potential impact
of pension policy on control relations in the economy. The development of
pension funds represents the growth of an increasingly important pool of
capital. This capital is a source of credit and investment and thus of control in
the economy. The existence of these funds, then, represents the possibility
for profound changes in control relations in the economy.3
Finally, although the Western economists have made effective use of the
opportunities afforded by the Koreans to test theories of political economy
and economic development, few Western social scientists from other
disciplines have sought to gain theoretical insights from the experience of
the Korean society. On the other hand, even though many of the Korean
social scientists trained in the Western countries (mainly highly
industrialised countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom,
Germany, and France) have introduced the Western social theories and
have applied these theories to the Korean society, social security policy¬
making is still in the embryonic stage of academic conception in Korea.
Though an increasing number of scholars, such as Nam-Jin JurA Joon-Kyu
SohrA Oy-Sung FlyurA and Ul-lm Oh^, are attempting to learn more about
policy-making processes, it is not yet widely practised.
Therefore, it can be said that the significance of this study is two-fold. First,
the case study of the development of a social security pension programme in
Korea can provide the Western social scientists with a unique opportunity to
3 John D. Stephens(1979), The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism. London: MacMillan Press,
p. 178.
4 Nam-Jin Jun(1980), "Establishment of the National Welfare Pension System in Korea: Policy-Making
Process in the Context of National Development in a Developing Country," Unpublished Ph.D Thesis,
The University of Chicago.
5 Joon-Kyu Sohn(1983), Social Welfare and Social Development, Seoul: Chibomundang. In Korean.
6 Oy-Sung Hyun(1983), "A Study on the Formulation Process and Its Characteristics of a Social
Welfare Policy for the Aged in Korea," Unpublished MSC. Thesis, Seoul National University. In Korean.
7 Ul-lm Oh(1988), "Practice and Patterns of the Policy Formulation Process for Social Welfare in Korea-
-The Case from the 3rd through 5th Republic--," Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, Kun Kook University.
In Korean.
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observe the process of development of the Korean social policy, and
enhance the validity and universality of existing social policy theories.
Secondly, this study can provide the Korean social scientists with
opportunities to look at the extent of applicability or otherwise of the Western
social policy theory to the Korean society.
If one is to believe that such a study will contribute anything to the
understanding of the development of social security policy, one must accept
two major assumptions: that case study can throw an important light on
political processes and that such processes are significant determinants of
policy designs. Since both these assumptions fall well short of universal
acceptance, we will discuss them more fully in the second chapter. That is, in
chapter two, we will attempt to suggest some of the factors affecting social
security policy development which play particularly important roles in policy¬
making in the developing countries. All these aims, we hope, are apparent.
In this remaining introductory chapter, we will consider some of the main
issues which these aims raise.
1.2. Method of Investigation.
The information and data concerning Korean national pension policy for
this study was obtained primarily in two ways: library work and interviews
with people who are judged to have played an important role in the
development of the social security pension programmes. This method
comes from the nature of the policy-making process in Korea.
1.2.1. Library Work.
Primarily I will rely on content and interpretive analyses, using available
historiographic materials and relevant statistics. Apart from newspapers,
books, monthlies, periodicals, journals, unpublished research papers,
census data and other statistical compilations available in libraries,
materials and data on the government side were obtained from the several
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government agencies, including the Ministry of Health and Social
Affairs(hearafter the MOHSA), the Economic Planning Board(hearafter the
EPB), and the Administration of Labour Affairs( now the Ministry of Labour,
after March, 1982). For the labour unions at the national level, data including
printed materials was acquired from the Seoul headquarters of the
Federation of Korean Trade Unions(hearafter the FKTU). Others were
provided by employers' associations like the Korean Employers'
Association, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and Federation of
Korean lndustries(hearafter the KFI).
For the most part, therefore, the data-base of this study consists of public
records such as government documents. One must also understand the
particular nature of newspapers and semi-academic monthly journals in
Korea. It is apparent that the freedom of the Korean press and media was
significantly reduced by the imposition of authoritarian rule. Newspapers,
however, are an important source of information for the 'inside stories' of a
particular bureaucratic apparatus as well as private organisations of the old
regime. I believe that censorship on social problems is less severe,
compared that on reports of political criticisms toward the Park and Chun
regimes. Semi-academic and popular monthly magazines which specialise
in material dealing with political and socio-economic issues, will be an
invaluable source of data.
In the gathering and examining of these materials, I was confronted with
several difficulties.
First, I have to mention about the credibility of statistics in Korea. For this
analysis, I was forced to rely on the official statistics because no alternative
data at the national level was available. Despite occasional praise of the
official Korean statistics by some foreign economists, there are doubts as to
their reliability. The reason is that some economic statistics sensitive to the
public were under close supervision of the high authority at least during the
period under review. Taking account of the facts, for example, that GNP
growth rate targets were finally set by the president himself, higher than
those initially set by the EPB, and that every effort was made to achieve the
final targets, the possibility of distortions of statistics on economic
performance can not be excluded.
Secondly, the difficulty of translation between two languages should be
referred to briefly in advance because most of my materials connected with
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the Korean social security policy-making were written by Koreans.
Therefore, in the following chapters, readers will find some awkward, and
even amusing English words and phrases, which are translated literally and
directly from Korean. It is inevitable because most of the Korean concepts
and shades of meaning have no equivalent in English, and vice versa, and
to do otherwise would destroy or distort the Korean meaning.
Thirdly, in relation to the second problem, I tried to use my materials written
in English as much as possible for two other reasons, even though I am
doubtful about the credibility of these materials. Firstly, as I mentioned
before, one of my purposes of this study was to provide the Western social
scientists with an opportunity to observe the development of the Korean
social security policy. For this reason, English materials would have
enhance their understanding. Secondly, as we will see in the following
chapters, Korean government exercised a rigid censorship on printed
materials during the research period from 1973 to 1986. Further, the college
and university professors were suppressed under the Academic Tenure Law
from 1976.2 Under these circumstances, associations for studying social
problems, socialisms, and the like had no chance of publication.
Fourthly, among Korea's four chief Executives and twenty-one Ministers of
Health and Social Affairs from 1955 to 1986, not one has written a detailed
account of his observations on selected topics. It is , therefore, difficult to
deal with the study of social security policy-making process in Korea.
Finally and most importantly, in Korea, with its much more closed system of
government policy-making, it is more difficult to gain access to source
documents. The secrecy of Korean policy-making prevents those involved in
decisions from writing accounts which 'tell the story.' Many portions of
government-related materials would be either confidential or would not have
been allowed to be circulated outside the group of authorised and policy¬
makers. To make matters worse, I was isolated from the list of recently
released materials by living in Edinburgh. However, I was fortunate in being
8 The law was officially described as being designed to get rid of 'idle' and 'incompetent' instructors from
31 public and 67 private universities. However, this law was utilized as an efficient step to control of
professors. For example, the regime forced resignations or dismissals of more than 400 professors in
March 1976. Three-quarters of them were estimated to be for political reasons. The agents of the KCIA
demanded that school administrators halt all extracurricular activities held by professors, such as
political writings, civil rights or charity work, or private study and religious activity.
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able to gain access to two government files which contained a great deal of
information about the social security pension policy-making process.
1.2.2. Interview.
To supplement the last problem, often the only way open to the researcher
is to interview participants in policy-making. This technique has its
drawbacks. A field trip of 15 weeks to interview and research additional
documents took place from June to September of 1989. During this period,
28 interviews were conducted with 23 individuals who were involved in the
national pension policy making process directly and indirectly. Most of these
people are past and present occupiers of key administrative positions within
the MOHSA, EPB, Korea Development lnstitute(hearafter the KDI),
professors, representatives of the FKTU and Employers' Association(See
Appendix 1). In addition, to obtain more thorough information about internal
dynamics of policy-making, the structured interviews by a written
questionnaire were confined to interviewing only those who were not
available during my field work period. For this, therefore, prepared a
questionnaire to be mailed to them. Apart from that, I conducted an extensive
series of personal meetings with government officials at the bureau and the
section levels, academic experts, and so on. To prepare and conduct the
interviews with them, I had to overcome several problems.
First, individuals had to be identified as being knowledgable on the subject
of development, there would clearly be misperceptions. The only way to
overcome this would have been to adopt a snowballing procedure,
beginning with the most prominent and obvious individuals and attempting,
through them, to discover other important actors.
The second problem in using interviews to investigate policy-making
process was that of the credence which could be given to the accounts of the
representatives. Respondents were not always able to remember events that
took place as much as fifteen years before. To solve this problem, I
contacted interviewees a few days before and confirmed my questions.
However, only in some cases was I able to check on the validity of
respondents' memories, and that largely through good fortune regarding
access to documents.
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Finally, Korea's high-ranking public officials rarely wish to expose their
own doings, for it has never been in their tradition to do so. A more important
reason may be attributed to the vague fear that one's revelation of the nature
of his work during his tenure of office might cause injury to those who were
involved in a particular decision and thereby bring about personal wrath and
uncertain political consequences from a regime still in power.9 in fact, some
respondents, on the one hand, refused to be interviewed, others, on the
other hand, felt uncomfortable about the interview. For the latter reason, I
have not always given full references in my thesis to respondents.
Regardless of these problems, they provided this researcher with the
information which gave the best insight into the operations of policy-making
process.
1.3. Using Case Study.
My work has a methodological aspect which needs to be examined-the
use of case study. The use of case study has proved an attractive way of
illustrating and conveying the rich detail of various kinds of events.
Therefore, a case study is instrumental in conducting a more in-depth
analysis of a chosen case. It also proves to be useful in generating
assumptions and refining a theory. 10 Thus, it becomes 'heuristic.'11
As a research method, however, its status remains somewhat dubious. It is
hard to define the case study in social science since it seems to be as varied
as the uses of other forms of data. In a sense, the case study is more easily
seen as a data source rather than a method of enquiry. Having said this, it is
clear that the many different uses of case studies complicate attempts to
present the problems of case study data or case study methodology.
9 Young-Nok Koo(1985), "Foreign Policy Decision-Making," In Young-Nok Koo and Sung-Joo
Han(Eds.), The Foreign Policy of the Republic of Korea. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 15.
10 Neil J. Smelser(1976), Comparative Methods in the Social Sciences. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall. p. 199.
11 Malti Dogan and Dominique Pelassvf 19841. How to Compare Nations: Strategies in Comparative
Politics. Chanham, N.J.: Chathan House Publishers, p. 109.
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Looking at a variety of authors, some suggest that the aim of the case is to
produce generalisation. The problem of the case study is how to achieve
this. Bryden argues that case studies, it is commonly alleged, contribute
nothing to the development of a science of politics.12 since case studies
deal with unique confluences of events, they are not cumulative. They do not
provide a basis for rigorous testing of hypotheses with a view to the
formation of valid generalisations of increasingly broad applicability, of
scientific laws even.13 Hall et.al. also would seem to have such a use for
case studies in mind in their analysis of the decision-making process. They
point to the danger that superficial and misleading generalisations can pass
as credible and satisfactory. This leads to the demand for a conceptual
orientation within which case studies are used.14 As they point out, case
studies may undermine a hypothesis but they can not validate it.1 5
Therefore, case studies lack predicted and ipso facto genuinely explanatory
power. At best they have produced intuitions and insights of varying degrees
of interest and provocativeness.
A remaining question to be discussed is that, having suggested that case
studies allow for theoretical conceptions to be made more consistent and
expanded, how can decision-making be studied using case studies? There
is no substitute for the case study in one vital aspect of policy study. Pheobe
Hall et.al. mentioned that its application to the study of policy developments
elicits two main types of criticisms: first, that the approach has not been
employed in sufficiently a scientific way to advance theory: and secondly,
that the case study does not lend itself to generalisation however carefully
used.1 ^ Furthermore, Salisbury states the argument against it as applied to
policy-making: "policy is necessarily an abstraction...to be approached
through aggregative or summarizing analytic procedures. It is patterns of
behaviour rather than separate, discrete acts which constitute policy. The
12 Kenneth Bryden(1974), Old Age Pension and Policv-Makinq in Canada. Montreal: McGill-Queen's
University Press, p. 5.
13 Raymond A. Bauer and Kenneth J. Gergen(Eds.) (1968), The Study of Policy Formation. New York:
The Free Press.
14 Pheobe Hall, et al.(1975), Change, Choice and Conflict in Social Policy. Gower. p. 17.
15 Ibid., p. 15.
16 Ibid., p. 13.
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concept of policy is thus anti-case study in its implications for research
strategy and encourages controlling for idiosyncratic variables."17
There are many factors to be considered in the analysis of policy formation
and this makes the testing of hypotheses a complicated business. One of the
indictments of the case study is that although it may describe this multiplicity
it offers no means of dealing with it analytically. Questions about the
interdependence, overlap, weighting or relevance of variables are, it is
argued, not taken into account in the case study approach.
Case studies, used systematically, have a certain heuristic merit and it is
upon this ground that they can best be defended:18
First, the method is as effective as other approaches in suggesting general
propositions about how policy develops; Secondly, the case study is a
valuable means of conveying the immensity of the task confronting those
who embark upon the journey from description to generalisation in this field;
Thirdly, at a time when the strengths and weakness as of positivist social
research are also being weighed in the balance, some of the advantages of
the case study show that this may be a better approach for the exploration of
the meaning actors attach to their behaviour in policy-making situations.
Since Korea has been a country where the strong state has led to
economic prosperity as well as persistent authoritarianism, the selection of
Korea as a single case is expected to highlight those advantages. In Korea,
furthermore, one can justify either approach on the ground that basic
research into political and socio-economic process, other than those of a
constitutional-legal nature, is still in its infancy.
17 Robert H. Salisbury(1968), "The Analysis of Public Policy: A Search for Theories and Roles," In
Austin RannevfEd.l. Political Science and Public Policy. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company.
p. 153.
18 Hall et.al.. Ibid., p. 16.
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1.4. Analysing the Policy-Making Process.
As mentioned before, a case study approach raises a methodological
question. One of the most important issues in considering methodology is
the way in which the methodological approach can not be separated from
the theoretical approach with which the objective of study is examined. The
connection is worth considering in explaining my own approach.
Perhaps the key issue in considering methodological approaches to the
study of social policy is the question of why one should the examine policy¬
making process if the nature of the process is already known? Social policy,
its scope and the means used to bring it about are the product of politics. But
to understand social security politics it is not sufficient to understand the
context in which conflict takes place and the interests of the groups involved.
Politics is also revealed through actions. Politics came alive through a policy
process. The process must be probed to reveal the interaction between the
different levels of conflict under inquiry here. Therefore, one of the main
reasons, as Simeon argues, is that "what governments do can not be fully
explained either by focusing only on the actions and perceptions of the
proximate policy-makers or by stressing only the impersonal forces of the
environment, such as levels of economic development, urbanisation and
affluence... ."19 The dynamic of confrontation and decision reflects the
politics of social policy, i.e. the broad forces work which attempt to influence
others in pursuit of some design. It defines the boundaries within which
conflicts take place and implies a set of written and unwritten rules through
which confrontation leads to policy. The study of policy-making process is
defined and pondered in such a way as to avoid some of its shortcomings.
The process is often the subject of inquiry and does not shed much light on
politics. Here, the process is analysed in order to bring out the essence of
politics. It will allow us to demonstrate the extent to which the setting and
content of the debates have changed the nature of coalition, formation has
evolved, the balance of forces has been altered and the connections
between societal and governmental actors have shifted. Therefore, the
dominant trend is that in some way the study of social policy-making can
lead to 'better' policy-making.
19 Simeon, R.(1976), "Studying Public Policy," Canadian Journal of Political Science. Vol. XIX. p. 550.
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John Edwards has suggested five reasons for studying policy-making:
First, it is of interest and value in its own right; Secondly, we can learn more
about the locus of effective power in society; Thirdly, it can be a means to
making policy formulation more effective, efficient or streamlined; Fourthly,
we may be better able to formulate alternative means of achieving given
ends; Finally, there is the 'intelligence' function of a deeper understanding of
the policy making-process.20
This introduces firmly the criteria of relevance into the study of social
policy-making. Therefore, a policy-making process includes the actions and
interactions that produce the authorities' ultimate choice of a particular policy
is contents over its rivals. Policy studies can also serve a variety of purposes.
It is customary to label studies as being concerned with policy-making or
contents or impact.21 Historically, most academic emphasis has been on the
process of making policy, while reformers have called for greater attention to
contents; studies of policy effects have usually run a poor third.22 However,
like Heclo's approach, this study eschews any once-and-for-all choice
among the three orientations because the content of a policy can itself be a
crucial independent factor in producing effects on the policy-making
process.Therefore, this study will approach the same phenomena from a
more political perspective by asking which political forces have influenced
the advent and extension of social policy, and we will look at proximate
sources and causes. In other words, the questions are: how issues of social
policy have arisen; where have the substantive ideas about what to do come
from; what is the process by which they have been politically accepted and
changed through time ? In sum, this research attempts to explore the policy¬
making process that Korea follows to establish the most suitable pattern of
the social security pension programmes. This is because little is indeed
known, particularly about the actual choosing process, i.e., policy-making
process leading to the adaptation of the social security pension programmes
in Korea. We believe that such a study will contribute something to the
understanding of the questions under consideration.
20 John Edwards(1981), "Subjectivist Approaches to the Study of Social Policy Making." Journal of
Social Policy. Vol. 10. pp. 289-290.




Abstracted from its historical dimension, policy-making can be visualised
as a cycle consisting of five components: policy-initiation, policy-making,
policy-implementation, policy-evolution, and policy-termination. Though
interwoven in the real world, the components are nevertheless conceptually
distinct, a factor which is analytically useful. The focal point is the policy-
initiation, which is often described and will be described here simply as the
agenda-setting. This agenda-setting refers to a course of action deliberately
chosen and implemented to effect the desired consequences in some
designated part of the relevant environment, which in the case of a public
policy is the society at large.22 The policy-making components are the links
between the agenda-setting and the environment: the policy-making
determines the nature of the agenda-setting, while the results produced by
that agenda-setting in the environment are the policy outcomes. Some of the
concepts of systems-derived analysis are useful in explaining the nature of
the cycles. In such analyses the political system is conceptualised as a
complex set of interacting variables in continuous interaction with their
environment. Boundary exchanges between the system and the
environment are classified into inputs and outputs, and inputs in turn, are
subclassified into demands and support. To an extent both of these subsets
are autonomous in that they may be affected by environmental changes
occurring independently of the political system.
These five stages are applicable to the policy-making process in Korea. In
this study, however, we will lay stress on the first two stages. This is
because, in Korea, the plan takes on the form of direct, centralised
bureaucratic planning which is characterised by a high level of coherence
between policy-making and policy-implementing process. For both the
consistency of the targets and the operational consistency of their
realisation, the powers of the president and the KCIA are crucial in
separating the planning and implementation process from any external
political influences and controls, thereby minimizing 'distortion' and
'irrationality.'24 Therefore, in a political environment like that of Korea, only
the policy-initiation and policy-making itself are the most important policy¬
making processes. In other words, "who proposed the idea of the pension
23 Brvden. Ibid., p. 12.
24 Kwang-Sik Song et.al.,(1977), Bureaucrats in Korea. Seoul: Tarakwon. p. 44. In Korean.
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scheme to the president," and "how this proposal was deliberated" have had
an effect on the policy-making processes.
In looking at the policy-making process, power is a key concept. This is
clearly fundamental to much of my discussion of a rational technical mode of
domination, since power is an aspect of domination. Many factors are
involved in the policy-making process: the president, congress, the courts,
the mass media, interest groups, bureaucrats, researchers, and political
parties, and other socio-economic environments. Therefore, we have to
explain what caused the actors and facts in each country to take the
positions they did and which thus caused policy outputs to differ. To begin,
we will choose seven groups^ and conceptualize the causal relations
between policy and actors in Korea as shown in Table 1-1. This
conceptualization of policy-making in Korea is an important step as we
begin to develop such analysis. As we can see in the Table 1-1, policy¬
making is a complex process. It involves several different groups of actors
and facts at its different stages. In the remaining section, therefore, we will
review the policy-making ladder and policy-making system in Korea. The
policy-making ladder constitutes the most important institutions and actions
especially relevant to policy-making process for national development, and
the central planning system of the Korean government consists of "the five-
year economic development planning system" and "the annual planning and
programming system."
1.4.1. The Policy-Making Ladder in Korea.
As we can see in the Table 1-1, the policy-making ladder is composed of
three levels. In this section, however, we will examine the Level I and II
actors, since we are not sure how the Level III factors shape the preferences
of the proximate policy-makers and the influential factors. One can talk of
25 These seven groups are: (1). the president and his staffs, the MOHSA and its research institution,
the SSC, the EPB and its research institution, the KDI, and the National Assembly as a proximate
policy-makers; the public, the FKTU, the FKI, and the press as an influential actors in the national
pension policy-making process in Korea.
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socialization, cognitive, learning, or consciousness building, but the degree
of influence each factor has and how the factors work are far from clear.26 |n
order to make Level III factors more applicable to the social security policy¬
making, therefore, we will examine the Level III factors in Chapter Two.
Table 1-1: The Policy-Making Ladder in Korea.
Policy
made bv
Level I: The Executive(president and his staffs, and bureaucrats), Political
Parties and National Assembly.
influenced bv
Level II: General Public,Media, Federation of Korean Trade Unions,
Federation of Korean Industries, and International Actors,
shaped bv
Level III: Environments(political, socio-economic, and international),
culture, history and tradition.
Source: Ideas derived from the models of Douglas R. Boulter(1980), "Setting
Speed Limits...and Comparing Public Policymaking," Comparative
Politics. Vol. 13. p. 80.
A. The Level I Actors.
The Level I actors are the most important actors in the policy-making
process, even though the Level II actors are involved in the policy-making
process. This is because the power structure of Korea institutionally
consisted of two poles; the Blue House(the Presidential Residence of the
Republic of Korea) and the Korean Central Intelligence Agency(hearafter the
KCIA) on the one side, and the ruling party, and the National Assembly on
the other.27
26 Boulter, Ibid., p. 80.
27 Jeong-Woo Kil(1986), "The Development of Authoritarian Capitalism: A Case Study of South Korea,"
Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, Yale University, p. 179.
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(1). The Executive Branch.
Among the Level I actors, the most important feature that characterises the
policy-making process during the regimes of Chung-Hee Park( 1961-1979)
and Doo-Hwan Chun(1980-1988) is the executive dominated and extremely
centralised pattern-a pattern indicating that important decisions are not only
made in Seoul but involve relatively few people at the top with strong
centralised executive control. There is no doubt that the top policy-maker in
the Korean government is the president. Naturally, this kind of political
system makes the responsibility of the ruler extremely important. The
centralisation of power toward the apex is a phenomenon that has occurred
in a firmly established tradition since the creation of the First Republic.
In relation to the centralisation of power, the role of the Office of President
cannot be underestimated. The presidential mansion or the Blue House,
called the 'small cabinet,' employed many brains and also allocated these
trained power holders to the cabinet or the National Assembly. The Office of
the President consists of the central and personal staffs which act on the
president's behalf. Those who directly assist the president in policy-making
are the Special Assistants and Political Secretariats. The major functions
that Special Assistants performed were to oversee the implementation of
presidential decisions by executive agencies, and advise the president on
important policy matters. This unit was very influential in presidential policy¬
making. According to the study by Dong-Suh Bark, one-third of the
presidential instructions to executive agencies were originated from the
Special Assistants.The relationship between the president and these
Special Assistants is more personal and informal than with cabinet
ministers. The Political Secretariats are divided into four divisions: the First
Political Secretariat deals with politics, political party matters, national
defense, foreign affairs, and justice; the Second Political Secretariat deals
with home affairs, education, and health and social affairs; the First
Economic Secretariat has responsibility for finance, economic planning and
other matters related to economic management; and the Second Economic
28 Dong-Suh Bark(1967), "Policy-Making in the Korean Executive Branch," In Byung-Chul Koh(Ed.),
Aspects of Administrative Development in South Korea. Kalamazoo, Michigan: The Korean Research
and Publication, p. 34.
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Secretariat handles matters relating to science and technology, defense
industry, and heavy and chemical industries. The formal duties assigned to
the Political Secretariats are to: (1). carry out general analysis of the present
state of affairs and assist the president in formulating policies; (2). handle
matters of planning and coordination under direct control of the president;
(3). perform comprehensive analyses of conditions pertaining to each
administrative branch; and (4). evaluate the performance of each ministry.
The political secretariats performing these duties serve to link the president
directly to each ministry, and their influence in controlling each
administrative agency is very significant.29 This has been due to the heavy
concentration of political and administrative power on the president, and the
dominating practice of authoritarian policy-making in the governmental
process, together with the organisational characteristics of the presidential
office. The presidential office has effectively served the enhancement of the
value promise of national development planning by means of their
substantial influences on important presidential policies. In a word, the
presidency, among other centres in Korean society, has a unique capacity to
contribute positively to making and implementing a creative social policy.
The centralisation of power at the apex largely determines the operational
mode of the state bureaucracy. That is, the administration is primarily
concerned with how effectively it carries out the decisions made at the top;
so, it is best characterised as a performance-oriented administration.
Through the planning and programming system and frequent on-the-spot-
checking trips, the president has been directly involved in checking, guiding
and facilitating the implementation of the plans by the concerned agencies.
This practice has created direct information channels between president and
executive agencies so that such direct information channels have a
significant impact on the formal policy-making process. For this reason,
some departments, such as the EPB, Defense, and Home Affairs, receive
more attention from the president than others because they support him in
the exercise of responsibilities that tend to be especially urgent; others,
29 Bong-Sik Kim(1978), "Decision Rules and Economic Policy in Korea: Sociopolitical Analysis," In Se-
Jin Kim and Chi-Won KanqfEds.K Korea: A Nation in Transition. Seoul: Research Center for Peace and
Unification, p. 154. And L.L. Wade and B.S. Kim(1978), Economic Development of South Korea:
Political Economy of Success. Seoul: Kyung Hee University Press, pp. 220-221.
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including the MOHSA are likely to command the president's attention only
when trouble or an issue that requires his intervention to settle it, arises.
There are well developed information channels between the president and
the EPB. This practice serves to intensify the economic growth-optimizing
process of the national development planning system. Once an information
channel is opened between the president and an executive agency with
regard to a specific policy, it commits the president to the policy, and other
policy deliberation organisations tend to be subject to the president's
commitment. For this reason, when a policy issue is likely to encounter
opposition in policy deliberation organisation, the originating agency usually
develops a strategy to inform and to win the support of the president before
submitting the policy issue for consideration by the organisations. Due to
these inter-agency politics, secrecy prevails in the Korean governmental
policy-making process.
(2). The Political Parties.
Political parties can be a competing alternative to an expanding
bureaucratic rule especially in the absence of well-institutionalised voluntary
associations and interest groups which could have access to the policy¬
making process of the regime. Under the Fourth and Fifth constitutions in
Korea, however, competitive party politics of the sort conventional in Anglo-
American and other liberal systems are implemented only with modification,
and the functional contributions of parties to policy process must be
understood differently, at least to some degree. Political parties seem to
perform only limited functions within the over-all political process in Korean
society. They remain dormant during off-election years, and only become
somewhat active during the period of election campaigns. They operate
merely as a procedural device in the formalization of candidates for the
National Assembly. Given the limited functional significance attached to
political parties within the over-all political process in Korea, party salience
is very low.30 There are several factors that account for the low level of
party salience in the Korean political process.
30 Bae-Ho Hahn and Ha-Pyong Kim(1976), "Party Bureaucrats and Party Development," In Dae-Sook
Suh and Chae-Jin Lee(Eds.), Political Leadership in Korea. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
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First, Park distrusted civil politicians and abhorred party politics. He did not
only think of the heroic leader as an ideal, but also considered behind-the-
scenes negotiations and compromise in the process of politics as
corruption.31 He was prone to believe that desirable national goals were
achieved by disregard or suppression over the political oppositions. It could
be said that Park's view of politics is to be labelled as Korean-type
democracy. He preferred efficient democracy which would not hinder
national security and economic development rather than inefficient Western
democracy which was unfitting to the cultural tradition and the situation of
Korea. He gave a preponderance to efficiency and order, consequently he
preferred administrative efficiency rather than party politics and
parliamentarism.32 Therefore, the president and his staff in the Blue House
became the locus of highly centralised political power backed by competent
bureaucratic institutions, namely, the KCIA in political matters and the
economic ministers in promoting the economic growth.
Secondly, even though it is appears that the diminishing role of political
parties was caused by the ascent of president's personalised power, the
political parties also suffered from the structural constraints. One of the major
constraints against developing well-institutionalised political parties in
Korean politics was the tendency to form political parties on the basis of
personal affiliation rather than political principles or ideologies. Such
personalised political parties are very likely to suffer from interparty conflicts
and political parties neither sought nor were given the opportunity of
representing particular socio-economic groups. Furthermore, under the
tense situation of the political division of the country, even the concept of
particular class interests were unacceptable. All the major political parties,
thus, were explicitly conservative; they failed to establish political channels
for representing the upward social and political demands of the broad range
of social sectors.
Thirdly, under the Fourth and Fifth constitutions, they could no longer play
a role in electing the country's chief executive. The presidential election
system seriously undermined the status of the political parties vis-a-vis their
p. 69.
31 Won-Tae Kim(1987), "A Study of the Policy Orientation and the Governing Ideology of President
Park Chung Hee," Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Kyung Hee University, p. 23.
32 Ibid., p. 35.
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leaders, since president Park and Chun no longer needed to rely on the
political parties in order to be elected. Furthermore, under the Fourth
constitution, one-third of the total number of National Assembly were to be
handpicked by president Park. The ruling Democratic Republican
Party(hearafter the DRP) and the major opposition party were expected to
split the remaining two-thirds of the total seats. Under the two-member
district system, the voter was allowed to vote for only one candidate; the top
two vote-getters in the district were elected.
Fourthly, Chun disbanded all political parties of the Fourth Republic,
purged their leaders, and ordered a multi-party system for the Fifth Republic.
Twelve political parties emerged, but Chun's party became dominant and
swept into power both in the presidential and legislative elections by the
1985 'election revolution.' As the president of the Fifth Republic, Chun
himself obviously wished to see the Democratic Justice Party(hearafter the
DJP) develop into a major instrument of his political rule by remaining as
president of the party from its creation. The Democratic Justice Party was
also instrumental in electing 151 of the 276 National Assembly members in
the general election held on 25th of March, 1981. Of the 151 DJP members,
61 were delegates chosen in accordance with the system of proportional
representation. Four years after the founding of the party and until the 1985
national election, the DJP expanded the membership to one million, all of
whom went through the programme of party training. Despite the emphasis
placed by the founders of the DJP upon the development of a modern
political party, and their aspirations to play a substantial role in the
governmental policy-making process, the ruling party has actually been
accorded a minor role in formulating the major policies of government,
acting simply as an administrative hierarchy or a handmaiden to a few
leading individuals within the executive and the ruling party. On the other
hand, after the absolute repression of the opposition forces by military-
security forces during the martial law in 1979 and 1980, the opposition
movement evolved in Korea through three distinct phases. During the first
phase, which lasted until 1982, the opposition forces still under government
repression, reconsidered its strategies and tactics. In the second phase, until
1984, the social forces were in the process of rebuilding grass-rooted
democratic organisations in urban labour and rural sectors. A third phase,
since 1984, constituted a period of active opposition by the formation of
public organisations and through mass demonstrations. The New Korea
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Democratic Party(NKDP) was formed in January 1985 basically from the
political opposition organisation, that is, the Council for the Promotion of
Democracy, led by Young-Sam Kim and Dae-Jung Kim since 1984. The
new party won a third of the seats in the new National Assembly in February,
1985.
In a sense, contributing to the relative insignificance of the party system in
Korea, political process is the relationship between the ruling party and the
administration. The parties are less instruments of interest aggregation than
of policy dissemination and propagation, as well as deliberation and
legitimation. In order to elicit cooperation between the government and
ruling party with respect to these latter functions, various formal mechanisms
are maintained between them. All conflicts of political opinions are adjusted
formally through these means. One of the formal mechanisms is the joint
meeting which is attended by the relevant ministers and members of the
policy deliberation committee of the ruling party. These policy consultations
between the government and the ruling party function with the concerned
government Minister without Portfolio and the policy-making Research Office
of the ruling party as the participants. It is conventional for the government to
introduce policy issues which reach levels higher than the Vice-Ministers'
Conference to relevant party organisations for deliberation and information
purposes. In this fashion, the party functions as an additional conduit
through which public policies are disseminated to a wider elite, and through
media coverage, to the general public. In this sense, the party is an
important instrument of communication between the government and the
public.33
(3). The National Assembly.
The characteristics of the executive are but a first step toward
understanding the agency's role in policy-making in Korea. However, the
executive leaders alone can not make policy by themselves. The most
authoritative expression of policy is law, and constitutionally it is the National
Assembly's function to enact the law. To create the programme that the
33 Bong-Sik Kim(1978), Ibid^, pp. 157-158.
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executive planners of social security envisioned, they needed the
cooperation of the National Assembly above all.34
In the developed countries, legislatures have repeatedly delegated their
authority to make public policy to the executive and administrative arms of
government, as the issues to be decided have become more numerous,
pressing, and technically complex. In contrast, legislatures in developing
countries have either never exercised a policy-making authority, or have had
that authority taken away by an executive seeking to monopolize political
power.35 Thus, suppression of the legislature by the executive in many less
developed countries can often be explained in terms of the basic socio¬
economic structure of these societies. The legislature is also perceived by
executive policy-makers as a body which lacks the expertise necessary to
properly consider complex issues, and as a threat.
The Korean legislature was, also, no exception. Under the Yushin
constitution of 1972, especially, the National Assembly became an even
weaker body than it once had been. During the Park and Chun regimes, the
concurrent power of the president and government bureaucracy
emasculated the other two branches of Korean government, the legislature
and the judiciary.
The formal powers of the legislative branch included the rights of
legislation interpellation, concurrence to the conclusion of treaties and the
declaration of war, and approval of government budgets. The offices in the
legislative were organised to include a speaker, two vice-speakers( one of
which was given by convention to the opposition party member), and the
chairman of thirteen standing committees and special committees. The
committee chairmanships have traditionally been occupied by the leading
members of the ruling parties. The routine legislative work is performed by a
relatively large staff in the secretariat. This legislative bureaucracy was
headed by the Secretary-general, an office of cabinet level rank with a staff
of more than 1,000 people. At the head of this staff were the senior
counsellors, membering between 30 and 40. The senior counsellors were
the core of the professional staff, each being an expert in a legislative
34 Martha Derthick(1979). Policymaking for Social Security. The Brookings Institution, p. 36.
35 Chong-Lim Kim et.al.,(1984), The Legislative Connection: The Politics of Representation in Kenya,
Korea and Turkey. Durham, N.Carolina: Duke University Press, p. 6.
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subfield. They helped legislators to draft bills and provided expert counsel
on various legislative matters.
Within the National Assembly, responsibility for social security has been
located almost exclusively in the Committee of Health and Social Affairs.
However, like other committees, the Committee has had a very limited role.
This is because most bills originated in the executive branch, and their
passage was almost always assured in advance due to the government's
control of two-thirds of the legislative seats.36 in Korea, party discipline was
strong. In particular, the leadership of the ruling parties exercised tight
control over its members so that it was very rare that a ruling party member
spoke or voted against his party position. That jurisdiction has been so
confined as to have had several important consequences for policy-making.
It limited the opportunities for the National Assembly as a whole to get
involved, since they only had the chance to act as an authorising legislation
and were not given the second chance that normally comes when
appropriations bills reach the floor. Debates were limited to several hours
and amendments were prohibited except for those approved by the
Committee. A motion to recommit the bill was permitted, but such motions
always came from the minority party and almost always were defeated by a
party-line vote. As a result, the National Assembly could no nothing but
support the programmes and policies formulated by the executive branch. In
this respect, the National Assembly could not be considered as exercising a
full power in lawmaking.
Nevertheless, the National Assembly was regarded as an important
representative institution by the public. Indeed, among elite groups,
legislators are probably the most sensitive to the needs and demands of the
public simply because they are subject to periodic approval by the voters.
This was very significant in a political setting like Korea's, where other
channels of citizen participation were not widely available. During this
period, the National Assembly also served as an important public forum.
Since government exercised tight control over the news media, the
legislature served as the only alternative arena for public debates on
important issues of the day. To be sure, there were many constraints, both
33 See, Chong-Lim Kim and Seong-Tong Pai(1981), Legislative Process in Korea Seoul: Seoul National
University, pp. 171-185.
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legal and de facto, on the range of issues that could legitimately be
discussed in the National Assembly. The Assembly was prohibited by law,
for instance, from raising any issue so fundamental that it touched on the
matter of the regime itself. Insofar as the issues did not challenge the
legitimacy of the governmental structure established in accordance with the
military coups, the National Assembly would consider any issue for
debate.
In sum, although most MPs in Korea are not men of power at the national
level, their values are important insofar as they are regarded as leaders
within their local communities and spokesmen for these committees in the
legislature and other central agencies of the state. Because they are
intermediaries charged with forging links between the mass public on the
periphery of the political system and the top policy makers who control the
institution of the state, the beliefs of the MPs are of interest, especially their
definition of socio-economic and political development. Therefore,
regardless of whether policy-makers accept the views and demands
expressed by legislators, they must at least listen to what MPs say if they are
to develop strategies through which their policies will be effectively
implemented at the grass roots, and if they are to continue to command
public support. Thus, while most MPs did not participate significantly in the
policy-making process, they contributed substantially to the creation of the
context within which that process occurred.
Turning to the locus of policy-making, we can conclude that policies were
most frequently made in the legislature not by legislators but by the
executive. In Korea, key policies were mostly made in the cabinet or
government. The executive has historically played an important role in
policy-making. The dominant role of the executive in the policy-making was
almost total and was built upon three factors: (1). a constitution that favoured
executive power; (2). the president's control of major parties in the
Assembly; and (3). the personal stature of the president himself.38
The leaders of the majority party worked closely with the government and
often worked as the government spokesman to the legislature.
37Chong-l_im Kim et.al., (1984), Ibid., p. 62.
33 Ibid,.
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Constitutionally, both individual MPs and the executive were empowered to
submit legislative bills. In practice, however, bills submitted by individual
MPs were not only few in number but also had a significantly poorer rate of
passage on the floor than government bills.39 Moreover, the National
Assembly seldom amended the government bills in any significant fashion.
Legislative committees were not the centre of decision-making, and floor
debates often concerned decisions already made elsewhere. However, the
National Assembly was considered to be established and certainly an
institution worth maintaining because it did attach a seal of legitimacy to the
policies enacted by the executive. This legitimacy of the National Assembly
was critically important to the executive, and was probably one of the main
reasons why the Park regime and its successor under president Chun did
not dissolve the legislative body.4®
In conclusion, in Korea, a large number of legislators failed to identify a
simply and pre-eminent centre of policy-making, which suggests that the
process of key policy-making involves a multitude of actors located in a
variety of government agencies.
B. The Level II Actors.
The Level II actors are supplemental policy-makers and are somewhat
controllable by the Level I actors. These non-governmental actors have no
legal authority in policy-making but are important in terms of frequently
providing ideas, pressures, and information to the primary actors.
3®For a detailed analysis of the origins of bills and other legislative actives of the executive, see,
Chong-Lim Kim and Byung-Kyu Woo(1976), "Legislative Leadership and Democratic Development," In
Dae-Sook Suh and Chae-Jin Lee(Eds.), Ibid., pp. 41-66.
40 Chong-Lim Kim et.al.,(1984), Ibid., p. 38.
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(1). The General Public.
Within the Korean political culture, there has been little experience among
the masses in organising and institutionalising group interests for the
purpose of representing those interests strongly to the government.41 The
major barrier to establishment and healthy functioning of such associations
is that "the government is often suspicious of such group."42 Therefore,
even if people could participate in politics, it is not voluntary participation.4^
People's political participation was largely a result of the directives from
above. By the same token, political participation in Korea might be termed
'mobilised participation' or 'political mobilisation.'44 Assuming
conversations and compromises as the prerequisites of politics, it was
undeniable that coercion and violence replaced those prerequisites at the
cost of people's participation and the regime's morality.
On the other hand, the attitude of administrators toward the masses is also
governed by the hierarchical norm. Administrators accept the Confucian
dictum that "people should follow established leadership without question,
and should not be concerned about the knowledge necessary for the
exercise of leadership( ).4$ Therefore,
administrators are supposed to rule and, at best, to teach and guide the
masses. There is no real concept of the government as the "servant of the
people," although "lip service is paid to such an idea." In traditional terms it is
"government high, people low."
Consequently, the people are in the position of begging for special favour
rather than requesting the government's abidance with legal provisions.
41 Ki-Shik Hahn(1975), "Underlying Factors in Political Party Organisation and Election," In Edward
Reynold Wright(Ed.), Korean Politics in Transition. Seattle: University of Washington Press, p. 87.
42 Edward Reynolds Wriqht(Ed.)(1975). Ibid., p. 7.
4^ Won-Tae Kim(1987), Ibid., pp. 58-59.
44 Young-Whan Kihl(1984), Politics and Policies in Divided Korea: Regimes in Contest. Colorado:
Westview Press, p. 17.
45 Edward Reynold Wrig ht(Ed.) (1975), Mi, P- 7.
28
(2). The Media.
The media affect the governmental policy-making not only by transmitting
public opinion to them, but also by choosing a certain issue as being salient.
In other words, the media are considered by policy-makers as a source of
policy ideas and information as well as a source of political pressures. Cobb
and Elder contend that the media have an impact on governmental agenda
through an issue expansion process. They argue that the media have "a key
important role in elevating issues to the systematic agenda and increasing
their chances of receiving formal agenda consideration.4§ Policy-makers do
not disregard the media's agenda, because one of the media's most
important roles is to make an issue salient. Policy-makers always pay
attention to the issues salient to the public.
The media in Korea, except for government-controlled organs, has a long
history of irreverence for authority. However, during the twenty-six-year
military rule, the media has suffered from continuous surveillance and often
suppression. Political authorities have generally viewed any unsolicited
criticism from outside as being detrimental to national security and interest.
The control of the press, like that of students, was strengthened in the
1970s.47 All sorts of media, including newspaper, journals, books,
broadcast and TV tapes, came under strict government censorship, and
letters of complaint to the editor were investigated by the police, on
government suggestion. These political tools used to control the Korean
people in general, such as the emergence decrees No. I and later No. 9,
have been used to suppress freedom of the press.
The Ministry of Culture and Information, on the one hand, has established
Special Screening Committees and held periodic conferences with media
officials to instruct what not to report, and otherwise how to report and
conform to the government's views on controversial issues.4^ The
government, on the other hand, has entrusted the Ethics Committee of
46 Roger W. Cobb and Charles P. Elder(1983), Participation in American Politics: Dynamics of Agenda-
Building, 2nd Edition, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 91-92.
47 For example, see, Sung-Jae Kang(1986), "The Park Regime and the Press Repression," Shindonq-A.
April, pp. 400-419. In Korean.
48 Norman Jacobs(1985), The Korean Road to Modernization and Development. Chicago: University of
Illinois Press, p. 54.
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Media Associations to inculcate sufficient responsibility in individuals so that
they will desist from expressing 'provocative' ideas. Under the hoary
principle of collective guilt, the committees' officers themselves are held
responsible and can be purged for their members' activities. Similarly, those
who, even innocently, transmit or receive condemned material, such as book
wholesalers and retailers who do not return objectionable items to
publishers, can be punished.But, just to be sure, the KCIA is authorized to
investigate and remove what the ministry considers political communist
subversives from the media.
In this process, there was a strong reaction from the press groups since
late 1973. Newsmen joined college students and civic and religious leaders
in their protest movements against the government, demanding what they
called the freedom of the press.50 The protest movement of journalists
spread rapidly after the government worked out a plan to have newspaper
publishers sign a pledge not to report student demonstrations and matters
concerning the national security. The government, meanwhile, took
measures to regulate press activities. On 28th of December, 1973, the
Ministry of Culture and Information announced a three-point guide-line
requiring the press to practice self-rule and to refrain from reporting stories
that defy or negate the government's present ruling setup, endanger the
national security and diplomacy, or create social unrest and threaten the
foundation for social stability.51 Another fascinating example of media
harassment was the state control of the advertisement in the Dong-A
llbo(Daily News) in late 1974 as a means to repress the press. When the
Dong-A llbo reported on a university demonstration on 23rd of October,
1974, its personnel were subjected to KCIA's violence, its papers stolen at
distribution centres, its staff watched by the police, and certain of its
managers, editors, and reporters pressed to resign. Moreover, the
government tried to bankrupt the paper by applying pressure on its
advertisers to terminate their advertisements.
49 Ibid., pp. 54-55.
50 Hapdong News Agency. Korea Annual 1974. p. 233.
51 Ibid., p. 234.
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After this incident, while opposition legislators seized the rostrum of the
National Assembly on 19th of March, 1975, the ruling party members met in
the lobby and adopted the Bill Forbidding Any Adverse Comment to
Foreigners. It forbade anyone to 'insult or slander' Korea or spread 'distorted
or false facts' or harm the 'safety, interests or dignity' of Korea either abroad
or by speaking to a foreigner in Korea. These measures were applicable to
the remarks made by opposition Assembly members to foreign journalists or
to dispatches filed by Korean newsmen working for foreign publications.
Detentions and threats were effective in making journalists fearful. Editors,
for example, refrained from publishing details of the government criticisms
expressed by opposition figures. Publishers were fearful that advertisements
would drop under government pressures if the papers printed anything the
regime might object to. Reporters needed licenses to gather news, and the
fear of being out of work through losing their licences constituted pressure to
keep reporters in line.
A more structural and institutional repression of the media came with the
emergence of the Chun regime in 1980. Chun found it necessary to
organize the mechanism of the press in such a way that the state would
control national opinion tightly.52 The military, which controlled and
dominated the state apparatus, had expelled from the press those who were
deemed anti-government elements or detrimental to the establishment of a
new military regime.53 However, Chun went further by conducting a drastic
change of the Korean press in the name of 'self-renovation' of news media.
Members of the Korean Newspaper Association and the Korean Broadcasts
Association held a joint meeting to adopt the so-called "Resolution for Self-
Regulation of News Media," which confirmed ex post facto a government
design of restructing the mechanism of the press on 4th of November,
1980.^4 The main purpose of the resolution was allegedly to "voluntarily
effect a self-renovation by eliminating irrational elements of the past and
preparing ourselves as modern public organisation."55 According to this
resolution, a large number of the mass media merged with the state-run
52 Young-Whan Kihl(1984), Ibjd., pp. 74-90.
52 A total 711 reports were expelled as of 9th of August, 1980.
54 Hapdong News Agency, Korea Annual 1981. pp. 416-417.
55 Ibid,, p. 417.
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Korean Broadcasting System, and the nation's two major agencies were
combined into one in order to monopolize the supply of both domestic and
foreign news to all local newspapers and broadcasting companies across
the country, and all press organisations were banned from assigning
resident correspondents to provincial cities. Many newspapers were ordered
to suspend publication, resulting in "one newspaper per each province,"
except for Seoul, the national capital. Furthermore, the press was thoroughly
controlled through the implementation of a new "Basic Law Concerning the
Press," which was enacted by the Legislative Council under martial law. The
government also installed an agency, the Public News Media Coordinating
Office(PNMCO) within the Ministry of Culture and Information. The PNMCO
was a potential instrument of news censorship. It prepared the so-called
'press guideline' everyday, on the basis of which newspapers and other
branches of the media reported domestic and foreign news. In sort, the Chun
regime exercised more repressive authoritarian control over the press than
ever before.
(3). The Federation of Korean Trade Unions(FKTU).
As we will observe in the following chapters, labour organisations could
not function effectively as independent interest groups under the Park and
Chun regimes; rather they existed as a political arm of the ruling parties and
the governments. These organisations were completely dominated by a
leadership sponsored by the government, and they provided unconditional
support for the regime. Therefore, the primary function of the leadership of
the FKTU had been to mobilise support for the regime rather than to
represent the interests of the workers.
The remarkable decline in the political power of labour unions was a
reflection of the intensive and extensive intervention of the Korean state in
industrial relations. Already emasculated by the American Military
Government and its local collaborators who carried out campaigns to expel
the leftists from the labour scene in the late 1940s, Korean workers were
passive participants in the political process. Moreover, the very low level of
economic development and the high rates of unemployment during the
1950s had them more concerned with economic subsistence. The Park
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military government reorganised and provided it with "a de facto monopoly
of representation protected by the Labour Union Law," in return for the
service for the new political and economic system.56 The desire of the state
elites, political elites as well as economic technocrats, was that the working
labour would be an "active but docile partner" in the state's fundamental
project, the rapid growth of the Korean economy. This interest of the state
elites became a fact through the state's measure for consolidation of a union
hierarchy within which various levels of labour unions were unified under a
certain internal mechanism of discipline. Therefore, the Korean state was
able to substantially restrict labour's right to bargain collectively and to
engage in collective activities while leaving labour's right to organise
untouched. This was accomplished through a barrage of labour law
changes.
The prime device for controlling labour movements was the Federation of
Korean Trade Unions(Hanguk Nochong.FKTU), which was at the top of the
labour hierarchy, composing 17 industrial labour unions.57 it was
established after the coup of 1961 as an outgrowth of the Federation of
Korean Trade Unions(Taehan Nochong) which had been founded as an
anti-communist labour organisation in competition with leftist Chosun
Labour Union(Chonpyong) right after liberation. Under the FKTU, each
industrial union then hierarchically comprised regional unions that
comprised company-based unions. This system of union hierarchy was
installed to be advantageous to the Korean state, employers, and few co-
opted labour union leaders. Both the state and the employers in this labour
control system could share the burden of controlling labour by co-opting the
labour unions at two different levels, national and company. Insofar as the
Korean state could control the national-level industrial unions, therefore,
labour disputes or strikes occurring in company unions could be easily
contained at the respective company level. However, under this system,
Korean workers were contained within a triple-layered system checked first
by the respective company, second by the national level union and
56 Moon-Kyu Park(1988), "Interest Representation in South Korea: The Limits of Corporatist Control,"
Asian Survey, Vol. 28. No. 8. p. 911.
57 The union members of FKTU were: Railroad, Textile, Mining, Electric, Foreign Organs,
Communication, Transport, Maritime, Bank, Monopoly, Chemical, Metal, Dockers, Printing, Automobile,
united, and Sightseeing. See, The Hapdong News Agency, Korea Annual 1980. p. 463.
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ultimately by the Korean state. In general, the FKTU became an organisation
which functioned in close relation with government labour offices. Because
of the conservative ideology of both ruling and opposition political parties,
on the one hand, and the government's tight control over any form of
spontaneous organised labour movements, on the other hand,
institutionalised political channels could not develop through which political
demands of the working class could be transmitted.
Furthermore, under the 1971 Special Law Concerning the National
Security and following revisions of the labour laws in 1973-74, the workers'
rights of collective bargaining and strikes in all companies were virtually
banned. The labour laws were once again revised in December 1980 under
the Chun regime, which imposed even more stringent restrictions on the
freedom of unions to organise. The Chun government was determined to put
into effect as of 1st of January, a new labour law, called the Labour-
Employer Council Law. Under this legislation, the conduct of labour-
employer relations became the responsibility of the Labour-Employer
Council, instead of using the labour union mechanism of the old system.
Therefore, the FKTU and industrial labour unions now became ineffective.
The underlying purpose of this legislation was to exclude outsiders or third
parties from labour disputes and bargaining, so that only the government
would partake in settling labour disputes between workers and their
employers.|n addition, the adoption of this law changed the character of
the labour union system in Korea from an individual labour union system to
a business enterprise labour union system. The Chun government intended
for these measures to weaken the power of labour unions and the labour
movement, cutting off the unions from solidarity with outside supporting
forces. The law also centralised the union chain of command to ensure
effective control over union policy-making through the union leaders. After
all, industrial workers were thoroughly excluded from the political process as
well as from the socio-economic policy-making.
The labour movement was restored in December 1983 when it revitalized
its trade union call for the discontinuation of the blacklisting workers who
had been active in disputes in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. Against
58 Young-Whan Kihl(1984). Ibid., p. 89.
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the state-sponsored formal trade union, FKTU, autonomous labour disputes
had rapidly increased in 1984. As a major development, the Korean
Workers' Welfare Council(KWWC) was established on 10th of March, 1984
by labour activists who had played leading roles in organising the
autonomous unions, but who had lost their bases of activity through the
repression of the government. The establishment of the KWWC was
important because it tried to overcome the limitations of the labour unionism
of the 1970s, which was dispersed among many isolated workshop units,
and established a basis for unity and solidarity within the movement. Further,
it provided the momentum for raising the level of Korean labour movement
from an economic struggle to a political one because the KWWC has
pursued a policy of uniting other democratic forces to call for the reform of
the labour-related laws promulgated since late 1984. It prepared a petition
urging revision of the labour-laws and submitted it to the National Assembly
and held rallies in many lactations. Throughout the labour movement in
1984 and 1986, the workers created independent frameworks within which
they were able to turn their economic struggle into a political struggle.
Consequently, the interests of the working class, whether organised or not,
were underrepresented in the political realm due to repressive policies and
the lack of institutionalised political channels. No progressive political
parties were established which could articulate the interests of the working
class or poor peasants.
(3). The Federation of Korean Industries(FKI).
In Korea there are four nation-wide economic and business organisations:
the Federation of Korean lndustries(FKI, a group of big corporations:
Jaebols), the Korean Chamber of Commerce and lndustry(KCCI, the oldest
and the largest group composed of a wide spectrum of businesses), the
Korea Traders Association(KTA, an organisation of exporters, large and
small), and the Central Federation of Medium and Small Industries
Cooperatives(CFMSIC, a group of small firms). These economic
organisations, especially the FKI, have had more influence on governmental
policy-making than any other interest groups such as the consumer groups
and labour unions in Korea.
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The FKI formally represented the collective interests of the jaebols( loosely,
big business) and it was the most powerful business association any others
in Korea. Equipped with 10 research and consulting organisations, the FKI
could embed the jaebols collective interests into the national development
policies. According to the FKI's self-evaluation on the effectiveness of its
policy suggestions, about 70 percent of them was reflected on the Korean
state's national development policies during the 1970s.In addition to the
indirect way of influencing the state policies through policy suggestion to the
Korean government, the FKI had a more direct way of channelling their
collective opinions to the state. For example, the chairman of the FKI was
considered to be the premier of Jaegye(jaebol community) and met the
Prime Minister on a equal basis.60 a chairman of the FKI could meet easily
with the president and could meet all economic ministers in their offices or in
the meeting over which they presided. No doubt, the FKI's continuous
economic power concentration was possible under the auspices of the
strong Korean state.
From the above, then, could the jaebols as a whole concentrate and
expand their economy without wielding a substantial degree of political
power vis-a-vis the Korean state? Although the FKI was modelled after the
Japanese Federation of Economic Organisation(FEO) which is powerful
enough to determine the political climate of Japan, the FKI was far less
powerful than the political power. Using many interviews with governmental
officials and entrepreneurs in Korea, Jones and Sakong elaborated on the
relationship between government and business during the period of high
economic development. In chapter three of their book, they asked an
interesting question: "Is there a Korea,Inc. parallel to Japan,Inc.?" By
'Japan,Inc.,' they meant that in Japan the economic growth policies have
been jointly decided and jointly executed by politicians and appointed
officials together with representatives of private business.61 Their answer to
the question seems sensible and instructive that:
59 Byoung-Hyu Bae(1980), "The Reality on the FKI," Wolqan ChosunfMonthlv Chosun), September,
pp. 287-297.
60 Ibid., p. 288.
61 Leroy P. Jones and II Sakong(1980), Government. Business, and Entrepreneurship in Economic
Development: The Korean Case. Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, p.66.
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"There is a similarity between Japan and Korea, in the large part
due to the common cultural heritage. There is, however, a
decisive difference between the two countries. In Korea, the
dominant partner is unequivocally the government, whereas, in
Japan, the reverse may be closer to the truth...This reversal of
dominance follows from differences in political structure. In
Japan, the business community can dismiss most politicians by
withholding support in an election. In Korea, the business
community could dismiss Park only by shutting down operations
and ruining themselves in the process. Conversely, the Korean
government can ensure the failure of any businessman, should it
care to do so....In Korea, state autonomy enhanced the state
capacity to intervene in Korean society by highlighting the critical
role played by the state's bank control."62
They summarize that:
"in Korea the government is dependent upon the success of
business, but not upon its political support. It therefore must listen
to the business community and frame policies that are in the long-
run best interests of entrepreneurs in general. At the same time,
however, it is in a position to take actions that are inimical to
certain short-run interests."63
In other words, while the maintenance and the legitimacy of regime hinged
on economic development that is, on the success of business), the
government should listen to the business community and frame economic
policies that were in the best interests of business groups.
Due to the jaebols as a whole growing in terms of economic power, they
could effectively transform their economic power to a 'political' leverage vis¬
a-vis the Korean state. Rather than being mere passive recipients of the
Korean state's favour, the jaebols could actively put pressure on the Korean
state to act in accordance with their collective interest by ultilizing their
collective economic power as a powerful leverage. During the 1970s and
62 ibid, pp. 67-69.
63 Ibid., pp. 68-69.
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1980s, the unstable power relationship between the Korean state and the
jaebols became more explicit. This is due to the collective interests of the
jaebols being articulated and that is the appropriate place to look in order to
examine the power relationship between the Korean state and the collective
jaebols.
Now we turn next to an examination of the national development policy¬
making system and the national development policy-making process.
1.4.2. The National Development Policy-Making System in
Korea.
The central planning system of the Korean government consists of the five-
year economic development planning system and the (annual) planning and
programming system. The former is concerned with integrating national
multi-year development policies into a five-year economic development
plan. The latter is concerned with coordinating all the policies of the
executive agencies into an annual system of programmes which the
government will carry out in the succeeding year. Both policy-making
systems were established under the military government shortly after the
1961 military coup. However, they were introduced into the governmental
bureaucracy on different bases.64 The five-year economic development
planning system was based on the value of rapid economic growth.
However, the motive to introduce the planning and programming system
was to demonstrate the expertise of the military bureaucracy, on the one
hand, and to efficiently control and manage governmental performance, on
the other hand. Such differences between the two planning systems have
been reflected in the characteristics of the national development planning
system of the Korean government.
64 For a comparison of the two systems, see Suk-Choon Cho(1968), "A Comparative Analysis of Two
Reforms Under the Military Regime in Korea," Korean Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 6. No. 2.
pp. 95-120.
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A. The Five-Year Economic Development Planning System.
The central organisation directly responsible for comprehensive
development planning is the Economic Planning Board(EPB) which was
formed immediately after the military coup led by president Park. The
establishment of the EPB symbolised the military government's resolve to
give top priority to economic development and its commitment to a
systematic and sustained pursuit of long-term economic development
plans.65 For this purpose, the EPB has set up 27 sectoral task groups
whose major task is to consider policy objectives and structural reforms and
to prepare initial drafts of sectoral plans. Each task group conducts, in close
cooperation with the KDI, a series of open forums to discuss and reach a
broad public consensus on key sectoral issues. The work of this sectoral
study group is coordinated through the Coordinating Committee on
Economic Planning chaired by the Vice-Minister of the EPB. The final drafts
prepared by the EPB are submitted to the Inter-ministerial Examination
Council on Economic Planning which was chaired by the Prime Minister, the
Economic and Scientific Council, and the State Council, before being finally
adopted by the president.
Of the 27 sectoral task groups, three deal with health and social security
problems. These include overall social development planning, social
security, and health. The latter two groups are chaired by the Assistant
Minister of the MOHSA.66 while the MOHSA has jurisdictional responsibility
for broad social security policy development in Korea, the EPB's tendency to
cut into domains of other government agencies should enable conflicty to
take place jurisdictional conflicts over policy leadership. However, based on
a secure political mandate and its superior capacities to collect and analyse
economic wide information, the EPB is able to coordinate and control plans
and policies of other government agencies in four ways.
First of all, the EPB is headed by the Deputy Prime Minister with
hierarchical superiority over the heads of other ministries. The EPB
65 Byung-Sun Choi(1991), 'The Structure of the Economic Policy-Making Institution in Korea and the
Strategic Role of the EPB," In Gerald E. Caiden and Bun-Woong Kim(Eds.), A Dragon's Progress:
Developmental Administration in Korea. Connecticut: Kumarian Press, p. 96.
66 Chong-Kee Park(1981), Planning and Coordination of Social Security Medical Care System with
Public Health Programs. KDI Monograph No. 8102. pp. 17-18.
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chairman is able to exercise direct leadership over the government
agencies.
Secondly, the EPB is given the full responsibility for the formulation of five-
year economic plans: from preparing the guidelines to filling in details within
the guidelines. Through these guidelines, the EPB controls the executive
agencies in their policy-making processes. All multi-year national
development policies and plans of the agencies are filtered and coordinated
by the EPB within the framework of a five-year economic development plan.
Thirdly, through the annual budget review and examination, the EPB is able
to control annual action programme, and to coordinate them within the
framework of a five-year economic development plan.
Finally, the asymmetry in institutional mandates, resources, and capacities
between the EPB and other ministries responsible for implementing policies
has led these agencies increasingly to engage in mutual adjustment. Most
importantly, the EPB has tried to strengthen its policy leadership and the
nexus between its policy initiatives and other ministries' subsequent policy
actions, by creating many formal policy coordination forums such as the
Economic Ministers' Conference chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister.®7
Due to such organisational characteristics of the EPB, together with the
strong political support of the president, the EPB has enjoyed since its
beginning. The leaders of the EPB have been the most influential men next
to the president within the executive branch.
B. The Planning and Programming System.
The Office of Planning and Coordinatation(hearafter the OPC) is the
central organisation responsible for the planning and programming system.
The OPC, directly attached to the Prime Minister, is chaired with the
examination and coordination of the executive agencies' policies into a
system of annual action programmes. Each executive agency has an Office
of Planning and Management(hearafter the OPM). The OPM is located
immediately below the Vice-Minister, and therefore is one level higher than
other field bureaus. Policies of the agency are to be coordinated by its OPM.
67 Byung-Sun Choi(1991), Ibid., p. 98.
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The OPC Director-General chairs the Committee of Planning Coordination,
which is filled by the Deputy Director General and the five staff chiefs of the
OPC, the OPM directors of the executive agencies, and the Secretary of
Political Affairs to the Prime Minister.
Each year, during January, this Committee formulates the guidelines for
the preparation of the executive agencies' annual action programmes for the
succeeding year. In accordance with the guidelines, the OPM of each
agency coordinates policies of the agency's field bureaus into a draft system
of action programmes, and submits the draft to the OPC by 20th of March.
However, most of the OPM's turn out to be ineffective for policy coordination.
Formally, the location of the OPM in an executive agency is on a level higher
than those of field bureaus, and the Director of the OPM is superior to the
directors of the bureaus. But the bureau directors receive instructions directly
from the Minister, Vice-Minister, and Deputy Vice-Ministers, and report
directly to them. The major intra-ministerial policies are made among them.
Therefore, the OPM director, whose primary function is coordination, rather
than policy-making, is less influential than the directors of the field bureaus
in the intra-ministerial policy-making process.
Between 21st and 25th of March, the OPC examines and coordinates the
ministerial proposals into a draft system of the governmental annual
programmes. By this time, the guidelines for annual budget estimates have
been completed by the EPB, and approved by the State Council. The OPC's
draft system of the governmental annual programmes is also submitted to
the State Council usually after the Council has approved the guidelines for
budget estimates. The system of annual programme is tentatively approved
by the Council by 30th of April.
At this point, we will briefly examine the budgetary process in Korea. By
31st of March each year the Minister of the EPB sends the guiding principles
for budget preparation to the heads of all ministries and agencies asking
them to furnish ministerial estimates for the next fiscal year.69 Upon receipt
68 Bom Hu(1974), "A Social Information System for National Development Planning of a Developing
Country: Korea," Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, State University of New York at Buffalo, p. 168.
69 For the Korean budgetary process, see, Dong-Kun Kim(1985), "The Budget System and Structure in
Korea," In Bun-Woong Kim et.al.,(Eds.), Administrative Dynamics and Development: The Korean
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of the circular, the ministerial budget office send out to each bureau and field
service within the ministry a memorandum asking them to sent bureau
estimates, together with a letter indicating the broad policy framework laid
down by the minister in connection with ministerial estimates. All the bureau
estimates were then analysed and summaries were prepared by the
ministerial budget officer for presentation to an informal committee,
composed of the vice-Minister, bureau chiefs, coordinator for planning and
management, and the ministerial budget officer. When they were approved
by the committee and the minister, the ministerial budget officer began the
task of preparing the estimates in the forms required for presentation to the
Office of Budget in the EPB. Under the Budget and Accounting Law, all the
ministries and agencies were required to submit estimates by 31st of May to
the Minister of EPB/O
The Bureau of Budget then begins reviewing and revising these estimates
in consultation with the agencies involved. At the same time, the Office of
Budget obtained preliminary revenue estimates from several sources. On
the basic of this information, the Minister of EPB make up his mind as to the
wisest course and then laid the situation before the president. The president
after hearing his recommendations reached decisions on the tentative
requirements. The decision reached by the president was communicated to
the Office of Budget, which set budget ceilings for each of the ministries and
agencies. On the basis of these ceilings and other standards set by the
Office, the budget examiners began reviewing the ministerial estimates.
The revised estimates were summarised in the various ways for
submission to the State Council and the president. When they were
approved by the president, the budget was prepared in the form requested
for presentation to the legislature. Submission of the budget bill to the
National Assembly takes place no late than 2nd of October,71 and is
followed by the policy speech of the president in the plenary session. The
National Assembly deliberations must be completed thirty days before the
fiscal year begins on 1st of January.
Experience. Seoul: Kyobo Publishing, Inc., pp. 156-169; and Hoon Yu(1981), "Preparation of the
Budget in Korea," Korean Journal of Public Administration. Vol. XIX. No. 2. pp. 158-165.
7® The Budget and Accounting Law, Para.2 Article 20.
71 The constitutions of 1972 and 1980 require the government to submit budget at least 90 days before
the beginning of the fiscal year. See Article 89, constitution of 1972, and Article 90, constitution of
1980.
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Since then, the tentatively approved system is used as the basis on which
the executive agencies prepare their budget estimates, which are put again
through examination and analysis under the EPB's. It is only after the
National Assembly approves the executive budget proposal that the OPC
adopts a final system of the governmental annual action programmes for the
following year. From the preceding discussion, it becomes clear that, without
the budget function, the planning and programming system is ineffective for
the coordination of governmental policies.
1.5. Design of the Study.
In this study we have attempted to elucidate the policy-making for National
Pensions in Korea. For this purpose, we have examined the major forces
leading to the development of this type of social security programme. Policy¬
making process is so complicated that it can not be easily understood
without having some theoretical knowledge.
In Chapter Two, therefore, we will outline a broad framework of the
approaches and provide a preview of what is considered more specifically in
the context of the pension policy-making. In order to ascertain how this kind
of programme was adopted and what directed its evolution, the literature on
social policy determinants will be deliberated. Yet several predominant
themes and approaches can be located. In this analysis, four key
approaches to the study of the pension development will be examined and
evaluated. The four approaches are the socio-economic development
approach; the pluralist approach; the authoritarian-corporatist approach; and
the diffusion approach. Two criteria have been used in selecting these
approaches. First, each of these interpretations has provided the framework
for a rich and important body of literature in the field of social policy analysis.
Secondly, all of these approaches have some potential ability to elucidate
the development of the pension policy in the Korean case.
Following this, we turn to an assessment of the general utility and
applicability of these to the analysis of Korean social security policy
development. Chapter Three deals with the approaches to the analysis of
Korean social security policy development prior to the establishment of the
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National Welfare Pension(NWP) programme of 1973. This is because it has
been expounded in chapter two that the social security policy development
in the developing countries as a whole has appeared different from that in
the developed ones. It means that in confronting social problems, the same
solutions may not be applicable for every country, and their consequences
may not be same for every country. Furthermore, social policy never exists in
a vacuum. Before embarking on a detailed descriptive-construction of policy¬
making process, therefore, it is essential to have a brief outline of Korea's
national characteristics and their impacts on the social security policy
development.
The actual story of policy-making process will be considered from chapter
four to chapter seven. In these chapters we will examine the formulation of
the pension schemes, beginning with the description of the environments
that the Korean government faced and ending with the final enactment of the
pension programme during the period of 1973-1986. As we mentioned
before, the policy-making process can be divided into five stages. In this
study, however, we will lay stress on the first two stages: policy-initiation and
policy-making. Throughout the policy-making process, we will aim at the
following four issues. First, the issues to be examined throughout will be
where and how policies are initiated, brought to the attention to government,
propelled forward to the point of commitment, or blocked and quietly buried.
Secondly, what is the time scale of government policy-making and what is
the role of bureaucrats, relative to others, in affecting decision? Thirdly, the
issues to be examined will be how and to what extent the interest groups
influence the policy-making process? Finally, how key issues are managed.
In other words, what actually happens to certain issues in terms of
compromise and conciliation between different departments?
In Chapter Four, we will focus on the background of the National Welfare
Pension scheme which has emerged as a political agenda. For this, we will
discuss the social, political, economic and international environments that
the Korean government was placed in at that time, and then in the chapter
five, we will explore the policy-making process for the NWP scheme in 1973.
In this chapter, we will examine how NWP programme was being
considered and how some of the basic questions and conflicts about the
nature of the policy were being resolved.
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In Chapter Six, we will examine the development of the pension policy
during the period of 1974-1985. We will focus on the postponement of the
NWP programme in relation to the Korean national development strategies.
Therefore, we will examine the major points of Korean political and socio¬
economic environments; these explain how the pension plan was
postponed for such a long time. In the first section, we will examine the
'missing link' between policy-making and policy implementation, that is, the
reasons why the pension scheme was postponed in 1974 even though its
necessity had been affirmed. In the second section, we will scrutinize the
government's social security policy during this period. Even though the NWP
programme was still postponed, several social security programmes were
enacted such as the Medical Insurance in 1977, the Welfare Law for the
Aged in 1981, and the welfare Law of the Children in 1982. In this section,
however, we will focus on the background of Medical Insurance scheme,
and especially, why the need for Medical Insurance drew the Korean
government's attention in 1976 instead of the NWP programme. In the third
section, we will explore the development of the NWP scheme during this
period of 1974-1985.
In Chapter Seven, we will scrutinize the process of Revised National
Pension policy-making in 1986. In the second section, we will focus on the
background of a re-emergence of pension policy as a political agenda. The
tendency for the re-emergence of pension programme was a reflection of
socio-economic environments and the support of political elites for this
development strategy. In the third section, we then turn to a discussion of the
policy-making process of revised pension programme between the
president's announcement of 11th of August, 1986 and the enactment of
Revised National Pension Act on 31th of December, 1986. The fourth,
concluding section, provides a summary analysis of the major arguments
and findings presented in the chapter.
In the concluding chapter, we will discuss briefly what we attempted in this
study and the implications of our attempt with regard to the objectives of the
study.
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Chapter 2. Forces Shaping the Inception and
Stratification of Social Security.
In this chapter, the major theoretical approaches to the development of
social security policy are presented and analyzed. The real purpose of
theory is to identify durable patterns of causal links over time and predict that
certain events will occur under certain conditions. Social policy has failed to
produce a substantive body of theory of this kind, relying instead on
conceptual descriptions of different types of welfare systems.1 In spite of this
problem, theory plays a crucial role in the study of social policy for these
reasons: "Theory is needed not only to conceptualise reality but to
communicate ideas in ways that can be comprehended readily. Theory not
only facilitates the task of social policy enquiry but is an essential element in
the efforts of social policy investigators to comprehend the real world."2
Research into the factors responsible for the rapid expansion of social
welfare provisions in the industrial countries has attracted widespread
interest. Many social scientists have recognised that the growth of statutory
welfare in these societies is a development of considerable historical
significance which requires general explanation. Some of these theories are
primarily historical, seeking to identify the social, economic and political
factors that gave rise to the emergence of modern statutory institutions.
Others are less concerned with the historical dimension, focusing instead on
their contemporary role in modern society. However, this distinction can not
always be sustained, since the historical and contemporary determinants
identified by these theories are often interchangeable.3
As we mentioned already, social policy's theoretical development is still
hampered by a parochial preoccupation with trends in the industrial
countries. Although a number of interesting hypotheses have been
formulated by social policy investigators, they have not been tested on a
1 Piet Thoenes(1966), The Elite in the Welfare State, Translated by Brigham, J. E., London: Faber &
Faber, p. 138 and Stewart MacPherson and James Midqlev(1987), Comparative Social Policy and the
Third World. Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, p. 114.
2 MacPherson and Midgley(1987), Ibid., p. 115.
3 MacPherson and Midgley (1987), Ibid., p. 123.
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global scale.4 One example of this problem, as Jones^ observed are that
references to industrialisation and welfare in the developing countries are
noticeably absent from the theoretical writings on the subject. Even though
some social scientists have employed theoretical constructs when reviewing
the development of social policy in the Third World, most have done so
superficially, referring to these theories ephemerally and uncritically. The
main reason is that, as many researchers recognise, it is difficult enough to
formulate valid propositions about welfare phenomena in one society-when
a multiplicity of disparate political, social and economic settings are
involved, the comprehension of this diversity and its encapsulation within a
sustainable theoretical schema places severe cognitive demands on the
investigator. The finding that Western social policy models and theories do
not adequately explain Third World welfare phenomena or take account of
the particular realities of Third World social policy has different implications
for social policy research. There is ground for arguing that social needs and
welfare responses in the developing countries differ from those of the
industrial countries. The level of development, for example, has an important
influence both on the nature of the problem and on the instruments available
for its solution, so that the experience of countries such as Britain and
Germany is far removed from that of developing countries. Social realities in
the developing countries may be interpreted differently when viewed from
different cultural and ideological viewpoints. The different development
paradigms offer insights into the nature of social needs and social policies in
developing societies and, at the same time, provide different normative
perceptions for social planners. It can be also argued that a dependency on
Western theory has weakened the originality of Third World scholars who
might offer radically different interpretations of Third World realities if they
were freed from the analytical predispositions of Western theory.
In spite of their differences, there is evidence to show that welfare
provisions in different parts of the world do have common features.
Therefore, we will consider whether a number of theoretical propositions
formulated by Western social policy investigators to explain welfare
phenomena in the industrial countries can be substantiated in the wider
4 MacPherson and Midglev(1987). Ibid,, p. 6.
5 Jones, H(1983), "Some Factors in Third World Social Policy," Journal of Social Policy and
Administration. Vol. 17 No. 2. pp. 106-117.
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empirical context of the Third World. For this purpose, we will study a
number of key factors which are thought to have relevance for the
emergence and functioning of statutory social programmes. Although more
rigorous applications have been attempted, there are few studies of this
kind, and at present there is no generally accepted theoretical view of the
factors responsible for the rise of welfarism in the Third World. This is
perhaps not surprising since the vast amount of historical and contemporary
information collected about the social policies of the developing countries
does not lend unequivocal support for any one explanation. Historical
evidence can be produced to show that Third World governments have
introduced modern social services for a great variety of reasons and that
they serve an equally varied range of contemporary functions. In view of its
complexity, therefore, it would be surprising if the emergence of social policy
in the Third World could be reduced to any single determinant. Also, most
accounts offer oversimplified interpretation of this very complex reality.
Based on the above understanding, therefore, first, we will examine the
developmental approaches of western social policy, and then evaluate
these approaches to the developing countries.
2.1. Brief History of the Development of Social Insurance
Programme.
The modern state has become increasingly involved in regulating social
interactions and distributing resources to its citizens. One of the most
important functions which the state has come to perform is the provision of
social welfare services for its populace. Instead of relying solely upon
individuals to generate the resources necessary for their present and future
well-being, or upon private charities to sustain those unable to make such
provisions, a public, institutionalised responsibility for such provisions has
been increasingly accepted. State-sponsored social security programmes
have been a major component of this institutionalised response.
This trend occurred in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. The
first social security legislation was inaugurated in Germany in 1883 with the
establishment of a government programme to cover the cost of sickness and
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maternity. A working-injury programme was adopted the following year and
a pension programme was begun in 1889. The social insurance
programmes begun in Germany were quickly imitated in Austria, Hungary,
and the Scandinavian countries. In 1911, Britain adopted its first social
insurance plan, and soon France, Italy, and the Netherlands followed. In
1921, Japan, which was an ardent admirer of German culture, became the
first non-European nation to embrace the social security principle.6
Therefore, the first stage from Germany's pioneering institution of social
insurance programmes in the 1880s through the First World War has been
called the "classic introductory phase" of the welfare state,7 as various social
security and income maintenance programmes were adopted in a wide
range of industrialising capitalist nations in Europe. In all these nations,
politicians, reformers, and trade union leaders grappled with the problem of
how to deal with the risk of destitution faced by wage-earners in capitalist-
industrial society due to interruption of income associated with
unemployment, sickness, industrial accident, death of the breadwinner, and
old age. In other words, social policy debates throughout the West in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries centred on whether to replace the
poor law, and with what to replace it. The main alternative to the poor law
was what was then called social insurance which, in common usage,
implied non-contributory pensions as well as contributory benefit schemes.
Social insurance was based on the idea that the state should operate a
quasi-insurance system, exacting compulsory 'contributions' from the
working population in order to finance the payment of benefits when certain
contingencies occurred: notably unemployment, sickness, and old age.8
During this period four social insurance systems developed in relation to
different risks: industrial accidents, sickness, old age, and unemployment.
The introduction of each system represented a break with liberal ideas
concerning the assignment of responsibility among individuals, groups, and
the state. This break with liberalism lay above all in the principle of
6 Milton I. Roemer(1977), Comparative National Policies on Health Care. Marcel Dekker, Inc., pp. 36-42.
7 Peter Flora and Jens Alber(1981), "Modernization, Democratization, and the Development of Welfare
States in Western Europe," In Peter Flora and Arnold J. Heidenheimer, The Development of Welfare
States in Europe and America, New Brunswick: Transaction Books, p. 54.
8 John Creedy and Richard Disney(1985), Social Insurance in Transition: An Economic Analysis,
Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 1.
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compulsory insurance as well as in the recognised amount of state financial
responsibility.9
Among social insurance, old age pension and insurance systems
represent an especially important component of the welfare state for several
reasons. First, popular pressure for new state welfare activity commonly
originated in demands for provision for the dependent aged outside the
traditional poor law framework. Secondly, mass support for the new welfare
programmes for the aged which were, at least initially, the most popular of
the modern welfare and social insurance measures, 10 often provided a
crucial momentum towards other, less immediately popular programmes
such as unemployment and health insurance. Finally, public provision of
support for the elderly, either through pensions or insurance has come to be
the largest single social undertaking of most national governments in the
West, both in terms of the number of people involved and amount of money
spent.11
The interwar period was an important phase in the development of social
insurance across the advanced capitalist democracies. During this period
the social insurance model was generally accepted as a suitable method of
protection for employees in industrial and related sectors. Countries that
were more advanced in this respect began to gradually extend the model to
cover all risks likely to jeopardize the worker's capacity to support himself
and his family through work. In industrialising society the most
underprivileged group, raising the most acute social problems, and posing
the greatest potential threat for disruption was the industrial proletariat. Thus
social insurance was usually intended, in principle, to protect the poorest of
the industrial workers. Therefore, the nature of compulsory insurance
remained limited throughout the interwar period with coverage generally
confined to categories of workers with the smallest means.
From this period, the development of social security policy was divided into
two groups: The German model and The British Model. The Bismarck
9 Flora and Alber, Ibid., p. 51.
10 Bantley Gilbert(1966), The Evolution of National Insurance in Great Britain: The Origins of the
Welfare State, London: Michael Joseph Ltd. p. 160.
11 Hugh Heclof1974L Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden. New Haven: Yale University Press,
p. 13.
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countries(e.g. Austria, Belgium, and Germany) developed pension schemes
in which both contributions and benefits were closely tied to pre-retirement
earnings. This type of programme structure tended to perpetuate even into
old age the differences in income among individuals which existed during
the working years. The second group of countries, primarily Britain and
Scandinavia, began in the opposite way by providing national minimum
benefits via a contribution of insurance and assistance schemes.12 in either
case, in the period before World War II, public pensions remained largely a
form of social assistance for the indigent rather than a retirement wage for
the elderly. It was only in the context of the post-war economic boom and
under pressure from the labour movement that the welfare state emerged in
a form that represented a radical break with the past. During the post-war
period governments in all the advanced capitalist democracies began to
assume increasing responsibility for distributing the national income. In all
countries income transfers to the elderly constituted the major component in
this development.13
The transition to social security in the post-war period was marked by the
gradual implementation of two new principles of distribution~the principle of
universality and the principle of substitutive benefits.14 The principle of
universality was advocated in the Beveridge Report, which appeared during
the war and had significant influence on post-war policy development. The
principle of universality advocated by Beveridge was an important step
forward in the transition from social assistance to social security. The goal of
the Beveridge plan was to construct a social order based on equality of
citizenship rather than on principle of class. The central idea was the
concept of the national minimum benefits, whereby insurance would cover
the entire population and all residents would be guaranteed a minimum for
subsistence, independent of duration of contributions or previous earnings
levels. Thus social security benefits were to be egalitarian in that all
recipients were to be treated alike and provided with the same level of
benefits regardless of past earnings or contributions. The principle of
universality was also applied, in a more restricted manner, in the Bismarck
countries as traditional social insurance programmes were gradually
12 |an Gough(1979), The Political Economy of the Welfare State. London: Macmillan. p. 57.
13 John F. Myles(1984), Old Age in the Welfare State. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, p. 17.
14 Ibid., p. 5.
consolidated and modernised in stages, by extending coverage to all
employed persons and their dependents, and finally by setting up similar,
but separate schemes for the self-employed.
The first systematic articulation of the substitutive principle appears in a
recommendation passed by the International Labour Office in 1944. It states
that "real security for the worker requires benefits related to former earnings
at a level that allows the worker and his family to maintain their traditional
standard of living."15 |n Beveridge countries like Britain and Sweden the
substitutive principle was achieved through the addition of a second tier of
earnings-related benefits to basic flat-rate benefits. Thus the implementation
of a system of substitutive benefits required the addition of a graduated
structure mirroring the wage inequalities of the market. This required the
abandonment of the seemingly egalitarian ethos implicit in the flat-rate
Beveridge system.16 in the Bismarck countries the principle of substitutive
benefits was achieved by increasing entitlements at all income levels and
raising the ceiling on covered earnings. Thus there has been considerable
convergence in the post-war period as all the advanced capitalist
democracies have gradually developed pension systems which reflect a
combination of the principles of the early Bismarck programmes and the
later Beveridge Plan.
Most semi-industrialization countries and the underdeveloped nations, on
the other hand, established a social insurance system quite recently, but
there have been a few notable exceptions. Chile, in 1924, was the first
relatively poor nation to enact social insurance legislation for its industrial
worker. Uruguay and Brazil soon followed and by the Second World War,
over half of Latin America had implemented social insurance
programmes.17
The Asian and Middle Eastern countries adopted various social security
programmes just recently from the mid-1980s to 1960s. One of the main
reasons is that most of the Asian nations have been preoccupied with
economic development as the prime instrument of alleviating changes in the
15 Guy Perrin(1969), "Reflections on Fifty Years of Social Security." International Labour Review.
Vol. 99, No. 3. p. 270.
16 Mvles. Ibid., p. 10.
17 See, John Dixon and Robert Scheurell(Eds.) (1990), Social Welfare in Latin America, London:
Routledge.
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past three decades or so. The other reason is that the Eastern Asian culture
which emphasizes familial relationships, hierarchical social structure, and
Confucian political philosophy characterized by personalism, hierarchical
subordination and centralized elite tradition, have spawned quite different
concepts about what the natures of man and society are, and what the scope
of responsibility of government for people's well-being. In these
environments, even though many scholars in Asian countries have started
debating the importance of social development for human welfare, these
countries still choose to maximise economic development, under the old
assumption that this improves the quality of life, and they thereby enshrine
Gross National Product(GNP) as the supreme goal of the national
development.^ It is well-known fact that Japan, one of the most
industrialized market countries, began its social welfare programmes later
and funded them at much lower levels than most other industrialized
countries.19 Similarly despite the fact that Taiwan and Korea are one of the
most rapidly growing industrial countries in the world, their social welfare
systems remain rather backward and underdeveloped. However, the
absence of public provision of welfare services for those in need does not
mean that they receive no care. As we will see in the Chapter Three,
traditional East Asian values lead people to care for their elderly parents,
disabled family members, or poor relatives. In these countries, much care for
the needy is still concentrated within the private sector of the family and
community.
The last wave of social security development began after 1960 in the
African nations that had recently received their independence.
In this scenario of the development of social security policy which is based
on the above examination, several questions arise in relation to the
development of social security policy.
First, why the autocratic German government established the first social
insurance system instead of the more liberalised industrial society such as
Britain and France? In other words, do the governing ideology and
governmental structure have an influence on the development of social
18Hyung-Shik Kim(1985), "Social Welfare and the Development Process," In John Dixon and Hyung-
Shik Kim(Eds.), Social Welfare in Asia, New Hampshire: Croom Helm. pp. 1-2.
19 See, T.J. Pemple(1982), Policy and Politics in Japan: Creative Conservatism. Philadelpia: Temple
University Press, Esp. Cp. 4.
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security policy?, or is it easier for the authoritarian government to initiate the
social security policy than the liberal and democratic government?
Secondly, social policy debates throughout the West in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries centred on whether to replace the poor law,
and with what to replace it. Then, why did most industrialised countries
choose social insurance programmes as an income maintenance scheme,
rather than other policies?
Thirdly, social security programmes are so universal among nations that
the programmes have been found to form a Guttman scale.20 That is, the
initiation of one type of programme generally precedes that of the next
across nations that have any social security establishment of consequence.
So how has the notion of diffusion been received by the Third World
countries and how is it employed in the context of their social security policy
development?
Fourthly, in relation to the third question, why then do different countries
rely, to differing extents, on income maintenance programmes versus
benefits in kind; on insurance, assistance or universal benefits; on direct
state provision versus state regulation of third-party provision; and so on ?21
All of the 142 countries analysed by the U.S. Social Security
Administration contain working injury components, and most(132 countries)
provide old age, disability, and survivors pensions. However, 83 countries
contain sickness and maternity programmes and only 64 countries provide
some family allowance and assistance services. Unemployment
programmes are the least developed components of these systems, with
only 40 countries containing provisions for this eventuality.22 Obviously, the
quality of these protections varies also with some systems providing virtual
replacement of lost income and others providing only a partial substitute.
Mechanisms for the organisation and administration of these programmes
also vary. Perhaps the most important difference in these programmes
concerns the extent of coverage which they provide. Therefore, this study
attempts to show how unique national characteristics have affected the
emergence and current form of the social security scheme. The study further
20 Phillips Cutright( 1965), "Political Structure, Economic Development, and National Social Security
Programmes," American Journal of Sociology. Vol. 70. p. 540.
21 Gough(1979), ibid,, p. 58.
22 US Department of Health and Human Service(1986), Social Security Programs Throughout the
World. 1985. p. xxiii.
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seeks to anticipate how these national characteristics might interact either
positively or negatively with approaches to social security policy.
Fifthly, what factors affect the social security policy development which play
particularly important roles in policy making process? Many factors will be
involved in the policy making process: the president, congress, the courts,
the mass media, interest groups, bureaucrats, researchers, and political
parties etc. In my opinion, these factors will be different from country to
country. Therefore, no single model of policy making is universally valid for
all countries. One of the question of the present study is: can Western
democratic-pluralism be a viable social security policy model for Third World
bureaucracy?
Sixthly, do these Western social insurance programmes contribute to
financial protection against the inevitable problems of the old age, illness,
and death? This question is very important to the development of social
security policy in the Third World countries. This is because social insurance
can be regarded as the ultimate determinant of distribution patterns only in
the formal sense that it has established the legal framework within which
social, economic and political factors interact. However, many social
scientists are convinced that these social security programmes have done
little to contribute financial protection against the social contingencies. For
example, the benefits of social security programmes overwhelmingly favour
the middle class, rather than the working class.23 a possible explanation is
that they have effected downward redistribution which has been offset in
other ways. If the principle effect of policies apparently designed specifically
for downward redistribution has been merely to reshuffle income among
lower income groups, then an understanding of why this is so should
increase understanding of why social policy generally has not affected
overall distribution significantly. It is proposed here that a study of political
processes relevant to such policy design will contribute to that
understanding. This study, therefore, proposes to deal with social insurance
policies for the aged in Korea.
The final question is whether the patterns and priorities in the provision of
these welfare services of the developed countries are imitiated in the Third
World countries. Rimlinger points out that:
23 Frances Woolley and Julian Le Grand(1990), "The Ackroyds, the Osbornes and the Welfare State:
The Impact of the Welfare State on the Two Hypothetical Families Over Their Life-Times," Policy and
Politics. Vol. 18 No. 1 pp. 17-30.
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"The developing countries are in a special situation. They can
borrow from a wide range of pattern of social protection that have
proved successful in countries that industrialised eariier their
problem is one of choosing the most suitable pattern."24
As a whole, all these questions should be converged into four theoretical
approaches: the socio-economic development approach, the pluralist
approach, the authoritarian-corporatist approach, and the diffusion
approach. In this chapter, therefore, we will examine and evaluate these four
theoretical approaches to the study of social security policy development.
We hope that each of these interpretations has provided the framework for a
rich and important body of literature in the field of social policy analysis, and
that all of these approaches have some potential ability to elucidate the
development of social security policy in the Korean case as well. Each
interpretation, therefore, has, at the outset, a certain plausibility in terms of
the case under consideration. These four approaches are not mutually
exclusive and do not by any means exhaust possible explanations for the
growth of modern social policy. Moreover, all four factors may be mixed, and
conceivably the mixture will vary both with different policies and with
different stages of the same policies. Each does, however, set out what has
been a major line of inquiry, and the importance of each is not intuitively
obvious. Since social science findings tend to sound self-evident in
retrospect, it is as well to begin by noting that all of these interpretations are
plausible but difficult to integrate with each other.
The remainder of this chapter is, therefore, divided into four sections and
each of these approaches is analysed in turn. Each section opens with a
brief statement of the major principles and links involved in one of the
approaches. Following that, a review is made of the literature in which that
perspective is developed and elaborated. The general literature
interpretation is reviewed first, and then studies applying that approach to
the Korean case are discussed. A critique of the general approach and the
literature which employs it then follows. Each of these interpretations is
assessed in terms of its clarity, theoretical soundness, general utility, and
applicability to the case. No attempt is made to select the single correct
24 Gaston V. Rimlinger(1971), Welfare Policy and Industrialization in Europe, America and Russia.
London: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., p. 334.
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theory of social security policy development from among these four
approaches. Even in a single case, the richness and complexity of political
realities preclude rigid adherence to a single conceptual approach. Instead,
the attempt is made to analyse the interplay of forces leading to the
development of the policy and the phases in which different interpretive
patterns gain and lose explanatory power.
2.2. The Socio-Economic Development Approach.
Perhaps the most prominent interpretation of the social security policy
development is provided by the socio-economic development approach.
According to this interpretation, the level of a nation's socio-economic
development and its national development strategies are the primary
determinants of its level of social security policy development.
2.2.1. A Theoretical Approach.
This realm of welfare studies gained its significant position in the 1960's
and 1970's as a result of the impetus brought out by sociological
functionalism and economic growth theory. On the basis of the functionalist
approach to social welfare studies, the main components of socio-economic
determinism are that the development process of social security
programmes is a natural outcome of the 'logic of industrialism' and change
in economic structure, and that ideology is irrelevant to the development of
social welfare services, in addition to the proposition that the convergence of
social security development takes place along with economic development.
The 'logic of industrialism' predicates that the welfare state is a common
phenomenon of all capitalist societies.
The causal relationship between capitalist societies and the rise of welfare
state lies in the assumption that change in socio-economic structure
generates needs for social security programmes. This interpretation
assumes that statutory social security programmes emerge in response to
the social problems created by industrialisation and the disintegration of
traditional forms of support.
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Economic development means industrialisation and urbanisation, changes
in structure and methods of production and migration from the rural areas to
the city.25 Those changes were seen to be accompanied by conflict, anxiety,
growing distance between generations, identity problems and, in some
instance, anti-social behaviour. In particular, a number of these factors were
seen to be important here.
At first, these changes broke down the traditional family system. The family
has for centuries been the primary institution through which the basic needs
of individuals have been met. A family unit was also provided for those who
could not participate fully in its efforts to produce enough for substance and
exchange; in this way, those who were economically active supported the
young, elderly, handicapped and sick whose productive capacities were
limited or impaired. However, these changes caused the number of
separated families to grow considerably, especially owing to migration.
Another indication of family breakdown was the increasing evidence of
neglected elderly persons.
The second was that the consequence of increased reliance on the
isolated wage-earner was an increased vulnerability to interruption in those
wages, particularly through unemployment or old age. In addition to a
cumulative income vulnerability, modern economic growth involved a
sustained course of essentially cyclical fluctuations.
Therefore, some form of compensation was imperative and in developing
countries, as was the case in the now developed countries, social security
measures have been introduced to meet these problems of insecurity and to
give protection against the risks which impair or destroy the income of the
individual and his ability to support his family. This is not to suggest,
however, that the substantive policies discussed here have been simply
automatic by-products of socio-economic development. Aggregate
relationships between economic level and social security programmes are
far from simple, and the international diffusion of new programmes has not
followed the straight path signposted by socio-economic development.26 a
second reason for rejecting any one-to-one correlation between socio-
25 Christine Cockburn(1980), "The Role of Social Security in Development," International Social
Security Review, Vol. 33 No. 3-4. p. 343.
26 Hugh Heclo(1974), Modern Social Policies in Britain and Sweden. New Haven: Yale University Press,
p. 287.
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economic development and social policy is that the former has been largely
determinate for substantive policy contents. In this account, we only infer that
socio-economic changes rather than political choice or ideological
preferences create the conditions for the emergence of modern social
security programmes.
The foregoing hypotheses have been substantiated by several
comparative studies on social welfare, but have been rejected by others, too.
The theses put forth by Cutright, Aaron, Wilensky, Jackman, and Collier and
Messick, etc., belong to the former group, while Dryor, and Taira and Kilby
belong to the latter group, which will be individually reviewed in the rest of
this section.
In the first instance, Cutright has focused on the relationships between
political structures, economic development and social security
programmes.27 Developing an index of socio-economic development from
data on energy consumption, urbanisation, and literacy, and an index of
social security development from the number of years a country has had any
of the five social security programmes in existence, Cutright then found that
the economic level is the main determinant of the number of years of social
insurance programme experience. The degree of social security coverage of
a nations' population is most powerfully correlated with its level of economic
development, but when economic development is controlled, the more
representative governments introduce programmes earlier than the less
representative governments. Thus, he concluded that national political,
economic, and social systems are interdependent.
Aaron uses some economic indicators such as per capita national income,
per capita social security expenditures, and social security expenditures as
a percentage of national income, to test the relationship between the level of
economic growth and the growth of social security schemes in his
comparative study of social security in twenty-two countries which spend five
percent or more of their GNP on social security. He then found that the level
27 Phillips Cutright(1965), "Political Structure, Economic Development and Social Security Programs,"
American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 70. pp. 537-550. For an interesting critique of this essay, see
Vladimir Rys(1966), "Comparative Studies of Social Security: Problems and Perspectives,"
International Social Security Review, Vol. 19. pp. 242-268.
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of economic development was the most important determinant of per capita
social security outlays. In providing an explanation of the percent of national
income spent on social security, however, economic variables were not
useful.He also found that the age of the social security system was one of
the significant factors in determining its future development. Countries with
older social security programmes spent more on these schemes and
continue to expand their coverage and improve the level and types of
benefits paid than countries which had introduced social security more
recently. Aaron also examined the relevance of political factors in the
development of social security and concluded that 'moderate leftist
governments which come to power on the promise of social reform take the
first steps.'29
In his study of sixty-four countries, Wilensky has criticized Aaron and
findings of others that the countries which they used were roughly
comparable in terms of their levels of economic development. Because of
the relative homogeneity of the samples, measures of the impact of
economic developments on social security expenditures had been
'excessively reduced.'30 When comparing a full range of nation states, he
argued, the validity of the economic interpretation could, supposedly, be
redistributed. He found that the level of economic growth, defined in per
capita GNP terms, is the key predictor of social security spending as a
percent of GNP.31
The findings of others such as Jackman,32 Collier and Messick,33 anc|
Boye34 also parallel those of Wilensky. In particular, a study by Collier and
28 Henry Aaron(1967), "Social Security: International Comparison," In Otto Eckstein(ed.), Studies in
the Economic of Income Maintenance. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, p. 23.
29 Aaron(1967). Ibid., p.17.
30 Harold Wilensky(1975), The Welfare State and Equality. Bekerly: University of California Press,
p. 18.
31 Ibid,, pp. 15-18.
32Robert W. Jackman(1974), "Political Democracy and Social Security: A Comparative Analysis,"
American Sociological Review. Vol. 39. pp. 29-45.
33 David Collier and Rechard E. Messick(1975), "Prerequisites Versus Diffusion: Testing Alternative
Explanations of Social Security Adoption." American Political Science Review. Vol. 69. pp. 1299-1315.
34 Boye, S(1977), 'The Cost of Social Security, 1960-71: Some National Economic Aspects,"
International Labour Review. Vol. 115 No. 3. p. 308.
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Messick contains a variant of the socio-economic development hypothesis.
In their article on the developments of the timing of social security adoption,
these analysts include an examination of the socio-economic 'prerequisites'
of the formation of the social security programme. Using data on the socio¬
economic conditions that existed at the time of social security adoption in
fifty-nine heterogeneous nations, they concluded that certain minimal levels
of socio-economic development must be obtained in order that a country be
able to initiate a social security programme.
In his comparative study of welfare policy and economic development
between a few industrial countries, Rimlinger35 argues that economic
aspects of labour productivity or manpower have contributed subsequently
to the steady expansion of health and welfare programmes, which can be
seen in all industrialised countries. For Rimlinger, social welfare system is
taken as a measure to educate and ensure the healthy condition of
manpower for the need of economic growth.
The works of Singer36 and Gilbert^7 argued that social security schemes
are not likely to develop in countries below a certain level of economic
development. Although Gilbert pointed out that this level was very difficult to
define, Singer suggested that it is only when a developing country attains a
degree of economic modernization comparable to that reached by
Honduras, Burma, or Gabon that its social security services are likely to
expand.
Cockburn also offered a similar interpretation, arguing that it is this very
process of development which weakens traditional forms of protection and
creates the need for social security.38
38 Gaston V. Rimlinger(1966), "Welfare Policy and Economic Development: A Comparative Historical
Perspective," Jpurnal of Economic History, Vol. XXVI No. 4. pp. 556-571.
36 Singer, H.W.(1968), "Social Factors in Development: an Overview with Special Emphasis on Social
Security," In Everett M. Kassalow (Ed.), The Role of Social Security in Economic Development.
Washington: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, pp. 21-38.
37 Gilbert, N.(1981), "Social Security in Developing Countries," In Wallace, H.M. and Brabin G.(eds.),
Maternal and Child Health Around the World, London: Macmillan. pp. 292-297.
38 Cockburn C.(1980), "The Role of Social Security in Development," International Social Security
Review. Vol. 33. pp. 337-358.
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On the other hand, some analysts such as Pryor, and Taira and Kilby
suggested different findings. Pryor's study of seven 'communist' and seven
'capitalist' countries also challenged the simplicity of the economic
development hypothesis and indicated that the relationship between
economic development and welfare and health expenditures was
ambiguous. While, with minor modifications this basic relationships held for
his time-series analysis, there was no relationship between his economic
development indicators and the level of expenditures adopted by a cross
section of his universe.39
In their study of nineteen developed countries of the West or of Western
origin, Taira and Kilby also found that the economic approach to social
security expenditures was not very useful. Their correlations between GNP
per capita and social security spending were both weak and negative.40
While they found that economic variables were more closely correlated with
social security spending in some years than in others, there was no
consistent pattern to this relationship, and these correlations never
possessed significant explanatory power.
In sum, the above conclusions derived from cross-national studies among
various countries at certain points in time indicated that the socio-economic
level is an important determinant in the early stage of welfare development.
In general terms, the wealth of a nation, as Liechter explained,41 determines
the degree of freedom or the constraints imposed on a nation's decision
makers in providing public goods and services. A nation's economic base
influences not only the content of public policy but also its administration. In
other words, both the policy agenda and the administration of public policy
are influenced by the nature of a society's economic base.
39 Frederick L. Pryor(1968), Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations. Homewood
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin Inc. pp. 146-150.
40 Koji Taira and Peter Kilby(1969), "Differences in Social Security Development in Selected Countries,"
International Social Security Review. Vol. 22. pp. 145-150.
41 Howard H. Leichter(1979), A Comparative Approach to Policy Analysis: Health Care Policy in Four
Nations. Qlmbridge. pp. 51-53.
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2.2.2. Evaluation.
The basic approach taken in this study is that the socio-economic
interpretation of social security policy development provides a useful and
potentially fruitful approach to the problem. Yet this interpretation suffers
from several important limitations.
The first problem which characterizes the literature employing this
perspective concerns its relatively monolithic relationship between social
security programmes and socio-economic development, and upon a simple
form of functionalism. Not only does it neglect many unquantifiable variables
such as culture, or historical values, but it also tends to downplay the
political dynamics involved in the policy process. Regardless of the strength
of the correlations or predictive ability, social policy could be a mere
concomitant or artifact of socio-economic development. Public policy and
social programmes are the results of real human interactions and decisions
in the political arena. Even though some of the analysts, such as Wilensky,
Cutright and Jackman, discussed above do make some attempt to address
this problem, their attempts are only very general. Therefore, linkages
between socio-economic developments and changing class structures,
stratification, bureaucratic activities and the options and constraints placed
upon a political elite must be explored.
The second problem is that the findings of these researches predicted that
industrialised countries as a group would have more advanced social
security programmes than the countries of the Third World. If this simply
meant that the greater affluence of the more industrialised countries enabled
them to make better social provision, it would not be a very striking
discovery. Looked at from this perspective, economic growth could be
regarded as the instrument and better living standards as the objective.
In reality, however, the controversial issue of deciding which social security
measures are to be adopted, is whether the institution of social security itself
is to be used consciously for the purpose of economic development.42
Mishra argued that: 'welfare provision actually facilitates economic
42 Walter Galeson(1968), "Social Security and Economic Development: A Wuantitative Approach,"
Industrial and Labour Relations Review, Vol. 21. No. 4. pp. 559-569.
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development.'43 ancj the United Nations report also mentioned that: ' social
development accelerates economic growth, accelerated economic growth
provides for further development, and this in turn fulfils preconditions for new
economic growth.'44 On this question, one point of view is forcibly
expressed thus: "It is somewhat ironical to suggest that social security, which
is an instrument of 'social justice', be used as an excuse for commandeering
society's resources for economic development which itself is invariably
responsible for producing social dislocations and social injustices
necessitating in turn protection of individuals against socioeconomic
hazards through means like social security. "45 According to this view, social
security programmes may be used as a policy instrument, primarily, for the
means of investing in human capital, but it also serve as an important tool in
the mobilising domestic capital. Better health and nutrition mean a more
vigorous people; and education gives them the knowledge and skills they
need in order to achieve growth. There is also understanding and vision.46
Investment in human capital may prove to be even more profitable than that
in more tangible assets. It must be seen, of course, as a long-term policy,
needing time to produce its effects.
References have already been made to the potential of insurance and
provident schemes for the mobilisation of capital which can then be used for
development.47 This is well recognised as having occurred in Singapore,
where the public housing programme has been largely financed from the
National Provident FundBut, in this approach, there was a danger of
43Ramesh Mishra(1976), "Convergence Theory and Social Change: The Development of Welfare in
Britain and Soviet Union," Comparative Studies in Sociology and History. Vol. 8. p. 31.
44 UN Research Institute for Social Developments965), Aspects of Social and Economic Growth,
p. 46.
45 Taira, T,(1974), "Social Security and National Economy," In Report on the ILO/NORAD Asian
Regional Seminar on Social Security, National Economy and Planning, Philippines, p. 112. Quoted from
Christine Cockburn(1980), Ibid., pp. 353-354.
46 Jones(1980), Ibid,, p. 7.
47 Mouton, P (1975). Social Security in Africa. Geneva: International Labour Office, p. 47.; Partasarati,
S. (1978), "Social Security as a Mobiliser of Savings: the Experience of Malaysia," International Social
Security Review. Vol. 19. p. 47.; Shome, P and Saito, K. A.(1980), "Creating Capital through Social
Security Institution: The Asian Experience," Studies in Domestic Finance. Vol. 61. World Bank. p. 1.;
Dean R. Leimer and Selig D. Lesnoy(1982), "Social Security and Private Savings: New Time-Series
Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 90. pp. 606-629.; and Haward Jones(1990). Social
Welfare in Third World Development. MacMillan Education LTD. p. 7, 47.
48 Jones(1990), Ibid., p. 47.
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confusing means and ends, for improvements in the quality of living were
important objectives in themselves and were not to be seen as merely aids
to higher economic output.
In relation to the development of Third World social security programmes,
the last problem is that this interpretation overemphasised the resource
constraints. Scepticism regarding the feasibility of large-scale public
provisioning in a poor country often arises precisely from the belief that
these measures are inordinately 'expensive.' But it would be a mistake to
regard these constraints as the most important obstacle to be overcome in
attempts to provide social security through direct public support in
developing countries. The following two examples produce contrary
evidences. The first example is that some developing countries such as
China, Sri Lanka, and Kerala have succeeded in social development in
spite of a low GNP per capita. These countries suggest that the scepticism
regarding the feasibility of large-scale public provisioning in a poor country
is, at least to some extent, misleading.49
On the other hand, Korea, as is widely known, has experienced
outstandingly high rates of economic growth between 1960s and 1980s,
however, the extent of government involvement in income redistribution and
social security programmes has been, until recently, rather small by
international standards. To take one example, before 1988, Korea had no
national insurance system worth the name, and no form of broad-base
medical assistance or medical insurance scheme until 1977. Also, the
Korean government has consistently rejected the option of developing into
welfare state. Nor has it expressed much direct concern about income
redistribution.
It is perhaps not without reason, then, that Korea has been variously seen
as an archetype of the fecundity of capitalism, a 'free enterprise model' for
other developing countries, an illustration of the redundancy of planning,
and, generally, a brilliant product of what some have called the 'market
order.'50 Therefore, it is impossible to understand these two examples
49Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen(1991), "Public Action for Social Security: Foundations and Strategy,"
In Ehtisham Ahmad et.al.,(Eds), Social Security in Developing Countries, Oxford: Clarendon Press,
p. 27.
50 Jean Dreze and Amertya Sen(1989), Hunger and Public Action. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 195.
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without reference to the major role of government policy in planning the
nature of economic growth and adjusting towards economic equilibrium. In
fact, close examination of the requirements for growth and for an effective
social policy makes it clear that government intervention is unavoidable, and
that it calls for planning in which these two aspects are closely integrated.
Given the distinct, it is possible in principle to distinguish two contrasting
strategies: growth-mediated security and support-led security.51 The former
strategy is to promote economic growth and take the best possible
advantage of the potentials released by greater general affluence, including
not only an exception of private incomes but also an improved basis for
public support. The latter strategy, on the other hand, is to resort directly to
wide-ranging public support in domains such as employment provision,
income redistribution, health care, education, and social assistance in order
to remove destitution without waiting for a transformation in the level of
general affluence. Here success may have to be based on a discriminating
use of national resources, the efficiency of public services, and a
redistributive bias in their delivery. Even though the possibility of success
through either approach is credible enough in principle, there are serious
questions about the viability of each of these strategies. Therefore, their real
success seems to be based on creating the political, social, and economic
conditions under which ambitious programmes are undertaken with
determination and effectiveness, and can be orientated towards the
deprived sections of the population.
In conclusion, the socio-economic interpretation of social security policy
development provides a useful and potentially fruitful approach to the
problem. However, this interpretation has gradually lost its ground in
comparative social security studies, and has been replaced by a new
perspective which analyses social security development as a process of
political choice on the one hand,52 and as a constellation of economic,
political, and social factors on the other53; both will be dealt with in the next
sections.
51 Dreze and Sen(1989). Ibid., pp. 183-202, and Dreze and Sen(1991). Ibid., pp. 22-28.
52 Joan Higgins( 1981), States of Welfare: A Comparative Analysis, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. p. 161.
53 Eric Butterworth(1975). Social Welfare in Modern Britain. London: Fantana/Collins. p. 15.
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2.3. The Pluralist Approach.
The second interpretation of the determinate of social security policy
development is the pluralist or pressure group politics approach. This
approach is the first of two which emphasize the role of key political actors in
the internal political arena.
The most simplistic form of this approach is that:
"pluralism seeks to explain government activity in terms of the
pressures emanating from the political system. Its distinctive
characteristic is its stress on the formation of pressure groups and
the manner in which policies are formed as the outcome of a
lobbying process."54
Political inputs, in the form of group demands and supports, are seen as
competing within an essentially neutral policy-making form, and resulting in
the public policy outputs desired by the majority group.
2.3.1. A Theoretical Approach.
Social theorists proposing a pluralist model emphasize a democratic
process wherein all interests are represented in policy debates, with
accommodation and compromise occurring over final outcomes. Pluralism
focuses on groups' abilities to organize and coalesce around issues that
interest or directly involve them. Dahl would argue that in any democratic
political process, almost every interested group has access to some political
resources, even though he would not argue that all groups have equal
access to resources.55 With regard to power differences in the political
process, pluralists argue that there is no single set of all-powerful leaders
who fully argue on their major goals, or who have enough power to achieve
their goals. Policy-making requires a coalition of different sets of leaders
who may have divergent goals. Further, pluralist view the state as primarily a
neutral arbiter in the debates over legislation. Dahl, utilizing a pluralist
54 Peter Taylor-Gooby and Jennifer Dale(1981), Social Theory and Social Welfare. London: Edward
Arnold, p. 179.
55 Robert Dahl(1967), Pluralist Democracy in the United States: Conflict and Consent Chicago: Rand
McNally & Co., p. 24.
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framework, also argues that it is easy to exaggerate the importance of
pressure groups which are inhibited from united action by the diversity of the
views and interests among their members.56 According to pluralist,
therefore, outcomes have generally been accepted by all involved, which is
one of the main strengths of democracy. The fact that the pluralists study
how legislation is hammered out is an important point. Emphasis on the
process and stages helps us to understand long-term dynamics.
There are several key notions in the pluralist perspective. For one thing,
pluralism is a means of coming to terms with the fact that the democratic
ideal has been only imperfectly realised in capitalist societies. Whether due
to the complexities of industrial civilisation itself or to the economic
injusticies of capitalism, pluralist (1). aim accurately to describe the workings
of imperfect democracy and (2). have tended to praise the political sphere in
capitalist societies as securing at best some valuable elements of
democracy in an imperfect world.57 Western society, for another thing, is not
made up of homogeneous citizens. Rather, we have a number of interest
groups, coming together voluntarily or organisational in order to assert their
social identity and political demands.
This approach to policy determinance is particularly appropriate to the
analysis of social security policy development. As Eckstein points out, the
direct, personal costs and benefits of social policy programmes are highly
visible to broad social groups and prompt them to press for enactment or
modification.58
Several analysts have been particularly enamoured of this approach.
In his statistical study of public expenditures in seven 'capitalist' and seven
'communist' nations, Pryor speculates that variations in the level of pressure
group activity may ultimately be at the root of the differences in expenditures
on health and welfare programmes.59 Sanders' study of social insurance
development in the United States focuses on the role of certain interest
56 Dahl(1967), Ibid., pp. 414-415.
57 Gregor McLennan(1987), "Capitalist State or Democratic Polity? Recent Developments in Marxist
and Pluralist Theory," In Gregor McLennan, etal.,(Eds.), The Idea of the Modern State, Milton Keynes:
Open University Press, pp. 81-82.
58 Harry Eckstein(1963), "Group Theory and the Comparative Study of Pressure Groups," In Harry
Eckstein and David E. Apter(Eds.), Comparative Politics, New York: The Free Press, p. 395.
59 Prvor(1968), Ibid., pp. 172-173.
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groups and organizations in securing the adoption and subsequent
modifications of the American social security system.60 The importance of
this approach has also been recognised by several analysts of the subject in
Latin America. Perhaps the most forceful statement of this hypothesis is
found in the work of Camelo Mesa-Lago.01 In his extensive study on the
social security systems of five Latin American countries, Mesa-Lago contend
that stratified pressure group power best explains Latin American policy
development. The mosaic-like quality and uneven protection of the various
social security schemes result from variations in the power of pressure
groups, their relative abilities to articulate demands for coverage, and their
capacities to mobilize the political resources to procure the enactment of
social security expansion. Thus, discrepancies in the political and economic
resources of the military, civil servants, white collar workers, the 'labour
aristocracy,' regular unionized workers, and marginal sectors account for the
differential degrees of their inclusion in a scheme and the differences in the
quantity and quality of the benefits they receive. Mesa-lago does
acknowledge the potential role of other key political actors, such as the
social security bureaucracy and the governing elite, but concludes that the
pressure group stratification approach provides the most useful
interpretation of policy development in Latin American countries.62
In sum, this interpretation ensures that welfare policy is, at least in theory,
representing the interest or value of the greater majority. This political
pluralism assumes the nature of the state upon the premises that political
power is competitive, fragmented and diffused; everybody, directly or
through organised groups, has some power and nobody has or can have
too much of it. 63 The state, acting in response to a multitude of conflicting
pressures from organised groups and interests, can not show any marked
bias towards some and against others. While the basic theoretical
framework and much of the application of this approach have been
designed with reference to industrialised Western nations, this perspective
60 Daniel S. Sanders(1973), The Impact of Reform Movements on Social Policy Change: The Case of
Social Insurance. Fair Lawn, L.F.: R.E. Burdick.
61 Carmelo Mesa-Lago(1978), Social Security in Latin America: Pressure Groups. Stratification and
Inequality, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
62 Ibid., pp. 11-13.
63 Ralph Miiiband(1973). The State in Capitalist Society, London: Quartet Books, p. 4.
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has also been employed to interpret social security policy development in
some developing countries. However, as we have seen in the Mesa-Lago's
work, the result is quite different from the industrialised countries. That is, the
higher level of social security privileges and benefits which middle and
upper strata groups have obtained vis-a-vis lower strata group is a function
of their greater political power.
2.3.2. Evaluation.
In the literature on the political system and political processes, this
approach has been used extensively and is subject to measured
refinements and elaborations. It has provided a relatively well-developed
theoretical framework within which public policy outputs may be interpreted.
In particular, works like that of Mesa-Lago merit considerable attention for
the strength of their analysis and their theoretical clarity. Within the field of
public policy analysis, therefore, the pluralist perspective has obtained
considerable respectability.
Despite the existence of several studies which stress the role of interest
articulation and pluralist politics, the application of this theory has some
critical flaws.
The first problem is that the state is not the neutral arbiter as pluralism
suggests. The structuralist theory articulated by Poulantzas64 identifies the
state as the representation of the balance of class forces in society, a
balance which in capitalist societies always favours the dominant economic
class but which is still highly variable over time. Furthermore, many
dependency analysts such as Miliband, claim that the eventual purpose of
most state action is to benefit the rich by strengthening the long-term process
of capital accumulation and ensuring reproduction of the system. In the
process of development of capital accumulation marked by rapid growth and
exclusion, the working class is mobilised only economically and not
politically. As far as the society remains a capitalist system, that is a relatively
small number of people who own a markedly disproportionate share of
personal wealth, and whose income is largely derived from that
64 Poulantzas, N.(1973), Political Power and Social Classes. London: New Left Books.
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ownership.65 Miliband thus points out that the principal form assumed by
the 'relations of production' in these capitalist countries is that between
capitalist employers and industrial wage-earners.66 |n consequence, state
intervention in economic life means intervention for the purpose of helping
capitalist enterprise.67 He also analyses this process of state intervention as
the 'bias of the system' which is justified by the process in which: "the
ideological dispositions of governments have generally been of a kind to
make more acceptable to them the structural constraints imposed upon them
by the system; and these dispositions have also made it easier for them to
submit to the pressures to which they have been subjected by dominant
interests. "68
Hall and her associates also point out that political pluralists have
confused the political process with political power. They argue that there is a
possibility that policy-making takes place within an unequal distribution of
power. Therefore, they put forward a 'bounded pluralist' approach which
argues that the policy-making process operates within a distinctly pluralist
process, but that the limits of policy-making are set by elites which for many
purposes are indistinguishable from what Miliband calls the ruling class.69
In this conception, the interest groups are not necessarily equal in political
strength or economic muscle, nor can the state any longer be seen as a
neutral arbiter or switchboard. In particular, critical pluralists of this sort have
argued that the business corporation wields a disproportionate influence
over the state.7® By the same token, the analysis of the creation of social
security reveals a relatively small number of elite groups being represented
in the policy-making process because of the disincentives to organize
include costs such as time, money, and lost opportunity. Further, the
incremental nature of later changes dissipated resistance from an obvious
interest group. Based on these views, the state can not be expected to be a
major instrument for redistribution against the will of dominant economic
class interest. It can therefore be argued that the political pluralism of social
security policy development is only a surface appearance, concealing a
65 Miliband(1973), Ibid., p. 17.
66 Ibid., p. 16.
67 Ibid., p. 72.
68 Ibid., p. 73.
89 Phoebe Hall, et.al.,(1975), Change, Choice and Conflict in Social Policy. London: Heinemann.
p. 151.
70 Gregor McLennan(1987), Ibid,, p. 85.
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compromise of competing social values, and that state welfare is not a
consensual agreement of the whole society, but rather is a set of policies to
meet the long-term interest of the upper or upper-middle social classes.
The second problem is that the pluralists also overlook the fact that often
agenda-setting and actual amendment-writing are the most important stages
in the political process. It is in framing the outlines of the debate, for
example, that more radical alternatives can be discounted, before a single
debate occurs. And even though a group might oppose the original
legislation, once they realize that it is going to be passed, they often play a
part in writing the final piece of legislation.
Finally, the uncritical application of pluralist notions to the Korean context
is also open to serious question. The application of this theory to Korean
politics, is the only attempt to force Korean realities into a model developed
by Western political scientists to explain essentially alien Anglo-American
reality. That is because the bulk of the recent work on Korean politics
indicates that pure pluralist theory is simply inadequate to explain the nature
of the Korean political process and the development of governmental
outputs. In the Korean political environment, class politics is less salient than
in advanced capitalist countries. Under conditions of weak labour union,
subordinate working classes try to organise the labour unions as a socio¬
political force against the power bloc for the class interests.71 But with their
small size and diversity, combined with the government control, until
recently, their interests have not had real representation. If they
acknowledge that select high status group, such as prominent domestic
capitalist who have a solid interlocking relationship with key political elites,
they may be able to effectively press their claims and secure desired political
outcomes. These analysts contend that occupational organization such as
labour unions do not have this political capacity. Instead, they present
workers' organisations as fundamentally bound to the political regime over
legal recognitions. This permits extensive regime control of the activities of
unions. Thus, these 'pressure groups' are hardly in a position to make
autonomous demands for social security protections or secure
implementation and expansion of existing social security policies. This
increasingly prominent interpretation of Korean politics, therefore, issues a
serious challenge to the pressure group politics approach. Therefore, any
71 Byug-Baeg, lm(1987), "The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South Korea," World Politics.
Vol. 39 No. 2 p. 236.
72
interpretation of social security policy development in Korea as the product
of autonomous pressure group demands and the articulation of workers'
interests should be viewed with a certain scepticism. It is only conceivable
that the evolution of social security policy in certain industrialised countries
such as Britain7^ or Latin American countries7^ may be best explained in
this manner. Analyses which focus on the role of pressure group activities
and the stratified nature of their access to decision makers are not, however,
completely erroneous in Korean reality. It would be fallacious to assume that
the control and repression of the worker is monolithic and undifferentiated in
Korea. Likewise, it would be erroneous to assume that no connection exists
between the needs and interests of workers, and the types of social welfare
policies developed by the regime. There are quite notable differences in the
size, organisational structures, activities and economic importance of
different groups in Korean society. On the other hand, there are significant
differences in the extent and quality of social security protections which
different groups receive. Analysts operating within the pluralist framework
are right to point out variegated treatments received by different sectors of
Korean society and the notable discrepancies in their social security
protections.
Their error lies, not in their recognition of interest group plurality and
differentiated access to decision-makers, but in their excessive emphasis on
demand articulation, and their inadequate analyses of the power and
perogatives of key political elites. These notable modifications of the pluralist
perspective should, therefore, enable the analyst to selectively incorporate
insights offered by the pressure group politics approach and produce a more
realistic appraisal of the impact of pressure group activity upon social
security development in Korea.
2.4. The Authoritarian-Corporatist Approach.
In the pluralist approach, group pressure is generated autonomously
within society. The role of the government is hypothesized as that of 'broker'
between contending interests. However, a crucial assumption in corporatist
72 See, Rimlinger, G. V.(1971), Welfare Policy and Industrialization in Europe. America and Russia,
New York: Wiley. Part I.
73 Mesa-Lago(1978), Ibid.
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thought is that the state may not be a mere passive receiver of pressures
from groups. It may also exercise its own initiatives by using social security
as the instrument to co-opt, neutralize, and control those groups in order to
maintain some sort of social order. In an attempt to overcome a perceived
threat from so-called populist movements or from political mobilization by
'popular' sectors, some regimes have created a government structure which
excludes these groups as a primary element in achieving 'order' and 'social
peace.'74 This theory, therefore, stresses the linkage between the state and
the policy development, and is central to the state-centred model.
2.4.1. A Theoretical Approach.
The most rigorous contemporary specification of the concept in ideal-
typical has been provided in an outstanding articles by Schmitter:7^
"Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest intermediation
in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of
singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered, and
functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed( if not
created ) by the state and granted a deliberate representational
monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for
observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and
articulation of demands and support."
The objective of this definition is to distinguish 'corporatism' from other
types of 'interest intermediation,' such as 'pluralism' and 'syndicalism.' As
specified in the above definition, the differences between pluralism and
corporatism may embody alternative relations of power and influence: they
could have emerged 'from below' in more-or-less spontaneous response to
prior changes within civil society and the associational sphere itself; or they
could have been imposed 'from above' as a matter of deliberate public
74 O'Donnell, G.(1974), "Corporatism and the Question of the State," In Malloy J.(Ed.), Authoritarianism
and Corporatism in Latin America. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, p. 57.
75 Philippe C. Schmitter(1974), "Still the Century of Corporatism?" Review of Politics. Vol. 36. No. 1.
pp. 93-94. and Schmitter(1977), Models of Interest Intermediation and Models of Societal Change in
Western Europe," Comparative Political Studies. Vol. 10 No. 1. p. 9.
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policy contrived and controlled by preexisting authority groups.76 Initially,
therefore, corporatist analysis sought to go beyond classical pluralism,
suggesting not only a different institutional configuration in the relationship
between specialised interest associations and the political process, but also
a different way of conceptualizing the role and importance of the state.
Instead of pluralist's picture of many power centres based upon voluntary
groups, the corporatist theory reflected the increasing centralisation of
organised interest groups( especially capital and labour ). Moreover,
corporatism witnessed the special role of the state itself in constructing a
framework for both economic and political affairs. According to the
corporatist approach, the state is no longer seen as a primarily dependent
factor or variable; it appears to have been and is a primary actor in the
formation of interests and of civil society in society. With the conspicuously
enhanced, expanded role of the state, the causality conceived by orthodox
pluralist approaches—intermediary associations or class actors are the
producers of public policy, not its products— is inverted, if not perverted. Not
only might state authorities deliberately seek to create from above a
structural configuration of interest politics compatible with their type of
political regime and their policy goals, but the indirect and often unintended
impact of changes in public policy may determine the timing, form, internal
structure, area of representation, mode of action and type of leadership of
associations. Endowed with state sponsorship through legal privileges,
interest associations therefore are not always autonomous entities putting
pressure on the state from outside, but rather instruments of public policy
used by the state.
The introduction of corporatism as a widespread systematic process, with
corporatist structures playing a significant political and economic role, is
traced to the World War II period, even though corporatist tendencies in
liberal democracies may be traced as far back as World War I. The crucial
factor, and the factor that allows us to locate its development in a country like
Sweden, was the necessity of sustaining trade union cooperation during the
course of the war with the promise of continued prominence in decision¬
making after the war and a commitment not to return to prewar conditions,
the recognition that the experience of full employment and comprehensive
planning had led to rising expectations of a postwar rise in living standards
76 Schmitter(1977), Ibid., p. 10.
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and security on the part of the working class, the example of the Soviet
economy and the common regarding its effect on the working class in the
postwar period, and , finally, the mass radicalism that exhibited itself in the
electoral success of working class parties in the immediate postwar years.77
This provided the material basis for industrial militancy in the postwar period
and for the reactive introduction of incomes policies and social welfare
measures designed to coerce or induce wage restraint on the part of trade
unions. From its very inception, state social expenditure in the postwar
period was introduced with the threat of wage pressure a key element in the
policy equation. Therefore, corporatism refers to the widespread tendency
across the advanced capitalist countries for industrial relations between
employer and trade union organisations to be resolved and institutionalised
at the level of the state itself. In addition, it was the changing balance of class
forces which attended the commitment to full employment and the
consequent development of economic planning to deal with its
consequences that lay at the heart of capitalist development. To legitimate
this increased state-business interface, as well as to facilitate labour
cooperation at the level of industrial industries, joint consultative structures,
workers councils, and the like were often promoted.
In his articles, Schmitter outlined two subtypes of corporatisms: societal
corporatism and state corporatism. Societal corporatism is found embedded
in the political systems with relatively autonomous, multilayered territorial
units; often, competitive electoral processes and party systems; ideologically
varied, coalitionally based executive authorities—even with highly 'layered'
or 'pillared' political subcultures.78 To explain the emergence of societal
corporatism, Schmitter argues that:
"The roots of societal corporatism can be traced primarily to the
imperative necessity for a stable, bourgeois-dominant regime, due to
process of concentration of ownership, competition between national
economies, expension of the role of public policy and rationalisation
of decision-making within the state to associate or incorporate
77 Leo Panitch(1977), 'The Development of Corporatism in Liberal Democracies." Comparative Political
Studies. Vol. 10 No. 1. p. 77.
78 Schmitter(1977),_|bid., p. 11.
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subordinate classes and status groups more closely within the
political process.
Yet although the class structure and conflicting interests in capitalist society
have played a key role in generating societal corporatism, Schmitter
assumes that, once the institutions and systems of interest representation
have developed, the participating organisations tend to acquire a relative
independence from and even disregard for, the interests of the individuals,
sectors and class that they supposedly represent. The leaderships of the
organisations do not only or primarily 'represent' the interests of their
members in decision-making at different levels of the state. Once in
operation, societal corporatism is thus becomes a relatively stable and
resilient means for the dominant groups in bourgeois society to maintain
their dominance. Although Schmitter explicitly wanted to challenge the
pluralist interpretation, somewhat surprisingly he thus assumes that the
institutional arrangements of societal corporatism create a stability in the
capitalist democracies reminiscent of the stability generated by the
institutions for conflict resolution in the pluralist industrial model.
State corporatism, on the other hand, tends to be associated with political
systems in which territorial subunits are tightly subordinated to central
bureaucratic power; elections are nonexistent or plebiscitary; party systems
are dominated or monopolized by a weak single party; executive authorities
are idiologically exclusive and more narrowly recruited; and , finally, political
subcultures based on class, ethnicity, language, or regionalism are
rigorously repressed.80 According to this definition, state corporatism was
introduced concomitantly with the abrogation of liberal democracy and the
smashing of the indigenous organisations of the working class in order to
repress both political and industrial class conflict. The progress of corporatist
ideas since the late nineteenth century and the advent of authoritarian
'corporatist' regimes in the twentieth century have been strongly fostered by
critiques of parliamentary and party government. To be sure, corporatist
doctrines have not been unanimous in their assessment of universal
79 Ibid,, pp. 24-25.
80 Schmitter(1977), Ibid., p. 11.
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suffrage, parliament, and competitive party systems.81 This is still more true
of the praxis of authoritarian regimes which have adopted corporatist
devices. Having abolished free universal suffrage, the competitive party
system, and parliament government, modern dictatorships use alternative
techniques of consensus mobilisation: either disciplined mass 'movement'
or a system of 'state corporatism.'
The distinguishing structural and behavioural differences between the two
are seen to depend on whether the matter of the constituent units, in terms of
their limited numbers, singularity, compulsory character, and monopolistic
representation of functional groups is a product more of general
socioeconomic developments and voluntarist arrangements than of state
imposition, and whether the state's controls on their leadership selection
and interest articulation is a product of "reciprocal consensus on procedure
and/or goals", or of an asymmetric imposition by the organised monopolists
of legitimate violence."82
Even though many scholars have used the term one-dimensionally to
apply only to 'societal' or 'liberal' corporatism, corporatism as used in this
research focuses on the 'state' or 'authoritarian' representation. In other
words, we will focus on the state's group reciprocal influence on interest
groups, and their consequent employment as agencies of mobilisation and
social control for the state vis-a-vis their members.
As far as state corporatism is concerned, perhaps one of the most fruitful
theoretical advances is found in what Guillermo O'Donnel has termed
'Bureaucratic Authoritarianism'(hearafter BA).83 O'Donnell saw
bureaucratic authoritarianism as a particular type of authoritarian rule in
which the state, with a high level of coercive power, is run by a dominant
81 Gerhard Lehmbruch(1977), "Liberal Corporatism and Party Government," Comparative Political
Studies. Vol. 10 No. 1. p. 91.
82 Schmitter(1974), Ibid., pp. 103-104.
83 Guillermo A. 0'Donnell(1973), Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South
American Politics. Bekeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, and
0'Donnell(1978), "Reflections on the Patterns of Change of in the Bureaucratic Authoritarian State,"
Latin American Research Review, Vol. 13 No. 1. pp. 3-38.
For the debates on O'Donnelfs argument in various aspects, see David Collier(Ed.)(1979), The New
Authoritarianism in Latin America, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
78
coalition of military leaders, upper bourgeoisie and high level technocrats in
close association with foreign capital. Its political domination by those new
elite groups is assisted by a high level of state coercive power with a
dominant role in the executive branch. Its policy outputs or outcome appears
primarily to secure interests of big industrialists and foreign capital at the
expense of the interests of the popular sector including the working class. In
O'Donnell's formulation of the bureaucratic authoritarianism argument, state
corporatism, though defined as a set of structures linking society with the
state, should be principally conceived as a state-centred, coercive
institutional arrangement to 'incorporate' or 'exclude' the popular sector and
the working class in particular. No matter how applicable to other regimes or
countries beyond Latin America the bureaucratic-authoritarian model may
be, O'Donnell combines a concern for political structure with a concern for
who governs and who benefits.
Aurhoritarian-corporatism restricts the civil and political rights of the citizen,
curtails or abolishes free elections, doing away with political competition
between parties and parliamentary government, and above all deprives
trade unions of their autonomy and integrates them forcibly into the state
apparatus.84 According to the authoritarian corporatism, therefore,
responsibility for policy initiation ultimately resides in the hands of top
political leader. The leader pursues the programmes and policies which he
decides will enhance the overall stability of the system and promote the
general developmental interests of the state. Other political actors such as
the interest groups and bureaucrats, play an essentially reactive role. They
are encouraged to participate in the decision, but only after the leader has
already decided the nature of the problem and publicly sketched the
contours of the policy response to it. This limited participation permits the
leader and his key advisers to locate the sources of discontent, coopt those
who are dissatisfied, and undermine the opposition. He may permit certain
minor modifications of the programme to placate some dissenting sectors,
but if their opposition continues, he can ultimately force compliance and
quiescence through overt repression. Otherwise, he has a number of means
at his disposal with which to retain control over the bureaucracy. The high
degree of bureaucratic turnover enhances administrative dependence upon
84 Ramesh Mishra(1984), The Welfare State in Crisis: Social Thought and Social Change. Sussex:
Wheatsheaf Books LTD. p. 107.
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continued good relations with the leader, and affords the latter a large
degree of decisional control.
From this point of view, authoritarianism really contradicts the essence of
the corporatist welfare state, because where corporate structures remain,
their functions are not so much those of representation but control. How and
what light then does authoritarian-corporatism throw on the problem of
exploring and explaining the part which the state plays in formulating and
implementing social security programmes?
One of the main answers is that social policy has always been seen as
having a role to play in promoting socio-political stability.85 Although the
outcomes for the poor has often been positive, there seems little doubt that
the primary function of social welfare has been one of social control and
appeasement. A fundamental weakness of these regimes arises as a result
of their severing links with any popular base so that they are left without
adequate means to legitimatize themselves. That the nature of this provision
has changed significantly over the past two decades is a result of the failure
of traditional forms of appeasement. The state has been obliged to seek new
measures in order to guarantee stability. In these circumstances, an efficient,
well-managed system of social welfare provision may be an important
element in keeping the populace passive.88
In this respect, George and Wilding mentioned that the first and most
important way in which social services contribute to political stability is
through the amelioration or solution of problems which could provoke
serious discontent and might be used as an indictment of the existing
economic and political order.8? The easing of social problems, as they
suggested, has an impact on political stability in three different ways;88
First, it reduces suffering and so presumably discontent among
the victims of such problems; Secondly, social services greatly
reduce the ammunition available for would-be critics of the
85 Viv George and Paul WiIding(1984), The Impact of Social Policy. London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul., p. 187.
86 Peter Ward(1986), Welfare Politics in Mexico: Preparing Over the Cracks. London: Allen & Unwin.
p. 2.
87George and Wildinq(1984), Ibid., p. 189.
88 Ibid., pp. 189-215.
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established economic and political order seeking to challenge its
ability to respond to human needs and make good the ravages of
its economic orthodoxies; Finally, the easing of social problems
through social service provision shows the existing political order
in a new light. The established order assumes a new legitimacy
and so attracts new sources of loyalty.
Such ideas were adopted and developed by Western social scientists to
explain the development of social security programmes.
The first of these is Rimlinger's discussion of social security development
in Chancellor Bismarck's Germany in the 1880s.89 In the German context,
the social security programme was developed largely at Bismarck's initiative
in order to stifle labour discontent, undermine the socialist opposition, and
strengthen the loyalty of workers to the state. Although he was acting in
response to pressure from below, the system he created was guided by the
interests of the existing political order.
Beveridge's interest in social security, as Harris points out, stemmed from
his conception of society 'as an increasingly complex organism in which it
was desirable to foster social solidarity and feelings of identification with a
benevolent state.'90 Skocpol explains the development of Social Security
Act in the United States in similar terms, arguing that "it was state managers
who controlled policy initiatives, and the handful of big business involved in
formulating social security were not representative of their class."91 In their
research on the development of social welfare in the United States, Piven
and Cloward also argued that "relief arrangements are initiated or expanded
during the occasional outbreaks of civil disorder produced by mass
unemployment, and are then abolished or contracted when political stability
is restored."92
On the other hand, O'Connor describes how different forms of state
expenditure attempt to fulfil both the accumulation and legitimization
functions. Government expenditure, O'Connor argues, is grouped under the
two main headings of 'social capital' and 'social expenses'. While social
89 Rimlinger(1971), Ibjd., pp. 89-136.
90 Harris, J.(1977), William Beveridqe, Clarendon Press, pp. 102-103.
91 Theda Skocpol and Hohn lkenberry(1983), "The Political Function of the American Welfare State in
Historical and Comparative Perspective," Comparative Social Research. Vol. 16. pp. 87-148.
92 Piven F. and Cloward R.A.(1972), Cloward. Regulating the Poor, Tavistock, p. xiii.
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capital is concerned with accumulation and with increasing productivity and
profits, social expenses consists of projects and services which are required
to maintain social harmony—to fulfil the state's 'legitimization function.'93
The most obvious example, as he points out, "is the welfare system, which is
designed chiefly to keep social peace among unemployed workers."94
Gough argues that "the capitalist state simultaneously acts to organize the
dominant classes as a political force and to politically disorganize the
dominated classes."95 The dominant class may need to compromise and
make sacrifies in order to maintain its dominance, and it is out of this "unable
equilibrium of compromise" that social reform and social programmes result.
Unlike O'Connor, however, Gough argues that the welfare state, at least in
Britain, resulted from "the post-war settlement between capital and labour"
and not from "concessions forced from the state by militant working-class
struggle."96 |n other words, concessions were made by the dominant class
on the basis of self-interest, and not because the labour movement forced its
hand. It is only since the Second World War and the establishment of a
welfare state that the bargaining power of organised labour has been
sufficiently strong to make a significant impact. Although Gough is
suggesting that working-class or labour movement agitation were not very
influential in the development of social policy before 1939, he does argue
that more general and widespread discontent were important causal factors
at particular moments.97
With regard to the relationship between the modernizing authoritarian
regime and social security policy development, Malloy argues that "social
security policy in most Latin America flowed from a paternalistic elite defined
attempt to diffuse labour agitation and protect the status quo."98 Using Brazil
as a case study, he disagreed with Mesa-Lago's interpretation. He, then,
suggested that the state does not respond passively to the pressures
exerted on it by different pressure groups but usually takes the initiative for
93 James Q'Connorf1973i. The Fiscal Crisis of the State. New York: St. Martin's Press, p. 7.
94 Ibid..
95 Ian Gough(1975), "State Expenditure in Advanced Capitalism," New Left Review. Vol. 92. p. 65.
96 Ibid., p. 68.
97 Joan Hiffins(1980), "Social Control Theories of Social Policy," Journal of Social Policy, Vol. 9 part I.
p. 6.
98 Malloy, J.(1979), The Politics of Social Security in Brazil, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
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social welfare. Nor does the state function subsequently to the dictates of a
ruling capitalist class, as some Marxist writers have claimed. This, he
argued, is an oversimplified conception of the political process which fails to
recognise the growth of the poor of the state and the importance of state-
centred political realities in modern societies. Therefore, the development of
social security can best be conceptualised, Molly argued, in terms of a
corporatist model in which political and administrative elites use social
provisions to manipulate established tradition of state-craft and to maintain
the corporate structure. Although Malloy's interpretation is debatable, it
offers a far more sophisticated account of the use of social welfare measures
by elites than the over-simplified conspiracy theories which have enjoyed
some popularity in academic circles.99
Finally, what, then, can we say about state autonomy in the Korean context
and what light do state-centric case studies throw on the problem of
exploring and explaining that part which the state plays in formulating and
implementing social security programmes?
As we shall observe in the following chapters, Korea does not readily
comply with the classic model of 'bureaucratic authoritarianism.' Political
pluralism exists, and there is a close relationship between the state and
popular groups. However, state domination over civil society in Korea with a
high degree of state bureaucratization was even more strengthened in the
wake of the creation of the Republic as an 'anti-communist bulwark' in East
Asia and the Korean War—accompanying the violent political events which
forged anti-communism to a universal degree of ideological unity of
dominant elites and the populace in general, as well. Furthermore, the
division of the country and thereby 'the constant threat from the North'
justifies the state monopoly of coercive, economic and symbolic resources.
Under such circumstances, elite groups desiring to seize the state
apparatus emerge first, and then legitimize and institutionalize their
dominant role in defining the national interest and ordering its priorities.
Political institutions and private associations are either created or
restructured by political leadership. Further, weakly organised social or
political associations in strength, number and ideological allegiance
minimizes the coalitional possibilities avoidable to the state elites. With the
minimal role of the party and legislative body, important decisions are made
99 James Midqlev(1984). Social Security, Inequality and the Third World. Chichester: Wiley, p. 126.
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in a closed circuit by the chief executive himself and a handful of technocrats
and high ranking bureaucrats. A high degree of state bureaucratization and
ideological cohesion of the state elites would provide a supportive condition
for installation of authoritarian control over one of the most significant
producers' groups, industrial workers, to facilitate implementation of
industrial modernization as the regime's prime goal.
Therefore, these studies provide much substance to the entrepreneurial
elite interpretation of social security policy development in Korea. Each of
these studies either directly or indirectly illustrates the linkage between
authoritarian-corporatism and public policy. In particular, the Molloy position
on the applicability of this approach to the Korean context has considerable
plausibility, because, as we have mentioned already, the facts surrounding
the creation of the institution lend support to this theory.
To summarize, a general literature on the authoritarian-corporatist model
has emerged in recent years, and several analysts have analyzed the
authoritarian character of the Korean political regime and its impact upon the
public policy making processes. While no systematic application of this
perspective of social security policy development in Korea has been done,
the general lines of argument implicit in such an approach are readily
discernible. Utilization of this approach in our study of social security policy
development in Korea seems, therefore, to merit serious consideration.
2.4.2. Evaluation.
The authoritarian-corporatist approach focuses explicitly on the internal
dynamics of the political arena, and is uniquely sensitive to the realities of
power and conflict which are the essence of politics. It offers an analytical
strength which few approaches to public policy determinance can parallel.
Yet, this approach has also several notable problems in being applied to
the development of social security policy.
One of the basic problems of the corporatist model concerns its
epistemological status. Corporatism is defined as an institutionalised pattern
of policy-formation in which large organisations cooperate with each other
and with public authorities not only in the articulation of interests, but in the
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'authoritative allocation of values' and in the implementation of such
policies. The most important interest organisations included in the
corporatist pattern are organised labour and business. Therefore,
corporatism conceives of societies as a dualism between the state on the
one side and interest organisations on the other side. However, this has
some ambiguities. First, with reference to the former 'pole,' it remains
unclear what its theorists understand by the concept of the state. For
example, as the concept of corporatism is concerned with a description of
the link between the decision-making structure and interest organisations, it
would seen necessary to define which action units constitute the state: is it
the government, or the administration, or the parliament, or all three of these
units? As associations have to use different strategies when trying to
influence state decisions depending on whether they are made by the
government or by the parliament or by the administration, it seems to be
necessary to differentiate between the different possible counterparts which
interest organisations must meet within the decision-making structure.100
Secondly, when looking at the second 'pole,' it is not clear whether it should
include only occupational and economic organisations, or whether it should
also include a third one, namely, the socioeconomic structure or, more
specifically, the nature and extent of the unorganised population. The
decision to concentrate only on economic problems and associational
organisations should not justify the exclusion of 'noneconomic' interest
groups ex ante. Finally, it does not refer to the organisational level per se or
to the relation between the organisations and the social structure, but to the
link between state and civil society. Therefore, one should ask if a state
confronted with monopolistic associations representing the central economic
interests has any other alternative but to 'recognize' them in one way or the
other. Here it would be interesting to specify whether the state has control
over the context of the interests expressed, over how violently they are
passed, over the point of time at which they are articulated, and to which
stage of the decision-making process they are addressed(i.e., the initiating
stage, the consultative stage, or the final decisive stage). Influence
mechanisms by associations and means of control by the state respectively
will vary widely according to the area in which the state tries to control
100 Birgitta Nedelmann and Kurt G. Meier(1977), "Theories of Contemporary Corporatism: Static or
Dynamic?" Comparative Political Studies. Vol. 10 No. 1. pp. 41-42.
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interest articulation and the area in which the interest organisations try to
affect public policy.
In relation to the development of social security policy, the corporatist
approach has some problems. The first problem is that this approach is too
confining in its purely instrumental understanding of social welfare policy.
This approach generally argues that these measures have the intended
effect of maintaining social inequality by inhibiting the growth of class
consciousness and that political dissent class conflict is the key to
understanding the development of social policy. Therefore, the main theme
of this approach is that social policy does not evolve out of humanitarianism
or compassion but as a response by the ruling elites to threaten social
stability. Social control and an affirmation of the work ethic are its main
objectives. Ruling elites are said to act on the basis of certain predictable
patterns of behaviour, to defend their self-interest and to assert their
superiority. However, the converse of this argument must be considered.
There are many groups in the population, for example, who do not constitute
a threat to social stability but who have benefited greatly from the expansion
of social services. Many sick and disabled, and other groups outside the
labour market, do not really offer a threat to policy-makers, except in their
potential for embarrassing themJO"1
The second problem is that when mass disturbance occurs or is
threatened the result is always an increase in welfare spending according to
this approach. However, this view can hardly be held simultaneously with
the totalitarian notion of power implict in the social control thesis. There have
been situations in which mass disturbances has resulted in overt forms of
social control, such as an increase in police activity, rather than indirect
control through social policy. Policy-makers have to consider the influence of
middle-class anti-welfare attitudes on government decisions. In order to
substantiate this approach, therefore, we would need to look not only at the
effects of policy but at the motives of policy-makers. If social stability is one
outcome of policy, then it must have been desired as a primary goal.
However, if the outcome of social welfare programmes is manipulation or
stigmatization of the recipients, then this too must be related to the intentions
of policy-makers.
101 Joan Higqins(1978), The Poverty Business Britain and America. London: Martin Robertson,
pp. 17-18.
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This last limitation centres on its general applicability to the Korean
context. While no systematic or comprehensive study on the role of
authoritarian-corporatism in the development of social security policy in
Korea has been done, this approach suffers from two notable limitations.
The first of these deals with a general vagueness of definition which
characterizes several key concepts. The precise meaning of an
'authoritarian-corporatism' is very difficult to grasp and specify, because,
even though some characteristics of Korean politics are similar to those
found in the Latin American bureaucratic authoritarian regimes, some
Korean social scientists102 differentiate the Korean case from the
O'Donnell's Bureaucratic-Authoritarian model.
The similarities are:103
(1). The popular sector was politically excluded: competitive elections were
abolished; strikes were prohibited; the organisation of labour unions was
severely restricted; and basic human rights were violated arbitrarily.
(2). The popular sector was economically excluded. The primarily focus of
economic policy was on overall economic growth, but not on the
improvement in the standard of living of the middle and lower classes.
Korean labour was not allowed to share equitably in the distribution of
earnings from economic growth. Instead, the big bourgeoisie and the high-
ranking state bureaucrats monopolized most of the benefits from economic
growth.
(3). The regime tried to 'depoliticize' social issues in terms of technological
rationality. Efficiency, rationality, and social stability replaced democracy as
the basis on which the regime laid claim to legitimacy.
Despite these similarities in political consequences, the fundamental
factors that differentiate the Korean case from the BA model are:104
102 Professor Sang-Jin Han discussed the specificity in the rise of the Korean BA regime. See Sang-
Jin Han(1983), "Bureaucratic Authoritarianism and Korean Society," In Study Group on Sociology of
Seoul National University(Eds.), Tradition and Change in Korean Society, Seoul: Bummunsa.
pp. 261-197. In Korean.
103 Hyug-Baeg lm(1987), "The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South Korea," World Politics.
Vol. 39 No. 2. pp. 239-240.
104 Suk-Joon Kim(1991), "Crisis, Regime Change, and Development: A Quantitative Analysis of South
Korean Political Transformation 1945-1987," In Gerald E. Caiden and Bun-Woong Kim(Eds.), Ibid., pp.
and Hyug-Baeg Im, Ibid., p. 240.
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(1). The deepening hypothesis is inappropriate in the Korean case,
because the deepening of the Korean economy began in the mid-1970s and
was the consequence rather than the cause of a BA regime. The Yushin
regime was not justified by an economic crisis; instead, president Park
justified Yushin on the pretext of continuing economic development and the
national unification.
(2). Although there was more significant popular political activism in 1971
than earlier, there was no serious antiunion or antileftist fears among the
military, the uppor and middle class, and the state bureaucrats. Instead,
external factors, such as North Korean military threats and the Nixon
doctrine, facilitated security fears among the ruling class.
(3). Korea had established a strong state long before the rise of the Yushin
regime and the Korean case does not support the strong state hypothesis of
the BA model.
(4). The Korean state has dominated other ruling coalition partners, such
as labour unions, business organisations, and foreign capital, since 1960s.
Thus, no BA coup coalition that could have pressed for a regime change
existed on the eve of a BA regime rise in Korea.
(5). There was relatively little discernable deterioration of income
distribution despite the labour movement being repressed.
(6). Korea's foreign dependence was the consequence as much of its
peculiar security needs as of the government's economic policy.
Although the bureaucratic authoritarian model can partially apply,
therefore, its limitations need significant revision when using it for the
Korean case.
The second limitation in the context Korea derives from the exclusivity of
this perspective. The unqualified utilization of this approach suggests public
policies as the purposeful choices each coalition makes as it attempts to
solve the extent of social, economic and political problems. While this
approach may have grasped the fundamentals of potential power in Korea,
public policy formation and evolution in a complex society could hardly be
so simple or so consistent. In the Korean political system, emphasis on the
role and powers of the president and his immediate coalitions seems well
justified. But the importance of several countervailing powers, the constraints
imposed by socio-economic realities, and the complicated maze of
bureaucratic implementation mitigate against pure presidential dominance.
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Sometimes a president's proposals and goals have uneven success in
obtaining acceptance and implementation because the presidential
assistance and pressure for a proposal is not sufficient, in and of itself, to
ensure its successful end and because certain constraints, as Benjamin A.
Most mentioned, business associations have much more powers particularly
than was previously supposed. Decisional power of the president, therefore,
is constrained by situational imperatives frequently posed by the socio¬
economic context of the nation. Thus, we see some modification of the pure
authoritarian interpretation, and a recognition of the countervailing
influences of business groups and bureaucratic enclaves.
In sum, the president and his small coalition groups remain the most
consistently important source of public policy initiation and change in Korea.
And it seems that presidential approval is a necessary condition for major
policy innovation. However, presidential commitment may not be a
necessary and sufficient condition for the production of desired policy
outcomes. Therefore, any thorough analysis of social security policy
development in Korea must be sensitive to certain constraints on
presidential power, and make appropriate the interplay of various forces
influencing that development.
2.5. The Diffusion Approach.
The previous three approaches emphasized causes of social security
policy development within a nation. However, this theory which explains the
evolution of social security systems focuses upon the diffusion of policy
innovations in the international arena. According to this perspective,
international policy developments of a nation are influenced and informed
by similar policy developments which have occurred or are occurring in
other nations and regions of the world. As Rys has pointed out:
"no modern state exists in splendid isolation, independent of the
international community that surrounds it, the study of factors which
influence the establishment of social insurance in a country will
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necessarily have to go beyond the frontiers of a national community
and be considered also at the international level."105
The worldwide spread of social security programmes is not, therefore,
simply the result of nations independently responding in a similar fashion to
similar problems and needs, but, at least in part, the product of the diffusion
of models and concepts from innovative centres to nations throughout the
world. In particular, the diffusion of ideas and practices has been important
in the creation of their social services in the developing countries.106 The
range of any plausible account of the development of statutory welfare
services will remain seriously deficient unless the conventional domestic
focus of this research is broadened to analyze developments in many more
countries. Proper consideration must be also be given to the study of
exogenous factors when investigating the origins of welfare schemes in
different societies. 107
2.5.1. A Theoretical Approach.
Diffusion explanations have received only occasional attention in political
analysis though they have been widely used in other areas of research.108
However, the notion of diffusion is most frequently employed in the context of
Third World development in contemporary social science. This is because
the modernization theorists first applied it to describe the process by which
the industrial culture of the Western World is transmitted to the newly-
independent countries as an integral part of the development process.109
Used in this way, the concept of diffusion may refer to the development of
social welfare institutions through the exchange of information and views
between policy makers or to the adoption of the welfare policies or practices
105 Vlandmir Rys(1964), "The Sociology of Social Security," Bulletin of the International Social Security
Association, Vol. 17. No. 1. p. 4.
106 James Midgley(1984), "Diffusion and the Development of Social Policy: Evidence from the Third
World." Journal of Social Policy, Vol. 13, Part.2, p. 167.
107 Ibid., p. 168.
108 David Collier and Richard E. Messick(1975), "Prerequsites Versus Diffusion: Testing Alternative
Explanations of Social Security Adoption," The American Political Science Review. Vol. 69. p. 1300.
109 James Midqlev(1984), Ibid., P. 168.
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of one country by policy makers in another; it may result in the discerning
adaptation of foreign experiences or the uncritical replication of alien welfare
policies.''
While diffusion approach to social security policy development has not
been used extensively, several social analysts and members of international
organizations concerned with social security have referred to the role of
diffusion in the development of the modern social services in the industrial
countries. In his rough sketch of the major determinants of social security
policy development, Rys paid considerable attention to 'external factors'
influencing social security evolution.1'1'' He argued that enquiries into the
social policies of neighbouring states had long been undertaken by
European governments to assist them to develop their own welfare
provisions. As examples of what he calls the 'cultural diffusion factor,' he
notes that Lloyd George had the German social insurance programme
carefully studied before he introduced the first British social security scheme,
and the existence of advanced social insurance programmes in recently
annexed Alsace and Lorraine had a strong impact on the development of
social security in France in 1932.112 His analysis notes that migrations of
workers and reciprocal agreements in social security affairs can have a
harmonizing effect upon social security programmes in different nations.
Taira and Kilby have included an analysis of the role of geographical
proximity in their study of social security expenditures among the
industrialised, capitalist countries of the West and of Western origin.113 in
this analysis, they find clear differences between countries in the European
common market, other European countries, and non-European countries in
levels of spending for social security. While their argument merits serious
criticism for its inability to separate cultural, economic, or political influences
from geographical ones, this study does suggest that spatial diffusion may
have an impact on social security development.
110 Ibid., p. 170.
111 Rvs(1964). Ibid., pp. 26-33.
112 See also, Thomas Jones(1951), Lloyd George, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
pp. 36-37.
113 Koji Taira and Peter Kilby(1969), "Differences in Social Security Development in Selected
Countries," International Social Security Review. Vol. 22. pp. 143-145.
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In a study that attempted to explain the timing of adoptation of a nation's
first social security programme, Collier and Messick provided confirmation of
the theory that the national decision to establish a social security framework
is influenced by the prior establishment of social insurance programmes in
other nations."'14 This study focuses heavily upon the role of diffusion in the
timing of social security adoption in fifty-nine countries. They make an
important distinction between hierarchical diffusion and spatial diffusion. The
former refers to the initiation of social insurance schemes in the most
economically advanced nations of West Europe and their replication in
developing nations around the world. Spatial diffusion involves the 'spillover
effect' across neighbouring international borders or along lines of
communication and foreign trade routes. With regard to the timing and
sequence of diffusion, their central finding is that the adoption of a social
security programme is best seen as the product of hierarchical diffusion, in
which a diffusion process descends from the more advanced centres to
more backward regions. Data is presented which indicates that late-
developing nations tended to adopt social security policies at much lower
levels of 'modernization' than did the innovators of the programmes. Yet,
they assert that there exists a particular pattern of diffusion where the
development process originates not from top of a development hierarchy,
but rather from the lower part. The Chinese and Cuban models of economic
and political development have examplified the case.115 in the second
phase of social security adoption, spatial diffusion plays an important role,
with nations imitiating neighbours, while in the final stage, hierarchical
diffusion from centre to peripheries provides the dominant pattern. They
conclude that the diffusion of the innovation approach provides the most
important key to understanding when and why nations adopt a social
security policy.
Finally, these analysts note the development of a whole host of
international organizations and international agreements which are involved
in the dissemination of information, the provision of technical advice, the
drafting of legislative proposals, the setting of international goals and
minimal standards, and the organization of international conferences for
114 collier and Messick(1975). Ibid., pp. 1299-1315.
115 |bid„ p. 1314.
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experts and policy makers in the realm of social security. For example, the
activities of the Correspondence Committee of the International Labour
Organization played a major role after the First World War in spreading the
idea of social security from Europe to other parts of the world and supporting
the consolidation of the already existing systems.1Since that time, the
activities of groups such as the International Social Security Association, the
Ibero-American Social Security Organization, and the Inter-American Social
Security Conference have promoted the standardization of social security
legislation.117> In analyzing the history and activities of these organizations,
the conclusion is drawn that these international organizations have played a
notable role diffusing information about social security policy developments
and fostering the adoption of certain programmes and standards.
However, apart from these observations, the contribution of diffusion to the
development of local welfare scheme has not been widely considered. The
role of diffusion in the development of statutory social welfare in the Third
World has been equally neglected.118 Even though it has been proposed
that:
"given the frequency of scholarly and technical exchange
programmes, the general lack of experience and expertise, and the
continuing impact of the colonial legacy, one suspects that policy
borrowing is particularly prevalent among less developed
nations."11^
Only a few writers have attempted to incorporate the diffusion factor into
their explanations of the development of welfare services in the Third World.
The neglect of diffusion in explanations of social welfare in developing
countries, and the tendency to relegate it to an explanatory factor of
comparatively little importance, has resulted in the production of incomplete
accounts which seriously understimate the power of imperialism to shape
116 Isabel Craig and Igor Tomes(1969), "Origins and Activities of the ILO Committee of Social Security
Experts," International Social Security Review. Vol. 22. p. 509.
117 Collier and Messick(1975), Ibid., p. 1305.
118 Midgley(1984), Ibid., p. 169.
119 Howard M. Leichter(1979), A Comparative Approach to Policy Analysis: Health Care Policy in Four
Nations,Cambridge University Press, p. 66.
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social institutions in subjugated societies and to perpetuate them after de¬
colonization. 120
Moving from an analysis of the industrialised countries and the role of
diffusion to works which analyze the impact of diffusion upon Third World
social security policy development, therefore, we will draw attention to the
influence of colonialism and the international organizations. These two
elements are most influential in fostering the development of social security
programmes in the Third World.
The development of a social security system in the Third World is often a
product of the colonial heritage they share with such nations as Great
Britain, France, and Spain. Midgley, MacPherson and others drew attention
to the historical influence of imperialism and colonialism in the development
of Third World social policy. Although indigenous systems of welfare existed
in many Third World societies before the advent of European rule, modern
statutory social services in the Third World are not derived from these
provisions but from European conceptions of welfare which were introduced
during colonial times.121 During this period, the missionaries, voluntary
societies, colonial administrations and other organizations such as
multinational firms played a key role in the early diffusion of Western welfare
practices to the Third World. After independence, the colonial social welfare
has been fostered by sustained links between the developing countries and
their former colonial rulers. Aid programmes, designed to assist the
developing countries in pursuing the objective of modernisation, expanded
considerably during the 1950s and 1960s and, in the social welfare field,
these resources were used extensively to train social service professionals
and administrators in the metropolitan countries and to provide technical
expertise for the development of local social service facilities. 12 2
Furthermore, their dependence on foreign literature, regular academic
exchange and deference to the perceived excellence of Western
scholarship fosters a one-sided relationship and the continued diffusion of
knowledge to the Third World. A number of former French colonies in Africa,
for example, have implemented some sort of family allowance programme
modelled on the French system even though family allowance programmes
120 rnidalev(1984), Ibid., p. 175.
121 ibid., pp. 175-176.
122 ibid., p. 178.
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are generally among the last programmes to be established in most social
security systems around the world.123 Another example is that the
Beveridge Report of 1942 inspired nationalist leaders in a number of British
colonies and led to the appointment of official commissions in India and
Ceylon.124 These factors are illustrative of the power of imitation that often
accompanies the diffusion of social security systems in the international
setting. The constructs of imperialism and diffusion, therefore, provide
insights into the development of welfare institutions in the Third World which
are often more useful than the deterministic theories described earlier.125
Another important factor and source of diffusion of social policies and
practices is to be found in the activities of the international agencies such as
the UN, ILO, ISSA, WHO, UNESCO and World Bank, which have played an
increasingly important role, since the Second World War, in the incremental
development of the social services in the Third World. Through their
publications, international conferences and workshops, these organizations
have been enormously influential in fostering the development of social
policy in the Third World. Although they have not actively encouraged the
replication of the welfare systems of any single industrial nation, their
'modern' or 'scientific' approaches to welfare have facilitated the continued
transfer of inappropriate social policies to the developing countries.126
One of the first attempts to define and measure social need in the Third
World context arose out of the efforts of the United Nations to promote social
planning in the Third World. In the 1950s, UN publications of economic
issues made little reference to social welfare. At this time, however, the UN
actively encouraged the creation of schools of social work in developing
countries to train professional social workers for employment in government
Ministries of Social Welfare because those on social issues were generally
confined to social pathologies such as juvenile delinquency, prostitution and
drug addition. Many UN missions to the Third World at the time were
123 pau| Fisher(1968), "Social Security and Development Planning: Some Issues," In Everett M.
Kassalow(Ed.), Ibid., p. 242.
124 perrin, G.(1969), "Reflections on Fifty Years of Social Security," International Labour Review.
Vol. 99- PP- 249-292.
125 MacPherson and Midgley(1987) Jbid., p. 142.
126 ibid., p. 141.
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comprised of social workers who reinforced the residual approach by
equating need with social pathology.127
Eventually, this approach attracted criticism both from within and outside
the UN and in the 1960s the Economic and Social Council initiated a major
reappraisal of the organisation's social welfare activities.128 a key element
in this approach was the recognition that social indicators would be needed
to measure and monitor social progress. Although the UN had been
interested in social welfare measurement for many years, publishing one of
the first documents on the subject as long ago as 1954, it was the
involvement of the UN Research Institute for Social Development(UNRISD)
in Geneva, and particularly the contributions of Drewnowski(1970) and
MacGanahan(1970), that fostered the levels of living conceptualization.129
Since then, two major approaches to the definition of social planning have
emerged. The first approach equates social planning with social service
planning, or sectoral social planning as it is also known. Many of its
proponents are professional social workers or others concerned with the
provision of family and community welfare services in developing countries
but they also include writers on planning in other social services ranging
from health to social security. The second approach emerged in the late
1960s and early 1970s as a reaction against what was felt to be an
excessively narrow emphasis on the social services in social planning and a
neglect of broader social goals. There emerged what became known as the
unified approach; the UN International Development Strategy of 1970
spelled this out:
"The ultimate objective of development must be to bring about
sustained improvement in the well-being of the individual and
bestow benefits on all. If undue privileges, extremes of wealth and
social injustices persist, then development fails in its essential
purpose... qualitative and structural changes in the society must go
hand in hand with rapid economic growth, and existing disparities—
regional, sectoral and social—should be sustainially reduced.
127 Margaret Hardiman and James Midqlev(1982). The Social Dimensions of Development: Social
Policy and Planning in the Third World. Chichester: Wiley, p. 19.
128 Ibid., p. 20.
129 Ibid., p. 20.
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These objectives are both determining factors and end results of
development; they should therefore be viewed as integrated parts of
the same dynamic process, and would require a unified
approach."130
These proponents of the unified approach did not identify a specific
professional role or organizational responsibility for social planners as
distinct from economic planners but instead treated social planning as
socially committed economic planning.131 The views of the advocates of the
unified approach were subsequently endorsed by the Economic and Social
Council and the General Assembly in its resolution "The Unified Approach to
Economic and Social Planning in National Development" of 11th of
December, 1970.
By the end of the 1970s, however, the UN found that 'there is not evidence
that the real trends of economic growth and social change have
corresponded any better than previously to the ultimate objective.'1 32
Alternatively, therefore, considerable attention was paid to the 'basic needs'
approach. The essential element in the basic needs strategy is that the
needs of the poor must become the core of development policies. Among all
the arguments regarding the feasibility of such a strategy, perhaps the most
crucial issue is that of demands redistribution.133
Under pressure from the UN, many Third World governments have created
departments in their central planning agencies which are concerned
specifically with planning the social services; similarly, policy and planning
units have been established in ministries responsible for social security.
To summarise, a body of literature which notes the impact of policy
diffusion on social security policy development has emerged. While this
approach has played a less important and extensive role in the field than the
130 United Nations(1979), Social Development and the International Development Strategy. Geneva:
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, p. 2.
131 Hardiman and Midgley(1982), Ibid., p.20.
132 United Nations(1979), Ibid., p. 3.
133 Stewart MacPherson(1982), Social Policy in the Third World: The Social Dilemmas of
I inderdevelopment. Brighton: Harvester, p. 13.
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socio-economic interpretation, it has succeeded in calling our attention to an
important second variable.
2.5.2. Evaluation.
The diffusion approach to social security policy development provides a
very useful corrective to the narrow insularity of the nation state focus. By
pointing out the fact that the social welfare policy development of a nation
can be notably influenced by extant policies in other countries and by the
advocacy activities of international organizations, this approach adds a
critical dimension to our analysis. Yet there are several problems with this
interpretation.
First, the problem of diffusion theory lies in its theoretical underpinning
about the functions of social welfare services on the one hand, and in its
assumption of the nature of social development on the other. The function of
the social welfare service is defined as a paternalistic mechanism for the
well-being of the whole society which appears to be incomplete. According
to this approach, however, the development process of social change is
taken as a one in which the less developed societies have to follow suit with
the advanced ones. This perspective is rather attenuated. Since an
empirical study of the development of social welfare services in Western
European countries has led to the conclusion that a diffusion process alone
can not account for the establishment of national social security programmes
in these countries. Although diffusion processes may have influenced the
course of national decision making, the example set by a pioneer country
does not provide sufficient incentive to adopt social insurance schemes
independent of internal socio-economic problems and potential
mobilisation. Therefore, an explanation of social welfare development
merely based on a diffusion theory is bound to be incomplete and
inadequate.134
134 Peter Flora and Jens Alber(1981), "Modernization, Democratization, and the Development of
Welfare States in Western Europe," In Peter Flora and Arnold J. Heidenheimer(Eds), The Development
of Welfare States in Europe and America. New Brunswich: Transaction Books, p. 63.
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The second problem is that, as Midgley argues,135 many analysts
overemphasize international influences which have been a significant factor
in the growth of social security. In spite of the emphasis given to diffusion, it
must be recognized that endogenous factors played an obvious role in the
development of statutory welfare in the developing countries both in colonial
and more recent times. Some social services which were introduced in the
developing countries by the colonial authorities were not replications of
metropolitan practices but innovations which were thought to be appropriate
to colonial conditions. It is also the case that events within the developing
countries often provided the initial stimulus for the creation of modern
welfare provisions which set the process of diffusion into the nation.
The third problem is that, according to the neo-Marxian dependency
school, diffusion was not a neutral or benevolent process but one which
subverted local culture and national confidence and resulted in the
imposition of oppressive and alien institutions. Therefore, diffusion is part of
a more extensive and fundamental problem of dependency in the modern
world system. Within this system, following centuries of foreign domination,
the developing countries occupy comparatively inferior and less powerful
positions than those of the industrial nations. In this context, diffusion does
not amount to a considered transaction between equals in which the social
policy makers of the Third World discerningly select those elements of the
social services of the industrial countries which are suited to their needs.
Although there are exceptions, it has been a largely one-sided process
resulting in the creation of inappropriate social welfare institutions which are
perpetuated today by pressures of domestic social demands and
entrenched interests.
Fourthly, in relation to the third, a persistent problem exists in much of the
work on the role of international organisations. In several works discussing
these entities, advocacy appears to outrank analysis. In their hopes that
international organizations may became vital authorities and pace setters in
the field of social security, several authors tends to argue for the importance
of these international actors without clearly analyzing their direct influence
upon legislation and the implementation of social security policies. This
135 Midalev(1984). Ibid., p. 181.
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orientation can impede a realistic understanding of the actual role
international organizations have had in policy diffusion.
Furthermore, since most of their personnel and expert advisors were
recruited from the industrialised countries, and their recommendations were
based on their own experiences, the advocacy groups will misinterpret the
Third World reality and result in the creation of inappropriate social welfare
programmes.
Finally, in this study of the formation and evolution of social security policy
in Korea, the diffusion approach to social security policy development will
play a notable role. Several Korean analysts attached great importance to
the diffusive influence. In fact, the Korean social security policy development
was influenced by some foreign advisors in the international organisations
and foreign social security programmes, especially Japanese schemes. In
this research, therefore, the discussion of the diffusive influence will note
those characteristics and connections of social security policy which have
facilitated the adoption and development of a Korean system. The high
international visibility of the policy, as well as its progressive image and
accepted legitimacy, will be noted. Likewise, attention will be given to the
influence of international organisations in fostering certain models for policy
development.
2.6. Conclusion.
In this chapter, we have reviewed whether the formation and expansion of
social security policy in Korea can be explained through several different
approaches. Four major interpretations have been advanced at one time or
another, and each explanation can alert us to the possible importance in the
historical record of the Korean case. In reality, of course, each approach
carries within itself a number of contradictions and alternatives. They do not
have equal explanatory significance, nor are their explanatory capabilities
consistent through different phases of policy development. We agree,
therefore, that to search for a single approach is less useful than adopting a
more eclectic approach which draws on the strengths of different theories.
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As Alford has noted,136 the difficulty with single bodies of theory, or single
paradigms, is that "each paradigm has a tendency to claim more explanatory
power than it possess and to extend the domain of its concepts to answer
those questions it is actually unable to deal with."
Alford, R.(1975), "Paradigms of Relations between State and Society," In Lindberg, L.N., Alford, R.,
Offe, C.(Eds.), Stress and Contradictions in Modern Capitalism. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books,
p. 152.
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Chapter 3. Korean National Characteristics and the
Development of the Social Security Policy.
3.1. A Point of Discussion.
In the previous chapter, we examined four key approaches to the study of
social security policy development. It was designed to test whether the
modernisation process would lead to the emergence of social security policy
either as a response to structural-functional differentiation or as a pre¬
emptive policy to contain class conflict or social unrest. In other words, the
emergence of modern social welfare is seen as a dynamic development
process whereby a social security system is established within the
constraints of social, economic, political and diffusion factors in the course of
social change. Since social change is multi-causal, no single factor can be
responsible for the transformation of social structure. Moreover, in terms of
the dual nature of social reality, the process of social change and the rise of
modern social security have to be interpreted from both objective and
subjective perspectives.
In the meantime, it has been expounded in the previous chapter that the
social security policy development in the developing countries as a whole
has appeared different from that in the developed ones. It means that in
confronting social problems, the same solutions may not be applicable for
every country, and the consequences may not be the same for every
country. By the same token, the concert of four approaches needs to be
recognised in the Korean situation because various specific cultural and
historical factors form the unique social situation in Korea. Historical
experience and dominant cultural values are embedded in individual lives,
prescribing patterns of interactions among individual, family, community, and
nation. Those factors and the resulting situations might not have existed or
might not be similar to those in the Western experience of social security
policy development. Thus, an understanding of national characteristics is
signified.
Following this, we turn to an assessment of the general utility and
applicability of these approaches to the analysis of Korean social security
policy development prior to the establishment of the National Welfare
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Pension(hereafter NWP) programme of 1973 which is one of our main
research projects. Before embarking on a detailed social security policy
development, therefore, it is essential to have a brief outline of Korea's
historical development, and to look into the factors related to the
modernisation process, such as the traditional culture and social structure,
formation of values and ideologies, political organisation, and national
development strategies in relation to the social security development. This
chapter, therefore, will examine the development of social security policy
development in Korean society with the four factors found in the
industrialisation process as well as the variants derived from the historical
and cultural impacts of the society. Understanding both the determinants
and the variants will give a sense of the pattern and direction of social
security development in Korean society, which emerged out of a new social
context.
This chapter is divided into five sections.
Following the introduction, in the second section, we will examine the
inherent social characteristics. In particular, we will focus on the traditional
social values and structures, and the family structure in Korean society,
which is under review, and then, we will look into the function and changes
of these characteristics in the process of industrialisation and urbanisation.
The third section is a brief illustration of the historical development of the
Korean society. For this purpose, we will divide the process of historical
events into four stages: the legacy of colonisation(1910-1945), the American
Military Regime(1945-1948), the First Republic(1948-1960) and the Korean
War(1950-1953), and the Third Republic(1963-1972). Special attention will
be paid to its national development policy and political characteristics during
this period. As for the national development policy, like many other
developing countries, the governing leadership in Korea established
national development planning to utilise resources better from 1962. The
final result of planning is most often a formal plan which shows specific
courses of action necessary to achieve specific results. Social security policy
is usually incorporated as an aspect of these national development plans
because, as in a developing country, the Korean government has been
continuously faced with the problem of the allocation of scarce resources for
overall development, and, as a result, the Korean government can not afford
to separate social security policy from other public policies. Therefore, this
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section will describe the national planning system, the routine policy-making
mechanism, the characteristics of economic development, and the result of
economic development during the period concerned. As for the political
characteristics in Korea, we will focus on the relation between politics and
planning. By definition, politics and planning have a close relationship to
one another. Although numerous authors have put forth various
interpretations,"' politics is commonly defined as an authoritative allocation
of resource for a society. Since the two are so closely related, the study of
social security policy development usually necessitates a study of the
political situation which generated the planning effort. In addition, the
underlying assumption of the pluralist theory in relation to social security
policy development indicates the significant role of pressure groups and the
increase in the political pressure groups with their dynamic impact on the
emergence of state social policy. Therefore, we will also examine the
development of pressure groups in Korea.
In the section four, we will describe briefly the national income distribution
prior to the establishment of the NWP programme which was directly or
indirectly related to the development of social security provisions.
In the final section, we will examine the impact of national characteristics
on the development of the Korean social security programmes prior to the
establishment of the NWP scheme.
3.2. Confucian Political Culture and Social Policy.
3.2.1. The Confucian Ethic.
Korea's cultural heritage and traditional values and beliefs, which are
strikingly different from the Western countries in many important ways, have
a great impact on the development of social security policy. To understand
social policy development in Korea, therefore, it is important to identify
Korean culture and the value placed on the nature of man and society, and
hence to examine the way this culture and those values are applied to the
social problems.
1 See the discussion of definition in David Easton(1953). The Political System. New York: Knopf., p. 53
and pp. 128-130.
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Perhaps the most significant culture that has influenced Korean values and
their beliefs about social policy has been Confucianism, particularily, the
Neo-Confucianism. The Neo-Confucian doctrine of the Chinese philosopher
Zhu Xi( 1130-1200), which was first introduced into Korea during the late
years of the Koryo dynasty(932-1392) and which the rulers of the Yi
dynasty(1392-1910) adopted as their state ideology.
Neo-Confucianism combined the social ethics of the classical Chinese
philosophers Confucius(551-479 B.C.) and Mencius(372-289 B.C.) with
Taoist and Buddhist metaphysics and had as one of its basic assumptions
the idea that the rules and practices of the ideal human association are an
extension of the immutable laws of the universe.2 The Confucian tradition
valued external order and hierarchy within the society, while at the same
time emphasizing the collective aspect of the social order. The Confucian
cultural ethics are very strong even today, being extremely important in the
understanding of the roots and philosophical foundation of social welfare,
and provide very an important basis for the process of the development of
social security policy in Korea. However, the concern in this section is not in
the first instance with the cultural systems, but with the cultural influence on
the development of social security policy.
Hierarchy and authority are the heart of Confucian ethics and represent a
vertical order, not horizontal. According to Neo-Confucianism, society was
defined in terms of the "Five Relationships"(o ryun), formulated by classical
Chinese thinkers such as Mencius and subsequently sanctified by the Neo-
Confucian metaphysicians: "between father and son, there should be
affection; between ruler and minister, there which should be righteousness;
between husband and wife, there should be attention to their separate
functions; between old and young, there should be a proper order; and
between friends, there should be faithfulness."
Out of the five traditional relationships, only the last was a relationship
between equals; the others were based on authority and subordination. The
fifth, relations between friends, is based on equality, but Korean Neo-
Confucianism cautiously restrains it by establishing age and familial limits.
2 Frederica M. Bunge(1982), South Korea. A Country Study. Washington D.C.: The American
University, p. 65.
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The authority keeps the good society that means harmony, universal and
uninterrupted stability, and the order that can be seen in a past Utopia. To
govern a harmonious society, a monarch rules from the top of the socio¬
political hierarchy. According to Wright, the implicit values in Confucian
politics are those of harmony, stability, and hierarchy based on absolute
authority of a well-ordered hierarchy; the Ultimate Li(Supreme Ultimate) in
politics came by the effect of a benevolent ruler with the assistance of group
elites in an ideal form of aristocratic administration.3
Under the Confucian tradition, political culture can be characterized as a
hierarchical view of political life-authoritarianism- on the part of the ruling
elites and a corresponding subordination on the part of the ruled.
Hierarchical subordinating is the heart of Confucian politics. The vertical
order preserved the good society ( or highest good) which meant a
harmonious, universal, and uninterrupted society.4 The politics of
Confucian harmony aimed at political stability through the governing of
changless ruling elites and not through the conflicting balance and the
struggle of divergent dialectical forces in search of an ever-changing
societal synthesis. On the Confucian political ideology, therefore, the public
opinion of the masses had nothing to do with policy making or with the
administration of public affairs. Mass political behaviour had long been
executed toward elite dominance and control of hierarchical institutions
without popular participation. Mass sentiments are more manipulated by
elites, rather than elite values being influenced by the sentiments of masses.
For the most part, communication between elites and masses flows
downward. It never occurred to the Korean ruling elites, given their
Confucian perspective, that a stable policy might be based on the
participation of divergent/pluralistic forces of the society as a whole because
the masses were assumed to be incapable of anything but servile
followership. Without the participation of the masses, the ruling elites
monopolized the power of policy-making, and became consolidatory force in
a highly centralised aristocratic bureaucracy.5
3 Arthur F. Wright(1962), "Values, Roles, and Personalities," In Arthur F. Wright and Denis
Twitchett(Eds.), Confucian Personalities, Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 6.
4 Bun-Woong Kim(1982), "Confucianism and Administrative Development Interventionism," In Bun-
Woong Kim and Wha-Joon Rho(Eds.), ibid., pp. 135-136.
5 Ibid., p. 137.
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Confucianism's preoccupation with setting everything, and especially
human relations into a universal and 'rational' order produced a situation
where persons became isolated from each other by a labyrinth of formalised
positions and attitudes. The ruler-ruled relation was, therefore, one of
impersonal hostility. The agents of the central government made little effort
to ingratiate themselves to the people. Rather, their attitude was that of a
superior class whose ambitions were not to be questioned or hindered by
the people. Throughout traditional Korean society, from the royal palace and
central government offices in Seoul to the humblest household in the
provinces, the themes of hierarchy and inequality have been pervasive.
There was no concept of privacy, self-determination, or the rights of the
individual. In sum, the effect of Confucianism on the popular psychology of
the Korean people can be characterised as follows: (1). hierarchical view of
life; (2). authoritarianism on the part of ruling class; (3). a corresponding
'submissiveness' on the part of the ruled; (4). a 'face/or status-oriented'
consciousness; (5). the well-ordered family.6
3.2.2. Social and Family Structure.
A. Social Structure.
Korea never developed a system of feudalism even though there were
tendencies in that direction prior to the establishment of a Yi dynasty in
1392. The Yi dynasty which was founded in that year quickly eliminated all
retainers and military groups of provincial officials or nobility. All political
power was concentrated in the hands of the central government at the
capital in Seoul. The Yi dynasty of Korea, which ruled for 520 years, was a
monolithic and centralised authority.
By the time of the 18th and 19th centuries the dynasty had developed a
socio-economic system that consisted of four main strata. These were the
scholar-officials, collectively referred to as the Yanqban; the Chunqin.
technicians and administrators subordinate to the Yangban; the Commoners
or Sanamin. a large group composed of farmers, craftsmen, and merchants;
6 Tae-Rim Yoon(1970), The Mental Structure of Korean People. Seoul: Hyunamsa. pp. 125-268.
In Korean.
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and the Chonmin or 'base people', a pariah class composed of slaves,
prostitutes, butchers, convicts, and other social outcasts.
The Yangban were the political, social, and cultural elite and had no
competitors for the highest positions in Korean society. Their authority was
based on their complete identification with Neo-Confucian orthodoxy. In the
strictest sense of the term, Yangban referred to government officials or office¬
holders who had passed the civil service examinations that tested
knowledge of the Confucian classics and their Neo-Confucian
interpretatious.
The social structure was designed, at least in theory, to reflect the four-
stratum division of society envisioned by Confucian doctrine: at the top of
society there were the literate and educated aristocrats(sa); next there were
the farmers(nong), the only really productive members of society; next came
the workers in industry(kong) who, according to Confucian thought, really
add nothing to their products, merely change their shapes. Therefore,
people in their sector provide less service to society than farmers do and are
accordingly a lower-grade power; fourth and almost at the bottom of society
were the merchants(sang) whose contributions to society were considered
to amount to nothing. The only exchanged one article for another in order to
profit for themselves. At the bottom, and actually off the list as such, were a
variety of outcaste jobs such as butchers, workers with leather and
executioners.
In the context of the wider society, a pyramid exists consisting of a well-
defined elite of scholar-officials versed in Neo-Confucian orthodoxy,
dominating—in the proper, preordained sequence—the lower strata of
farmers, craftsman, and merchants. This was legitimised by the traditional
ethical distinction between the character of the 'gentleman' and that of the
'small man', a central theme in the writings of Confucius and Mencius.
Ideally, in a Confucian state there should be no conflict since each person
and group knows his status and pays homage to the person above him. Yi
dynasty Korea, however, never attained such a perfection of Confucianism
that conflict was eliminated.
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B. Family Structure in Korea.
(1). Traditional Korean Concept of Family.
One of the characteristics of Korean society, in earlier days, before the
country was opened to foreign influences, as well as in modern times, is the
strong bond between the members of one family, a bond which endures as
long as one lives. In a sense, it even continues unbroken beyond the
individuals' lives and through the generations.7 The family is seen as the
most basic social system. From a functionalist point of view, the family
constitutes the fundamental unit in integrating its individual members into a
cohesive structure performing social, political, and economic activities.
However, the concept of family in Korea is perceived quite differently from
that of Western society. In the Western society, family is seen as composed
of unique individuals and emphasises individualism, equalitarianism, and
rationalism. But in the Korean society, the family is seen as composed of
members who are bound together by obedience, inequality and authority. It
will, therefore, prove to be an appropriate alternative to focus on the family
itself in lieu of the society as a whole, and further to examine the functions
inherent in the Korean family and its changes, in particular with association
to industrialisation and urbanisation.
According to Confucian thought, the family is the basic system of society.8
Out of the five traditional Confucian relationships, three are family
relationships: father-son, man-woman and elder-younger. The remaining
two, though not family relationship, can be conceived of in terms of the
family. The person in the position of superiority, that is, the father, husband,
and elder, has the right and duty to make decisions for and to take care of
the inferior. The inferior, son, wife, or younger, has the duty to obey and be
loyal to the superior.9
7 B.C.A. Walraven(1989), "Symbolic Expression of Family Cohesion in Korean Tradition," Korea
Journal, Vol. 29. No. 3. p. 4.
8 Jai-Seuk Choi(1982), A Study of Korean Family. SeoulJljisa. In Korean.
9 Thomas Hosuk Kang(1971), "The Making of Confucian Societies in Tokagawa Japan and Yi Korea: A
Comparative Analysis of the Behaviour Patterns in Accepting the Foreign Ideology, Neo-Confucianism,"
Unpublished Ph.D thesis, The American University, p. 62.
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Among these family relationships, the relationship between father and son
was considered the most important pattern since, especially in the case of
the eldest son, this was the link through which the family would be
perpetuated. This is because, reflecting Mencius' comment that of all unfilial
acts the worst is to deprive one's parents of posterity, the most important
concern for the family group was the production of a male heir who would
carry on the family line and perform ancestor rituals in the household and at
the graveside. The first son customarily assumed leadership of the family
after his father's death and inherited his father's house and a greater portion
of land than his brothers in order to be in a position to carry out the ritually
prescribed obligations to the family's ancestors.
The primary social role for women, on the other hand, was the production
of a male heir for their husband's families. According to the Confucian
custom, once married, a woman had to leave her parents' household for
good and occupy the lowest position in her husbands' family. The duty of a
woman to her husband, or rather to her husband's family, as defined by the
third of the Five Relationships, was absolute and inflexible. Furthermore, Yi
dynasty law prohibited widows from remarrying, although a widower could.
(2). Filial Piety.
The traditional family consciousness in Korea expresses itself as the gist
of "filial piety" which attaches the greatest importance to father-son
relationship. The nature of the relationship between parents and child is that
the parents should act toward the child with 'nurture' and the child should
return it with 'filial piety and absolute obedience.'10 Thus, filial piety has
been a cardinal value of traditional Korean society. Filial piety, the first of the
Five Relationships, defined by Mencius as the affection between father and
son, was a central concept of the ethical system. Although Mencius
described it as essentially an emotional bond, it entailed a large number of
reciprocal duties and responsibilities between the generations of a single
family and for the most part came to be identified as an unequal relationship
in which the son owed the father unquestioning obedience.11 Broadly
speaking, filial piety involves the principle that a son is worth existing only for
his parents. There is an unconditional superior-inferior relation that exists
10 Jung-Dong Ryu(1982), "Royalty to the King and Filial Piety Based on Love," Asian Quarterly. Vol. 18.
pp. 41-42.
11 Bunge(Ed.) (1982), ibid., p. 71.
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between parents and children, and, by extension, between all superiors and
subordinates in society. The traditional concept of filial piety can be
classified into direct and indirect filial piety.
(1). Direct filial piety involves the following—
1). Submission: you should respect your parents, not as equal beings, but
by recognition of the fact that you are inferior to them. As an expression of
this submission, you should do whatever you are requested to do, and take
food and wear cloths they prepare for you, even if you dislike them. To do so
is to manifest your sincere submission.
2). Attendance: You should always be ready to do every kind of chore for
your parents, such as folding up their quilts and pads, providing them with
basins of water to wash their faces and hands, and helping them when they
want to move about.
3). Realising what your parents intend: It is proper for a son to realize
what his parents intend and to follow what they would wish even after their
death. But it is also necessary for a son to enjoy what his parents enjoy;
respect what his parents respect and get along well with persons with whom
his parents have good relations, even though the son himself is reluctant to
do so.
4). Solemn performance of the funerals of parents: When his parents die,
a son should perform the solemn funeral ceremony according to the
mourning rites. He should build a serving room where the spirits of his
parents may be preserved. For three years the son also should: eat only
water and gruel, use a different room from his wife, avoid useless talk with
others, and never seek a warm place in winter nor a shady spot in summer.
5). Solemn sacrifice for deceased parents: A son should prepare food for
his deceased parents as if they were alive and still beside him. He should
continue with his whole heart to observe this religious celebration according
to the prescribed rules.
(2). Indirect filial piety requires observance of the following precepts:
1). Do not exhibit extraordinary feeling of love for your wife.
2). Have an heir as the successor of your family.
3). Be loyal to your king.
4). Get along well with your friends.
5). Perform every action at the proper moment as a manifestation of filial
piety.
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No one can carry out filial piety to an excessive degree; it is boundless.
The exercise of filial piety is also unconditional. A son should devote himself
totally to his obligation of filial piety, whether or not his parents carry out their
responsibilities. Filial piety is a value in itself and absolute obedience and
submission is always equal to love. Any violation of filial piety is not merely a
moral defect, but also a crime.
(3). Traditional Kinship Organisation.
Early description of traditional Korean social structure cites the
overwhelmingly familial character of social relations. Not only did formal ties
of kinship determine social behaviour and values between related
individuals, but the structure of these relations and the Confucianist ideology
that supported them were used as a model for social relations throughout
the entire society as well. The crucial importance of the structure and
ideology of a traditional kinship organisation has proved highly resistant to
change. The family is a paternal system, transcending time, inherited from
the progenitor of the external family or clan and linked to all of its offspring. In
this regard, family and clan are rarely differentiated in Korean culture. The
individual Korean, therefore, is part of a complex clan and kinship
organisation that extends beyond the nuclear family unit and exists on four
levels.
At the lowest level the basic unit is the household, consisting of husband
and wife, their children and , if the husband were the eldest son in his family,
his parents as well. The eldest son's household, the stem family, was known
as the 'big house'(kun jip), while that of each of the younger sons, a branch
family containing husband, wife, and children only, was known as the 'little
house'(jakunjip). It was through the stem family of the eldest son that the
main line of descent was traced from generation to generation, and the
weight of tradition bore most heavily on him and his wife.
The second level of kinship is the 'mourning group'(dongnae), which
consisted of all those descendants of a common patri-lineal ancestor up to
four generations back. The central purpose of this unit is ancestor worship.
The third level of kinship organisation is the lineage(pa). The lineage is
traditionally not only responsible for ancestor worship, but also for the aid of
poor or distressed lineage members, the education of children at schools
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maintained by the Pa, and the supervision of the behaviour of younger
lineage members. Because most villagers were members of the same
lineage in traditional times, the Pa performed many of the social functions on
the local level that are nor performed by public schools, police, and social
welfare agencies.
The fourth and most encompassing kinship group is the clan or more
accurately, the surname-origin group(dongsung dongbon). In many cases,
its only real function was to define the limits of available marriage partners.
Because of a very strict rule of exogamy, people from the same surname
could not marry even though they might only be very distantly related.
These four levels are tied together by the Confucian principle of filial piety,
the practice of ancestor-worship, and the law of exogamy, which
distinguished relatives from non-relatives in the most precise way. For
example, village leaders are lineage elders and self-help organisations
such as Kye(credit associations formed by small numbers of persons for
various objectives), Ture and Pumasi(communal aid institutions formed
during the harvest time) are usually limited to members of the same Pa or
lineage. Under the circumstances, the individual is required to behave as a
representatives of a certain family or clan rather than as a unique individual.
3.2.3. The Passing of the Traditional Social Structure.
Several aspects of the Confucian ethic have been discussed, providing a
sense of what values and attitudes have molded social behaviour. The
question to be addressed now is to what extent do the aspects of the
Confucian ethic discussed above continue to exist in Korean society and
characterize the social behaviour in this society.
During the twentieth century Koreans have seen their country become a
prize in great-power rivalries, undergo thirty-six years of exploitive colonial
domination, suffer a disastrous civil war, and contend with virtually
continuous political upheaval. During this time Korean social patterns have
undergone changes concomitant with the transformation of a society that
was highly mobile, urbanising rapidly, and in many other respects
experiencing an industrial revolution.
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At the end of the nineteenth century Western influences began to penetrate
Korean society, effecting changes in the social stratification and values of
the stagnant Yi Dynasty. The victory of modernised Japan over China in the
war of 1894-1895 marked the end of the traditional China-centred
international order, and after the Japanese made Korea a colony in 1910,
they systematically dismantled the old society on both the local and national
levels. The old social strata lost their legal status: Yangban and Commoners
were made equal before the law, and slavery and the category of 'base
people' or Chonmin, were abolished. The civil service examinations based
on Confucian subjects were discontinued, and more modern ways of
selecting officials for government service were proposed. In addition, after
annexation the Japanese began a comprehensive land survey in order to
establish land ownership. Traditionally all land belonged to the king, who let
it out in the form of grants to government offices, provided schools, scholar-
officials, and other privileged subjects. Although specific parcels of land
tended to remain within the same family from generation to generation,
including the communal land held by lineages, there was no institution of
private property in land until the Japanese confirmed individual titles of
ownership during the nine-year survey. As a result of the land survey, rural
society was radically transformed. Local Yangban who collaborated with the
Japanese were able to hold onto their land and maintain their privileged
social and economic position; those who did not were plunged into poverty.
Farmers whose families had tilled the same land for generations but who
could not prove ownership in a way satisfactory to the colonial authorities
had their holdings confiscated. This land was either held by the government
or given to influential individuals who came to constitute a new landlord
class. The farmers themselves either became tenants or were forced to
leave the land.
While two new classes-agricultural entrepreneurs and a rural proletariat of
tenants—were growing up in the countryside, the Japanese built railroads,
schools, and hospitals, and developed a modern system of administration.
The new, modern sector required technically trained experts, and although
the top positions were invariably occupied by Japanese, Koreans worked on
the lower levels as secondary technical and administrative personnel.
During this period, Western forces also began to modify Korean traditions.
The influence of Christian missionaries is thought to have had a particularly
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strong impact.12 To the early missionaries the veneration of ancestors was
unacceptable and in conflict with their own religious beliefs; therefore, they
directly attacked Confucianism. Because Confucianist ethics underpin the
family structure, this attack was in effect an attack on basic social order.
Missionaries also exercised significant influence on the reform of women's
education.13 Conversion to Christianity encouraged women to emerge from
their seclusion in the home and attend churches and schools, work outside
the home, and participate with men in social affairs.
The process of change accelerated after World War II. Since then, four
developments were particularly significant for Korea's social mobilisation.
The first was the land reform, which was carried out by U.S. and Korean
authorities between 1945 and 1950. The institution of private property was
retained in the countryside, but the American Military Government
confiscated and redistributed all land held by the Japanese. After the land
reform in 1950, the percentage of tenants in the farming population fell from
48.9 percent to 7 percent in 1965; the amount of land farmed by tenants fell
from about 60 percent to 15 percent in the same period. A new class of
independent, family proprietors was established.
The second development was the great influx of repatriates and refugees
from overseas and from North Korea. Between 1945 and 1949 almost 2
million Koreans returned to South Korea from Japan, Manchuria, and other
foreign countries. Moreover with the establishment of a communist state in
the north, large numbers of refugees( estimated about 1.1 million) fled to the
south by 1947 and were joined by about 2.1 million more during the Korean
War. Most of these refugees settled in the cities—new recruits for the
country's industrial labour forces.
The third development was that the Korean War itself was responsible for
the continued erosion of traditional values and the increasingly fluid nature
of the society. The War brought all Korean men into the armed forces,
through which they were exposed to a way of life and with modern
technology and the values that accompanied it.14 The War displaced large
segments of the population; there was a large influx of refugees from the
12 Nena Vreeland et.al.,(1975), Area Handbook for South Korea, 2nd Edition, Washington D.C.:The
American University, p. 91.
12 Ibid.
14 Ibid., p. 94.
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North, many of whom resettled in communities without traditional social ties
and obligations.
The fourth was the economic development after the military coup in 1961.
The industrial development provided much of the impetus for the promotion
of values of scientific and economic rationality and technological expertise.
Furthermore, by the late 1960s Korea's cities had become the focus of
dynamic change as millions of people left their rural villages and the all-
embracing kinship system for the cities and salaried employment in new
industries and commerce. This process raised the business class and
modern managers as a new elite class because it had had a low status in
traditional society. Industrialisation and urbanisation had an impact on family
too. Rapid industrialisation had developed occupational and regional
migration which had been accompanied by family dissolution. With this
family separation, the normal family pattern consistent with the progress of
industrialisation has become nuclear family or conjugal family. It is assumed
that the modern industrial system is usually more compatible with the
conjugal family which is centred on the married couple rather than on large
kinship.Technological revolution and business management have
enhanced occupational mobility and demographic migration. Migration from
rural to urban areas has broken down the extended family system of
traditional society, and obliged it to move to the nuclear family system. As the
nuclear family is based on the principal of equality, patrichial dignity
weakens notably. As we can see in the Table 3-1, Korea is beginning to
follow the trend of nuclear family system.









1966 5.7 67.7 24.0 2.6
1970 6.8 70.0 22.1 1.1
1975 13.3 69.5 16.7 0.5
Source: EPB(1985). Social Indicators in Korea.
15 William J. Goode(1980), "World Revolution and Family Patterns," In Arlene Skolnick and J.H.
Skolnick(Eds.), Family in Transition, Berkeley: University of California, pp. 45-51.
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Furthermore, industrialisation and urbanisation have lowered dignity for
the aged, pushed the aged generation away from the society, decreased
their roles and lowered traditional respect for the aged.16 These changes
began to soften the rigidity of social stratification; yangban status was no
longer an automatic guarantee of political power, the pressures dictating
deferential behaviour on the part of commoners were eased, and patriarchal
relationship has been to some extent replaced by democratic and
egalitarian relationship.
As much as Korean society has changed during this period, nevertheless,
it has remained deeply rooted in the traditions of the past. The centuries-old
habits of social behaviour could not be legislated out of existence at a
stroke; former yangban thought of themselves as adhering to a higher code
of ethical behaviour than common folk and retained a strong aversion to
physical labour. The economic basis of yangban superiority, particularly
their hold on landownerships and wealth, remained in force, so that status
as a former yangban still carried considerable weight. Even though there
have been differences in forms of government, authoritarian traits have also
continuously existed. In addition, the ruler-ruled relationship of traditional
Korean ethics experienced little basic change and no large discontinuities in
its movement. It is probably not necessary to chart the course of government
relationship with the people since, during the colonial period, the Japanese
and Korean governments' policies were always one of oppression and
hostility. Indeed the Japanese colonial regime and the subsequent Korean
rule of Rhee and Park would seem to have been quite amenable to their
perpetuation. It can therefore be considered that traditional patterns of
behaviour have been carried over into the modern, individual situation of
Korea in the 1960s.
In particular, as far as the family is seen to be the basic unit and last resort
of individual security, there is no doubt that the Korean family has still largely
retained its function as the help and support system internally not only within
members of a family, but within members of the same clan or lineage. At
both the top and the bottom of Korean society standards other than those of
strict merit are apt to be used in the distribution of favour and benefits.
16 Sun-Nam Choi(1984), Modern Society and Welfare of the Aged. Seoul: Hongikjeh. pp. 141-144.
In Korean.
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Although the stagnation of the Yi Dynasty is not likely to return to the
Republic of Korea, the primacy of the kinship organisation that was
established then is likely to retain its potency for some time to come.
Finally, the following two examples have shown that the convergent
development of family structure towards stem or nuclear type does not
necessarily bring out the same trend in the extended family values which
rest upon collectivism and move towards individualism. The first example is
that, although family life has changed radically in the transition from the rural
village to the large city, urban people are not disconnected or atomized.
During New Year and Chusok(the Autumn Harvest Festival), the trains and
highways are jammed with people travelling to visit living relatives and
graveyards in other parts of the country.17 Furthermore, the urban
individual, whether he is head of a large conglomerate or a newly arrived
migrant from the countryside, is apt to deal with the world of strangers
outside his doorstep by relying on a well-established network of kinship or
quasi-kinship connections for assistance. The second example is that,
although many women work outside the house, the dominant conception
particularly for the middle class, is that the husband is the 'outside person'--
the one whose employment provides the major source of economic support-
-and the wife is the 'inside person' whose chief responsibility is the
maintenance of the household. Probably the most important responsibility of
the woman is the management of her children's education. Given the
extreme importance of education for social status and economic
advancement, the wife must see that the children keep up in their studies. If
they fail in school, it is a great loss of face not only for her but for her
husband and his entire family. As a consequence, the tendency remains for
working women to leave the labour force when they get married.
As we can see in these two examples, therefore, it can be concluded that
the contemporary family structure in industrialised Korea has moved in
favour of a stem or nuclear family but still with extended family values and
ideals.
17 The year of 1991 case, the government estimated that about 44 percent of population(20 millions)
would traveling during the Chusok holidays(21-23, September). To take a measure to meet the traffic
congestion, therefore, the Ministry of Transportation held special meeting under the superintendence of
the Vice-Minister on 13th of September, 1991. See, Hankuk llbo(European Edition), 14 September,
1991. p. 14.
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3.2.4. The Impact on the Social Security Policy Development.
Confucians assume that man can not live alone because he is a social
being by nature and must live among other men; men group together under
a bond; and men act in structured situations according to certain principles
and expectations. Confucian's basic interests and concerns are with human
ties and interactions and with reciprocal relationships with men among men.
This Confucian culture reflects on the reciprocal altruism and many Koreans
continue to maintain the old tradition of ritual and civility. One of the most
outstanding examples of mutual support in Korean society is the Hvanavak.
a village code to establish a system of mutual support. The spirit of the
Hvanavak is embodied in four objectives that emphasize: mutual
encouragement of morality, mutual supervision of wrong conduct, mutual
decorum in social relationships, and mutual succor in time of disaster or
hardship. Through this mechanism, community members help each other
in the promotion of business, the correction of mistakes, the furtherance of
civic pride and community problem solving.
Kve, a mutual financial association, is also an outstanding example of
reciprocal altruism in Korea. Everyone who becomes a member of the
association has equal rights and obligations, regardless of their age or their
social status. A Kve is a kind of communal benefit. Every member of a Kve
contributes a fixed amount at each monthly meeting over a period of time.
The most popular Kve is the mutual financing association for funerals. When
a parent of one of the members dies, the members of the association are
obliged to make donations of a certain amount of money.
Regardless of this culture of mutual support programmes, the traditional
characteristics, such as the Confucian ideology, the authoritarian form of
government and the family system, impeded the development of a modern
social security system. In this context of political culture, there has been no
direct channel through which the masses can influence the ruling group to
meet their needs. In the given situation, the authority did neither realise the
importance of social security policy nor consider such policy in government
decision-making. Changes and innovations in social security institutions
came about as a result of redefinitions by elites of their own values. The
ruling elites use social policy as a effective instrument for social control.
18 Ki-Baik Lee(1984), A New History of Korea. Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, p. 207.
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During periods of political stability, when pressures for development of
social security programmes occur, the ruling elites, acting on the basis of
Confucian political culture of subordination of the ruled and authoritarianism
of the ruler, purposely retain and reinforce traditional values by the
introduction of the official ideology of loyalty to the nation, to preserve the
status quo. Changes in social policy occurs when events threaten the
political system, and political elites introduce new social security systems or
expand the scope of current social security systems. This limited government
role results from the fact that in the monarchial system of the dynasties,
assertion of political and economic equity by the populace inconceivable,
and the people did not challenge the situation; so the dispensation of equal
justice through litigation according to law was not expected or called for.19
The important point in relation to the family is that, whatever direction
individual relations in Korea might take, most Koreans have been heavily
dependent on the family structure for their survival in Korea. Those in need
in Korea were traditionally supported by the extended family or the
neighbourhood through mutual concessions. The recent changes, then,
might be that the lagged effect of changes in the family during this period will
have an impact on the creation and direction of the welfare system in Korea.
Even though urbanisation and modernisation has eroded most personal
support systems, however, government has minimally alleviated the
problems of the acute poverty. Social services have been seen to provide a
minimum standard. The strategy for social security policy development
mentioned by the MOHSA suggest that Korea, as a developing country,
when dealing with social security, should try to maintain spiritual aspects by
promoting the traditional social values and cultivating the merits of the
traditional family system to supplement the social security and welfare
system.20 Furthermore, the Korean government promulgated a national
charter for old people on 8th of May, 1982, which is based on a belief that
the concept of filial piety is still a strong influence on parent-child relations,
and on the manner in which society in general views old people. Based on
this belief, national social and economic policy is being directed toward
19 Se-Jin Kim(1972), "National Government and Politics in South Korea," In Se-Jin Kim and Chang-Hyun
Cho(Eds.), Government and Politics of Korea. Silver Spring, Maryland: The Research Institute on
Korea's Affairs.
2cThe Bureau of Social Welfare, MOHSA(1979), Ibid., p. 30.
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reaffirming the responsibilities of families to care for old people rather than
emphasising policies to foster the social and economic independence of old
people. The amended Old-Age Welfare Law on 30 th of December, 1989,
was also based on the old notion that a sound family atmosphere centred
around the elder members, and a filial piety to parents, while pursuing
welfare policy as a prime objective of the nation.21 In that sense, the basic
principle of the law was "...to give more priority on assisting those elderly
people living with their families than those who are being accommodated in
welfare facilities by raising the amount of the old parent supporting
allowance and the exemption level of inheritance tax, giving higher priority
in purchasing new apartments, and paying old-age allowance."22 The law
expected that such measures would promote the atmosphere of support and
respect for the aged. The social security system in Korea, therefore, has not
developed along with changes in the family system, but concomitantly with
the economic growth and the general trend of social change in Korea.23 |n
conclusion, the underdevelopment of social security policy can be explained
by traditional social values and customs.
3.3. Korean Social Policy Development in Historical Context.
Throughout much of the 2,200 years of their recorded history, Koreans
were able to retain their status as the 'hermit kingdom' and a strong sense of
their racial, linguistic, and cultural homogeneity until 1876 when,
succumbing to Japanese demands, Korea was forced to open its doors to
the outside world. Since this time, Korea has been beset by successive
calamitous events which have brought destruction and profound distress to
all portions of society. During the period of the world-wide expansion of
Western imperial countries, Korea or Yi Dynasty was incorporated into the
capitalist world system as a peripheral country. Korean history in the
following 40 years was to be the process through which Japan made Korea
a colony despite the strong resistance of the Korean people. Korea was
21 Young-Ki Ahn(1990), "A Study on Amended Old-Age Welfare Law," The Korean Journal of Policy
Studies. Vol. 5. p. 105.
22 Ibid., p. 126.
23 The Bureau of Social Welfare, M0HSA(1979), "Changing Family Patterns and Social Security
Protection: The Case of Korea," International Social Security Review. Vol. 32, No. 1. p. 27.
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forcibly deprived of its sovereign rights and its people were subjected to
Japanese colonialism from 22nd of August, 1910, to 15th of August, 1945.
This was a period in which the economic and other benefits of Japanese
rule have to be weighed against the oppression and exploitation that
characterised colonial status. When Japan was defeated in World War II,
Korea emerged as a divided country, a victim of the new cold war. The North
became a pawn of Soviet power, the South of American power. The South
was run by an American Military Government(AMG) from 1945 to 1948,
when the first national elections were held and an independent Korean
government, the Republic of Korea, was established. The Korean War begin
in June 1950, less than two years later. Battles raged up and down most of
the peninsula until the front stabilised around the 38th parallel in 1951 and a
truce was signed in July 1953.
3.1.1. Korea Under Japanese Rule: 1910-1945.
(A). Japan's Colonial Policy in Korea.
There were three periods of Japanese colonial rule: the first was the period
of subjection, suppression and appropriation that lasted until 1919; the
second was the period of 'accommodation and appeasement' between
1920 and 1931, which brought about some relaxation of colonial control and
allowed the educational and cultural development of Korea; and the third
was the period of Japanisation and industrial development from 1931 to
August 1945.24
During the first period, a variety of momentous changes took place in
Korea. These changes to a large degree brought about the end of dynasties
which was Korea's education and culture, as well as economic and social
system. Japan governed Korea under a regency-general and subsequently
under a governor-general directly subordinate to Japanese premiers. The
nature of the Japanese government can be surmised by the fact that all of
the governor-generals were high-ranking Japanese military officers. Until
1921 they were not allowed to publish their own newspapers or organise
political or intellectual groups.
24 Ibid., p. 224.
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Nationalist sentiments gave rise to a Korean student demonstration in
Japan, and on 1st of March, 1919, to a Proclamation of Independence by a
small group of leaders in Seoul. With the consolidation of what became
known as the 'March The First Movement', street demonstrations led by
religious groups and spontaneous demonstrators erupted throughout the
country in protest against Japanese rule. The 'March The First Movement'
brought a change in Japanese administrative policy in Korea from military
administration to one based on a so-called cultural policy. The main
contents of the cultural policy were the change from military police to civil
police, increased employment and a better treatment of Koreans, and
permission for Koreans to have limited freedom of press and organisation.
During the first two periods, Japan's initial policy was to increase
agricultural production in Korea to meet Japan's growing need for rice.25 |n
order to build the economic base for military rule over Korea, the Japanese
carried out a large scale land survey from 1910 to 1918. The land survey
established the capitalist social relations by available the land as the major
means of production at that time. The main results of the land survey were
that one-third of the most productive land was in the hands of the Japanese
and over 300,000(eventually nearly one million) Japanese had entered
Korea in pursuit of economic advantages.26 An army of displaced Korean
farmers was forced, under the most arduous circumstances, to wander
aimlessly or to resettle, many of them in Manchuria and Siberia, where,
subsequently, the politically active among them became attached to
revolutionary communist politics; for this reason, Korean communism must
be judged to have been initiated in Japan.27
Japan had also begun to build large-scale industries in Korea. Under the
protective Company Law issued in December, 1910( to be effective on 1st of
January, 1911 and expire in 1920), however, the Japanese seized
opportunities to dominate commercial and industrial fields. The law required
that all commercial and industrial companies in Korea have Japanese either
as co-investors or as managerial staff, in order to obtain government
licences. Japanese owned firms were not subjected to this law.
25 At that time, Japan had a difficulty of obtaining rice, and , in the end, the Rice Riot was raised in
1917.
26 L.L. Wade and B.S. Kim(1978), Ibid., p. 10.
27 Ibid.,
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However, the ascendancy of the military in Japanese politics in the 1930s
changed the tide again. Particularly after 1937, when Japan launched its
expansionist war against China, the colonial government decided on a
policy of mobilising the entire country for the cause of the war. Not only was
the economy recognised as being on a war footing, but the Koreans were to
be totally assimilated as Japanese. The government also began to enlist
Korean youth into the Japanese army as volunteers in 1938, and then as
conscripts in 1943. During the third period, Japan's political and
administrative control in Korea remained firm once Korea had became
formally a part of the Japanese empire.28
To be sure, the 36 years of Japanese rule significantly influenced Korean
culture and society, although only limited segments of Korean life were
affected. Japanese influence was most evident in the administrative and
legal fields.29 Substantial inflows of Japanese administrators and their
systems and capital brought changes to Korea's administrative, economic,
and legal structures. The legal doctrine, as introduced and put into effect in
Korea during the Japanese colonial administration, however, was used as a
mechanism of control. It was not a liberating or protective device. Such a
strong legalistic bent not only had evidence in administrative practice in the
Japanese era but also in university teaching in that period. And this basic
orientation was retained in Korean bureaucracy as well as in academe in
the post-liberation period.30 The impact of the Japanese was limited,
however, by the restrictions placed on Korean participation in economic and
political planning and management, and the customs and structures of
Korean society as a whole were not deeply affected.31
28 Han-Kyo Kim(1973), "The Japanese Colonial Administration in Korea: An Overview," In Andrew C.
Nahm(Ed.), Korea Under Japanese Colonial Rule: Studies of the Policy and Techniques of Japanese
Colonialism. West Michigan University, The Centre for Korean Studies, p. 43.
29 Parvez Hasan(1976), Korea: Problems and Issues in a Rapidly Growing Economy. Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 26.
39 Hahn-Been Lee and Sin-Taek Kang(1982), "Development of the Study of Public Administration in
Korea," In Bun-Woong Kim and Wha-Joon Rho(Eds.), Korean Public Bureaucracy, Seoul: Kobo
Publishing Inc., p. 19.
31 Hasan(1976), Ibid., p. 26.
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(B). Development of Social Security Policy During the
Japanese Rule.
In accordance with the diffusion approach, which we have seen in the
Second Chapter, the development of a social security system in the Third
World is often a product of the colonial heritage. Although indigenous
systems of welfare existed in many Third World societies before the advent
of European rule, modern statutory social services in the Third World are not
derived from these provisions but from European conceptions of welfare
which were introduced during colonial time.32 Based on this theory, even if
some doubtful question arose, European colonialists made a great
contribution to the development of social security policy in their colonies. At
this point, our question is "does this approach apply to all cases?" In other
words, was Japan, a non-European colonialists, also conducive to the
development of social security policy in her own colonies, especially in
Korea? To solve this question, first, we will explain briefly the Japanese
social security system during this period, and then, we will examine how far
the Japanese colonial authority applied these schemes to the Korean
society.
During this period, Japan had a relatively well-developed social security
system. The Health Insurance Law, which is the first Japanese social
insurance scheme, was promulgated in April 1922, and enforced in 1927.
The law covered most of the workers. The National Health Insurance, which
was enacted in 1937 and enforced in 1938, covered primarily the farming
population, and organised as a voluntary establishment, not by compulsory
requirement, provided only 50 percent of medical expenses either in cash or
services and was certainly not adequate. The Welfare(Employees) Pension
Insurance of 1941 was a scheme covering most of those covered by Health
Insurance, for the aged, those with permanent disability, and for survivors.
Other than these schemes, Seamen's Insurance Scheme(1939),
Unemployment Insurance Scheme(1947), and the Industrial Injury
Compensation Insurance Scheme(1947) were enacted by the Japanese
government.
32 Midqlev(1984), Ibid., pp. 175-176.
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The rule of Japanese who were influenced by Western society did little to
inculcate Western liberal values such as egalitarianism.33 Even though the
Japanese colonial authority planned to assimilate the Koreans into
Japanese culture and to construct a strong logistic base for Japan's
continental expansionism, even so, the Japanese did not enact any of these
schemes for the welfare of the Korean people. Furthermore, the Korean
people were not allowed to participate in political activities, nor were they
able to challenge the situation for their own welfare. The main reason was
that the Japanese aims in Korea were only to exploit human and natural
resources in order to aid the economic development and war preparations of
Japan. Therefore, the limited role of government to develop social security
policy was not changed; only temporary and curative measures were taken
in the case of disaster, old age, and sickness.34 jhe benefits were very
limited and sporadic.
Only the Poor Law, which was enacted in Japan in 1929 and implemented
in 1937, was enacted in Korea 15 years later, but it was not put into effect at
all. In spite of this, the law was important because it was the first legal
document that gave the government responsibility for the poverty, sickness,
etc. of the people, and it further guaranteed the minimum standard of life. A
few social security institutions were administrated by the Japanese
governor-general in Korea, but major private institutions were carried out by
the Koreans during this period. Social welfare facilities in 1927 included 3
neighbourhood welfare services, 10 personal counselling services, 4
housing services, 8 job information services, 25 child welfare services, 26
poor relief services, 24 correctional services, and 2 services for aged. 35
In conclusion, in the period of the Japanese rule, the government neither
played nor was expected to play a role in social policy. Consequently, the
direct diffusion effect would not apply to the Korean case at this period.
33 Ibid.,
34 In-Hyub Chana(1981). Introduction to Social Welfare. Seoul: KDI., In Korean.
33 In-Hyub Chang(1985), "Korea, South," In John Dixon and Hyung-Shik Kim)Eds.), Ibid., p. 179.
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3.3.2. Korea Under American Military Government(AMG):
1945-1948.
(A). The AMG's Policy in Korea.
Korea regained its independence in 1945, but this did not bring release
from political and economic problems; in fact, the first years after
independence were extraordinarily difficult and influenced the pattern of
subsequent political and economic events. There were increasingly bitter
power struggles in the South and an almost complete breakdown in the
economic, political, and social order. But the separation of the nation into
two states had the most far-reaching effect. The geophysical characteristics
of the Korean peninsula make it an economically interrelated unit, with the
large mineral deposits and hydroelectric facilities in the North
complementing the predominatingly agricultural economy of the South. The
division of the country destroyed this interdependence of the economy. It
gave the South less than half the land, about three-fifths of the population,
most of the agriculture, and very little of the industry.
The three years from the surrender of Japan in August 1945 to the
establishment of an independent Republic in August 1948 were marked in
Korea by internal political struggle and by constant friction between the AMG
in the South and the Soviet occupation forces in the North. The AMG of
South Korea began on 9th of September 1945 shortly after the formal
surrender of the Japanese forces on Korean territory south of the 38th
parallel. For the examination of the AMG's policy, we have to consider the
nature of the American occupation forces in South Korea and ask whether it
was a liberator or a conqueror, and whether it was different from or the same
as the Japanese colonial forces. Indeed the three years of this period were
significantly influential on the post-liberation Korean political and socio¬
economic development. The U.S. government, of course, asserted the
liberator's view and the Koreans received the Americans as such, but the
Americans acted as the conquerors. According to the army manual, Korea
was treated as a conquered enemy country, but Japan was treated as a
liberated friendly country. This treatment contradicted our common
knowledge that Japan was one of the major enemies of the U.S. during
World War II, and Korea was liberated from Japan as the result of Japan's
defeat in the war. However, this contradictory treatment of Korea and Japan
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can be understood when we consider the U.S. foreign policy in the post-war
period, that is, the cold war policy, which included two basic elements: anti-
Soviet and anti-revolutionary in the Third World countries.36 On the basis of
these two principles the AMG's Korean policy was established, so that the
change from Japanese to Americans as the ruling foreign forces in Korea
did not make a fundamental change in the nature of the state.
This was because the only American interest in Korea was to build an anti-
communist bulwark which was based on the support of the conservative
Korean allies and opposed to the revolutionary Korean nationalists. Korea
was becoming very important for the U.S. military strategy because Korean
territory would became the only area of the northeast Asian continent not
under communist control since the Soviet Union consolidated its power in
North Korea, and since the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-Shek had
begun to falter in China. For this purpose, the U.S. reorganised all Korean
social, economic, and political structures.
In decolonised Korea, the two most important political issues were the
punishment of the pro-Japanese collaborators and land and industry
reforms which were owned by Japanese and their collaborators. However,
the AMG ignored this need for revolutionary changes of the South Korean
economy and society, and pursued a policy to maintain the status quo and to
support the conservative Koreans. Let's look at why these three issues were
necessary in decolonised Korea.
First, under Japanese rule, only those who supported the Japanese
colonial forces could maintain their prestige as large landlords and wealthy
businessmen. The colonial bureaucrats directly participated in the Japanese
exploitation and oppression of the Koreans. These former pro-Japanese
collaborators could easily transform themselves into being pro-American
and anti-communist, because they needed a new protector against the
nationalist Koreans who wanted to punish them and confiscate their
properties. Under the auspices of the AMG, they established the Korean
Democratic Party(KDP). In an awkward effort to give Korea a semblance of
self-administration, on 5th of October, 1945, the AMG appointed an eleven-
member Advisory Council, which was originally supported by the KDP. Nine
members of the council came from the KDP and one of them became the
36Richard Barnet(1972), Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World. New York: A
Meridian Book, pp. 19-20.
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chair. But the representative of the Korean People's Republic(KPR) was in
the north, and Un-Hyong Yo refused to participate in a council so dominated
by collaborators. As a result, the various political leaders who had been
keeping alive the flame of independence were not recognised as official
representatives of the Korean people by the AMG. Among them was a
group, the Provisional Government of Korea, who had been refugees in
China.37 Advised by these men, the AMG surrounded itself with a choice set
of rich collaborators and KDP leaders. With the support of these bureaucrats
in the AMG, the KDP could elevate itself from a weak political group to the
ruling party under the AMG, while helping the AMG suppress its political
rival, the KPR. The KPR was forced to transform from a de facto Korean
government into several political parties and finally to abolish itself.
Secondly, the land reforms meant fundamental changes in the economic
system of agricultural South Korean society. Decolonised Korea needed
wide-reaching land reforms in order to democratise the exploitive social
relationship between the landlords and tenants, and to solve the problem of
the miserable poverty of the peasants. Korean agriculture had serious
problems, the resulting legacy of forty years of Japanese colonisation. The
Japanese colonial forces maintained the use of landlords as a means of
exploiting Korean peasants. As a result, the proportion of tenants among the
total peasants had increased from 35 percent in 1913 to 54 percent in 1941.
Including semi-tenants(24%), more than three-fourths of Korean peasants
were exploited by landlords.38 Furthermore, tenants were forced to pay land
rents with 50 or 70 percent of the principal crops raised usually in a small
area of less than one chongbo(2.45 acres). Therefore, Korean peasants or
tenants led lives of miserable poverty. In 1930, 48.3 percent of the total
Korean peasants and 68.1 percent of tenants were starving.39 Moreover, in
decolonised Korea, the population increased rapidly because of the
repatriates from Manchuria and Japan, most of whom were former peasants
and wanted farm land. Thus, it was necessary to confiscate the lands owned
by Japanese and Korean landlords and to redistribute them to the tiller
37 Channon McCune(1966), Korea: Land of Broken Calm. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.,
p. 101.
38 The minority Japanese and Korean landlords who accounted for only 3% of the total agricultural
households owned 50 or 60 % of the total cultivated lands throughout Japanese rule.
39 Kyong-Sik Park(1986), Japanese Imperialism's Control of Korea, Seoul: Chonga. p. 507. In Korean.
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peasants, not only to democratise the exploitive relationship between
landlords and tenants but also to restore the South Korean economy and to
solve the problems of large unemployment and the miserable poverty of
peasants.
However, the AMG wanted to keep the old order. Since the AMG had the
landlords' group, the KDP, as its Korean ally, a fundamental land reform
could not be expected. Instead, the distribution of some lands to tenants or
the 'small scale revolution' made by people's committees was to be undone
by the Americans. The pressure for land reform was so great that the AMG
was forced to announce a programme for reducing the rate of land rent in
October, 1945. The pressure for land reform was greatly increased after a
fundamental land reform was carried out in the North in March, 1946.40
Thus, the AMG reluctantly announced on 15th of March the sale of former
Japanese-owned farmland to the tiller peasants. The land price would be a
sum five times the value of the annual production and would be paid yearly
with one-third of the crop for fifteen years.41 However, the Americans did not
even keep their own word. The Americans gradually realised that neglect of
the continuing demand for land reform, like that implemented in the North,
could provide the conditions for the rapid increase of revolutionary leftists.
Thus, the AMG assigned the job of drafting a land reform law to the Korean
Interim Legislative Assembly(SKILA), which was established in December,
1945, the majority of whose members were landlords and their supporters.
The draft law which the SKILA made in December, 1947, stipulated the
following: confiscation of the lands owned by the Japanese without
compensation and the lands owned by Korean landlords with
compensation; distribution of the lands to the peasants and the refugee
repatriates with charge. The SKILA could not reach an agreement to make
the draft a law until the time came when it was abolished in March 1948.42
Planning to hold a general election on 10th of May in South Korea, the
Military Government could not postpone land reform any longer because the
peasants accounted for three fourths of the population. Moreover, the
Americans needed to make concessions to the peasants in order to alleviate
40 The land reform in the North was characterised by confiscating the lands owned by Japanese and
Korean landlords without compensation and distributed them to the tenants without charge.
41 Hirosi Sakurai(1982), "Reexamination of the Korean Land Reform," In Chong-Sik Lee et.al.,
Rethinking of Contemporary Korean History. Seoul: Tolbegae. Trans, from Japanese. In Korean.
42 Sakurai, Ibid., pp. 13-17.
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the strong opposition from the revolutionary Korean nationalists to the
separate elections in South Korea alone. The AMG announced the sale of
former Japanese-owned land on 22nd of March, 1948. Thus, finally the AMG
carried out a partial land reform.
Finally, the American control of South Korean economy became concrete
when AMG declared to take-over the Japanese properties in South Korea.
As a result, the AMG came to control 80 percent of the total South Korean
capital, or 94 percent of the total investment in manufacturing industry.43
The AMG's permission to sell and buy Japanese properties was in
contradiction to the Korean's general belief that all Japanese properties in
Korea were originally Korean properties which had been exploited by the
Japanese for forty years. This policy was the AMG's attempt to help its
Korean collaborators, because only the collaborators had the wealth to buy
Japanese properties. Therefore, the post-decolonisation Korean labour
movement, which was characterised by the workers' self-management,
entered into a new stage when the National Council of Korean Labour
Unions(Choson Nodong Chohap Chonguk Pyonguihoe: Chonpyong), was
organised on 6th of November, 1945.44 The AMG viewed the growth of the
workers' self-management movement under the leadership of Chonpyong
as an important threat to the American interest in building an anti-communist
bulwark based on the cooperation of Korean collaborators. To control the
workers' movement, the AMG established the Department of Labour and
supported to establish the rightist Korean Federation of Labour
Unions(Taehan Nochong: FKLU). The FKLU was a political organisation, but
not a real labour union because it was organised by non-workers and its
goal was not improvement of workers' living conditions, but the struggle
against communism.4^ The history of labour disputes from then on is filled
with the struggles between FKLU, with its AMG support, and the Chonpyong,
with its workers' support.
43 Yun-Hyong Chong(1981), "Economic Growth and Monopoly Capital," In Yun-Hwan Kim et.al., The
Process of Korean Economy: From Liberation to the 1970's. Seoul: Tolbegae. p. 134. In Korean.
44 Following the tradition of the leftist leadership in the Korean labour movement under the Japanese
colonisation, the Chonpyong was controlled by the leftists.
45 Korean Federation of Labour Unions(1979), History of Korean Labour Union Movements. Seoul, pp.
278-281. In Korean.
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In sum, the basic objectives of AMG in Korea were to establish a free and
independent nation with effective self-government, a stable economy, and
friendly relations with the United States. But, unfortunately, the Americans
did not have a clearly outlined bureaucratic plan for Korea because the
American advisers had little time to investigate thoroughly those situations,
and therefore, the military government pursued a policy to maintain the
status quo and to support the conservative Koreans.
(B). Development of Social Security Policy Under the
American Military Government.
During the period of the United States occupation, which was expected to
implant Western values in social welfare areas, the efforts for many
refugees, the poor and the sick were also only curative and temporary, and
the form of the service provision was mainly that of institutional care. The
U.S. social policy in Korea became clear when it was compared with that in
Japan. After World War Two, the American Occupation Authority in Japan
was highly concerned about the Japanese social security system. Perhaps
the most significant action taken by the Occupation Authority in the area of
social security was an American Mission headed by Dr. William H. Wandal.
The Mission arrived in August, 1947 and submitted the report, titled
"Recommendations on the Social Security System." The report consisted of
three parts: the first part described all the Japanese social security schemes;
and the second part contained the Mission's recommendations;
supplementary appendices, primarily statistical tables were given in part
three of the report.4^ A distinctive feature of the post-war Japanese social
security system has been implemented by this report.
However, the AMG did not take up any serious research on this subject,
mainly because, as we mentioned already, the only U.S. interest in Korea
was to build an anti-communist bulwark which was based on the support of
the conservative Korean allies. As a result, the AMG only wanted to keep the
older order. However, unlike the Japanese regime, the AMG followed the
46 See, Social Security Mission to Japan(1948), Report of the Social Security Mission to Japan.
Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army.
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Poor Law as enacted in 1944, and developed additional memoranda
concerning refugees, and others in need.47
3.3.3. Korea Under the First Republic: 1948-1960.
(A). Politics.
A general election was held in 1948 in the Southern half of Korea, under
the Supervision of the United Nations Temporary Commission on
Korea(UNTCOK) to establish the first National Assembly. The National
Assembly drafted and approved the nation's constitution, and Korea soon
joined the ranks of independent states, with Syngman Rhee as her first
president. The government created under the new constitution was a
republic that contained a curious mixture of both the British parliamentary
system and the American presidential system.4^ The constitution's full
guarantee of basic individual rights and liberties has been interpreted by
many to be an explicit attempt on the part of political leaders to establish a
liberal democracy.
However, the new government quickly fell prey to Rhee's autocratic rule.
Rhee was a typically charismatic leader who attempted to monopolise all
political power. Political opposition was ruthlessly suppressed, destroying
any chance which might have existed for the development of a viable two-
party or multi-party system. The legislature was overshadowed by the
executive and became increasingly a rubber stamp organisation. Because
of this, the democratic political system did not contribute to making the
political power pluralistic, but rather came to justify a dictatorial political
leader through an imitation of democratic procedures.4§
47 Young-Whan Lee(1989), "Poor Relief Policy Under the American Military Government," In Sang-Rak
Ha(Ed.), The History of Social Welfare in Korea. Seoul: Pak Young Sa. pp. 423-466. In Korean.
48 John Kie-Chaing Oh(1968), Korea: Democracy on Trail. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p. 18.
49 Wan-Ki Paik(1991), "The Formation of the Governing Elites in Korean Society," In Gerald E. Caiden
and Bun-Woong KimfEds.) A Dragon's Progress: Development Administration in Korea. Connecticut:
Kumarian Press, Inc., pp. 44-45.
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(B). Economic Situation.
Korea's economic and political problems were inherited by the AMG
during the brief period from 1945 to 1948. American economic interests in
the country were never clearly established and so there was no purposeful
development of the economic fragment that was Korea.50 The AMG role
was, therefore, mainly limited to meeting the immediate problems created by
post-war dislocation and the needs of a flood of refugees returning from
other areas of the former Japanese Empire.
When the country was finally liberated from Japanese colonial rule, Korea
was an exhausted land. Her natural resources and manpower had ruthlessly
and indiscriminately been exploited, her energy was sapped, and her time
and creativity were wasted for Japan's vanity and greed. These
circumstances had thrown Korea's economy into complete chaos. Even if
the occupation forces had arrived with a carefully laid economic plan, the
situation would have been difficult because the Japanese had developed
Korea's economy as an integral part of the empire, linking it to that of Japan
and Manchuria. The division of Korea into two zones at an arbitrary line
further aggravated the situation. Rice production, which had depended on
fertilizer produced in the North, fell, while what rice was produced failed to
reach the urban populations and was consumed in the countryside. Mass
starvation was prevented only by large quantities of wheat from the U.S.
The industries which had been located in the South was unable to function
for lack of raw materials and then energy(after electrical power from the
North was cut off in 1948). Brown records that, in 1946, Korean
manufacturing plants had been reduced by more than half of the pre-1945
number and that those still in operation were producing at only 20 percent of
capacity.51 The concentration of heavy industry in the North(86%) left the
South (with 74% of light industry) with an unbalanced and unintegrated
manufacturing sector.52 Furthermore, the problem was compounded by the
fact that most of the mines and industries had been owned and operated by
50 Paul W.Kuznet(1977), Economic Growth and Structure in the Republic of Korea. New Haven: Yale
University Press, pp. 89-90.
51 Gilbert T. Brown(1973), Korean Pricing Policies and Economic Development in the 1960s. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 3.
52 George M. McCune and Arthur L. Grey, Jr.(1950), Korea Today. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, p. 57.
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the Japanese. As the AMG let the 700,000 Japanese depart from South
Korea in the months following the American occupation, almost all of the
mines and factories were without managers, technicians, and capital
resources. This led to severe problems of unemployment and material
shortages. Thus there were many inherent problems in building a self-
sufficient economy in the southern half of the peninsula. What is worse,
Korea was founded in 1948 but had been in existence less than two years
when the Korean War was begun in 1950. Most of the peninsular was
ravaged, and the country's meagre stock of industrial capital and high-level
manpower was demolished. Reconstruction began even before the war
ended with an armistice in mid-1953, but much of the economic growth from
1953 to 1959 or 1960 represented recovery and not an advance over pre¬
war levels of development.55
(C). Korean War: 1950-1953.
The Korean War had the most significant effect on the social scene. The
war began on 25th of June, 1950 and ended with a military armistice rather
than a peace treaty on 27th of July 1953. The war had a major effect on
industrial well-being, political development, institutional structure, and the
world surrounding Korean peninsular, that can not be ignored.54
First, the war created devastation throughout Korea and was a bitter
memory to all Koreans. The level of destruction was extremely high by
standards of modern warfare. Brown cites figures showing that more than
one out of every twenty South Korean civilians, or 991,000 people, were
casualties--667,000 were killed or missing, 230,000 were wounded, 84,000
forcibly removed to North Korea.55 Physical destruction was also huge.
Brown reports that physical losses were equal to the entire 1953 national
product.55 Some 661,000 buildings and facilities were destroyed, 40
percent of which were dwellings and 20 percent transportation goods and
other infrastructures.
Secondly, the war itself was responsible for the continued erosion of
traditional values and the increasingly fluid nature of the society. Although
the war lasted only a relatively short time, it brought almost all Korean men
53 Kuznets(1977), Ibid., p. 90.
54 ibjd,, p. 37.
55Brown(1973), ibid., p. 35.
33 Ibid.,
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into the armed forces, through which they were exposed to a way of life most
had never seen before-to the possibilities of urban life and modern
technology and the values that accompanied them. The war displaced large
segments of the population; there was a large influx of refugees from the
North, many of whom resettled in communities without traditional social ties
and obligations. Throughout rural Korea community solidarity competed
successfully with traditional kinship ties for the loyalties of the average
person~a considerable shift in the balance of such values.
Thirdly, the war had profound consequences for the economy in later
years. Extensive physical damage and institutional disarray made reform
and reconstruction essential. War brought about inflation which led to a
variety of barter techniques, a degree of government corruption much
greater than was traditional in Korea, and the breakdown of many ordinary
business arrangements. In consequence, much of the economic growth from
1953 to 1959 represented reconstruction and the replacement of previous
productive capacity rather than expansion beyond previously achieved
output level.
Fourthly, the war resulted in institutional and political changes. War and
American support for the Korean military, not the voluntary internal operation
of Korean cultural processes, had made the army pre-eminent.57 This
development led to the military coup of 1961 and subsequent rule by an
authoritarian regime controlled by the military.
Fifthly, the war marked the first time that the United Nations undertook
military action. Though most of the UN troops were Korean and U.S.
soldiers, they were joined by fifteen UN members who sent troops and
military supplies. Moreover, a large number of Chinese troops remained in
North Korea until October 1958, and China began to play an increasingly
important role in Korean affairs. The war also spurred Japan's industrial
recovery and the U.S. decision to rearm Japan.
Finally, the war is still an unfinished war, a war without victory. Half a
million soldiers, with many more forces and weapons ready to back them up,
are poised on each side of the demilitarised zone that cuts across the
peninsula. Since tension on the Korean peninsula remained high, the U.S.
continued to station its troops in Korea, over the strenuous objections of
North Korean leaders. The confrontation not only diverted for military use,
57 Gregory Henderson(1968), Korea: The Politics of the Vortex. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, p. 186.
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resources that might have otherwise been used for socio-economic
purposes but also shifted the locus of political power and with it the nature of
domestic socio-economic policies. In addition, the confrontation enhanced
the size and power of the army from 100,000 men in 1950 to as many as
650,000 men thereafter.
(D). The National Reconstruction Process.
As the military front stabilised in 1953, reconstruction efforts began and it
was perhaps from that date that the growth of the modern economy is best
studied. President Rhee knew little of economics, but could not be shaken
from his conviction that economic development was viewed as a part of
economic recovery and an extension of economic stabilisation, and
economic planning was considered as a basic tool of communists. 58 He
believed the solution for Korea's economic problem was through complete
dependence upon U.S. aid and his great concern was how to maintain an
arbitrary exchange rate( from U.S. dollars to the Korean currency) in dealing
with the U.S.. However, the U.S. aid programme was directed more towards
importation of consumer goods than to the building up of basic production
facilities, aggravating Korea's tendency to consumption, rather than
production, and hence fostering a consumption-first economy. This ran
diametrically counter to the direction the Korean economy should have
taken for the attainment of self-sufficiency.59
International pressures on Korean politics and on plans for economic
development came from the UN and the U.S.
First, during the war and until the time that the cease-fire agreement was
signed, all important relief activities were carried out through the agency of
the United Nations Command. The UN created two specialised UN agencies
for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Korea. They were the United
Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of
Korea(UNCURK) and the United Nations Korean Reconstruction
Agency(UNKRA). The function of UNCURK was to represent the UN in
58 In-Joung Whang(1991), "Government Direction of the Korean Economy," In Gerald E. Caiden and
Bun-Woong Kim(Eds.), Ibid.,, p. 86.
59 Robert T. Oliver(1978), Svnaman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea. 1942-1960: A Personal
Narrative. Seoul: Panmun Book Company Ltd., pp. 481-482.
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bringing about the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic
government in Korea. UNCURK had prime responsibility in political affairs
relating to the establishment of a democratic government and a unified
Korea. Moreover, it acted as an advisory body to the Agent General of
UNKRA. The relief and rehabilitation programme was placed in the hands of
UNKRA, whose head, the Agent General, reported directly to the General
Assembly for approval of proposed programmes and policies. When the
UNKRA programme began in Korea, the UN's own aid programme was also
in being, administered through the Economic Cooperation
Administration(ECA), the Civil Relief in Korea(CRIK), and the Armed Forces
Assistance in Korea(AFAK) agencies. Due to UNKRA's political and financial
weakness and the existence of a stronger U.S. aid programme, however, the
UNKRA was unable to exert any pressure on the Korean government in
economic affairs and, specifically, in development planning. When the
Robert Nathan Associates prepared the Nathan Plan, the first long-term
development for Korea, and submitted it to the UNKRA authorities in 1954,
UNKRA could not capitalize on this well-prepared economic plan as had
originally been intended.
Secondly, the U.S. aid programme, on the other, began to be used to exert
political pressures on the Korean economy from 1952 when programme
officials urged upon the Korean government the aid option of several policy
measures desired by the U.S. government. The purpose underlying such
U.S. pressures was based on the U.S. policies to protect Korea from
communist aggression and to achieve rapid economic stability in the
country. Instruments of such pressure were the Meyer Agreement of 24th of
May, 1952 which established the Combined Economic Board(CEB), the
Tasca mission, and the Office of Economic Coordinator(OEC). Until 1961,
these instruments extended political pressure on the Korean government
encouraging the adoption of various economic development plans in Korea.
Especially, in relation to the economic planning, the Tasca mission
investigated the economic needs of Korea after the conclusion of the
armistice and formulated a Three-Year Economic Development Plan on 15th
of June, 1953. The Tasca Report suggested that it would be necessary for
the U.S. to extend, for four or five years, long-term aid to Korea in support of
its defence, relief, and rehabilitation programmes. The Tasca Report was the
first long-term economic development plan formulated by the U.S.
government for the effective rehabilitation of Korean economy through the
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help of American aid. In mid-1958, two important policies concerning the
U.S. aid programme were made public. The first was the announcement of a
gradual reduction of the U.S. aid level due to domestic pressures on the
American government, and the second was the shifting of aid programmes
from outright grants to loans. Therefore, the Korean government's
formulation of a Three-Year Economic Development Plan in December,
1959, was one important consequence of the declining trend in the U.S. aid
programme and the shifting of aid from outright grants to loans. The plan
was chiefly intended to obtain more American aid for investment and
development.
The average rise in the Gross National Product(GNP) was 5.5 percent per
year from 1954 to 1958. Industrial production led the advance, growing by
nearly 14 percent per year. But the tightening of fiscal and monetary policies
in 1958, coupled with the phasing-out of the UN reconstruction agency
programme and the reduction in direct aid from the U.S. in 1957, caused a
shortage of raw materials for import-dependent industries that led to an
overall economic decline. By 1958 Liberal Party leaders paid more attention
to political survival through control than to economic development. The
government adopted a comprehensive Seven-Year Economic Development
Plan in January, 1960, but before it could be implemented, the Student
Revolution brought down the government.
(E). Development of Social Security Policy
Under the First Republic.
As the AMG before it, the Rhee regime represented the interests of the
minority capitalists against the majority workers, and of the minority
landlords against the majority peasants. Rhee had the AMG bureaucrats as
his supportive political elites, but did not have the economic base to
maintain his political apparatus. Thus, the Rhee regime's socio-economic
policy was to build a capitalist class as an anti-communist bulwark. For this
purpose, the Rhee regime sold the former Japanese owned properties,
which accounted for more than 80 percent of the total Korean capital, to
Korean employers for the AMG at low prices and postponed land reform until
1950 to allow the landlords opportunities to see their lands and transform
themselves into capitalists entrepreneurs. Thus, through the government's
139
favoured treatment of them, the former pro-Japanese businessmen and
landlords became the leaders of the Korean economy.60
While pursuing the policies to promote the interests of the landlords and
businessmen, the Rhee regime did not make many effort to solve the
economic problems of the workers and peasants. The Rhee regime did not
seem to have the will or ability to solve the sky-rocketing inflation, the
massive food shortage, the miserable housing situation, and the large scale
of unemployment. The government, however, specified that by law it had a
responsibility for those who were old, sick, and unable to work, but related
laws and regulations were not developed. Social welfare services were
supplied through the private sector operated by foreign financing and
foreign staff; most were Christian missionary groups. Therefore, the main
objective of social welfare was focused on the relief of immediate social ills,
including flood and fire victims, distribution of free grain during years of bad
corps, placement of orphans in institutions or adoptive homes, aid to
disabled veterans, and programmes for family planning.
One of the historical events which had a persistent impact on the
development of social security policy in Korea could be the Korean War. The
problems left by the war have been persistent economically and
psychologically, and have had an inevitable impact on the people and other
social institutions. The war is believed to have influenced the changes of
national social security policy development in four aspects.
At first, the war itself directly affected the development of social policy in
Korea by creating huge problems, like the large numbers of war orphans,
refugees, widows, and disabled persons, and a ruined economy. From the
initiation of the modern social welfare system, this war created enormous
needs for protective social services on a level that the government, with its
weak economic basis at the time, could not handle. Therefore, foreign aid
and services in these areas were a major part of the relief efforts, and private
welfare agencies were established to administer foreign aid. The decrease
in the welfare population in Korea since the 1960s might be understood as a
natural decrease in these dependent populations, as social and economic
60 Pyong-Tae Kim(1981), "Evaluation and Reflection of Land Reform," In Yun-Hwan Kim et.al.,
Development Process of Korean Economy. SeoubTolbaegae, p. 47. In Korean; Yong-Beom Cho
et.al.,(1984), Korean Monopoly Capital and Chaebol. Seoul: Pulbit, p. 45. In Korean.
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structures, including the family and market, returned to normal. After the war,
most people were on the edge of absolute poverty.
Secondly, as Wilensky indicated, modern Korean society moved towards a
'warfare-welfare' state in which political elites, alert to problems of national
integration and morale, secured the collaboration of the masses for wars
and disciplined sacrifice by extending social security, providing the symbols
of participation, and an illusory equality.61 With the exception of the cost of
raising the size of Korean army from 100,000 men in 1950 to as many as
650,000 in 1951 hearafter, the war created huge national defence
expenditures. As we can see in the Table 3-2, the military spending undercut
welfare spending in Korea. To illustrate this statistical pattern more
concretely, increases in military spending are associated with small
increases in social security spending. The resulting swift increase in military
spending cast the die for a poor welfare performance for Korea, which was
swept up in the atmosphere of crisis.
Table3-2: Social Security and Defense Expenditures in Relation to Total
Government Expenditures, 1965-1985.









1965 93.5 5.0 (5.4) 29.8(31.9)
1970 441.3 16.8(3.8) 102.3(23.2)




1985 14,867.0 779.0 (5.2) 3,957.9 (26.6)
Sources: Ministry of Finance, various Issues of Summary of Financial statistics.
Thirdly, we can think about a diffusion effect of Korean social security
policy development in the process of the socio-economic reconstruction
since the war. As we mentioned already, the international organisations,
especially the UN, made a great contribution to post-war reconstruction.
However, judging from the UN publications at that time, the UN encouraged
only economic development and showed little concern about the social
61 Harold L. Wilensky(1975), Ibid., p. 70.
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security development. Therefore, we do not find direct diffusion effort from
the international organisations during this period.
Finally, looking at the war from the positive side, it further effected a
ruthless levelling of wealth, with an accompanying breakdown of social
networks and the inhibitions of tradition and class to the pursuit of economic
opportunities. This static asset redistribution phase was followed by a
dynamic redistribution phase which reflected the strong drive of the Korean
people and their faith that, with effort and the right opportunities, these
standards could be achieved. Thus, until the 1960s Korea had a relatively
equitable social and economic base from which to launch its development
efforts, and a much higher human resource potential than the great majority
of countries with a comparable per capita income level.
3.3.4. Korea Under the Third Republic: 1961-1972.
(A). Politics.
The abbreviated Second Republic was inaugurated in August of 1960 and
was overthrown in May, 1961, by the military group led by the then Major
General Chung-Hee Park. The Second Republic's brief history was
characterised by considerable idealism, a commitment to civil liberties,
broadened participation and, at the same time, an irresponsibly biased
press, governmental vacillation, instability, continued lack of party discipline
and , arguably, ideological polarisation on issues concerning the type of
economic order to be pursued, attitudes toward the roles of the states
coercive instruments, the means of achieving national unification, and
dependency on the U.S.62
Many military officers and civilian intellectuals had perceived the Second
Republic under Chang Myun as a weaker regime incapable of dealing with
social unrest. They supported or at least tolerated the military intervention in
the political process. But they strongly believed that it would be illegitimate
for the military to assume the direction of the political system for long periods
of time. The military junta ruled Korea for two and half years, after which
62 Sung-Joo Han(1974), The Failure of Democracy in South Korea. Burkeley: University of California
Press. P. 5 and passim.
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junta leaders decided to perpetuate their control by becoming politicians
themselves.
After its victory in the elections Park's government took a number of bold
measures for political reform and economic development in the 1960s. His
government initiated the First Five-Year Plan for Economic Development in
1962. It also began negotiations with Japan on a diplomatic normalisation
treaty, signed in 1965, to end the twenty years of non-communication
between two close neighbours. Park's government also took the bold action
of sending troops to South Vietnam in 1966 to assist the U.S. effort there.
The move, ostensibly made to repay the debt incurred to the U.S. during the
war, gained hard currency for Korea in the form of payment for services
rendered by the Korean armed personnel in Vietnam and for the purchase of
Korean goods and services there.
Compared to the Park's Yushin Regime( 1972-1979), the Third Republic
can be considered to have maintained democracy though only formally,
because only the most basic of the democratic procedures, i.e., the political
participation of the people through direct voting, was formally maintained.
The ruling elites put much effort and energy into the creation of political
parties. An opposition party was allowed and even encouraged. A National
Assembly with full democratic and legislative powers was established, and
the leaders of the new regime repeatedly declared their loyalty to the
concept of political democracy. Indeed after the government was re-elected
on a civilian basis- up to 1969- civil liberties and freedom of political
debate were given a fair degree of protection.
As we have seen already, however, Korean society has been historically
characterised by a monolithic power structure in the sense that all kinds of
power centralised into the hands of one man. This traditional power structure
has surprisingly been reinforced while otherwise the society has been
modernised and diversified.63 Despite his initial endeavour to remove the
crude characteristic of a military cabinet, however, Park's power structure
continued to be more and more centralised than Rhee's previous regime. He
wielded almost absolute power, never restricted by any constitutional
limitation and built the efficiency-oriented structure of elites considered to be
63 Wan-Ki Paik(1982), "The Formation of the Governing Elites in Korean Society," Korean Social
Science Journal, Vol. 9. p. 51.
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a necessary instrument for achieving indefinitely prolonged power. He was
prone to believe that desirable national goals are achieved by disregard or
suppression over the political oppositions. Therefore, he considered the
political opposition and criticism as an enemy to be attacked and destroyed.
The coup members realised their own inferiority, not only in terms of their
less educated and more rural backgrounds but also in terms of their
legitimacy and ability to govern the country. Given the heavy influence of the
Chinese imperial bureaucratic system under the Confucian heritage, which
we examined already in this chapter, the status of civil servants and
university professors had been regarded as highly prestigious. What
followed then was a large-scale cooperation of various civilian groups in the
governing progress. A complex ruling coalition formed among military
officers, bureaucrats, entrepreneurs, the mass media, university professors,
and other professionals, to protect and promote mutually compatible
interests and values.®4 Park needed elites more concerned with the
implementation of policies than with their formation: the kind of elite system
he wanted was an instrumental one. In other words, he did not like politics-
oriented elites, but administrative-oriented ones.®® Ruling elites formed in
this kind of political process were always subordinate to the political leader.
The relationship between the political leader and the elites was
characterised by domination and submission. Elite groups created by this
kind of dictatorial leaders can never be deeply rooted in the people's mind,
and hence have no appeal and little power over them. The groups were not
concerned with policy-making; instead they were totally devoted to serving
and implementing the leaders' will.
Therefore, the most important feature that characterises the policy-making
process during the Park regime is the executive domination and extremely
centralised pattern. Thus, it is not surprising that the pluralistic model with its
ideal of popular participation in public policy-making does not match up to
empirical Korean political realities. Equally significant is the dominating role
of the president at the apex of power. Naturally, this kind of political system
makes the personality of the ruler extremely important. In relation to the
centralisation of power, the role of the braintrust at the Blue House can not
64 For the new elites of Korea, see Sung-Chul Yang(1981), Korea and Two Regimes. Cambridge, Mass:
Schenkman Publishing Company, Inc., pp. 233-244; Wan-Ki Paik(1982), Ibid., pp. 49-65.
65 Wan-Ki Paik(1982). Ibid., pp. 53-54.
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be underestimated. The presidential mansion or the Blue House, called the
'small cabinet,' employed many brains and also allocated these trained
power holders to the cabinet or the National Assembly. In sum, the power
structure of the Park regime institutionally consisted of two poles; the Blue
House and the KCIA on the one side, and the ruling party, Democratic
Republican Party and the National Assembly tool on the other. The cabinet
controlling the administration functioned in between these two poles, and in
the process of pursuing economic development, the cabinet members
concentrated their concern on economics rather than on politics.
(B). National Development Strategy.
During the Third Republic, Park had most frequently emphasised security
and unification and economic development. In political development, he had
focused on duty and order rather than rights and freedom. In social welfare,
worrying about the evil effects attendant upon economic development, he
stressed welfare in the latter period.
While the Korean economy of the fifties can be characterised as extreme
depression due to the Korean War and as being dependent on the American
aid, that of the sixties can be characterised as the beginning of state-
pursued, export-oriented industrialisation. President Park showed more
commitment to the nation's economic development. He emphasised that
"without a hope for an economic future, reforms in other fields such as
politics, social affairs, and culture could not be expected to yield fruits" and
"without economic reconstruction, there would be no such things as triumph
over communism or attaining independence." He believed that creation of a
self-supporting economy through planned economic development was a key
to national development as well as a precondition for unification. Professor
Lim analysed the reasons why President Park was so interested in the
economic development. He suggested the following factors:66
(1). The military revolution, when seen from the democratic ideal, was
hardly convincing. Therefore, it is hard to base the political legitimacy of the
Park's government on the democratic value alone.
(2). The people and the intellectual elite asserted the need for long-term
economic planning in order to shake off the nation's dependence on foreign
66 Hy-Sop Lim(1975), "Social Development in Korea and Tasks Facing Sociology," Korean Social
Science Journal. Vol. 3 p. 191.
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aid.
(3). It might be easier for the leaders of the Park's government, most of
them formally soldiers, to pursue an instrumental value such as economic
growth than to seek a symbolic value such as democracy.
(4). The political leaders who had experience as military commanders
were naturally inclined to pay greater concern to the threat from the
communist regime in North Korea and economic competition between the
South and North.
For this single purpose, President Park mobilised the entire executive
branch to make decisions based on expected economic outcomes. During
the Park administration, the symbols of 'national development' and
'economic development' predominated government policies and actions.
President Park, therefore, introduced various institutional changes
necessary for effective economic decision-making.67
At first, President Park replaced the Ministry of Construction with the
Economic Planning Board(EPB) on 22nd of July, 1961. The EPB was given
substantially the same role of economic planning and coordination which
had been assigned to the Ministry of Construction, but it was strengthened
by the transfer to it of the Budget Bureau from the Ministry of Finance and the
Statistic Bureau from the Home Ministry. The new EPB was also given a
status somewhat above that of Ministries in the central government
organisation structure. The chairman of the EPB serves as the head of the
cabinet in the absence of the Prime Minister.
Also in 1961, an Office of Planning and Coordination was established
under the Prime Minister to evaluate and monitor project and programme
performance, and the Planning and Management Units were set up under
the Vice Minister in every ministry to superintend and monitor tasks.68 This
significant action focused attention upon the importance which the
government attached to the role of planning in the achievement of the goals
and objectives of the military revolution.69 However, it should be noted that
67 Kyung-Cho Chung(1962), New Korea: New Land of the Morning Calm, New York: The MacMillan
Company, pp. 127-128.
68 Lloyd M. Short(1962), "Government Economic Planning in the Republic of Korea," International
Review of Administrative Science. Vol. 28, No. 4 pp. 441-448.
69 Ibid., p. 441.
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this was only the latest in a series of steps taken by Korea to achieve
governmental progress through planning.
The first draft of a five year plan was completed by the EPB in September,
1961, and the summary of the plan was promulgated and then released to
the press on 11th of January, 1962/0 The rapidity with which the plan was
drawn up testifies to the seriousness of the new rulers, but this swiftness of
action was made possible because there already existed plans and data
upon which to build. As we have seen already, Korea's first economic plan
was actually developed in 1958 under the Rhee regime. The order to
construct a plan came as a result of growing domestic and foreign pressures
that demanded a better economic showing. After its formulation, however,
Rhee completely ignored it. The Chang Myun government in 1960
developed an economic plan of its own, and though the early demise of that
government prevented the plans enactment, it became the early source for
the military's first five year plan for 1962-1966/1 The other reason was that
the plan was also directly influenced by the U.S. aid policy. When Chairman
Park visited Washington D.C. for a conference with President Kennedy, he
brought with him a draft of the Five-Year Plan because of the statement from
the Kennedy administration'a policy that foreign aid would be given only to
countries which were attempting long-range economic planning/2
Under the First Five-Year Plan(1962-1966), the economic system was a
form of 'guided capitalism,' in which the principle of free enterprise and
respect for the freedom and initiative of private enterprise were to be
observed, but in which the government either participated directly, or
indirectly rendered guidance to, basic industries and other important
fields/3 The plan adopted an unbalanced growth approach as in the Draft
Five Year Plan of the Chang regime by giving special emphasis to:
(1). Development of sources of energy, such as power and coal;
(2). Increasing earnings of farm households by raising agricultural
productivity;
70 Charles Wolf(1964),"Economic Planning in Korea," Korean Affairs. Vol. 3, No. 2. p. 230.
71 Irma Adelman(Ed.)(1969), Practical Approach to Development Planning: Korea's Second Five-Year
Plan, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 12.
72 Hankuk llbo, 13 August, 1961.
73 EPB(1962), Summary of the First Five Year Economic Plan, 1962-1966, Seoul, p. 28.
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(3). Expansion of key industrial facilities and adequate provision for social
overhead capital;
(4). Utilisation of idle resources;
(5). Improvement in the balance of international payments, primarily
through increased exports; and
(6). Technical advancement.74
The plan also envisaged a national construction service movement to
mobilise unemployed rural labour to build roads, multi-purpose dams and
other urban public works to inspire its 'spirit of revolution.'
The Five-Year Plan for Korea marks an important step in the country's
economic development. It is also significant that this plan was the first in
Korean history that the government succeeded in implementing and,
furthermore, that it was formulated purely by Korean specialists without the
help of foreign firms or foreign specialists as was the case with the former
plans. However, the First Plan was revised in 1964, shifting the strategy from
import-substitution to export promotion with the import of foreign capital and
technology and was scaled down by a radical lowering of planned growth
targets. The modified plan was largely ignored as ad hoc efforts at economic
stabilisation were made. Reasons given for revision included high inflation,
failure of the monetary reform in 1962, poor harvest in 1962-63, financial
scandals, and defects of the original plan such as "failure to consider
foreign-loan payment obligations, insufficient attention to public finance,
inadequacy of supply-demand scheduling and supporting measures, and
neglect of intersectoral and interproject relationship."75 In addition, the
change in strategy and its implementation process was guided, or dictated
by the U.S.75 The Agency for International Development(AID), a bank of the
U.S. gave economic assistance to Korea, providing grants, loans, technical
assistance, and advice. The primary goal of AID was to have Korea support
the cost of its own defence through the assistance of the export-led strategy.
74 Ibid., p. 29.
75 Paul W. Kuznets(1977), Ibid.,.p. 202.
76 Edward S. Mason et. al.,(1980), The Economic Mobilisation of the Republic of Korea. Cambridge,
Mass: Harvard University Press, p. 47.
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The adoption of export-oriented policies in Korea has contributed to the
growth of the national economies by utilising the country's abundant
resource and labour, and economising on its capital; by permitting the use of
large-scale production methods and encouraging technical improvements in
export industries; as well as by creating a demand for domestic materials,
raising incomes, and augmenting the availability of imports.77 As regards
the policy choices available to Korea around 1960, the first consideration is
the poor natural resource endowment of the country. Korea has few minerals
and the ratio of the population to arable land is high. With import substitution
in nondurable consumer goods and in the intermediate products used in
their manufacture virtually completed, production for domestic market in
these industries did not offer sufficient possibilities for rapid growth either. At
the same time, the smallness of domestic markets in Korea restricted the
scope of import substitution in intermediate products, machinery, and
consumer durables. The new policy has further been influenced by the
availability of a well-motivated labour force with a high educational level and
relatively low wages that provides the country with a competitive advantage
in exporting labour-intensive goods. The expansion of these industries also
offered possibilities for absorbing unemployment while requiring less capital
per unit of output than does the production of most intermediate goods,
machinery, and durable consumer goods. Accordingly new policies had to
be devised to improve the balance of payments and to attain high rates of
economic growth which had became a political as well as an economic
objective.
Preparations for the Second Plan(1967-71) were began in early 1964.
Whereas the first plan had been conceived almost entirely by a few Korean
economic experts, the second plan engaged a wide spectrum of foreign
participants.78 A system of involving a cross section of the Korean
community was also devised. Experience with the first plan had made it
clear that the planning process required a detailed and up-to-date collection
of economic data and information. In order to insure both participation and
adequate information, the idea of 'industrial committees' was conceived.
77 Bela Balassa(1970), "Industrial Policies in Taiwan and Korea." International Development
Association, Economic Development Working Paper, No. 86. p. 3.
78 Adelman(1969), Ibid., pp. 14-15.
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The main foci of the Second Plan were not substantially different from
those of the first: key industrial sectors developed within the framework of
expanding social overhead. This time, targets were set at rates higher than
even those projected originally by the military. A target of 10 percent growth
per year for gross national product was adopted. In order to achieve this
goal, an ambitious plan for investment development was established. Major
goals of the plan were reform in policies related to exports, domestic
savings, and foreign aid. Accordingly, the Second Five-Year Plan was
formulated in 1965, approved in 1966 and invoked in January 1977.
(C). The Development of Social Security Policy
Under the Third Republic.
Under the First and Second Republics, the objective of social welfare
focused on the relief of immediate social contingencies. Therefore, for the
general public, there was no modern social security system which is
equivalent to the social security programme or pension insurance
programme in other countries, concerning the socio-economic
contingencies. Only several special programmes were established to
provide some financial assistance to those who retired or separated from an
organisation in the government or private institution with respective legal
provision. These programmes, however, met with only a limited success.
The basic modern social security programmes were first introduced in
Korea in the early 1960s. As we can see in the Table 3-3, laws for social
security programmes such as public assistance, social insurance, and
social welfare services began to be developed.
For the government employees, the law of the Civil Servant Pension Act
was enacted in 1962. This act was simply the result of implementing the
pension programme clause in the Civil Servant Law which was enacted on
12th of August, 1948, when the First Republic was established. The pension
programme clause had not been implemented until 1st of January, 1960,
because of the Korean War and the financial situation of the government.^
79 Chun-Song Choi(1977), Social Security in Korea. Seoul: San Kyung Moon Hwa Sa. pp. 264-266.
In Korean.
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Figure 3-3: Social Welfare-Related Legislations, 1961-1986.
Year Name of Law Contents(Population).
1961 Prostitution Prohibition Act Anti-prostitution(Prostitutes) A
•• Livelihood Protection Act Livelihood Protection (I nabled poor) B
1962 Employment Standard Act Labour Law(AII employees)
»
Social Protection for Refugee &
Meritorious Service Act
Special aid (Patriots) B
" Civil Servant Pension Act Pension(Civil servants) A
« Disaster Relief Act Emergency aid(Victims of disasters) B
« Medical Insurance Act Health lnsurance(AII citizens) A
1963 Military Veteran Pension Act Pension(Military) A
■■ Industrial Accident Compensation Accident insurance(workshop) A
1970 Social Welfare Work Act Base law for social service C
1973 NWP Act National pension(AII citizens) A
« Private School Teacher Pension Pension (Private school teacher) A
1976 Medical Insurance Act(Revised) Medical insurancefAII citizens) A
1977 Medical Aid Act Medical aid (Poor) B
« Civil Servants, Private School Teachers
Medical Insurance Act
Medical insurance(Civil servants & Private
school teachers)
A
1980 Social Welfare Work Fund Act Law for fund management C
1981 Child Welfare Act(Revised) Child welfare(Age under 18) C
»
Elderly Welfare Act Welfare for the aged (Age > 65) C
■■
Disability Welfare Act Welfare for handicapped C
1983 Lively Protection Act(Revised) Comprehensive aid (Deserving poor) C
1986 National Pension Act(Revised) Compulsory pension scheme A
Note: A: Social Insurance.
B: Social Assistance.
C: Social Welfare Service.
It was implemented by the Civil Servants Pension Act in 1962, because the
government was concerned with the increasing turnover rate of the
government personnel, as the private sector recovered from the effects of the
Korean War.80 The programme covers only those who served twenty years
or more in the government without an interruption. The law also specifies the
80 Ibid.,
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details of the lump-sum provident grant system, which will be given to those
who wish to receive a lump-sum payment at the time of retirement instead of
annual pension, and to those who served less than twenty years but at least
five or more years in the government without an interruption.
For military personnel, the law of Military Pension Act was enacted in 1963.
The qualifying conditions and the payment formula are similar to those for
the government employees, but unique payment schedules are adopted.
For the employees of sizable private enterprises, the law of Industrial
Accident Compensation Insurance Act was enacted in 1963. This social
insurance programme was chosen by the labour section of the Social
Security Committee^l to be introduced to Korea, in the light of the historical
fact that protection against work-related injury is the oldest and most
widespread type of social security measure throughout the world. The law
was in effect replacing the industrial accident compensation clause in the
Labour Standard Law.
The Medical Insurance programme was chosen to be studied by the Social
Security Committee and passed on the last day of the last session of the the
Supreme Council for National Reconstruction SCNR: Military Junta) in the
load of laws which were to be passed before the Council was dissolved.82
The Social Security Committee originally planned the programme in a
comprehensive and compulsory fashion. However, as it was being
deliberated by the SCNR, it turned to be a voluntary pilot project rather than
a medical insurance programme.
Finally, in relation to the development of social security policy, for the
employees of sizable private enterprises and public institutions, legal
protection is provided when receiving a lump-sum Retirement Allowance^
from the respective employer. The law of Employment Standard Act enacted
81 This committee was established to examine and deliberate on matters related to social security
system at the request of the Minister of Health and Social Affairs on 20th of March, 1962.
82 Professor Sohn analysed the policy-making process and the content of the Medical Insurance Act.
See, Joon-Kyu Sohn(1983), Ibid., pp. 108-123.
88 Actually a lump-sum Retirement Allowance programme had been widely prevailed in Japanese
controlled institutions while they occupied Korea before 1945. However, even after Japanese moved
out from Korea and before the necessary legal provisions were provided for the Retirement Allowance
programme, the government remained in effect for many larger organisations to help the living of the
retired employees. See, Seung-Yun Lee et.al.,(1971), A Feasibility Study of Compulsory Contributory
Retirement Scheme in Korea. Seoul: Sogang University, Research Institute for Economics and
Business, p. 22.
152
in 1961 specifies that a lump-sum Retirement Allowance be provided by the
employers of organisations when any qualified employee retirees or
separates from the organisations.84
As we can see in the above Table, the development of social security
systems in Korea tend to be composed of several stratified and highly
particularistic programmes. As Mesa-Lago has demonstrated, the civil
servants and the military tend to receive social security protections first, and
to maintain levels of social security protection considerably superior to those
of other groups in the society. Following these two groups, elite workers in
key economic sectors have obtained relatively extensive social security
protections. Other organised industrial workers have been given such
benefits in a relatively recent period, and those benefits tend to be less
extensive, in both quantitative and qualitative terms. With regard to the other
urban workers and the agricultural workers, their degree of social security
protection is quite insignificant.
However, most of the programmes were not put into effect, because top
priority was given to economic and industrial development, and social policy
was not a special concern of the government. At this time, social policy was
defined by government spokesmen as 'luxuries.' Therefore, the issue of
income distribution and equitable social development was not considered
that important by Park's Third Republic. The position can be understood as
being politically motivated, but there can be few other regimes that have put
more emphasis on growth in opposition to equality than the Park
government in this period. There are several other reasons why Park was
not seriously concerned about the development of social policy during this
period. First, it seemed pointless to worry about the redistribution of wealth
until there was something to distribute. Secondly, it was thought that rapid
economic growth would lead to improved conditions for everyone according
to the 'trickle-down' process. Thirdly, so much money was ploughed into
economic development that there was precious little left for anything else,
especially after the military and general administration had taken its 40
percent share of the national budgets.
84 The Article 28 of Employment Standard Act of 1962 specifies that any employer who employs thirty
or more workers must pay at least the minimum amount stipulated by the law. Also, anyone employed in
an organisation more than a year is qualified to receive the grant with different schedule which depends
largely on the number of the years served in that organisation.
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Finally, as we will see in the following section, the equity problem was less
acute in Korea than in many developing countries. The conclusions of many
reports, especially that of the World Bank, on income distribution, that the
level of inequality income distribution is low in Korea and that the level has
remained stable in the course of high economic growth can—if it is not
founded on solid facts-mislead policy-makers of the Korean government, in
light of the fact that the World Bank has been exerting considerable
influences on the formulation of long-term economic policies in Korea. In
fact, Korea was not, until the early 1970s, confronted with the choice of
whether equity or growth was to be the primary economic goal: the Koreans
in the 1950s and 1960s were situated equitably in their common poverty.
3.4. Income Distribution Until 1960s.
As we have seen in the above details, even though social security policy
was not developed, empirical studies on income distribution indicate that
Korean income distribution in the 1960s was relatively equitably compared
not only to many less developed countries, but also to some developed
countries.
In his study of income distribution in Asian countries, professor Oshima
concluded that Korea has an index of inequality as low as that of the U.S.
and Japan.85 Professor Adelman's study suggests that Korea has the
lowest level of income inequality among the group of less developed
countries, and that although a time-series analysis indicates that several
structural changes occurred in the 1964 to 1970 period, the overall degree
of income inequality remained unchanged.86 The findings of the IBRD-
Sussex studies on global and comparative income distribution was no
exception.87
In their study, Korea is not only rated as a low inequality country in terms of
its Gini Coefficient ratio but also as a country showing relatively high annual
85 Harry T. Oshima(1970), "Income Inequality and Economic Growth: The post-war Experience of Asian
Countries," Malaysian Economic Review. Vol. XV. No. 2.
86 Irma Adelman(1973), "Redistribution with Growth: The Case of Korea," Mimeographed.
87 Hollis Chenery et.al.,(Eds.)(1973), Redistribution with Growth: An Approach to Policy,
Mimeographed.
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increases in welfare. In evaluating Korea's good performance in distributing
the benefits of growth, one must note that it is partly a result of the historical
events and development strategy.
Since Japanese colonial occupation of Korea ended, several key factors
associated with that period provided a favourable climate for equity in
distribution of income.
First, there are the two land reforms, which were undertaken in 1947 under
the AMG and in 1949 under the Rhee government.88 Before the land reform,
it is estimated that around 94 percent of farmers were either full- or part-
tenants. Redistribution of Japanese-held land in 1947 and a further land
reform in 1949 virtually eliminated tenancy, put a ceiling of 3 hectares on
paddy holding, and established a structure of very small owner-operated
farms. The broad distribution of land contributed importantly to the fact that
farmers gained equitably from the growth of farm incomes.
A second historical factor is that the great majority of productive assets
were controlled by the Japanese prior to independence. The Japanese
owned over 90 percent of industrial assets in 1941. These assets became
the property of the Korean government when the Japanese left. The
government, reasoning that a slow disposal of these assets would lead to
relatively less concentration, took more than 10 years to disperse ownership
to the population. This resulted in much less concentration of industrial asset
ownership.
A third factor is that the Korean war effected a ruthless further levelling of
wealth, with an accompanying breakdown of social networks and the
inhibitions of tradition and class to the pursuit of economic opportunities.89
Approximately, 20 percent of the capital stock was destroyed between 1950
and 1953 and had to be slowly rebuilt after a cessation.
Four other major events occurred in the 1960s in which government
attempts at economic reform had positive distributive effects.
The first was the cancellation of rural usurious loans. At the time, unofficial
rural interest rates were often known to exceed 100 percent. The effect on
88 For details, see Sung-Hwan Ban et.al.,(1980), Rural Development, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press.
89 EPB(1978), Korea's Economic Development Growth and the Distribution of Growth Benefits. Seoul:
Republic of Korea, pp. 1-2.
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disposable income of the cancelled debts of the indebted farmers and farm
workers was very important from a redistributional viewpoint. This
represented a major redistribution from the upper-middle income groups to
lower ones in rural areas.
The second event of this period was the confiscation of wealth assimilated
illegally by tax evasion, profiteering, bribery, preferential treatment and
monopoly. By December 1962, 30 big businesses had been accused and
found guilty and they were assessed fines totalling 4.2 billion won. For 5 of
the 30 firms, the shock of the magnitude of the fines drove them from the
ranks of big business.
The third factor is that the export-oriented development strategy also
contributed to the achievement of equity. The accelerating rate of growth in
labour-intensive export industries provided a steadily expanding pool of job
opportunities to the unemployed and the underemployed, as well as to the
growing labour force. In most developing countries, a GNP real growth rate
of at least 5 to 6 percent appears necessary to absorb the increase in the
urban labour force and provide the minimum necessary conditions for
equitable growth.90 Korea's steady growth of almost 10 percent per annum
since 1962 has more than fulfilled this basic requirement. In the case of
labour-intensive development the prospects for equitable income
distribution are considerably better. If labour can be absorbed into more
productive employment at a pace faster than the growth of the labour force,
unemployment and underemployment will be reduced. Substantial
employment opportunities in the non-farm sector will result in the migration
of rural workers to the cities, and the overall tightening of the labour market
will result in an increase in wages while contributing to the reduction of
sectoral differentials in household income. When human capital and
national wealth are relatively well distributed, as has been the case of
Korea, no distributive policy can be more effective than employment
creation.91
Finally, for most of the period since independence, the distribution of
education has exerted a positive influence on income distribution. A major
adult education campaign had been started in the late 1940s, and primary
education was made nearly universal by the early 1960s. In 1945, about 22
90 Ibid., p. 11.
91 Sang-Mok Suh(1985), Economic Growth and Change in Income Distribution: The Korean Case,
Seoul: The KDI. p. 16.
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percent of those over 12 years of age were estimated to have been literate;
literacy is now estimated at about 90 percent. The breadth and intensity of
the improvement in educational attainment has been one of the major
elements in Korea's development strategy. The availability of a well-trained
and highly productive labour force made possible the rapid expansion of
manufacturing activities that intensively used labour, particularly skilled
labour, and a rapid growth of labour productivity and incomes.
In summary, Korea's successful performance in growth and income
distribution has been based on a mixture of:
(1). a unique situation: land and asset redistribution;
(2). a historical event: the Korean war and military coup;
(3). egalitarian government initiatives: cancellation of usurious debts,
confiscation of illegal wealth, increased education and greater
employment opportunities.
Thus, in the 1960s Korea had a relatively equitable social and economic
base from which to launch its development efforts, and a much higher
human resource potential than the great majority of countries with a
comparable per capita income level.
3.5. Conclusion.
The examination of the above national characteristics enables us to
interpret the development of social security policy prior to the NWP
programme in the following ways. There was no historical experience as a
basic for development of a welfare system. In the period of dynasties, the
government neither played nor was expected to play a role in social security
areas. Even the Japanese and the U.S. military occupations following after
the dynasties did not implement modernised social security systems. In
addition to the lack of roots for institutionalised social security systems, the
new Korean government established in 1948 was not able to initiate a
social security programme because the authoritarian rule of the Korean
government did not enable the people to express their needs and call for
social policy; and that the political leaders and bureaucrats upon whom
social policy development depended did not concern themselves with this
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matter. An unstable political situation and administrative inability following
the Japanese, the AMG, and the Korean War were further obstacles to the
modernisation of Korean social policy.
This situation somewhat changed since 1961. Korea had political stability,
increased administrative capacity, and economic progress. However, other
characteristics inherited in the approach to policy-making and administration
continued to represent serious obstacles. For example, there was continued
suppression of interest groups and the masses in political participation,
which might have otherwise influenced the ruling group to meet social
needs. Because of the absence of democratic inputs to government, any
progress in development of social security development depended wholly
on the interests of a small group of political leaders and bureaucrats.
However, they were not interested. This presumably resulted from several
factors. The government, which had given priority to economic and industrial
development, believed that implementation of social security programmes
would stagnate national development. This is because the programmes
would involve an enormous amount of money, which could be used in
economic and industrial development.
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Chapter 4. The Emergence of Pension Policy.
4.1. A Point of Discussion.
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the Korean government has
enshrined economic growth near the top of the regime's hierarchy of values.
President Park's hierarchy of values could not have been more similar. In
the first place, economics took priority over politics. In his own words: "In
human life, economics precedes politics or culture.""' So far as higher ends
such as reunification and national defence( as well as deferred objectives
such as democracy) were seen as being furthered by, rather than in conflict
with, economic growth. In the Korean government also the term 'social' of
'social policy' or 'social development' has been used in the contrasting
relation to the adjective 'economic' attached to 'economic policy' or
'economic growth.'2 Moreover, the association of the value premise which
the President has, had very significant impacts on policy-making in Korean
bureaucracy, in which hierarchical authority is revered.3 Because of such
bureaucratic behaviour, the value of economic growth has not been
seriously challenged from inside the governmental bureaucracy. When a
single value or a set of values is reinforced to become a single goal criterion,
it becomes a constraint upon goal-diversification. Therefore, social welfare
policies were in many ways not compatible with economic development in
Korean case. The inclusion of social contents in the five-year economic
development plans have been proposed or recommended by research-
oriented or advisory groups,4 which are more or less free from hierarchical
orders but have little influence.
1 Chung-Hee Park(1970), The Country, the Revolution, and I, Seoul: Lollym Corporation Publishers,
p. 26.
3 Jones and Sakong(1980), Ibid., p. 43.
3 Professor Cho points out that "in the Korean governmental policy-making process, hierarchical order
is the most powerful value governing bureaucratic behaviour." See, Suk-Choon Cho(1970), "The Korean
Bureaucracy: Authority and Policy Formation Process," Korean Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 8
No. 2. p. 162.
4 For example, in July, 1968, the Social Security Committee completed the report entitled "Social
Development: The Basic Design and Direction." The report presents five short-term goals and three
long-term objectives of Korea's social development planning. In practice, however, the report has
aimed to remove various impediments to, or facilitate favourable conditions for, the country's rapid
economic growth, rather than to apply an integrated approach to national development.
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The Korean government used the five-year economic development plan as
the central framework of an action programme. However, it was not until the
Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan(1971-1976) that social
security had ever been mentioned in the development plan. Even then, there
were only several paragraphs related specifically to social security. And
especially about social insurance, viz:
"During the Third Plan period, the industrial accident compensation
insurance programme and the medical insurance programme will be
gradually expanded in the number of beneficiaries. During the plan
period, this insurance programme will be expanded so as to cover all
enterprise shiring more than 30 employees. The medical insurance
programme has been in operation at two selected business firms,
one in mining and the other in manufacturing, on a trial basis since
the time when the Medical Insurance Law was legislated in 1962. At
present a total of 18,000 persons are covered by this insurance
programme. On the basis of the experience in these pioneer
schemes, the medical insurance programme will be expanded
during the plan period."5
As can be seen from the above statements, there was no mention at all of
a national pension programme. Under the present condition, how and why,
then, did the pension issue arrive on the political agenda in the early 1970s?
During the New Year's Press Conference, on 12th of January, 1973,
President Park suddenly disclosed that "the government would organize a
social security pension system under which the government will pay
retirement pensions to all retired workers, disability pension to both mentally
and physically retarded persons, and a bereavement pension to bereaved
families. It would be effective from 1st of January, 1974."6
To have a proper understanding of policy-initiation( i.e., how and why
pension policy was initiated and brought to the attention to government) we
will examine the policy backgrounds in relation to the four theoretical
approaches which we examined in Chapter Two. This is because, as we
5 The EPB(1971), The Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan, 1972-1976. Seoul: Republic of
Korea, pp. 91-92.
6Chong-Kee Park(1975), Social Security in Korea: An Approach to Socio-Economic Development,
Seoul: Korea Development Institute, pp. 104-105.
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mentioned already, the form in which social security exists today is a
reflection of what has happened in the past. A review of those factors which
have shaped its development will produce clues for a prediction of its future.
In other words, as I shall demonstrate throughout this chapter, we have to
understand the emergence of pension policy in relation to the major state of
affairs with which the Korean government was faced at that time. It relates to
the regime's responsiveness to internal as well as external changes to
political and socio-economic development. Building on this argument, I
contend that the voice of society and the policy-makers in the government
vis-a-vis that of the chief executive could have been strengthened in the
process in which the pressures besetting Park's long-term political strategy
become ever more present.
Entering into the 1970s, Korea was undergoing a series of uncertain
courses. First of all, in the political sphere, in order that he might succeed for
a third term in 1971, Park tried to amend the constitution in 1969. This
constitutional amendment cost the regime its legitimacy. The power struggle
for the leadership succession arose within the ruling elite coalition in 1969,
and the 1971 presidential election almost brought about a defeat for Park.
From this event, Park learned that he needed the reorganisation of his ruling
coalition as well as the state structure. As regards the economy, although the
export-oriented development strategy of the Park regime achieved a rapid
economic growth, it also produced numerous socio-political tensions in the
Korean society in late 1960s and early 1970s. The regime faced growing
public demands brought on by problems such as inflation, balance-of-
payments deficits, foreign indebtedness, income inequality, and economic
recession. In this situation, there emerged a growing voice in the
government recommending a fundamental reassessment of the export-first
programme. It was suggested by some others that the programme had
reached its limits and that it should cease to play a predominant role in
leading the nation's industrial development. In the social area, the state-led
development with export-oriented strategy produced a serious balance
between manufacturing industries and agriculture sectors. Further, this
strategy also produced serious problems in working conditions and labour
activities. Due to an international division of labour, the Korean economy
mainly utilized its 'cheap wage' as a principal advantage in competition in
the international market. Recently mobilised labour, however, seriously
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challenged these working conditions and low wages. In 1971 the anti-
government demonstrations and disputes of workers peaked at the highest
point since Park had consolidated power in 1961. Finally, internationally,
following the Nixon Doctrine in 1969, the controversy over the reduction of
US aid and the withdrawal of US troops in Korea were viewed as a warning
that Koreans must rely on themselves for defence and self-reliance. Perhaps
the first, and one of the most serious shocks to Korea, was Nixon's New
Economic Policy in 1971, which reflected the rising protectionist mood of the
country.
All these environmental pressures limited the alternative choices of the
Park regime to reduce the serious gap between state and society in the early
1970s. To handle these political and socio-economic problems, the Park
regime actually pursued a series of specific policies. The results were
restructuring state structure and development strategies. As regards political
restructure, between the two alternatives of democratic way and
authoritarian path, Park chose the Yushin coup which strengthened state
power to become more authoritarian rather than democratic. The Fourth
Republic was established by the Yushin Reforms through a revision of the
constitution in order to institutionalize the long dictatorship of Park. In the
economic area, following a period of muddling through, the government
adopted an alternative industrial path, i.e., export-led heavy and
chemical(HC) industrialisation as the state direction in industry. An industrial
choice that was almost entirely new to Korea. Finally, the pension
programme emerged with dual-purposes: socio-political palliation and
economic acceleration. This is because the pension programme can serve
as a desirable socio-political objective by providing income protection for
most economically vulnerable groups, such as the retired aged, widows and
orphans, and the disabled. In addition, it serves as an important economic
objective by providing a source of funds to finance economic development.
In this chapter, therefore, we will discuss more specifically the political,
socio-economic, and international environments which were the
backgrounds of the emergence of the pension programme at this time. The
actual NWP policy-making process will be examined in the following
chapter.
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4.2. The Background of NWP Policy-Initiation.
4.2.1. Political Environments.
The period of political change may be divided into two parts: prior to 1972,
the period with the characteristics of relatively competitive democracy with a
bipartisan system; and after 1972, the rise of the authoritarian
Yushin(Revitalization) regime, completely retreating to executive dominance
maintained through manipulation of all political and economic mechanisms.
As the principal motive of the military coup in 1961 was an intermilitary
power struggle within the military rather than the restoration of democracy
through the revolution, Park and his followers tried to secure their power by
promoting the constitutional amendment for Park's unlimited presidency in
1969. In spite of strong criticism, the constitutional amendment was
subsequently endorsed in a popular referendum held on 21st of December
1969. In this process, there was a nationwide opposition movement which
was organized by the students, religious groups, intellectuals, and
opposition politicians. The protests were continued all the year.
According to the new constitution, Park competed with his opposition
leader, Dae-Jung Kim, at the presidential election on 27th of April in 1971.
During the election campaign, the basic state ideology of the Park regime
such as 'anti-communism' and the priority of 'export-led economic
development' was challenged by Kim. Kim, for instance, publicly proposed
the abolition of the newly established Reserved Army for the Defence of the
Home Country, instead, he suggested the establishment of a regional
security system among four regional powers( the US, Japan, China, and
USSR ) to reduce the North-South Korean conflicts. Widely politicizing the
developmental issues, Kim also argued that Park's developmental path
would create over time stark imbalances between cities and rural areas, rich
and poor, and big business and medium-sized and small firms in that
opportunities and the welfare of the mass public had been emasculated in
the developmental process.7 Neither could the military dictatorship be
prolonged under the guise of modernization of the fatherland, nor the
developmental policy centering on economic growth alone any longer be
justified. Once elected, he said, he would realize a 'mass-participatory
7 Dong-A llbo, 10 October, 1970.
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economy' and 'mass-participatory democracy,'8 in which various sectors of
the society could join in the national developmental process and the
opposed citizenry would enjoy the benefits of democracy such as the system
of regional autonomy, the independence of the legislature and the judiciary
from the executive branch, freedom of the press, and the right to organize
labour unions.9
Although Park barely won this election, his victory would not grant him the
privilege of running the State with comfort. While the voters allowed Park to
rule for the third term, they gave the Opposition Party a sufficient force in the
National Assembly to serve as a restraint on the government. On 25th of
May, 1971, the Opposition NDP won 65 seats, while the ruling DRP gained
86 seats in the National Assembly. The result compelled President Park to
modify his strong stewardship in running state affairs. The turnout did not
provide enough seats for the two-thirds vote which would allow the Park
regime to revise the constitution again. The 1971 National Assembly
elections also provided the focal point for university students who criticized
alleged election irregularities, compulsory military drill and severe corruption
in the higher echelons of government. This political situation was very
difficult for Park to handle with the existing state structure. Since the Park
regime had regarded economic development as 'the key of its own political
success,' political stability and public order for sustaining growth were
required.
Processed in an intimidating political atmosphere, the Law Regarding the
Special Act on National Security was proclaimed on 2th of December, 1971,
to forbid all social disturbances. It contained the six-point national
emergency programmes that the President might activate, when necessary:
(1). To control prices, wages, and rents for specific periods;
(2). To issue a national mobilization decree to mobilize human and
material resources for national defence purposes on a nationwide or
regional scale;
8 For election on this theme by Kim, see Dae-Jung Kim(1985), Mass-Participatory Economy: A
Democratic Alternative for Korea. Lanham, MD: University Press of America Inc.,.
9 For more of the contents of election campaigns by Kim and the NDP, see the Dong-A llbo, 24 March
and 5 May, 1971.
10 For more details, see C.I. Eugene Kim(1972), "The Meaning of the 1971 Korean Elections: A Pattern
of Political Development," Asian Survey, Vol. 12 No. 3. pp. 213-224.
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(3). To evacuate inhabitants or materials from a specified area for
purposes of military operations;
(4). To ban outdoor assemblies and demonstrations;
(5). To prohibit publication of articles "affecting national security, leading to
the split of national opinion, or promoting the confusion of social order," and
(6). To restrict strikes by labour organizations.
The measure pointed out that persons who violated the measures under a
state of national emergency should be sentenced to a maximum of ten years
in prison. Comprehensive as they were, endowing the chief executive with
all the power necessary to mobilize the state and society, the major aspects
of this Special Act precisely pointed to Park's wish to manage the then-
current guidelines exacerbated by the negative consequences of his long-
term political strategy. Briefly, the economic provision of the Special Act
enabling Park to regulate various aspects of the economy was soon
followed by such emergency measures as the August 2nd Emergency
Measure. This measure was primarily geared to getting around the structural
recession, which, according to one major government voice, was caused in
large part by the export-first strategy. The labour provision of the Special Act
reflected also the ever-increasing labour unrest, which tended to go beyond
the capacity of the then-existing government's restrictive measures on
labour. The Clauses regarding the political actions of the social groups were
directly geared to suppress the anti-Park movements of the time, which
increasingly formed a tacit alliance. Finally, the emergency and the national
security provisions! including the presidential power to declare a 'state of
national emergency,' to 'request national mobilisation,' and to 'enjoy greater
freedom of action in national security budgets' ) would additionally empower
Park to suppress and muzzle his political opponents as well as to find a
solution for the national security problems.
In short, the economic, socio-political, and national security problems
eroding confidence in Park's ability to govern the nation were to be
accommodated, at least in theory, in a tightly staged state reform unilaterally
claimed by President Park. The security concern was the chief reason that
the Park administration resorted to extracurricular political activity in this
period. However, when one scrutinizes the core contents of the executive-
sponsored bill hastily processed by the Park administration only a few
weeks after the announcement of the Special Declaration, it can be seen
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that the national security concern was not the sole source of such an
unusual move by the State. Rather, the declaration of a measures was
motivated by the domestic politics.
4.2.2. Economic Environments.
Economic strategy under Park fell roughly into two periods: namely, pre-
and post-Yushin Reform. As we have mentioned in the previous chapter, the
First Five-Year Plan(1962-1967) launched by the Park regime had been
initially aimed at import substitution and domestic capital formulation. With
the sharp decline of US aid since 1957, however, Korea could not afford to
promote her economy in an import-substitution pattern because her initial
economic conditions for growth were by no means favourable. As a result,
the First Five-Year Plan was revised in 1964, shifting the strategy from
import-substitution to export-promotion with the import of foreign capital and
technology. Since then, the export-promotion strategy, based on the
maximization of export through the intensified production of light
manufactures, was depicted as a sort of panacea for solving seemingly
difficult state tasks. Promoted in such a way throughout the sixties, Park's
export-first strategy was studded with many auspicious results. Indeed, as
Park had hoped, Korea experienced unprecedented export increases,
which, in turn, provided Korea with rapid industrial as well as economic
growth. As shown in Table 4-1, a moderate rate of growth was recorded to
become one of the most rapid in the world. In 1970 constant prices, real
GNP grew at an annual average rate of 6.3 percent during the first half of the
decade and at 11.1. percent for the next five-year period. In terms of per
capita, the average annual growth rate was 3.4 percent between 1961 and
1965, compared with 8.9 percent for the second half of the decade.
Further, Park was able to enjoy three major political victories( 1963, 1967,
and 1971), in each of which he claimed that his successive tenure in office
was necessary not to interrupt the 'modernisation of the fatherland' via
export promotion. As a result of this favourable political position of Park,
supported by unprecedented economic performances, export promotion had
become couched at the core of Park's politics for his long-term strategy for
cohesion.
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1960 1,130 45.74 — —
1961 1,185 46.45 4.9% 1.6%
1962 1,221 46.55 3.1 0.2
1963 1,328 49.21 8.8 5.7
1964 1,442 52.10 8.8 5.9
1965 1,530 54.00 6.1 3.7
1966 1,719 59.36 12.4 9.9
1967 1,853 62.73 7.8 5.7
1968 2,087 69.18 12.6 10.3
1969 2,401 78.09 15.0 12.9
1970 2,589 82.73 7.9 5.9
1971 2,827 88.81 9.2 7.4
1972 3,024 93.44 7.0 5.2
Source: The Bank of Korea(1973), National Income Statistics Yearbook:
1973. Seoul, pp. 116-117 and 208-209.
Park assumed in his visionary export politics that increase in exports,
spreading out their positive effects to elsewhere in the nation, would result in
a self-supportive economy, stable politics( in Park's term, democracy, or the
democratic welfare state), and an independent capacity for national security.
Nevertheless, the first consequence of the success of Park's export
politics( e.g., rapid industrial expansion via export promotion) would not
guarantee over time that the broader goals further envisioned by Park in his
export politics would take care of themselves. After less than a decade of
export promotion, Park's long-term strategy began to face the spectre of
serious strains, and the myth of the export strategy as Park's self-legitimizing
strategy began to fall apart. What, then, had been going wrong with the
export-first programme? In other words, in spite of many apparently
successful economic and political outcomes of the export-first strategy led by
the light industries, why was the Park administration beginning to
fundamentally question the viability of the programme per se and coming up
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with the idea that the government should bring an end to the previous
industrial course? Therefore, we will examine some economic environments
within which were the regime faced growing public demands and then we
will focus upon the impact of the crisis of Park's long-term political
strategy (i.e., the export politics) on the direction of the Park government's
industrial policy.
A. Inflation.
Perhaps the most serious problems for the Park regime was a sharply
increasing rate of inflation by 1971. The rapid economic growth rate of
Korea had led to inflation as well as massive trade deficits despite a 37
percent annual rise in exports since 1964. The government had been mainly
responsible for the inflation which had adverse effects on economic growth
and the balance of payments.11 The government had monopolized
monetary policy. The Monetary Board had been under the control of the
Finance Ministry with veto power against the Board's decisions since 1961.
The government owned all the commercial and special banks. When the
money supply grew by more than the rate of growth of real output of goods
and services, the result was inflation. Government spending had been
another reason for Korea's persistently high inflation rate. The real increase
in expenditures came from investments, which were 20.0 percent of
government spending in 1961-1970 but amounted to 24.3 percent in 1971-
1973. The government also had used political pressure to secure the
approval of bank loans, which accounted for more than 60 percent of the
total investment financing of major business firms in Korea. Finally, inflation
was caused by the increasing costs of imports which contributed to the
upward price spiral. The government set and monopolized the prices in
public services and major commodities such as oil, gas, and coal.
The deleterious effects of acute inflation were great. Inflation put added
pressure on the country's balance of payments by encouraging imports and
discouraging exports at an over-valued exchange rate. Domestically,
inflation affected the economy adversely by promoting the wrong kinds of
investment, and channelling productive energies into activities promising
11 Seung-Hee Kim(1976), "Economic Development of South Korea," In Se-Jin Kim and Chang-Hyun
ChofEds.1, Korea: A Divided Nation, Maryland: The Research Institute on Korean Affairs, pp. 128-135.
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high speculative profits, but not socially desirable. In addition, continued
inflation had the potential of leading to social and political unrest by lowering
the purchasing power of the middle classes and diminishing incentives to
work. Inflation had become a major social issue, with urban groups feeling
that they were suffering disproportionately from its consequences. Various
tactics of the government were attempted, such as price controls, but with
little success.
B. Trade and Balance of Payments.
As can be seen in the Table 4-2, Korea's trade deficits exhibited a system
of improvement in 1963-1964, when the export-first programme was about to
be launched. After that time, however, the deficits rapidly worsened,
showing, for instance, an almost quadrupled rate of increase in 1964-1970.
Likewise, the balance of payments postures, which also improved a great
deal in the early years of export promotion( i.e., from 1963-to 1966), sharply
deteriorated, reaching as low as a deficit of $623 million in 1970.
Table 4-2: Korea's Trade Balances and Balance of Payments, 1963-1970.




1963 86.8 497.0 -410.2 -146
1964 120.0 364.9 -244.9 -26
1965 175.1 420.3 -245.3 -9
1966 250.3 679.3 -429.5 -103
1967 334.7 908.9 -574.2 -192
1968 486.2 1,322.0 -835.8 -440
1969 658.3 1,650.0 -991.7 -549
1970 882.2 1,804.2 -922.0 -623
Note: Currency-Million US $ at current prices.
Source: EPB(1980), Handbook of the Korean Economy, Seoul: Republic of
Korea, pp. 195-197.
While foreign capital inflow had mainly contributed to promoting the
exports, the burden of foreign loans was increasing. The increasing foreign
debt was due to the Park regime's incentives measures to induce foreign
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capital inflow under the guidance of AID. As such, Korea's trade and
balance of payments deficits were serious built-in tensions of Park's export-
first programme. However, preoccupied with high-growth performances via
export target maximization, the Park administration paid little heed to the
growing deficits problem. In fact, inducement of foreign input, expansively
defined, was much encouraged by the Park administration which was
anxious to expand the nation's export capacities for the sake of export
maximization. Yet, concern was rising over the costliness of such industrial
structure, as the trade and payments deficits grew at unprecedented rates
toward the end of the sixties and, further, as the growing deficits become
associated with many problems in the economy such as the mounting
foreign debts. 12 |n 1971 when the Second Five-Year Plan ended, foreign
debt reached more than $3,000 million and the amount of total debt service
payments of principal and interest due for the year was one-fifth of the size of
total exports in that year.13 Total capital inflows constituted 83 percent of
export earnings in 1969. The resulting burden of foreign capital redemption
has been a serious problem since then. In fact, as the major indicators of
Korea's mode of incorporation into external markets, such as trade balance,
balance of payments, and foreign debts continuously deteriorated over the
years regardless of rapid industrial expansion, criticism of the fundamental
philosophical basis of Park's developmental course had been increasingly
renewed. As the political opposition was once more bringing such charges
to the forefront of Korean politics after Park's developmental strategy had
been in place for some years, Park again faced the social challenges
mounting against his design for industrialization. Toward the end of the
sixties, the growing number of student protests had become increasingly
radicalized. They pointed to the fact that the nation, by way of Park's
political-economic programme, had already become a 'foreign capital-
dependent' society in which nothing but corruption prevailed, jeopardizing
the future course of national development. Albeit with different tones, an
increasing number of academicians also brought out similar themes through
various channels of public expression. They stated that the economy's
external linkages, mainly expressed by trade and balance of payments
12 Korea's indebtedness grew from $69.2 million in 1962 to $301.3 million in 1965 and then, to $2,570.0
million in 1970. See Ann O. Krueger(1982), The Developmental Role of the Foreign Sector and Aid,
Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, p. 145.
13 Ibid., p. 146.
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deficit and foreign loans, had gone too far, and that the nation's industrial
structure was in desperate need of amelioration.
C. Economic Recession.
A cursory look at the economic condition during the early seventies would
defy the view that Korea was in deep trouble. The economy, as expressed
by its aggregate indicators such as GNP growth rates, seemed to perform
well. For instance, in 1970, the growth rate was 7.9 percent. In the following
two years, high growth performances continued and they marked 9.2
percent in 1971 and 7.0 percent in 1972. While a sharp retrenchment trend
in the growth rates seemed quite evident in those years, especially when
those rates were compared with the 1969 GNP growth rate(15.0%), on the
surface the economy still appeared to be in good shape. Probably, it was
because of these aggregate indicators that in spite of the serious tension so
evidently building up in Korea's industrial structure in the latter part of the
sixties, the government was hesitant to resort to any comprehensive
undertakings to initiate a fundamental change in its long-followed industrial
course( i.e., export-led light industrialization). Indeed, it could have been felt
that even if external linkage of the nation's industrial course was riddled with
some difficulties owing to a deteriorating industrial structure, it would be
premature to limit the growth of light industries, which still brought in
considerable amount of foreign currency and, thereby, contributed to a 'still-
high' growth performance.
However, as central planners soon learned that the external linkage
problems were not the only pressures it had to deal with, and that there
existed as well signs of internal destabilisation. One of the developments
putting the government into such a position was the faltering performance of
manufacturing firms, which had hitherto iea Korea's rapid industrial
expansion. Throughout most of the sixties, the Park administration provided
manufacturing firms with policies that might undermine the very prospects of
the nation's course of manufacturing growth. The government encouraged
firms, especially those engaged in one way or another in export activities, to
borrow from external sources of finance to expand their production
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capacities."'4 Not only were domestic credits made amply available to those
firms, but also the government actively processed foreign loans via
aggressive diplomacy. It was generally thought among the economic
planners that as long as those firms contributed to maximizing export sales
and brought foreign currency to domestic markets, over-extension of those
firms to external credits could be tolerated. However, approximately a
decade after the initiation of this government policy toward manufacturing
firms, 'the more the better' loan policy turned out to be quite costly. The debt-
equity ratio of manufacturing industries in general was relatively healthy in
the initial years of export promotion. For example, the ratio in 1965 was one-
to-one. Yet, after some years of implementation of the government's lenient
loan policy toward manufacturing firms, the overall financial structures of
manufacturing industries deteriorated sharply, reaching, for instance, as low
as one-to-four level in 1971. Further, as these firms became heavily obliged
to repay external debts, their profit margins were said to be in sharp decline.
Indeed, the return on investment of manufacturing firms dropped from 7.1
percent in 1966 to a somewhat stunning level of 0.9 percent in 1971.15 Had
these unhealthy effects been limited to these firms, the government could
have let these firms suffer the costs of this extremely negative situation
because these problems would have been largely firm-level problems. Yet,
the consequences of this state of manufacturing firms would hardly be
limited to the firm level. In the middle of 1969, when exports slowdown,15
foreign debts constantly soared,17 and the government squeezed credits. In
such a context,15 the government was under serious pressure to deal with
the stumbling manufacturing firms exporting negative effects elsewhere in
the economy. In 1969, the government had to manage more than thirty firms
14 The EPB(1982), Economic Policy in the Age of Development: The Twenty-Year History of the EPB.
Seoul: Republic of Korea, pp. 86-90. In Korean.
15 Kae H. Chung(1974), "Industrial Progress in South Korea," Asian Survey, Vol. 14 No. 5. p. 452.
16 The rate of growth of exports fell from a high of 42 percent in 1968 to 34 and 28 percent in 1969 and
1970. See, David C. Cole and Yung-Chul Park(1983), Financial Development in Korea, 1945-1978.
Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, p. 145.
17 The net indebtness of Korea increased from $301 million in 1965 to $2,570.0 million in 1970 and then
to 3,044.2 million in 1971. See, Krueger(1982), Ibid,, p. 145.
18 The tight monetary policy of the government went to such an extent that it reduced the rate of
expansion of domestic credit from 85 percent in 1968 to 27 percent in 1970. See, Cole and Park, Op.
Cjt, pp. 160-161.
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that simply could not afford the loans that they had drawn. 19 Apart from
these firms, ninety other firms were being threatened with bankruptcy.20 it
was reported that almost 95 percent of the total capital invested in them was
derived from loans. As could be seen, the effects of this state of
manufacturing firms on the economy would be predictably costly.
Furthermore, the sharp retrenchment trends in manufacturing growth and
overall investment increases, accompanied by a number of bankruptcies
declared by firms, also meant that unemployment would rise considerably.
To reverse such ominous trends in the economy, the EPB announced in
1971 a major currency devaluation 18%) in the hope of stimulating exports
and, thereby, activating the investment activities of manufacturing firms.21
Yet, apart from the many potential positive effects it might have had on the
economy, the devaluation would only increase the burden of firms because
the devaluation would increase the cost of foreign imports and the debt
burden of heavily indebted firms. Further, and for more immediate purposes,
the government also installed in the Blue House the Special Committee for
the Rearrangement of Ill-Managed Firms, in 1969, and the Committee for the
Rationalization of Corporations, in 1971, in order to minimize the negative
effects of the ill-managed firms on the economy. In fact, with the US quota on
Korean textile exports in late 1971 and with foreign lending institutions such
as the IMF forcing the government to place a ceiling on loans from
commercial sources, more firms were facing bankruptcy. This only
contributed to the distressing state of investment activities in Korea.
D. Effect of the President Nixon's New Economic Policy.
By 1970 US trade had declined as a percentage of total world trade and
turned temporarily in 1971 to a balance-of-trade deficit. The American
economy was approaching a crisis, with stagnant productivity, double-digit
inflation in 1973, and the first trade deficit in the twentieth century. On 15th of
1971, Nixon dropped his bombshell, the New Economic Policy. The policy
19 See, The Planning Office(1979), A Study on the Development of Industrialization in Korea. Seoul:
Korea, p. 218. In Korean.
2° Joungwon Alexander Kim(1976), Divided Korea: The Politics of Development. 1945-1972,
Cambridge,M.A.,: Harvard University Press, p. 277.
21 Cole and Park, Ibid., p. 160.
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imposed a 10 percent surcharge on Korea's export goods and limited the
annual growth rate of Korea's non-cotton textile sales in the US to 7.5
percent. The pending textile quotas placed on Korea's most important export
became extraordinarily threatening to Korea's economy as a whole. In 1971,
textiles accounted for over 35 percent of the foreign exchange earned,
growing from $173 million in 1968 to $432 million in 1971. The protectionist
policy of the US was expected to cost Korea an estimated $100 million
annually, or more than the US aid that Korea had received in any year since
the introduction of the First Five-Year Plan.22 According to Dong-A llbo,
American protectionism was likely to deprive Korea of $850 million in
expected earnings from the coming Third Five-Year Plan(1972-1976).23
Indeed, the growing protectionist policy of the US raised questions about
Korea's export-led growth strategy dependent on the outputs of light
industries. Ironically, the strategy had been proposed and dictated by the US
since the early 1960s. Trade dependence upon the US made the Korean
economy highly vulnerable to the surcharges and quotas on imports
imposed by the Nixon administration.
E. Problems of National Income Redistribution.
As we have examined in the previous chapter, Korea's level of income
inequality has been reported to be low. Based on Oshima, Adelman, and
others' studies, Korea is described as an exception to the Kuznets
hypothesis24 that the secular behaviour of inequality follows an inverted 'U-
shaped' pattern, with inequality first increasing and then decreasing with
development. In reality, however, the trend of inequality has worsened at
least during late 1960s and the early 1970s. This is because rapid economic
growth strategy under Park's rule was attained at a considerable income
inequality.
22 Joungwon Alexander Kim(1971), "The Republic of Korea: A Quest for New Directions," Asian Survey,
Vol. 11 No. 1. p. 93.
23 Dong-A llbo, 18 December, 1972.
24 Kuznets observed that income was distributed more unequally in less developed countries than in
more developed ones, and concluded that economic and individual growth seemed to increase income
inequality. See, Simon Kuznets(1954), "Economic Growth and Income Inequality," American Economic
Review. Vol. 45. pp. 1-28.
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It has no exaggeration to say that throughout the period of rapid output
growth, government authorities did not pay any serious attention to the gap
between the rich and the poor, except for dismissing any argument about
this issue as dangerous or even "communist" propaganda. This constitutes a
fundamental difference from the process of development planning in the
cases of Japan and Taiwan, even though Korea is often cited as having
experienced a similar pattern of economic growth. During the period 1964-
1968 Japan introduced a special plan for correcting distortions! including
inequalities) occurring in the process of rapid output growth, which followed
upon the commencement of the country's Five-Year Economic Development
Plans in 1956. In the case of Taiwan, the philosophical guidelines of Sun
Yat-Sen's "livelihood of people", incorporated in the Five-Year Economic
Plans, is said to have expressed from the beginning a concern for equity.25
In the Korean case, at first, rural needs were neglected in the early years so
that the gap between urban and rural life-styles and standards of living
widened throughout the 1960s. Most of the developmental economic
programmes were city oriented, leaving the countryside virtually untouched.
Secondly, the problem of rural-urban income disparities was but a part of the
large problem of income distribution between the rich and the poor. The
income of the poor was threatened by uncontrolled inflation, ill-managed
taxation, and the performance of the regime's investment in a selected few
corporations, despite the nominal rise in their income as shown in largely
meaningless national statistics. As Table 4-3 shows, the year 1970 was a
turning point of the Korean income distribution. For example, the top 20
percent of the people in Korea had steadily increased its share of the total
national income from 41 percent in 1970 to 45 percent in 1976. The sharp
and visible widening gap between the rich and the poor created a
psychological problem of democratization in the nation. Finally, the rising
expectations engendered by the economic success produced the major
internal problems of the Park regime. Since the trend of inequality had
worsened, it might have led the Korean people to pay attention to the issue
of distributive equity. Now that high growth has been maintained over a
decade, with that kind of growth policy expected to be continued for many
years, the Korean people were obviously keenly interested in learning how
the government would now become active in its distribution policy. This
25 Dae-Hwan Kim(1985), "Rapid Economic Growth and National Economic Integration in Korea, 1963-
1978," Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, Magdalen College, University of Oxford, p. 243.
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growth of concern for distributional equity is rooted in the various political,
economic and sociocultural factors of the society. During the past decade
concern for equity has been raised by several factors of Korean society.
Many university professors were the first to point out the "importance of
distributive equity" in economic development policies. They warned of the
inadequacy of "trickle-downism" which they believed dominated the thinking
of Korean policy-makers.26 The mass public also has shown a strong
concern for equitable redistribution of income. Most Korean people believed
that a severe income gap existed between the rich and the poor in society.
Table 4-3: Income Share in Se ected Years, 1965-1980.
Income 1965 1970 1976 1978 1980
Lowest 20 % 5.8 7.3 5.7 5.2 5.1
Low 40 % 19.32 19.6 19.6 15.5 16.1
Middle 40 % 38.9 38.8 37.8 37.8 38.5
Upper 20 % 41.8 41.6 45.3 46.7 45.4
Gini Coefficient 0.344 0.332 0.391 0.400 0.389
Source: EPB(1981). Korean Economic Indicators, p. 15.
4.2.3. Social Environments.
A. Conflict with the Federation of Korean Industries(FKI).
The disenchanted voices of the Federation of Korean Industries regarding
the way in which the business community operated began to burgeon,
beginning in the late sixties. As the number of firms subject to serious
problems began to rise, the FKI issued A Scheme on the Purification of the
Political. Economic, and Social Atmosphere in February, 1971. In this
statement, the FKI argued mainly that a number of the problems many
manufacturers faced during that time had their roots in 'too many
government demands' on the business community. These demands,
according to the FKI, tended to push firms to serve the goals and targets set
26 Yong-Duck Jung(1982), "Income Redistribution in Korea: Causes for the Growing Concern,"
Journal of East and West Studies. Vol. XI No. 1. p. 29.
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up by the government that often ran counter to the interests of industrial
firms.27 Claiming in that scheme that the previous institutional working in
which business operated was essentially an 'authoritarian political system,'
the FKI called for the abolition of the 'supremacy of politics over economics.'
This supremacy was said to exist in the business environment because of
excessive government intervention via the financial system and because of
the government's direct 'guidance for corporate direction.' Going a step
further, the FKI also suggested in April that the 'government-supplied' mode
of economic operation had already reached its limits and that government
measures toward business should from then on be based on the 'free
market' principle.28 To be sure, it was claimed that the size of firms
expanded a great deal under the government's strenuous efforts to spur
export activities. These efforts, in turn, according to the FKI, rendered
favourable credits to many manufacturing firms.29 Yet, as these credits were
tied to expanding the production capacity of the firms to meet the
predetermined macro-targets, a number of manufacturing firms suffered
extremely vulnerable financial strictures and rapidly falling profit margins,
both of which, in turn, contributed to the exploding number of business
failures. The better part of these firms' business problems, whose degree of
seriousness became more and more intense than ever before, was said to
have been caused by excessive government direction of the economy. As
the economy slipped into the backwash effects of the high growth of the
sixties and, in particular, as the recession of 'August 1971-January 1972'
was felt by the business community to be the first 'full-hedged recession'
since the beginning of industrialization, the FKI's criticism of the government
became more and more acute.
Compared with the earlier position of the FKI that it would become 'a
standard bearer of industrialization of the nation' by exerting 'immediate and
focused effects in concert with the national policy,' the position taken by the
FKI approximately a decade later was quite a bold one. Not only did the FKI
stage direct attacks on the government's way of conducting politico-
economic operations, by saying that it was essentially 'authoritarian,' but
also it recommended the new policy direction. In normal times, such
27 See, The Federation of Korean lndustry(19xx), The Twenty-Year History of the FKI. Seoul: Korea,
pp. 237-240. In Korean.
28 The FKI(1971), "The Resolution for the Innovation of Economic Operation," In Ibid., pp. 461-462.
29 Ibid., p. 249.
177
recalcitrant voices from private firms would not carry that much weight, given
their enormous dependence on the government, which was often depicted
as "the maker and at times the breaker of the conglomerates." Yet, facing a
seemingly difficult economic condition in this period as well as elections to
be held in the middle of 1971, the government could not be totally indifferent
to the claims of the FKI.
B. Conflict with the Labour Unions.
The Park regime attempted to close channels of political access to the
labour unions so as to deactivate them politically, not only by means of
repression but also through legal restraints. The elites of state forced the
union movement into a purely business or economic unionism. They did not
aim at strengthening labour as a ruling group's coalition partner and even
did not attempt to employ inclusionary corporatist policies to enable the
working class to participate in the political community as had existed in
Brazil, Argentina, and Peru. Rather the Park regime was characterized by
Stepan's 'exclusionary corporatism,' in which the ruling elite attempt to
construct political order and economic efficiency through coercive means,
excluding autonomous organisations within the system.30 Because the
primary factor which contributed to the successful economic development in
Korea was the abundant and relatively skilful labour force, when the Park
regime shifted gear toward the export-oriented growth strategy in 1964,
Korean workers were not lacking the latent talent needed for being
industrious on the job. Reasonably well educated and often highly
experienced, the Korean workers had another important attribute, namely,
adherence to Confucian beliefs, which place a high value on loyalty,
punctuality, hard work, and respect for authority. These initial conditions
were attractive to the multinational corporations who were seeking to move
beyond the national boundary, particularly to the manufacturers of the
declining light industry sector in Japan as well as the US in the 1960s. In
addition, with no natural resources except its cheap work force, the cost of
labour had been a critical issue to the Park regime. As a result, the regime's
effort to keep wages low and control the labour movement had resulted in
30 Alfred Stepan(1978), The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, pp. 76-77.
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even greater repression than the more publicized wave of arrests and trials
of dissident students and intellectuals. Whenever labour movements
engaged in an uprising, they were severely crushed and repressed,
following the anti-communism ideology, and often mobilized in the interest of
authority.
In response to increasing activation of labour union movements after the
student uprising toppled the Rhee regime, the military coup leaders in 1961
dissolved the trade unions. In 1963 the KCIA unified the unions under a
single national centre, selecting about 30 labour representatives to be
trained for organising new labour unions.31 The state elite founded the
Federation of Korean Trade Unions(FKTU) and the constituent national
industrial unions, reorganizing them in a top-down manner. Laws banned
labour unions from participating in any activities for party politics such as by
collecting political funds from its members and by using the funds for political
purpose. The Park regime announced in December 1969, another rule to
control the labour situation, namely, the "Special Law for the Labour Union
and the Labour Dispute within Foreign-Invested Factories." According to the
law, workers were prohibited from engaging in labour organisations and
participating in any sort of strike against foreign investors. Thus, the basic
rights of workers were stripped away to attract foreign investors.
In this situation, the feebleness of the labour unions had been one of the
workers' major problems. Unions were legal by the law, but 620,000 of the
1.5 million workers belonged to the nationwide FKTU which was strictly
controlled by the KCIA. Union activity was hedged on all sides by legal
restraints. No union could be set up in a foreign-owned company without the
management's consent. Collective bargaining was permitted in theory, but
the Government Office of Labour Affairs had the right to impose a settlement.
Strikes were banned. Agents of the KCIA were stationed openly in every
union office, and they attended election meetings to dictate the results.
Besides the direct repression of opposition by the legal restraints, the regime
operated in tight secrecy and gave little information to the public in a strictly
censored press.
31 Jang-Jip Choi(1984), "A Corporatist Control of the Labour Union in South Korea," Korean Social
Science Journal. Vol. 11. p. 30. For more detail, see, Nak-Chung Kim(1982), History of Korea's Labour
Movement Seoul: Chongsa. p. 30.
179
Nevertheless, the workers came increasingly to know how to use their
representative organisation as a useful instrument within the given legal
framework when students, dissidents and religious sectors helped the
labourers take collective action. Ever since the theory of comparative
advantage was strongly emphasized by the government on the grounds of
international competitiveness, Park followed the theory with avengeance.
Whenever and wherever possible, the President advocated that an
adequate wage level was the key to export success, which, in turn, was
taken as the core of his scheme for national development. Yet, as this policy
emphasis did not include lenient labour provisions over an extended period
of time, the argument no longer had persuasive power over industrial
workers, who became increasingly disenchanted with the 'myth of export
politics.'
At the end of the 1960s, the Park regime was faced with problems in the
labour sector due to inflation and a low-wage policy based on the pursuit of
export-oriented industrialisation and increasing foreign capital input. At this
time, the chief activity of labour unions, which were compelled by law to
engage in economic matters only, has concentrated on wage increases. In
real terms, wages, though very sluggish, rose throughout the decades. Even
though the industrial dispute figures in the three years, 1968-71, before the
declaration of the Law concerning Special Measures for Safeguarding
National Security( the LSMSNS ) in 1971 did not show any sign of increase,
let alone sudden upsurge, some large scale industrial disputes were
threatening employers. Some large scale strikes made a great impact, for
example, the labour disputes at the foreign invested electronics firms,
Signetics Co. and Oak Co. in 1968; a large scale industry-wide strike by
textile workers at the sixteen cotton textile firms; a prolonged strike by the
metal workers at the government-run Chosen Shipbuilding Co. in 1969; the
chemical workers' hunger strike at the Korea Pfizer Co. of 1970, a subsidiary
of American Pfizer; and the auto workers' strike at Saehan Motor Co. in
1971, a joint investment with General Motors. However, garment shop
worker Tae-ll, Jeon's dramatic suicide at the Peace Market in Seoul, on 13
November, 1970, by burning himself, was the most significant event that
symbolised workers' protest against low wages and unbearable working
conditions. Whereas the Jeon's incident was a great event in terms of social
impact, the cotton textile workers' strike and the strike at the Chosun
Shipbuilding Co. were a clear sign that workers' solidarity and union
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strength were growing to a considerable degree. To the regime's political
elites, who had relied heavily on a narrowly conceived production-oriented
strategy, all of these events were interpreted as having obstructed an export-
oriented economy.
C. Conflicts with Other Social Groups.
Social inequalities resulting from the widening gap between rich and poor
during the period of rapid economic growth often lead to widespread
political alienation and antipathy towards those in power, fostering what
Shils calls " the oppositional mentality."32 Indeed, rapid economic growth in
Korea disrupted traditional social structures, increased income inequalities,
and had a destabilising effect upon the political system. The widening
economic disparities between rich and poor, together with urban-rural gaps
and regional developmental imbalance, stimulated nascent social and
political conflicts. One of the disturbing manifestations of these conflicts was
a riot in August, 1971, staged by approximately 30,000 poor residents in
public housing units in one of Seoul's suburbs. To protest their poverty and
unemployment, the rioters set fire to a police station, destroyed four cars,
and fought 1,000 policemen. After several dozen rioters and policemen were
injured, the government agreed to redress their grievances.33 stunned by
such stark incidents accompanying the upsurges of labour and urban poor,
students and other segments of the middle class became active.
The most explosive social problem faced by the Park government in the
early 1970s was concerned with persistent student unrest. As the
government strengthened a compulsory military training programme for all
male college students in March, 1971, a massive protest was launched to
boycott the programme or to request its substantial relaxation. The student
protest was all the more intensified in the fall, and was accompanied by the
beginning of a social movement against government corruption. In October,
as he was unable to halt the student movement, President Park issued a
32 Edward A. Shils(1962), Political Development in the New States, The Hague: Mouton Company,
pp. 34-35.
33 For the full details, see. In-Joung, Whang, 1985, Policy Issues in Managing Urban Services for the
Poor- The Case of Squatter Improvement in Seoul, Korea-. KDI Working Paper *8512.
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special order authorizing the military and police forces to ferret out student
demonstrators from college campuses.
Compared with college students and industrial workers, some segments of
the middle class were more apt to articulate their disillusionment with the
economic and social reality, presumably because they had a clearer
perception of their relative deprivation. This trend was discernible in a series
of events that took place in the Summer in 1971. College professors
adopted resolutions calling for salary increases and educational
independence from the Ministry of Education. Junior doctors and nurses
walked out of public hospitals to demand better financial compensation. A
majority of judges tendered their resignations en mass in protest at the
government's interference with their judicial decision-making procedures.
Moreover, the rapid development of an atomized urban mass society
seemed to breed a new sense of social isolation and political cynicism
among educated citizens. Among these groups, a number of intellectuals
criticized Park's developmental path. Written under such differing titles as
"Economic Policy and Social Dislocation," "Korean Industrialization Facing a
Turning Point," "We Cannot Live by Economic Growth Alone," and "The Off
Track Economic Developmental Models.", scholars have a common view of
the nature and causes of the problems embedded in Korea's developmental
path.
On the other hand, according to the then-current Assistant Deputy-Director
of KCIA, ll-Jae Cho, the KCIA also recognized that Korea's state of tension
between social strata had become serious aspect since the late 1960s.
During the policy conference for the government policy direction of 1971,
which is usually held before the President's annual round of visits to the
Ministries, the KCIA suggested to the government Ministries to give priority to
mitigate these tensions.34
The government was planning to initiate major innovative approaches
toward the incipient symptom of a distribution crisis, which could not be
solved by a routine administrative response. Thus, the government
concluded the foundation of the economic developmental strategy should be
fundamentally reassessed.




During the 1960s, North Korea was anxious to capitalize upon the political
dissent in South Korea to create Vietnamese-style revolutionary conditions
in the South. Its effects throughout the 1960s and in the early 1970s,
however, did not strike a response chord in South Korea. On the contrary,
such belligerent actions as the commands attack on the Blue House in
January, 1968 and the seizure of the US intelligence ship Pueblo off
Wonsan a few days later angered and frightened the South Korean public.
Entering into the 1970s, Korea was undergoing a series of uncertain
international passages: a growing Sino-American detente mood which
might jeopardize the US security commitment to Korea, and the sharp
reduction of American aid and withdrawal of American troops from Korea,
which might weaken the stability of Park regime. This changed mood
brought the two Korean regimes closer together psychologically and led to
the initiation of South-North dialogue on resolving some of the outstanding
issues of inter-Korean relations. A dramatic announcement was made on 4th
of July, 1972, in Seoul and Pyongyang simultaneously, about the agreement
reached between the Korean authorities in the Joint Communique on the
South-North Dialogue. In the end, the necessity for carrying out the South-
North dialogue on Korean reunification was used by the ruling elites as a
convenient excuse for strengthening the authority structure and control
mechanisms of the political systems in the two Koreas.The South Korean
response to detente under President Park was the more daring but its effect
upon internal politics was damaging to the cause of democracy. As the
decade of the 1970s began, President Park's already-firm hold on power at
home was strengthened considerably.
Coinciding with the uncertainties mentioned above, perhaps the most
direct and serious shock to the Park regime was Nixon's New Economic
Policy in 1971, placing 10 percent surcharge tax on Korea's textile goods
and imposing a quota of 7.5 percent annual growth on non-cotton textile
sales. It was expected that the impact would not only cause the collapse of
Korea's economy which had mainly relied on exports of textile goods but
also unavoidably add to social unrest, all of which would threaten the Park
regime.
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4.3. Results:The Adjustment of State Structure and
Development Strategy.
As we have examined in the previous section, the major political and
socio-economic problems with which the Park regime were met: (1). The
crisis in political legitimacy following the constitutional amendment for Park's
unlimited presidency in 1969 and alleged election fraud in the 1971
presidential election; (2). The crisis in distribution between urban and rural
regions and industrial sectors; (3). The external threats from North Korea
following the 'Vietnamization' of the US policy and the US troop withdrawal
from Korea; and (4). The economic crisis itself which was produced due to
an extreme unbalanced development strategy. All these environmental
pressures limited the alternative choices of the Park regime to reduce the
serious gap between state and society in the early 1970s. Park's decision
was the restructuring of the state structure by his second coup, that is, the
Yushin coup in 1972. Under this high concentration of political power within
the state bureaucracy, the Park regime changed the growth strategy based
on light industry to deepen its industrial structure through upgrading its
products toward capital-and technology-intensive goods.
4.3.1. The Second Coup and the Yushin System of the Park
Regime: The Fourth Republic.
Approximately a year later, as this Special Act was being clandestinely
elaborated by the 'strategic political groups' surrounding Park called the
'planning caucus,' (these groups interpreting Park's continuous ambition to
run the state under a new constitution), President Park proclaimed martial
law throughout Korea to impose an authoritarian Yushin constitution. The
core contents of the 17th of October Declaration, proclaimed under a state of
martial law imposing strict censorship on mass media channels, closing
down universities and colleges, and banning political gatherings and strikes,
laid down that the government would: (1). Dissolve the National Assembly,
prohibit party and political activities, and suspend part of the existing
constitution; (2). Establish the Emergency State Council, which would fulfil
the purposes of the suspended provisions of the constitution; (3). Announce
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a new constitution which would be established by the Emergency State
Council, within ten days after the 17th of October Declaration, which would
be established by the Emergency State Council; (4). Hold a plebiscite within
a month after the establishment of the new constitution in order to ask for a
vote of confidence from the public on the new constitution.
Those who criticized the new constitution, the government campaign for
revising constitution and/or the President were put on trial before a court-
martial on charges of spreading 'groundless rumours.' The prohibition of
opposition was justified on grounds that it was a political luxury Korea could
not afford. If debate were allowed, the resulting turmoil would dissipate the
nation's political, economic, social and moral strength. The press and
broadcasting media were also subject to total pre-publication censorship
with editors taking printed copies of each page to a military censor's office
for approval. The martial law was lifted less than two days before the
scheduled election of 2,359 delegates to the National Conference for
Unification, which in turn was to choose a President to serve for the next six
years. Despite the lifting of martial law, political party activities continued to
be banned until the proclamation of the new constitution and the
inauguration of a new President. On 23rd of December, Park was officially
re-elected to rule the country for six years, winning near unanimous support
with all but 2 of the 2,359 delegates to the electoral college voting for him.
The two votes were declared invalid. In the process, the Fourth Republic was
established.
Under the Yushin regime, the state structure became extremely
authoritarian. According to the Yushin constitution and a series of measures
processed by the Emergency State Council, the President would be
empowered to declare a state of 'martial law' and 'national emergency,'
when deemed necessary by the President(Article 53 and 54). Under these
circumstances, he could also 'temporarily suspend the freedom and rights of
the people as defined in the present constitution.'(Article 53). Moreover, the
power of the President in pronouncing the emergency measures would not
be subject to 'judicial investigations.'(Article 53). In normal times, the
President, who would be elected by the National Conference for Unification
for a six-year term with no limit on terms in office, could dissolve the National
Assembly(Article 59). He could appoint the Prime Minister and members of
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the State Council(Article 63 and 65). Further, the President could also
nominate one third of the members of the National Assembly, the Chief
Justice, and other Supreme Court Judges(Article 103).
With all these extraordinary powers invested in the hands of the President,
he would enjoy further enormous power in the whole range of state affairs,
including economic, socio-political, and national defence affairs. Park used
state bureaucracy as a major tool to rule. The technocrats' role dramatically
increased and replaced the politicians' role by reducing political power, on
the one hand, and by substituting politicians with technocrats in the political
arena, such as the National Assembly, on the other hand. In reality, Park
tried to establish his unchallengable authoritarian leadership by utilizing
state bureaucracy and bureaucrats as a major political mechanism. Park
and the technocrats were tightly linked into the Yushin system. Democracy
was blamed as 'inefficient way' for politics. Technocrats, on the other hand,
attempted to get more benefits through consolidating the Park's Yushin
system.
Following the consolidation of power within the ruling coalition and state
institutions, the Yushin system penetrated the Korean society.
First, since they emphasized that 'national security and self-reliance' was
the most important state goal, the Korean society was significantly organised
by numerous security related institutions: (1). The autonomous students
organisations were curbed and they were officially organised by the state
run Korean Student Corps for National Defense, the branches of which were
established at all the different levels of schools including universities and
senior high schools in 1972. All students were also legally required to take
the 'military training' course as a normal compulsory academic course which
had been taught by the military officers since 1969. (2). All the male citizens
aged between 18 and 50 years old were organised into the National Civil
Defense Corps and they were regularly trained. (3). All the male citizens of
the reserved army forces had been organised in 1968, but now the armed
forces strengthened its organisation as well as its training in mid-1970s.
Most of public and private institutions, such as the state bureaucracies,
businesses, industries, firms, schools, have their Emergency Planning
Offices to prepare for a national emergency situation and performed the
military drills all over the nation. (4). From fear of the espionage from the
North, every ten or so households were organised into primary units, that is,
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the Tong and Ban, nationwide and met every month to prevent them from
being penetrated to disseminate the state polices to the entire households.
All the Koreans were required to keep their residential identification card,
issued since 1968, as a means of controlling citizen activities.
Second, as O'Donnell argues the development-oriented authoritarian
regimes commonly arise to control mass participation and to prevent the
political expression of social cleavage that can easily emerge in democratic
systems,35 the Park regime sought to answer the popular demands through
extra-constitutional means and repressive measures without any significant
structural change or elaborate and guiding ideology.In the confinement of
political participation to the elite and counter-elite(opposition groups), the
Park regime attempted to justified forcible repression of populist movements
with symbolic references. He stressed generic values such as national
security, economic development, anti-communism, administrative
democracy, social justice and order, Koreanised democracy, loyalty and filial
piety derived from Confucian in order to neutralize opponents and co-opt a
variety of support. The desired consequence for the regime was the
elimination of all forms of spontaneous political activity and dissent and the
imposition of a more stable and predictable set of social interaction patterns,
particularly for the continued economic development of the state. With the
limited, controlled, and co-opted elite, the appeals based on a consensual,
nonconflictive society reduced politics to administration of the public and
particular interests. The Park regime justified the harsh measures to prevent
'social disorder and chaos' which might jeopardize the development plans.
In consequence, under the Yushin system there appeared some significant
changes. First of all, in the political sphere, even formally sustained liberal
democracy! or political pluralism) began to be abandoned since this
reformation. The Yushin constitution provided for an indirect election of the
President, and the appointment by the President of one-third of the 219-
member National Assembly, and the reduction of the powers of the
legislature and the judiciary. Additionally, in terms of the institutional
structure, Park was now assured of an indefinite term as President with
almost an unchallengable power. In the economic area, the control and
intervention of the government became intensified. And socially, the
35 Guillermo 0'Donnell(1978), "Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian
State," Latin American Research Review. Vol. 13. pp3-38.
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government's manipulation of civil society took a form of direct rule without
major intervention of politicians, bureaucrats or interest groups. In other
words, major policies were decided and implemented by a group of
presidential secretariats and supported by members of Yujonghoe(political
Fraternity for Revitalizing Reforms) who were selected by the President and
were responsible only to the President himself.
4.3.2. The Adjustment of Export-Led Development Strategy:
The Import-Substituting HC Industrialization
and Economic Liberalization.
As we have examined in the previous section, Korea's industrial structure
became increasingly distorted even though Park's export-first strategy
contributed to unprecedented industrial growth. Further, the nation's
production activities became extremely limited to simple manufacturing
exports which would, in turn, imply that Korea had to invariably rely on
foreign input in order to export.
Under these circumstances, progressive social voices resumed the
fundamental questioning of the stark dependence of the nation's economy
on foreign capital. The political opposition took advantage of such a
situation, and the issue of industrial distortion by way of foreign dependence
became for them the major political ammunition to attack Park's entire
political-economy trajectory. Issuing a series of policy recommendations,
business communities argued that the then-current mode of business
operation set up by the government for export promotion was essentially
'authoritarian' and that it should be subject to immediate change. In a more
vociferous way, sections of labourers, who were previously docile in
following the government's direction, clamoured for 'better' labour
provisions, which, according to them and their sympathizers, had been
limited by the government's single-minded effort focusing on export target
maximization and not necessarily on social equity. Academic circles long
argued for less government intervention for growth only and more
intervention for imbalances in the economy and the society. This change
was also accepted as an overture to the shift from state-dominant
industrialization to one that would be based on 'civil initiatives.'
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The effect of all these constraining developments was multiple for the Park
administration. However, given its self-declared political strategy of defining
how the incumbents were to be judged by the society, one direct
significance of such structural antinomies associated with Park's export-first
strategy was clear. These difficulties signified that the Park administration
would face a heightened impetus to find immediately an alternative to its
previous industrial strategy. Guided by such a general consensus tacitly
forming in the government, Park's initial response was to rely on the nation's
formal planning institution, the EPB. Indeed, when the recession of this
period was felt strongly by the government and when the movements
against Park's policy reached their peaks, a vibrant debate was hastily
waged among the officials and semi-officials working for the EPB. The core
of this debate, quite expectedly, was what the nature of the state of the
economy was and how the problems associated with it could be resolved.
One voice dominated the outcome of the debate, arguing that the then-
current state of the economy should be defined as 'structural recession' and
that a fundamental change in the developmental strategy was necessary to
cope with the industrial recession.
Under these circumstances, the EPB would hasten its efforts to upgrade
the industrial structure, this time, not as a 'symbol to appease nationalist
feeling,' as in the early years of industrialization but with more substantial
concern toward reversing ominous trends in the economy.36 However,
EPB's means of settling the matter were very restricted. At first, reducing
foreign dependence by way of curtailing foreign capital would have
appeared as a tempting solution to eschew the political charge of Korea's
stark dependence. But the reduced foreign dependence by way of the halt of
foreign capital inducement could be come by only at the expense of a short-
term political cost. The flight of much-needed foreign capital would have
resulted in an immediate political cost of weakened business opportunities
because Korea's exporters already heavily relied on foreign capital of
various sorts for re-exports.
Another more realistic solution would have been to spur exports so that
surplus earnings from exports could resolve the dilemma of Korea's stark
36 David C. Cole and Princeton N. Lyman(1971), Korean Development: The Interplay of Politics and
Economics. Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, p. 213.
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dependence on foreign inputs. Therefore, as the preparation for launching
the Third Five-Year Plan, 1972-1976, was getting under way beginning in
1970, the Park administration, in effect, emphasized that one of its goals was
to 'increase exports dramatically' so that it could get rid of the chronic
balance of payments problems on the way to what Park's called a 'complete
national independence.' Plausible as it might have sounded, the option of
dramatically increasing exports, also, seemed not to be a promising option.
The prospects for Korea's exports were increasingly clouded by events
occurring outside Korea during this period. As indicated by the US proposal
delivered to the Korean government in 1971, Korea was to limit its textile
export sales in the US to a level of 7.5 percent annual growth. Thus, the
hope of increasing exports for the sake of alleviating the burdens of Korea's
distorted industrial structure through a 'dramatic increase in exports' was in
serious trouble, at least in the eyes of the Park administration.37
Following a period of muddling through, the EPB, among other things,
announced two points concerning a new mode of industrialization strategy.
First, the EPB emphasized the necessity to build import-substituting heavy
and chemical industries(hearafter HC industries). The EPB hoped that this
policy would remedy industrial distortion and reduce the level of foreign
dependence. The rational behind this gradual policy was that a massive
approach towards HC industrialization in Korea was premature in that there
existed only a handful of recent HC industries and that the promotion of HC
industries required enormous capital. Secondly, the EPB suggested that the
government would opt for a 'civilian-initiated' mode of industrialization,
giving more freedom of economic action to the society. Given the
problematic nature of the state-led mode of industrialization, the government
emphasized that the economy would now be operated within the new
tradition of 'civilian-initiated' economic operation, giving the initiatives to
civilian sectors. Openly publicised, the government's pronouncements on
this major change in Korea's mode of economic operation were welcomed
by many, particularly since this change was accompanied by a series of
statements that the government, among other things, would rely more on
market mechanisms, civilize banks, gradually foster HC industries, pursue
'growth and stabilisation' together, and spend more on social welfare.
37 Dong-A llbo, 14 July, 1971.
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In these policies, the government was responding to societal pressures.
The government's announcements on the 'civilian-initiated mode' of
economic operation as well as on emphasizing workers' welfare bore a
remarkable resemblance to the demands of the business community and the
labourers and their sympathizers. The major state decisions for Korea's
future industrial course arose out of the heated debate among the central
planners working for the nation's most powerful economic institution, the
EPB, which could be interpreted as the activation of the greater autonomy of
bureaucrats as against the chief executive in the process of decision¬
making. At another level, had such announcements by the government been
sustained in the years that followed, HC industrialization could have taken
place in a piecemeal fashion, on the basis of private corporations' own
judgements on the direction and the size of investment. As can be recalled,
the government announced that it would gradually foster HC industries as
both import substitutors and export promoters, in areas where Korea had a
comparative advantage. Further, it also said that such a change in the
course of the nation's industrial direction would be implemented within the
new framework of the civilian-initiated mode, which handed over the state
initiative in the economy to the civilian sector. In short, in this atmosphere,
Korea was on the way to an essentially new industrial course, disassociating
itself from the previous industrial course of all-encompassing state-directed,
export-led light industrialization. The government, among other things,
would from then on emphasize growth, stabilization, and social welfare
together, rather than single-mindly focusing an growth alone, as it had in the
past.
4.4. The Emergence of Pension Scheme.
In the previous sections, we examined the political and socio-economic
problems that the Park regime faced in the early 1970s, and the results of
these crisis. To handle these crisis, the Park regime actually pursued a
series of specific policies. As a political measure, Park chose the Yushin
coup which strengthened state power to become more authoritarian rather
than a democratic solution. In the economic area, the Park regime chose (1).
The import-substituting HC industries which was expected to remedy
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industrial distortion and reduce the level of foreign dependence, and (2).
Economic liberalization which gave more freedom of economic action to the
society.
In this section, we will focus on another aspect of Park's means of settling
these problems. In other words, we will examine why the Park regime had to
select the social security pension scheme as a policy measure together with
these economic and political means. Throughout this section, I argue that
pension policy was brought forward deliberately by the Park regime with a
dual-role: socio-political appeasement and economic acceleration. As a
social objective, a pension programme will provide a social equity through
income protection for most economically vulnerable groups, such as the
retired, aged, widows and orphans, and the disabled. As a political
objective, an efficient, well-managed system of pension provision may be an
important element in keeping the populace passive. As George and Wilding
mentions social services contribute to political stability through the
amelioration or solution of problems which would provoke serious
discontent. 38 |n addition, economically, it serves as an important economic
objective by providing a source of funds to finance economic development.
In this framework, we will examine the emergence of pension policy as a
political agenda.
4.4.1. Pension Policy: As a Socio-Political Appeasement.
The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs(MOHSA) and its Office of Labour
Affairs, which are the major governmental agencies responsible for welfare
policy and programmes, had been studying and planning various social
insurance programmes since the early 1960s.
The Social Security Committee(SSC) was established to examine and
deliberate on matters related to a social security system at the request of the
MOHSA on 20 March, 1962. The number of members of the committee are
appointed by the MOHSA up to a total of twenty persons who have
experience and knowledge in the area of social security. For actual
research, research fellows were appointed by the MOHSA. In the beginning
these research fellows were assigned to four different sections:
comprehensive, labour, public assistance, and medical insurance, and they
38 George and Wilding(1984), Ibid., p. 189.
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started research work on social security programmes in their assigned
section. However, it did not perform any substantial function in its earlier
years. In 1967, Minister Hee-Sup, Chung reinforced its research function
and assigned to it the responsibility for the preparation of a long-term social
development plan. This was a rather unusual measure, since the SSC, as
an advisory committee, had no legal authority to make decisions, and the
issue of social development was beyond its formal function. This measure,
however, launched the country's first multi-year social planning process. At
its inception, forty-nine Korean professors and four foreign advisers were
invited to form an advisory team, which was divided into eight sub¬
committees of dealing in the social ethics, community development,
population and labour force, health and medicare, social welfare, public
assistance, social insurance, and social programmes and projects
respectively.
The basic guidelines for the formulation of a long-term social development
plan were prepared by the team. In July, 1968, the team completed the
report entitled "Social Development: the Basic Design and Direction". In
initiating and carrying out the social development planning attempt, the
participants relied upon the recommendations for balanced economic and
social development by the United Nations.39 The team, however, vigorously
attempted to define normative values. The ensuing report prepared by the
SSC research team and approved by the MOHSA presented five short-term
goals and three long-term objectives of Korea's social development
planning.
The short-term goals are:
1). To find a social moral system based on new values;
2). To remove social impediments to the country's rapid economic growth;
3). To promote labour productivity by developing human resources and
creativity;
4). To lay the ground for a better and civilised life by improving living
conditions;
39 It was acknowledged in the preface of the 1968 report that the report has been prepared on the basis
of the recommendations from the United Nations. In the preface, the UN document entitled
"International Survey of Programs of Social Development) 1959 )" was specially referred to.
40 The MOHSA(1968), Social Development: The Basic Design and Directions. Seoul: The SSC.
pp. 67-69. In Korean.
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5). To realise social justice and rationalisation in the distribution of national
wealth.
The long-term objectives defined by the report are:
1). To promote the happiness of the individual;
2). To improve the quality of family life; and
3). To move the nation toward a welfare state.
Since the team of professors and foreign advisers was dispersed in 1968,
the task of social development planning has been carried out by the
Research Office of the SSC/MOHSA. By September 1970, the Office had
revised the 1968 report into a more operational plan, entitled "Social
Development: Long-Term Plan( 1972-1986 )". In this process, the
recommendations of the UN, especially the UN Research Institute for Social
Development UNRISD ), were given special consideration. The plan holds
that in setting the objective of social development planning developing
countries should give special consideration to: 1). The social conditions in
economic growth( social requirements of economic growth, the contribution
of social factors to economic growth and social obstacles to economic
growth); 2). The social costs of economic growth( pollution, the destruction of
national resources, the distortion of traditional ways of life, and the
aggravation of inequality); and 3). The raising of the level of living of the poor
and the promoting of popular participation in national developmental
Formally, the 1970 social development plan declared that the "ultimate aim"
of national development planning should be the improvement of the
people's well-being. In the plan, however, this ultimate aim was seen to be
achieved through economic growth and social development. On this
assumption, the plan defined two "objectives" and seven "targets" of Korea's
social development planning.42
The two objectives are:
1). The promotion of rapid economic growth; and
2). The improvement of the level of people's living.
The seven targets are:
41 The MOHSACI97Q). Social Development: Long-Term Plan, 1972-1986. Seoul: The SSC, pp. 37-71.
In Korean.
42 For the detail, see. Ibid, pp.37-82.
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1). The structural and qualitative improvement of education and the
development of human resources;
2). The intensive implementation of family planning programmes;
3). The improvement of the housing and living environment;
4). The introduction and extension of a social security system;
5). The extension of social welfare programmes;
6). The acceleration of community development; and
7). The removal of structural and institutional impediments to economic
growth.
In practice, however, the actual aim of the long-term plan was to draw the
attention of top policy-makers of the government to the issue of social
development, and thereby increase the political feasibility for adding social
contents to the Third Plan, starting in 1972. The editing of the report and the
plan, for this reason, reflects the strategy that the MOHSA was developing
during their preparation for adoption by the government. Firstly, it is
emphasised that they adhered to the recommendations of the United
Nations. Secondly, emphasis was given in the introductory explanation to
the significance of social development planning, such as the need for social
development, the concepts and techniques of social development planning,
and the relations of social development to economic development, or
national defence. Thirdly, emphasis was also put upon the introduction of as
much quantitative data as possible in the plan. The 1970 social plan,
therefore, was distributed to the high ranking policy-makers of the executive
branch, the members of the National Assembly, the leaders of the governing
party( DRP ), and some outsiders.
Among the social insurance programmes that the Social Security
Committee was studying were the Old Age Insurance, which was later
named Welfare Pension Insurance Programme, for the employed workers
and the National Pension Insurance programme for the self-employed and
other income-earning people. The Social Security Committee proposed to
adopt the Welfare Pension Insurance Programme for the employed workers
effective in 1970.43 |n a preliminary rough draft prepared by the Committee
in September 1968 for the purpose of discussion, there was no specific
reason and method as to why it should and how it could be implemented,
43The MOHSA(1968). Ibid., pp. 208-209.
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but it was described simply as one of the programmes which could improve
the living conditions of the people. It was planned in that draft that the
Welfare Pension Insurance programme would cover 19 percent of the
employed workers by 1975. By this time the National Pension Insurance
Programme would start operating by covering only 20 percent of the eligible
persons in 1975, and by 1980, it would cover 75 percent of the eligible
persons.44 This kind of approach which was called "gradual and partial
approach" to the adoption of a social insurance system by the Social
Security Committee would then be completed by 1980 with the
implementation of other social programmes such as Family Allowance,
Unemployment Compensation, and the Comprehensive Compulsory
Medical Insurance. The following subsequent discussions of the draft for
several months led to the target years being changed. The Welfare Pension
Insurance Programme was planned to start in 1971 and the National
Pension Insurance programme was planned to start in 1977 instead of 1975
as mentioned in the earlier draft, and it was planned to cover 56.89 percent
of the eligible persons by 1986, which was different from 75 percent
coverage by 1980 in the earlier draft4^
The Social Security Committee tried to focus on the Welfare Pension
Insurance Programme to be included in the Third Plan, but it failed to
produce it.4^ All these discussions and plans were never finalised as the
policy of the MOHSA, because policy makers were simply not interested in
the social security aspect; they were preoccupied with the economic
development aspect of national development.
In the early 1970s, however, the Park regime could not ignore any more
the concern with distributive issues. In order to mobilize national effort for
economic development projects beginning in the early 1960s, the Park
regime repeated such slogans as "Bunyung ui Chilship Nyundae," which
mean that we can reach the long-awaited socio-economic well-being in the
1970s. Through such government publicity people have increased their
44 Ibid., pp. 209-210.
45 The MOHSA(1970), Ibid., pp. 203-208.
46 The MOHSA(1973), Social Security and Social Development. No. 2. Seoul: The SSC. P- 19.
In Korean.
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expectations of sharing the benefits of economic growth.47 The disparity
between urban and rural areas, and between social strata, together with the
people's expectation and the improvement of general economic conditions,
brought the growth of demand for equitable redistribution of the benefits of
rapid economic growth. The Park regime also was concerned with the
redistributional issue more consciously for political purposes since the early
1970s. Within a decade of its seizure of power President Park called for a
constitutional referendum under his martial law powers in October, 1972.
The new constitution, the so-called Yushin Constitution, made it possible for
Park to rule the country for life. It was anticipated that this shift would confront
severe political opposition and it actually did throughout the early 1970s.
With all of the aforementioned economic, social and political problems, the
widening expectation-performance gap activated the popular sectors. When
the regime was unable to respond to their demands, social unrest in the form
of anti-government demonstrations and labour disputes increased. Growing
out of such a tense atmosphere were a series of state moves rushed in by
the government to muddle through such comprehensive problems plaguing
Korea's national development strategy. This caused the Park regime to
search for another palliative to promise the public. New slogans appeared
such as 'equitable share of economic benefits' and 'introduction of welfare
policies,' in addition to such old ones as 'national security against
communist North Korea' and 'continuous economic progress.'4^ These
trends, on the other hand, were affected by emphasizing the diffusion of
policy innovations. Since the later 1960s, the equitable redistribution of
income and social development has become one of the most important
issues in the international development field. Further, a Regional
Conference of the International Council on Social Welfare(ICSW) was
planned to hold its five day discussion in Seoul on standards of social
welfare between 3 and 7 September, 1973. As we observed, on the other
hand, interest originated with Korean intellectuals, including university
professors, journalists, and government researchers, usually who had
47 According to a survey report by the MOHSA, 56% of urban inhibitants and 80% of rural people
believed that their living conditions would improve in the near future. A survey by the MOHSA, reported
in the Dong-A IIbo, 21 July, 1973.
48 Yong-Duck Jung(1982), "Income Redistribution in Korea: Causes for the Growing Concern." Journal
of East and West Studies. Vol. XI No. 1. p. 47.
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education, training, or travel abroad. For example, toward the final year of
the Second Five-Year Plan, the Team of Professors for Economic
Development Evaluation4^ started pointing out that rapid economic growth
had caused various social problems, and arguing that social problems
should be properly considered in economic development planning. In the
Evaluation Report of the Second Year(1968) programme, the team held:
"Up to date, all those social problems have been particularly dealt
with outside the scope of economic development planning.
However, it is felt that the problem of social development should
be weighed as much as that of economic development and has to
be included in the Third Five-Year Plan as a major field, as an
economic development plan can not be successfully launched
unless various sociological impediments are moved."50
However, Park and his advisors hesitated to adapt the MOHSA's proposal.
To the Park regime, the goal of a social security pension programme, if it
meant slower economic growth, could not be acceptable. Essential
deflationary measures, which were expected to slow growth and lift
unemployment, could well add to domestic unrest which had already
increased. It is in this climate, as Friedlander claims,51 that the Park regime
had launched the Saemaul(New Village) Movement in 1971 to reduce
social and distributional crisis without adjusting its main development
strategy. The Saemaul Movement pursues economic and social
development by means of voluntary participation and the cooperative effect
of the people. This movement, aimed at building up national strength, is a
pan-national movement seeking the improvement of the people's economic
and social standing by harmoniously developing living conditions on the
fundamental basis of diligence, self-help, and cooperation. It seeks to foster
49 This team was organized on the instruction of president Park for an overall evaluation of the
implementation of the five-year economic development plans in 1965, and attached to the Office of
Planning and Coordination for the Prime Minister.
50 The Office of Planning and Coordination for the Prime Minister(1969), Evaluation Report of the
Second Year Programme 1968: The Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan. Seoul: The
Republic of Korea, p. 75. In Korean.
51 He claims that in industrial countries, the emphasis is an effective social insurance programmes,
whereas in the developing countries there is greater interest in community development programmes.
See, Walter A. Friedlander(1975), International Social Welfare. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
p. 155.
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a sound human consciousness, the improvement of social environment and
the increase of national income.52 |n his book, President Park said that in
conducting the Saemaul Undong, "it is impossible for the institutional
apparatus of social welfare to fulfil its function without the revolutionary spirit
of diligence, frugality, self-regeneration, mutual assistance, etc."53 in short,
the Saemaul Undong based on President Park's ideology of welfare, is a
national movement for creating a better life for the people, making the
communities a good place to live, and eventually building a wealthy and
strong nation. According to its critics, however, these were only the
ostensible purposes of the Saemaul. Rather, the core purpose was to tighten
control over the deprived groups across the nation, via centralized cell
organizations of the Saemaul. Whatever the reasons, the main thrust
seemed to be that the growing tension from frustrated segments of the
society would, at least in theory, be accommodated via the Saemaul, whose
beneficial aspects were to be radically propagated through various mass
media channels, starting in late 1971.
Yet, even though the Saemaul Undong provided Park with politically
favourable conditions at the moment, such a tradition-based measure was
far from being the measure to cure fundamentally Park's development
strategy which was in a great shambles internally and externally. Thus, the
need for a comprehensive social security system was increasing as the
Korean society became more industrialized. Under these circumstances,
Korea may have no alternative to developing "western-style" social security
programmes, although the scope of such programmes can be reduced to
meet the present economic and social conditions of Korea.54 Developing
social security programmes for the poor and the deprived usually implies a
great share of social security expenditures by the government. When the
available financial resources are limited, it is of critical importance to set
appropriate priorities among the alternatives uses of resources.
52 Suk-Joon Kim(1975), "Hypothetical Causal Model of an Input-Output System in Rural Development,"
The Korean Public Administration Review, pp. 251-279.
53 Chung-Hee Park(1971), The Nation's Latent Power. Seoul: Kwang-Myong Publishing Co., p. 254.
In Korean.
54 Sang-Mok Suh(1980), Dilemmas in Developing Social Security Programs for Korea. Seoul: KDI.
pp. 27-34.
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In Korea, social insurance is likely to receive a higher priority than public
assistance because the former is more visible and its beneficiaries are more
vocal.55. Most people tend to agree that it was wise to develop Industrial
Accident Insurance initially, and then Medical Insurance at the next stage.
But there are divergent views as to what to do next in the field of social
insurance. Labour unions and business groups take the view that
Unemployment Insurance needs to be introduced immediately, particularly
in the view of the deteriorating employment situation in the economy.
Researchers and professors specialising in social security, however, agree
that it is premature. There are no established public channels for job
placement and training. They propose, alternatively, that the implementation
of the Medical Insurance Programme and the Social Security Pension
Programme should have a higher priority than introduction of
Unemployment Insurance. Furthermore, some people raise the issue of
whether it is wise to introduce a new Social Insurance Programme when the
existing ones, especially the Medical Insurance, was not enforced. But, it can
be argued that making some kind of start is very important because it takes a
long time to develop a mature social insurance programme covering the
entire population. In the end, to muddle through all these socio-political
problems, the social security pension scheme was promoted as a palliative
measure.
On 23 January, 1973, when President Park made an annual visit to the
MOHSA, the Minister proposed that the Ministry would put the NWP
programme into effect. According to Mr. Jae-Sung, Min, former member of
the SSC, the MOHSA, like any other Ministries, was busy formulating a new
policy to provide for the President's annual visiting. At this time, his Master's
thesis,'The Establishment of the Pension Insurance System in Korea", was
adopted as a MOHSA's new year policy.56 now that the President
announced the establishment of social security programme, the MOHSA, as
the government agency with the jurisdiction over social security, hastily
assembled a working plan of a social security pension programme, which
was called the National Welfare Pension. The term "National Welfare
Pension" was used for the first time on this occasion. The term was borrowed
55 Suh(1980), Ibid...
56 Jae-Sung Min(1973), "A Study on the Establishment of the Pension Insurance System in Korea,"
Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Seoul National University; and Interview with Jae-Sung Min.
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from the names of two social insurance programmes in Japan, whose
contents the National Welfare Pension was supposed to have combined in
one programme.They were Welfare Pension Insurance and National
Pension Insurance programmes. The reason behind all this was that the
MOHSA had been studying two separate social insurance programmes
which were modelled after the two Japanese social insurance programmes
and planning to introduce them separately. However, it was known from the
press conference, that the President had in mind a rather comprehensive
pension system, so that the MOHSA assembled the two separate
programmes and named it National Welfare Pension by combining their
names.
The content of the NWP briefed by the MOHSA was as follows: 58
( 1 ). Purpose: To secure the retirement life of the working people.
( 2 ). Subscribers: Employed workers to begin with, but self-employed
persons to be included gradually, at the ages between 20 and 60.
( 3 ). Financing:
1). Subscription fee from employed persons; 2% to 3% of the monthly
earnings.
2). Subscription fee from self-employed persons; fixed monthly amount.
3). Donation of subscription fee from employers of the employed
workers; 2% to 3% of the monthly salary.
4). Administrative expenditures; subscribed by the government.
( 4 ). Types of annuity: 1). Old Age Annuity; 2). Disability Annuity; and
3). Survivor Annuity.
( 5 ). Effects of the Programme.
1). The NWP programme would have an income redistribution effect.
2). It would mobilise domestic savings.
3). It would permit the maturation of the social security system in Korea.
( 6). A long-range prospect was suggested as seen in the following Table.
57 Interview with Chun-Song Choi, Chief Research Fellow, The SSC in the MOHSA.
The Bureau of Welfare Pension(1974), Footstep of the National Welfare Pension. Unpublished















1,000 or more 217 330,000 7
1976
Employing 500
or more 861 710,000 27.6
1978
Employing 30 or
more 24,393 2,350,000 60.3
1980 Self-Employed — 4,350,000 119.3
President Park, upon receipt of the briefing, instructed that the MOHSA, the
EPB, and the KDI should work together in order that the programme could
be effective on 1 January, 1974.
4.3.2. Pension Policy: As a Source of Economic Acceleration.
Another aspect of the emergence of Korea's social security pension policy
in which economists had become interested was the use of pension funds
as a method of increasing savings and mobilizing them for development. If
contributions are greater than benefits, a social security pension system can
mobilize a considerable amount of savings that otherwise would not be
acquired by developing countries. As a result, such a situation will occur
over a long period of 15 to 20 years or more years.Many scholars, such as
Reviglio,69 Singer,60 Fisher,61 Cockburn, etc., examined social security
policy as source of savings. For example, a study of Reviglio's62 has shown
Franco Reviglio(1967), "Social Security: A Means of Savings Mobilization for Economic
Development," International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, July.
60 H.W. Singer(1968), "Social Fasctors in Development: An Overview with Special Emphasis on Social
Security," In Everett M. Kassalow(Ed.), Ibid,, pp. 21-38.
61 Paul Fisher(1968), "Social Security and Development Planning: Some Issues," In Kassalow(Ed.),
Ibid., pp. 239-261.
62 Reviqlio. Ibid., pp. 324-368.
202
that in eight of 23 countries analyzed social security gross savings(i.e.,
without deducting government subsidies) represent a significant addition(
5% or more) to total domestic investment. Net social security savings(i.e.,
after deducting government subsidies) added 5 % or more to total net
savings in 17 out of 31 developing countries. In 10 out of 35 developing
countries analyzed, the contribution of net social security savings
represented a higher proportion of gross national product than in the US.
Total social security assets amounted to more than 10 percent of GNP in 5
out of 27 developing countries analyzed, and between 5 and 10 percent in 8
additional countries. In 4 out of 15 developing countries, social security
agencies held over one-third of the internal public debt.
To achieve this goal, short-term risk protection programmes do not, as a
rule, lead to a significant increase of savings. In addition, the savings
potential of long-term social insurance programmes depends on the
methods used to finance them. In offering policy advice to developing
countries regarding methods of increasing savings, the social security
approach should obviously rank among the alternatives to be examined.63
Where social security programmes provided for a funded social security
insurance system, a relatively rapid accumulation of pension reserve funds
is brought about by three major factors.64 First, as a rule, contributions will
be collected for several years before any benefits are paid. A new system
may specify a qualifying period of 10, 15, or 20 years of covered
employment before a worker can draw pension benefits. Secondly, the
typical age distribution in developing countries contains a large percentage
of younger persons. Consequently, there are many young contributors and
relatively few aged persons when a social insurance pension programme is
first initiated. Moreover, the number of insured persons will increase, without
a similar increase in the number of beneficiaries, as industrialization draws
more persons into covered employment. Finally, the amount of social
insurance receipts may increase as a result of inflation as wages and
contributions! often a fixed percent of wages) rise. Benefits will not rise,
however, unless they are tied to a cost-of-living index or a wage index by an
escalator clause. Depending on the way the reserves are invested, inflation
may, however, nullify the savings effects. For this reason, in some
63 Singer, Ibid., p. 38.
64 Paul Fisher(1968), Ibid^, pp. 251-252.
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developing countries social security programmes have been established
and expanded despite a slow rate of industrial growth, and as a result, the
growth of social security system is to some extent unrelated to the rate of
economic development in the developing countries.65
This idea had a big effect upon the Korean scholars as well as the policy¬
makers. Up to now, they had not fully recognised the value of a social
insurance system in accumulating capital funds for economic development
financing. Encouraged by this idea, the first significant research result was
published in 1971. Under the title: "A Feasibility Study of Compulsory
Retirement Scheme in Korea," it advocated that "the social security pension
system does not need to work at cross purposes with the objectives of the
conventional economic development plan and, when integrated with the
Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan, can in effect help attaining
these objectives.Since this first new aspect of social insurance research
seemed to influence on the following studies so very much, the contents
serve usefully for this research.6T
(1). Basic Assumptions:
1). The coverage used in projection is limited to all the workers aged
between 18 and 60 employed in the establishments with 50 or more
employees in mining and manufacturing, in those with 30 or more
employees in services, and self-employed in service.
2). The contribution rates for employees and employers are 5 percent
each, of payrolls, adding to 10 percent in total.
3). The rate of return on funds accumulated through contribution is
assumed to be 10 percent per year in real terms.
4). The operational costs of the proposed pension programme is assumed
to be a flat rate of 10 percent of the size of the accumulated funds.
5). The initial year from which contributions is to be paid in is assumed to
be the year 1972.
65 Ibid., p. 243.
66 Seung-Yun Lee et.al.,(1971), A Feasibility Study of Compulsory Retirement Scheme in Korea.
Seoul: Sogang University.
According to Mr. Jae-Sung Min, this research was conducted with the financial support of the USAID.
Interview with Jae-Sung Min.
67 See, ibid., pp. 76-92.
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6). The lump-sum benefits payable upon retirement or to beneficiaries
during the transitional period( 1976-81) will consist of the total amount of
contributions paid in by both the covered worker and his or her employer
together with 10 percent interest return, and
7). The over-all average size of benefits payable after the end of the
transitional period( that is from 1982 on) is assumed to be 40 percent of
average earnings during the last five-year period of employment.
(2). Major Findings:
1). Despite the limited coverage assumed for the initial period, the pension
funds to be accumulated through contributions during the Third Five-Year
Plan period( 1972-76) would amount to 256 billion Won(in 1965 base price)
and to 1,835 billion Won by the end of 1986.
2). The estimated amount of fund accumulation for the five-year plan
period would roughly occupy 6.9 percent of the projected GNP for 1976, the
end-year of the plan period, and 7 percent of the projected GNP for 1981.
3). The total sum of pension funds accumulated would amount to more
than 35 percent of the projected domestic savings for 1976 and 65 percent
for 1981. The net savings from the programme( deducting running costs and
pay-outs) would amount to 57 percent of the domestic savings.
4). The ratio of annual pension contributions to the projected GNP for the
corresponding year is from 1.3 to 2.5 percent throughout the project period.
5). The ratio of annual pension contributions to the projected domestic
savings for the corresponding year ranges from 6.77 to 5.56 percent
throughout the projected period. The ratio of annual net savings from the
programme to domestic savings for the same year ranges from 6.1 to 4.64
percent.
6). The ratio of annual pension contributions to annual total tax revenues
ranges from 6.92 to 5.56 percent throughout the projected period.
7). When social security pension contributions are incorporated into the
structure of taxes, the ratio of the sum of pension contributions and tax
revenues to GNP would be around 18.3 to 18.7 percent annually throughout
the projected period.
(3). Policy Recommendations:
1). An ad hoc coordinating committee representing various interest groups
and public agencies concerned should be organised to examine intensively
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a wide range of problems related to the following aspects of the proposed
pension plan: legal provisions and their relationship with the existing laws;
administration and organisation; management of pension funds; actuarial
projections of contributions and benefits payoffs; and detailed programmes
for accumulation of advanced funds prior to the implementation of the plan.
2). A series of carefully prepared opinion polls and public hearings be
carried out to find out the public response and opportune timing of the
introduction of the plan.
3). The government set aside either a large lump-sum fund or annual
appropriations of funds for accumulation of advanced funding, through the
government fiscal system, especially designed to ensure a maximum
accumulation of net savings over a maximum extended period through the
social security pension system. This method of advanced funding is
essential for the proposed pension system to be successful both as a
powerful saving device and an effective means of promoting social welfare.
4). A guiding principle to be applied to the introduction and implementation
of the proposed social security retirement pension system be that of
gradualism, in terms of the coverage, contributions rates, and kinds and size
of benefits.
Like the MOHSA's proposal, this report also failed to be included in the
Third Five-Year Plan, simply because the policy-makers were preoccupied
with the economic development aspect of national development.
However, they whistled a different tune in relation to the new industrial
development strategy. Compared to light industry, the development of the
HC industries needed the mobilisation of far larger amounts of capital with
more complex forms of processing. The only financial sources available to
the new industrial strategy were of foreign capital inflow through the
governmental approval and guarantees. As we examined before, this
method has certain constraints. Therefore, during the Third Five-Year Plan
period, the government projected to improve the balance of payments. The
government planned to decrease foreign capital during the Third Plan
period in order to improve the balance of payments. It was planned that
foreign savings would decrease from 9.2 percent of GNP in 1970 and 3.4
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percent in 1976.68 Total investment requirements of 4,525 billion won for
the Third Plan period was expected to be financed by 3,575 billion won of
domestic savings and 949 billion won of foreign savings. Thus, it had to be
necessary to increase sharply the private savings of households and
corporations if long-range development potential were to be met, i.e.,
mobilisation of domestic savings.69 To accelerate investment, the
government intervened and funded the National Investment Fund which
allowed the government access to public employee pension funds and a
substantial government portion of private savings at regular banking
institutions. But the funds were insufficient to finance all projects, and banks
were urged to make special loans at very low nominal interest rates on a
preferential basis.
In these circumstances, the government needed some other measures that
could mobilise domestic savings. The KDI was interested in the pension
scheme for this reason. This was because, since the KDI was founded as a
research institution to the Economic Planning Board( EPB ) in the
development policy planning in 1971, it was in need of a fresh policy
conception. At that time, one of the KDI's reports recommended social
security savings. This report suggested that if this system were applied to the
selected sectors, i.e., manufacturing, services and public administration, and
five percent of wage income was saved, then roughly .74 percent of GNP
could be mobilised as an additional savings.70This was about 20 percent of
the private savings and one-half of the household savings in 1970.
When Paul Fisher, a member of the Foreign Advisory Committee of the
KDI, visited Korea for consultation, he hinted that a social security pension
scheme not only serves a desirable social objective but also an important
economic objective, and , what is more, does not impose a heavy financial
burden on the government compared to any other social security
schemes.71 On the other hand, president Mahn-Je, Kim of the KDI took a
personal interest in this issue, and he was instrumental in finally convincing
68The EPB(1971), The Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan, 1972-1976, Seoul: Government of
Korea, p. 150.
ibid., p. 98.
70 Woo H. Nam(1972), Domestic Savings: Projections and Feasibility, Seoul: KDI. Occasional Paper
7201. pp. 25-26.
71 Joon-Kyu Sohn(1983), Ibid., p. 130.;
Paul Fisher's idea was well represented in his article. See, Faul Fisher(1968), Ibid., pp. 239-261.
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top decision makers in the government that a well designed social security
programme would not only serve a desirable social goal but also an
important economic objective. Dr. Chong-Kee, Park's interest in the subject
of social security, on the other hand, was aroused while engaged in a
National Planning Association's research project dealing with socio¬
economic development programmes in the United States
As a result of Paul Fisher's encouragement and his personal interest,
President Kim asked Dr. Park to undertake a feasibility analysis and to took
into the desirability of establishing a social security pension system in
September, 1972. The President of KDI proposed the idea of a social
security pension scheme to President Park in a meeting in September 1972.
President Park expressed interest and asked at the meeting for the KDI to
undertake a study of the scheme for implementation.72 From 22 September
to 6 October, 1972, Dr. Park visited the United States for discussions with
social security experts on the possibilities of introducing a social security
pension programme in Korea. A preliminary study paper was prepared on
25 November, 1972, indicating the broad direction and the scope of a
proposed social security pension scheme. This was one year before the
enactment of the National Welfare Pension Law on 1 December, 1973. The
KDI estimated that the scheme could mobilise about 100 billion won in less
than two years. 73 Discussions were held between the KDI and Deputy
Prime Minister and Minister of Economic Planning Board( EPB ) about the
nature of the proposed social security scheme, and then the President of the
KDI met with President Park and his advisers to discuss the potential
benefits and costs of the proposed scheme and their policy implications on
30 November, 1972.
The KDI proposed the following recommendations:7^
( 1 ). To organise a preparatory committee and a working-level
subcommittee in order to promote the establishment of a social security
pension system and to prepare a detailed plan for it.
72 Interview with Chong-Kee Park, Research Director, KDI.
73 Mahn-Jae Kim and Chong-Kee Park(1972), Prospective Scheme for the Social Security Pension
Programme, Seoul: KDI. In Korean.
74 Chong-Kee Park and Dai-Young Kim(1973), A Proposed Scheme for Social Security Pension
Programme, Seoul: KDI. pp. 19-20. In Korean.
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( 2 ). Important problems that should be dealt at the working level
subcommittee are:
1). Drawing up a social security pension law and implementation decree.
2). Measuring the volume of administrative operations and required
expenditures in the first year of implementation of the system.
3). Drawing up a plan for securing administrative personnel and for
overseas training of key managing staff.
4). Studying public relations devices for pan-national enlightenment about
the social security pension system.
( 3 ). To send a group of working-level people abroad in order to observe
and study social security systems in foreign countries and organisations
such as the United States, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Japan, the
Philippines, and International Labour Organisation.
( 4 ). To invite a social security expert from abroad in order to have a
consultant on various planning tasks and administrative management during
the period of preparation of the establishment of the social security pension
system and initial years of its operations.
( 5 ). To establish the Office of Social Security Administration in order to
take full responsibility for and administer the effective operation of the social
security pension system.
( 6 ). To establish the Social Security Trust Fund Management Committee
which is composed of Ministers of EPB, Finance, Health and Social Affairs,
and the Director of the Office of Social Security Administration.
President Park formally requested the KDI to undertake an in-depth study
to develop the framework of a social security pension programme and to
provide technical assistance to the appropriate agency of the government,
because the KDI was not a government organisation.
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4.5. Conclusion.
In this chapter, we examined two general questions: why did the need for a
social security pension programme come to the Korean government's
attention in the early 1970s?; and why did a social security pension
programme have a priority over other social policies?
As we have examined, the emergence of a social security pension policy
can be viewed from different perspectives. It can be argued that the
emergence of a social security pension policy was the government's
intention to cope with the political, socio-economic pressures through its
strategic choices. Therefore, we can say that the development of the Korean
social insurance policy seems to be not the outcome solely of ideological
commitment, but it seems to be the complex result of political, and socio¬
economic conflict in the country. Furthermore, contrary to the existance of
some Korean scholars' assertions7® that a social security pension policy
emerged as means of a domestic savings, we examined that pension policy
emerged with dual-purposes: socio-political palliation and economic
acceleration. The existing general concept of the emergence of a social
security pension policy followed in Jun's wake. In his Ph.D. thesis entitled
"Establishment of the National Pension in Korea," Jun argues that the idea of
a pension programme was conceived to help with the modernisation of
domestic capital for HC industries. His opinion was that:7®
"The government planned to increase the production of heavy and
chemical industries in the Third Plan period. The government
wanted to achieve this objective by using domestic capital, instead
of foreign capital. Capital formulation by domestic savings had
been one of the overriding concerns of the government of Korea
since it launched the First Plan. In this circumstances, the
government needed some other measures that could mobilize
domestic savings so that it could still move ahead with the
improvement of HC industries as planned in the Third Plan in spite
of the constraints of foreign capital import and policies for domestic
savings. The idea of a social security pension scheme was
conceived as one of these measures."
75 Nam-Jin Jun(1980), Ibid.; Ui-lm Oh, Ibid.,
76 Nam-Jin Jun. Ibid., pp. 72-87.
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Jun's assertion was partly reasonable as we examined in this chapter. In
my view, however, this opinion laid overemphasis on the economic aspect of
social security development, while he left socio-political problems out of
consideration. Several interviewees justified my view, especially on the part
of the MOHSA side. They said that the MOHSA plan was not to mobilise
savings but, rather, to establish a well organised social security system in
Korea.77 However, in relation to the Jun's opinion, Jae-Sung Min, former
research fellow of the SSC/MOHSA mentioned that the initiation of a
pension programme was liable to lead to misunderstanding because of the
National Investment Fund which allowed the government access to pension
funds.78 Chun-Song Choi, former chief research fellow of the SSC/MOHSA,
confirmed, on the other hand, that they had considered the pension
programme as a means of the mobilisation of domestic savings simply for
the attention of top policy-makers of the government.79 In addition, Chong-
Kee Park, research director of the KDI, mentioned that even the KDI did not
study the pension programme only as a source of economic acceration. He
added that if someone regard the pension programme only as a mobilisation
of domestic savings he would lean to the economic development side.SO
Therefore, we can conclude that the emergence of social security pension
policy was due to the following causes and effects.
Firstly, the consideration of the social insurance system in Korea in the
early 1970s was a response to the fact that there had been many worker and
student protests and much social unrest. From this view point, the
emergence of pension policy can be explained primarily as a means of
social control and social legitimation in the society in order to diffuse class
consciousness and class conflict.
Secondly, according to the adjustment of national development strategy,
the Korean government needed the mobilisation of far larger amounts of
capital. The Korean policy-makers had become interested in the use of
pension funds as a method of increasing savings and mobilizing them for
development. Therefore, the economic aspect of social security policy
development in Korea was quite different from that of industrialized
77 Interview with Chun-Song Choi, Jae-Sung Min, Jong-Kil Im, Yong-Moon Kim, and Jong-Ock Hong. All
of them are working for the MOHSA.
78 Interview with Jae-Sung Min.
7^ Interview with Chun-Song Choi.
80 Interview with Chong-Kee Park.
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countries. The European experience may make it appear that social security
is one of the by-products of industrialisation, while, in the Korean case,
social security pension policy emerged as an effective means not only to
increase savings but also to channel potential savings from unorganised to
organised financial markets.
Thirdly, with the improvement of the general economic conditions of the
country, the overall expectations of the population for social welfare also
increased. Hence, the importance of 'social development' was praised by
various segments of the population, and was a growing expectations from
the population, primarily in urban areas, for a modern social security system.
Finally, another important political factor in the situation of Korea was
related to external conflicts and international pressures. Dialogue was
initiated between North and South Korea during the early 1970s. In order to
assure a favourable comparison between the conditions of the two different
Korean populations, the South Korean government felt the need to pay
attention to the social welfare of the population in addition to economic
development. Besides, in the early 1970s, several development agencies
urged their member states to pay attention to the broadening of the welfare
implications of economic development. These international expectations
created additional new pressure on the Korean government. In these
circumstances, a Regional Conference of the International Council on Social
Welfare(ICSW) was planned to hold its five-day discussion in Seoul on
standards of social welfare on 3 and 7 September, 1973.
To sum up, the pension policy in Korea emerged in response to various
sources and degrees of political and socio-economic pressures. From this
discussion, it would be impossible to identify one main reason why the
social insurance policy in Korea emerged in the early 1970s. Rather, various
environmental pressures were convergent, and the state function was one of
responding to these various demands through social security pension
policy.
212
Chapter 5. The National Welfare Pension Policy-Making
Process.
As we have examined in the previous chapter, the social security pension
policy emerged with dual-purposes: socio-political palliation and economic
acceleration. For these purposes, two agencies, the SSC/MOHSA and the
KDI/EPB, were interested in the development of the social security pension
programme and both made proposals. Speaking in the abstract, these two
proposals would be different substantially because of the different intentions
of the plan. The EPB's idea gave priority to economic acceleration, while the
MOHSA's idea laid stress on socio-political palliation. Whatever the
purposes, the NWP policy-making involves a number of imprtant policy
issues which Korea seeks to resolve in its own fashion. This is because, as
Rimlinger mentioned, the exercise of the state's power on behalf of some
individuals, often at the expenses of others, must have a basis of
legitimacy.1 The issue, therefore, must be resolved as to what legitimizes
social protection. There are a number of crucial decisions that have to be
made. These are:
(1). To what extent is it the individual's responsibility to look after himself
and his family, and to what extent is this a social responsibility?
(2). Who should be protected, which is another way of saying: who has the
right to protection, or who needs to be protected in the interest of the
community?
(3). How broad the cover should be. Should it include only wage workers
in certain industries, or wage and salary earners in all industries, or should it
be extended to all citizens who work, including self-employed, regardless of
their level of earnings?
(4). How protection should be provided ? This covers the whole range of
issues regarding conditions of benefit payment, the level and structure of
benefits, and their financing.
(5). How pension funds should be managed in the pursuit of ancillary
social and economic goals ?
For these reasons, we will examine in this chapter how these issues were
settled in view of the dual-purposes in the Korean NWP policy-making
process.
1 Rimlinger(1971), Ibjd., p. 3.
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5.1. Formation of the Working Committee and the Two
Proposals.
5.1.1. The Working Committee.
After President Park announced that the government would organise a
social security pension system during his New Year's Press Conference on
the 12th of January, 1973, the pension issue had formally arrived on the
policy agenda. In the beginning, it will be worth mentioning again the two
interesting points in the agenda-setting process which we have examined in
the previous chapter. The first point is that the MOHSA, as the government
agency with the jurisdiction over social security, had been studied and
recommended a pension scheme since early 1960s, but it had never been
attractive to the president and policy-makers. According to ex-Minister Hee-
Sup Chung, there was once, in 1967, a series of sincere discussions
between President Park and him about current five-year economic
development plan. But, immediately confronting the objection of the EPB, the
policy did not come into the political agenda.2 How, then, President Park
expressed interest when the president of KDI proposed the idea of a social
security pension scheme to him in a meeting in September, 1972 ?
Secondly, when President Park made an annual visit to the MOHSA, upon
receipt of the briefing, why did he instruct that the MOHSA, the EPB, and the
KDI should work together in order that the programme could be effective on
1st of January, 1974. There was a rather unusual measure to the fact that the
KDI was included instead of the SSC/MOHSA. Since the KDI, as a research
institution to the EPB in the development policy planning, had no legal
authority to make decisions and the issue of social development was
beyond its formal function.
The answers were that, firstly, the president of KDI seemed to argue
convincingly that a social security pension programme need not work at
cross purposes with the objectives of development planning and, when
integrated with the development plan, could in effect help these objectives.
Secondly, bureaucratic policies tend to be determined and implemented by
the power of those who suggest them rather than on the substance of the
proposed policy. Proposed programmes suggested by a powerful figure( in
terms of personal relation with top official) tend to be emphasised; otherwise
2 Interview with Hee-Sup Chung, Quoted from Bom Hu(1974), Ibid., p. 152.
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they just become programmes with little hope of success. This is true
because bureaucrats in high levels of the administrative hierarchy prefer to
rely on their favourite persons, irrespective of their ranks and ability. They
regard these favourites as their eyes and ears in matters of collecting data
for decision-making. Finally, even if mobilization of domestic savings was
listed as one of the effects of the programme, it is obvious from the MOHSA's
report that the estimate of a reserve fund of 7 billion won in the first year of
the programme's operation was very far from the KDI's projection of 100
billion won to be reserved from the social security pension scheme in less
than two years of operation. Therefore, the MOHSA's estimation was
contrary to Park's expectations. This is the reason why President Park
instructed that the MOHSA, the EPB, and the KDI should work together.
These three elements had crucial influence upon the entire NWP policy¬
making process because, in a political environment like that of Korea, the
person "who proposed the idea to the president" has a direct effect on the
"how the agenda would be deliberated" in the policy-making process.
To carry out the President's instruction, Mahn-Jae, Kim and Dr. Jong-Kee,
Park met with So-Young, Chung, a Chief Economic Secretary to the
President, and Joo-Nam, Kim, an Assistant Vice-Minister for Planning in the
EPB, to discuss the formation of a working committee and to lay out the
detailed planning for the introduction of a social security programme. The
discussion was later joined by Won-Kyu, Kim, Director of Planning and
Coordination in the MOHSA, and Joon-lk, Park, Director of the Social Affairs
Bureau in the MOHSA.3 As a result of this meeting, the Vice Prime Minister
and Minister of EPB, Wan-Son, Tae, appointed a Working Committee to
prepare a draft legislative package on 31 January, 1973.4
After the formation of the Working Committee, the MOHSA submitted its
working plan of the National Welfare Pension( NWP ) programme for
consideration by the Working Committee in February 1973, and the KDI
3 Chong-Kee Park(1975), Ibid., p. 105.
4 The Committee members were:
1). Kie-Wook Lee: Economic Coordinator, the EPB; 2). Joon-lk Park: Director of Social Affairs Bureau,
the MOHSA; 3). Won-Chan Chang: Director of Pension Bureau, Ministry of Government Administration;
4). Sanq-Yoon Lee: Director of Workmen's Compensation Insurance Bureau, Office of Labour
Affairs,The MOHSA; 5). Chai-Sunq Min: A Senior Research Staff in the SSC, the MOHSA; and Chonq-
Kee Park: A Senior Research Staff, the KDI.
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submitted a preliminary version of the proposed Social Security Pension
scheme on 2nd of March, 1973.5
5.1.2. The Two Proposals.
As we will examine in the following sections, there were substantial
differences between the two proposals. Most of the differences resulted from
the different intentions of the plans. Another reason was that the MOHSA's
proposal was modelled after the two Japanese social insurance
programmes, while the KDI's plan was influenced by the social security
system of the United States with the consultation of many people from the
US and their member's former experiences from that country.5 In this
section, we will analyse these two proposals in comparison with other
countries with matters relveant to the subjects. For this, we will divide these
proposals into five categories: coverage, finance, types and amount of
benefits, organisational structure, and utilization of the reserve pension fund.
This is because these five categorises would simplify matters in explaining
the differences.
A. Coverage.
The most desirable goal of a social insurance programme is that all
persons—regardless of income level, type of employment, citizenship, or
age- should be covered by the system. Basically, this goal of universal
coverage rest upon broad principles of social justice. In practice, however,
the objection can be made that universal pensions flow, to a certain extent,
to persons who do not need them, but, in fact, upper-income elderly persons
are likely to pay as much, or nearly as much, in taxes as they receive in
benefits. Moreover, the evenhandedness of universal pensions has distinct
disadvantages in relation to groups that can be bypassed under social
insurance systems. The history of universal pensions also suggests certain
problems. Nearly all of the countries with universal pensions now have
income-tested supplements that bring the minimum income of the aged
5 Chong-Kee Park(1975), Ibid., p. 105.
6 Interview with Jae-Sung Min and Chong-Kee Park.
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above the level of the universal pension if the universal pension no larger
provides a subsistence level of income as a result of inflation.7 This is a
considerably less costly way of providing a minimum income that is
regarded as adequate than raising the universal pension of all recipients to
that level.
For these reasons, as many cases of social security programmes both
developed and developing countries, there are some universal restrictions
of coverage. However, these universal restrictions of coverage in the
developed countries are different from those of the developing countries.
Most of the industrialized countries prescribed the upper-income limit of
coverage restriction, while the developing countries stipulated for the lower-
income limit restriction of coverage. For example, the German Law of 1889
covered wage earners in most industries, including agriculture and domestic
service, as well as salaried employees earning no more than 2,000 marks a
year. The principle of excluding salaried workers with earnings above a
certain level had been established in the sickness insurance legislation,
presumably on the assumption that those earning more than the maximum
amount could afford to pay for their own medical care or could purchase
private insurance.8 in case of the Japanese pension programme which was
emulated by the MOHSA's proposal, there are two major public pension
mechanisms. First is an "Employment Pension Insurance Scheme," covering
all employees in 'covered working places' employing 5 or more people at
the initial stage. Others who may be covered voluntarily by employees
insurance are: (1). All workers in establishments other than 'covered'
places(e.g. smaller than 5 persons) as long as more than half-agree. (2).
Individual workers in uncovered places, with the employer's consent; and
(3). Persons ineligible for any of the above but who, having at least 10 years
prior coverage, wish to insure themselves. The second public pension
programme is called the "National Pension." This is divided again into
contributory and non-contributory sections. The contributory scheme is
sufficient to make contributions and who are not otherwise covered, except
for spouses of the insured, students, and persons already pensioned or who
were over 50 in 1961. The non-contributory scheme is designed for all those
7 Margaret S. Gordon(1988), Social Security Policies in Industrial Countries: A Comparative Analysis,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 39.
8 Ibid., p. 40.
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who were unable to contribute to the contributory scheme because of age or
low income.
As in most cases of social security programmes in developing countries,
coverage remains restricted to those in the most highly paid and secure
employment. This link between formal waged employment and participation
in a social security scheme is extremely common, whether the specific form
of provision is based on a provident fund or social insurance schemes.9
Therefore, the most obvious feature of a social insurance scheme in
developing countries is that it covers only a tiny proportion of the population.
As in many other developing countries, the two proposals prescribed the
lower-income limit of coverage restriction. The two proposals are as follows.
(1). The MOHSA Proposal: Qualifications and categories of the
subscribers are citizens of the Republic of Korea aged 20 years through 60
years. Subscribers are divided into three classes:
a). Class I subscriber: Employed workers and will be eligible on
1 January, 1974.
b). Class II subscriber: Self-employed and will be eligible
beginning on 1 January, 1976.
c). Class III subscriber: Those on public assistance and will be
eligible beginning on 1 January, 1981.
(2). The KDI Proposal: Qualifications and categories of the
subscribers are citizens of the Republic of Korea aged 18 years through 60
years who are employed in one of these businesses: a). Mining and
manufacturing; b). Construction; c). Electric enterprises; d). Commerce; e).
Banking; f). Transportation; g). Service( 1974-1976: thirty or more
employees, 1977- : ten or more employees ); h). Self-employment with an
income of more than 180,000 won per year, which is the tax exemption limit.
This limited coverage followed the precedent of the previous social
security systems in Korea. For example, the article 28 of the Employment
Standard Act of 1962 specifies that any employer who employs thirty or
more workers must furnish a Retirement Allowance Programme for his
9 Stewart MacPherson(1987), "Social Security in Developing Countries," Social Policy and
Administration. Vol. 2 No. 1. p. 6.
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employees, while the Industrial Accident Compensation Act of 1963
enforced the employees of the business enterprises employing more than
500 workers. Many policy-makers justified the limited coverage of the
pension programme for an early stage of its implementation for the following
reasons. Firstly, the administrative difficulties of collecting contributions
outside the large urban undertakings^ as well as the financial inability of
the rural workers, peddlers and other similar groups to pay for their own
NWP contributions will impose the practical limitation on the coverage of the
proposed pension scheme at least for the initial period.11 Secondly, the
limited coverage in the initial phase will give a valuable period of gaining
experience, insights, administrative capacity and public support with respect
to the NWP programme.12
Nevertheless, the limitation of coverage will produce many problems.
Because of the limited coverage, this scheme will not adequately protect
ordinary people against the contingencies which threaten their incomes nor
will it replace the traditional systems of care which are being subjected to the
strains of social change in Korea. Nor will this scheme effectively contribute
towards raising the levels of living of the poor through redistribution. Indeed,
it will be argued not only that the NWP programme will fail to redistribute
resources towards the most needy groups to any significant extent but that it
will reinforce and even accentuate inequality in Korea. The NWP
programme will reinforce inequality because it caters only for a small
proportion of the labour force who are engaged in regular waged or salaried
employment in the urban areas; the majority of the population who work in
subsistence agriculture or in the urban informal sector, are excluded.
B. Financing.
When policymakers consider how to pay the costs of pension, more than a
method of finance is at stake. Financing is more than a means to an end. It is
central. Social insurance schemes are distinguished from other forms of
social security by the fact that they are financed from the regular
contributions of their members together with those of the employer and the
'0 Interview with Yong-Moon Kim, Jae-Sung Min and Chong-Kee Park.
11 Interview with Jong-Ok Hong and Chong-Kee Park.
12 Sung-Yun Lee et.al.,(1971), Ibid., p. 44.
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state and that they provide protection to their members and their families
against a number of risks or contingencies which interrupt, reduce, or
terminate income or which place an additional burden on income."'3
Therefore, it is of course important to understand why this was so and why
policymakers became committed to the payroll tax as the sole source of
revenue. Besides their choice of a tax source, it is also important to
understand the policymakers' choice of rate.
Perhaps the most significant point that can be made about the financing of
a social insurance programme is that the general pattern of relatively
substantial contributions from general government revenues in the British
Commonwealth and Scandinavian countries, contrasted with heavy reliance
on contributory employer and employee taxes in many of the Western
European countries and the United States, prevails, as it does in the
financing of social insurance programmes in general.14 This largely reflects
the more substantial role of universal pensions and income-tested benefits,
which are usually financed from general revenues in the British and
Scandinavian countries, and the much greater reliance on earnings-related
social insurance programmes in many of the continental countries and the
United States. At one extreme are Australia and New Zealand, where
pension programmes are flat-rate and financed entirely from general
government revenues, and at the other extreme are France and the United
States, where pension programmes are financed entirely, or almost entirely,
by contributory taxes. In the British case, for example, old age pensions were
brought into the National Insurance Scheme by the Contributory Pension Act
of 1925; previously they had been paid out of general tax revenue and
subject to a means test. From then until 1961, the British system of social
insurance was based firmly on the principle of 'flat rate' benefits in exchange
for 'flat rate' contributions. According to the German social insurance law of
1889, on the other hand, contributions were earnings-related and were
equal for employees and employers, while the Imperial Government
provided a subsidy of 50 marks a year for each recipient of a pension and
paid certain administrative expenses. With three sources of funds-
employers, employees, and the government—the German provisions
13 James Midgley(1984), Social Security, Inequality and the Third World, pp. 89-90.
14 Margaret S. Gordon(1988), Ibid,, p. 75.
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established the principle of tripartite financing which was followed by many
other European countries in their social insurance schemes.
As we mentioned before, one of the outstanding changes during the period
since World War II has been the development of income-maintenance
programmes for the aged, survivors, and the disabled(OASI programmes)
which are more complex in basic structure than those that had developed
earlier. There has been resistance to increase in the contributions from
general revenues under conditions of budgetary stringency, but there has
also been resistance to increases in employer payroll taxes as a way of
meeting rising costs, particularly in view of the problem of maintaining the
competitive position in international trade that has been crucial for many
countries. Furthermore, both types brought out some fundamental issues.
First, if flat-rate contributions are levied, social insurance contributions are a
generally regressive form of taxation. For example, the flat-rate contribution
of 11s. 8d. a week payable by employed men represents 5.8 percent of a
wage of £10 but only 1.2 percent of a £50 salary. The implication of these
figures are obvious.15 Therefore, the more we rely on flat-rate employees'
contributions rather than progressive taxes to pay for National Insurance, the
greater the proportion of the cost borne by the lower-paid worker. In short,
while the flat-rate contributions paid employers may be less objectionable
than the employees' flat-rate contribution, it would be a mistake to regard
them as a method of 'soaking the rich.' They may, on balance, have the
opposite effect. Secondly, the basic problem facing most countries with
earnings-related insurance systems in the 1950s was the tendency for
wages to rise steadily with the result that benefits based on average lifetime
earnings were inevitably inadequate in relation to current earnings at the
time of retirement. West Germany was one of the leaders in facing this
problem, in its important pension reform legislation of 1957. Average lifetime
earnings still play a role in benefit determination, but the revaluation process
involves computing the ratio of earnings of the individual retiree during the
years he or she has worked, to the national average earnings level in each
of those same years. The average ratio is then multiplied by the national
average earnings in the three years prior to the year preceding the retiree's
15 Tony Lynes(1969), Pension Rights and Wrongs: A Critique of the Conservative Scheme. Fabian
Society, p. 5.
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application for benefits. 16 Furthermore, the countries that had begun with an
earnings-related social insurance system eventually recognised the need for
some type of minimum income guarantee to protect those that had never
been covered by the social insurance system, or who, for one reason or
another, had failed to develop rights to an adequate pension. From this
perspective, it is now more appropriate to refer to three-tiered systems in
many cases, sometimes involving mandatory or nationwide collectively
bargained employer pensions that supplement the public two-tiered system
and sometimes consisting of complex combinations of universal, means-
tested, and insurance benefits.
According to the MOHSA's proposal, the financing method is different
between Class I and Class II. In the case of Class I, the financing formula
was a two-tiered system: flat-rate contribution and earnings-related
contribution. In the Class II case, on the other hand, the financing was
formulated with the flat-rate portion.
Another controversial issue is the choice of a contribution rate. The choice
of a contribution rate was to some extent determined by the choice of a type
of contribution. If the payroll tax were to support the programme exclusively,
it would have to be higher than if the direct use of general revenues were
planned for. Policymakers could choose to set a fairly high rate and build up
a big reserve fund to meet future costs, or they could minimize the rate by
basing it on current costs, which began low. Considering its economic
significance upon both employers and employees, the proposed two
proposals are as follows.
(1). The MOHSA Proposal:
a). Class I: Subscriber will pay 3 percent of the monthly earning as a
monthly subscription fee and their employers shall do the same.
b). Class II: Subscriber will pay 400 won per month beginning in January
1976.
c). Class III: subscriber's subscription fee, 1,000 won, will be subsidized by
the government, beginning in January 1981.
16 Margaret S. Gordon. Ibid... pp. 58-59.
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(2). The KDI Proposal:
a). One plan was to be chosen from three alternative plans.
Plan I Plan II Plan III
Employee CO 4% 5%
Employer 3% 4% 5%
Self-Employed 5% 6% 7%
As we have seen above, an equal amount of contribution will be charged
to his employers. However, as one report concluded, the amount of
contribution rate would not be so serious for most employers who would be
subject to participate in the pension programme at initial stage. 17
The final issue is a government subsidy from the general revenues. There
are pros and cons of government subsidies.1** Several arguments have
been given for introducing government subsidies as a major source of
finance for social security. The first argument is the 'logic' approach. Three
parties are involved in economic security--the worker, the employer, and the
government-and it is reasoned that each should pay equally. A second
argument in support of government subsidies is that there would be
substantially higher general-revenue costs for public assistance if there
were no social security system. Therefore, it is argued, some of the resulting
savings to the General Treasury because of the existence of social security
should be given to that programme. A third argument in favour of a
government subsidy is that higher direct contribution rates would be difficult
to levy. Accordingly, this is the only way that benefits can be increased
substantially. Quite obviously, if equal tripartite financing were put into effect,
the general benefit level could immediately be increased by 50 percent.
However, one problem with financing through government subsidies is
that, for budgetary or political reasons, the payments may not be made in the
amount required or at the time specified. It is not conceivable that reliance
on government subsidies for financing a major portion of the cost of the
social security programme could lead to its collapse or to partial repudiation
of benefit obligations. Another difficulty which may arise if there is financing
through government subsidies is the pressure that would be generated to
17 Seung-Yun Lee, et.al.,(197"1), Ibid., p. 55.
18 See, Robert J. Myers(1970), Expansionism in Social Insurance. The Institute of Economic Affairs,
Occasional Paper No. 32. pp. 25-27.
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impose a means test on the beneficiaries, so that those who would
substantial other income would not be paid benefits. This would possibly
occur on the grounds that people with large incomes should not receive
payments which are partially financed from general revenues. Regardless of
these pros and cons of government subsidies, most industrialised countries
contribute towards the cost of social insurance programmes.
One common feature to the two proposals is that the programme is
financed solely through contributions by employers and employees, even
though the proposals clear the way for the government intervention. The
MOHSA's proposals are: a). The government's National Treasury will
provide expenditures necessary for the annual operation of the pension
programme up to 5 percent per year of the whole collected funds; b). The
government may subsidize the subscription fee of Class II subscribers when
they are exempted from paying the contribution. The KDI's proposal, on the
other hand, only mentioned that the government will subsidize when the
pension fund runs into the red.
Originally, the MOHSA members did not propose to rely solely on the
payroll tax. They believed that the combined payroll tax rate( the employee
tax and the employer's matching share ) should not be allowed to rise above
a certain percent, and that when that rates was reached, there should be
intervention with general government funds.19 They reasoned that a rate
higher than a certain percent might impair the living standards for workers
and that the employer's share might actually fall on workers. However, the
others, especially economic planners, opposed the government subsidy
because they feared the loss of revenue that would otherwise be available
for the financing of economic development.20 The EPB-side of policy¬
makers were really afraid of the loss of revenue that would otherwise be
available for the financing of economic development. In addition, several
objections to using general revenues were adduced by policymakers: that it
would be unfair to persons who were not covered by the system; that it
would remove all restraints on spending; that it would be financially safe;
and that it would make the protection an earned right.21
19 Interview with Chun-Song Che.
20 Interview with Chun-Song Che.
21 Interview with Chong-Kee Park.
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C. Types and Level of Benefits.
Social security replaces income that is lost because of a worker's retirement,
disability, or death. Obviously, one of the leading policy choices posed by
their programme is how much income it should provide. The rate of annual
pension benefits are quite different in individual countries with different
bases of determining the level of pension rate. However, the discussion
concerning the level of benefits might induce far greater complicated
problems in the future. That is, by either charging too low a contribution rate
or paying too high benefit, the reserve funds would be depleted in the
foreseeable future unless the government took some measures to cover the
net decrease of the funds reserved. By charging high or contribution rate,
and paying relatively low rate of pension it is expected that the contributors
would soon be discouraged from participating in the programme.
Furthermore, so long as benefits under the contributory insurance
programme remain at totally inadequate levels while the non-contributory
assistance payments steadily increase, the contributory programme is
threatened.
However, like financing methods, the benefit structures are in general
divided into two broad types according to whether the pension amounts
payable are the same for all recipients of a given status, or vary among
beneficiaries in close relation to their past contributions or past earnings.
The former type is commonly referred to as a 'flat-rate' scheme. The size of
benefits does not vary with the previous earnings of individual claimants.
The first pension scheme in Britain paid a flat-rate pension without the need
for previous contributions, but when contributions were introduced they were
initially set at a fixed value per person. Until 1961, the British system of
social insurance was based firmly on the principle of 'flat-rate' benefits in
exchange for 'flat-rate' contributions. The Beveridge Report endorsed it
unequivocally that:
"...Social insurance and national assistance organised by the state
are designed to guarantee, on condition of service, a basic income
for subsistence. The actual incomes and by consequence the
normal standards of expenditure of different sections of the
population differ greatly. Making provision for these higher
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standards is primarily the function of the individual, that is to say, it
is a matter for free choice and voluntary insurance."22
Whatever differences there might be in incomes derived from work,
Beveridge argued, those whose earnings were interrupted or terminated
must receive equal treatment from the state. According to this method, the
lower the previous earnings of an employee are, the higher percentage
thereof is presented by his pension, and vice versa. A flat pension involves
certain difficulties in the case where there is considerable variation among
the wage of different workers. The amount of flat pension selected may be
unduly low in relation to the wages of higher-paid workers, thereof reducing
their interest in expected pension after retirement.
The latter type, which relates the pension of individual beneficiaries to prior
earnings is in force in the great majority of old-age pension plans. The
proportional rate of contributions is usually constant, except that there may
be an upper limit to the value of earnings on which contributions are levied.
Earnings-related contributions may be combined with earnings-related
pensions, whereby the benefits are calculated as a proportion of some
measure of earnings obtained during the individual's lifetime. In this case,
the methods of averaging a worker's earnings for pension calculation
purpose is of considerable importance because individual's earnings vary
considerably throughout their career and because earnings include fringe
benefits and other transitory components. If pensions were directly
proportional to pensionable earnings, then of course those in poverty during
their working lives would tend to remain in poverty during old age.
As we have seen above, both of the benefit structures have certain defects.
For this reason, the actual programme that emerged was a hybrid: hybrid in
flat-rate benefits with earnings-related benefits.22
In determining the benefit structure for the Korean pension programme, the
two proposals suggested the same hybrid approach which combines both
flat-rate amount and earnings-related pension. As we can see in the
22 Sir William Beveridge(1942), Social Insurance and Allied Services. London: Her Majesty's Stationery
Office, Cmnd. 6404. p. 121.
23 For the methods of the hybrid, see, John Creedy(1982), State Pensions in Britain. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, pp. 19-33; and John Creedy and Richard Disney(1985), Social Insurance
in Transition: An Economic Analysis, Oxford: Clarendon Press, Especially Part Two.
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following two proposals, four different kinds of benefits are provided. A
person who has attained insured status may receive retirement benefits for
himself, and dependent's benefits for his spouse and children. When the
insured dies, survivor benefits are paid to the surviving spouse, children and
dependent parents. For an insured person, disability benefits are paid if he
is too seriously disabled to work. Finally, a lump-sum is payable to persons
who are not qualified to receive pension benefits. Flowever, the two
proposals are in striking contrast in relation to the benefit formula and benefit
level. The two proposals are as follows.
(1). The MOHSA Proposal: The MOHSA's proposal provides four
different kinds of benefits. A person who has attained insured status may
receive retirement benefits for himself, and dependent's benefits for his
spouse and children. When the insured dies, survivor benefits are paid to
the surviving spouse, children and dependent parents. For an insured
person, disability benefits are paid if he is too seriously disabled to work.
Finally, a lump-sum is payable to persons who are not qualified to receive
pension benefits.
1). Old-Age Pension.
Class I Subscribers: a). When the subscriber is unemployed: he will be
paid basic pension^4 and additional pension, when he reaches age 60( 55
for women, miners, and seamen ); b). When the subscriber is employed: he
will be paid eight-tenths of the basic pension and additional pension, when
he reaches 65; c). In both cases they have to have subscribed to the
pension fund for more than 20 years( 15 years or more for miners and
seamen ).
Class II Subscribers: When the subscriber reaches age 65, he will be paid
320 won multiplied by the number of subscription fee paid months plus 320
won multiplied by one-third of the number of months exempted from paying
the subscription fee. The subscriber has to have subscribed to or been
exempted from paying subscription fee for more than 25 years.
24 Basic pension= Fixed sum + proportional allotment.
Fixed sum= 290 times the number of subscription period.
Proportional allotment= average monthly wage of the whole subscription period times 1% times the
number of the subscription period.
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Class III Subscribers:
a). They will be paid when they reach age 65; amount is not specified;
b). Exemptions: When those men who are 40 years old or more( 35 for
women and miners ) at the time of the effective of the programme reach age
60 or 65, they can still get paid the basic pension as long as they have paid
a retroactive subscription fee for up to 10 years to make up the 20 years of
subscription payment period. They will have to pay double the amount of the
subscription fee, since the employers are not to pay the retroactive
subscription fee for the employee.
2). Disability Pension:
Class I Subscribers: Subscribers who have subscribed to the pension fund
for more than one year will be paid disability pensions when they incur
disease or injury according to the degree of disability determined two years
after the first medical examination of such disease or injury, and when they
are not covered by the Industrial Accident Compensation Act or the Labour
Standard Law.
a). 1st degree disability! loss of 100% earning ability ):
120 percent of basic pension + additional pension.
b). 2nd degree disability! loss of 75% earning ability ):
basic pension + additional pension.
c). 3rd degree disability! loss of 50% earning ability ):
70 percent of basic pension + additional pension.
d). 4th degree disability! loss of 30% earning ability ):
50% of basic pension + additional pension.
Class II Subscribers: a). Qualifications are the same as Class I subscribers
except they have to have subscribed to the pension fund for more than three
years; b). The amount is the same as the old age pension for Class II
subscribers! minimum 12,000 won will be guaranteed ) plus 25 percent
additional pension for 1st and 2nd degree disability, and 15 percent for 3rd
and 4th degree disability.
3). Survivor Pension:
Class I Subscribers: a). When present subscribers of the pensioners of
Class I old age pension and disability pension! 1st and 2nd degree disability
) die, the surviving members of their families are paid survivor pensions in
the order of spouses and children, parents, grandchildren, and grandparents
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supported by the recipients at the time of their death; b). When spouse and
children are eligible, they are paid 60 percent of basic pension plus
additional pension( minimum 12,000 won will be guaranteed ), for others, 60
percent of basic pension is paid; c). Subscribers have to have subscribed for
more than one year.
Class II Subscribers: a). When present subscribers or the pensioners of the
Class II old age pension and disability pension( 1st and 2nd degree
disability ) die, the subscribers pensions will be paid at the amount of 60
percent of the Class II old age pension plus additional pension to spouse
and children( minimum 12,000 won will be guaranteed ); b). For others!
parents, grandchildren, and grandparents ) at the amount of 60 percent of
the Class II old age pension; c). The subscribers have to have subscribed
more than three years.
4). Lump-Sum Refund:
Class I Subscribers: a). When the subscribers lose qualifications and have
reached age 60, or it has passed 20 years since the first day of subscription,
they will be paid a lump sum at the amount of average monthly standard
wage times the rate prescribed by law; b). They have to have subscribed for
more than three years! one year for women ).
Class II Subscribers: a), when the subscriber loses qualification and has
reached age 65 or passed the period of exemption from one-third of the
paying the subscription fee, which is the total subscribed period, he will be
paid a lump sum at the amount of average monthly wage equivalent to 60
percent of the monthly average wage of all workers times the rate prescribed
by law; b). The subscribers have to have subscribed for more than two years
by paying the subscription fee.
(2). The KDI Proposal: The KDI proposal provides three different kinds
of benefits: old age pension, disability pension, and survivor pension.
1). Old Age Pension: a). When the subscriber reaches age 60( 55 for
women ) and retires, and if he has subscribed for more than 120 months! 10
years ), he will be paid 30 percent of his average monthly income for the
immediate past five years! 35 percent for the subscriber who earns below
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15,000 won per month ); b). If the subscriber continues to work and earns
more than 15,000 won per month, the excess income will be deducted from
his pension; c). If the subscriber has subscribed for more than 120 months,
he will be paid additional pension equivalent to one percent of his average
monthly income for the immediately preceeding five years for additional 12
months' subscription.
d). An exception: Those who are age 51 and older in 1974 and employed
in an eligible business will be paid the same pension as the regular
subscriber, if he has subscribed for the rest of the subscription period until
60( at least 5 years ); when less than 60 months, a lump-sum refund will be
made at the amount at the rate of one month's basic pension times every 4
month's subscription, up to 85 percent of the average monthly income.
2). Disability Pension: a). When the subscriber is under age 60( 55 for
women ) and has lost two-thirds of his earning ability by decease or injuries,
he will be paid 30 percent of the average monthly income for the immediate
past 5 years, if he subscribed for 36 months; b). If he has subscribed more
than 36 months, additional pension equivalent to one percent of the average
monthly income for every additional 12 months will be paid; c). If the
subscriber is permanently disabled, additional pension equivalent to 10
percent of the every monthly income for the immediate past 5 years will be
paid.
3). Survivor Pension: a). When the subscriber dies of disease or injury,
and the spouse is over 55 years of age, the survivor pension is paid; b).
When the spouse is disabled or has children, the pension is paid even if the
spouse is under 55 years of age; c). When the spouse is under 55 at the time
of the subscriber's death, the spouse will be paid 50 percent of the basic
pension of the subscriber for 3 years; d). The subscriber's children under
age 18 will be paid 20 percent of the basic pension of the subscriber per
child until they reach age 18; e). If the children have no parents left, then
they will be paid 30 percent of the deceased parent's basic pension; f). If
there are no immediate survivors, then the subscriber's parents will be paid
30 percent of the basic pension of the subscriber.
In a comparison of the two proposals, the KDI's proposal is more simple
and benefits levels are much more tight-fisted than that of the MOHSA's
230
proposal. This is caused by the different intentions of the plans which we
mentioned already. However, both of the proposals will not be sufficient to
cover the amount needed for a reasonably high rate of pension with 3 or 5
percent of contribution rate. In the future, therefore, the funds accumulated
with the contribution of both employer and employee might induce far more
complicated problems. That is, by either charging too low contribution rate or
deplete in foreseeable future unless the government take some measures to
cover the net decrease of the funds reserved. By charging high rate of
contribution, and paying relatively low rate of pension it is expected that the
contributors would soon be discouraged from participating in the
programme.
D. Administration of Pension.
Administration of the pension scheme and management of the pension
funds were one of the most important issues in the Korean pension policy¬
making process because these items would affect the purposes of pension
policy initiation which we examined in Chapter Four. Social insurance
schemes are administered by quasi-governmental organisations which are
directly responsible to government, although in some countries there are
several organisations of this kind catering for different categories of workers
while, in others, one organisation administers a unitary, central scheme for
all workers. In the German case, for example, the insurance institutions were
organised by the government of the various states; they were staffed by paid
government officials, but also included representatives of employer and
workers in equal numbers.25 These organisations receive the contributions
of members and their employers and those of the state, manage these
revenues, and pay benefits when required. Those responsible for the
administration of these funds are required to maintain an adequate balance
between contributions and benefits but, since they normally do not have the
authority to vary the level of contributions or benefits directly, they must
request the government to order increases in the rate of contribution if
benefit levels fall well behind the cost of living or if the fund is danger of
depletion.
25 Margaret S. Gordon(1988), Ibid., p. 41.
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There are basically two polar methods of operating pension schemes: the
"funded" and the "pay-as-you-go" schemes. However, in practice, very few
schemes adhere rigidly to either method.26 |n the former scheme, all
contributions are effectively deposited into a fund, which accumulates at
compound interest. These funds are then used as retirement and other
contingencies, to pay the claimed benefits. The fund may be administered
on a risk pooling basis, for a group of individuals who are thought to face
risks, and the scheme may have an explicit degree of income redistribution
built into it. All individuals may not therefore expect the same rate of return
from their contributions, although the system as a whole must be self-
financed. The fully funded method has a considerable capacity to generate
savings due to the creation of reserves. When programmes are newly
established, social security contributions have a high income elasticity of
yield as the contribution base is increased, i.e., as coverage is expanded,
thereby bringing in added revenues from more participants and for a wider
range of contingencies covered. The later the retirement age, the longer the
postponement of benefit payments. Also, if borrowing is not widely allowed
against contributions, the potential for savings generation is high. Since
contributions are predictable throughout the working life and benefit
payments are actuarially determinable, there appears to be greater freedom
in mobilising these savings on a long-term basis.27 The accumulated funds
thus formed through the generation of savings may be used for necessary
consumption or long-term investment which we will examine in the following
section.
In the latter scheme, their rigourous application would involve the complete
absence of a fund, and pensions and contributions would be adjusted
regularly according to demographic changes, growth or inflation. In practice,
however, a partial fund is often accumulated and contributions may include
a donation from central exchequer funds as well as some of the revenue
from contributions.
One of the reasons for change from the funded to the pay-as-you-go
scheme was the adverse impact of inflation on the value of reserves, and
indeed, the entire array of uncertainties surrounding estimates of future
benefits and costs in an unstable economic environment. Another important
26 John Creedy(1982). Ibid., p. 13.
27 Parthasarathi Shome(1978), "Social Security as a Mobilizer of Savings: The Experience of
Malaysia." International Social Security Review, Vol. No. 1. p. 61.
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factor has been reluctance to impose on the present generation of workers
tax burdens high enough to meet much larger costs in the future as the aged
population increases and systems mature.The result of pay-as-you-go
financing is to bring about intergenerational transfers from present workers
to retired, disabled, and survivor beneficiaries. Therefore, it is often argued
that the successful operation of pay-as-you-go scheme requires a social
contact between three generations: present-day workers pay their
contributory taxes on the understanding that a future generation of workers
will in turn pay taxes to finance the benefits that will accrue to them in the
future. The result of this transfers is a reduction in income inequality because
although the contributory taxes are regressive, the benefits flow in large part
to persons who have little other income. However, in most social insurance
systems the transfers are from persons with average earnings to low-income
recipients, not from high-income to low-income persons.
In relation to the administration, both proposals recommended the funded
scheme because the funded method has a considerable capacity to
generate savings due to the creation of reserves. Therefore, this method
would coincide with one of the purposes of pension policy-initiation, namely,
economic acceleration. However, the two proposals are contrary to each
other in relation to the organisational structure. The MOHSA proposed that a
new National Welfare Pension Bureau would be created in the MOHSA in
the central government and then, the bureau will utilize the local Office of the
Labour Affairs throughout the country until the bureau establishes its own
local branches; whereas the KDI proposed a new autonomous Office of
Social Security Administration in the central government and the Office of
Social Security Administration would establish local offices but the task of
collecting subscription fee will be performed by the Office of National Tax
Administration. These two proposals are poles apart in relation to who would
manage the pension funds. In other words, this issue would be a potent
influence on the priority of the suggested purposes, namely, whether the
NWP programme would be a means of economic acceleration or a means of
socio-political palliation.
28 Margaret S. Gordon(1988), Ibid., p. 80.
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E. Means to Utilize the Reserve Fund.
Finally, what is crucial in considering the role of social security in
development is how these funds derived from the surpluses of social
security schemes are used. Is the financial health of the fund to be a first
consideration and maximum yield and security sought? Should reserves be
used primarily in the interest of contributors, through, for example, loans to
insured persons for housing purposes and credits to employees to finance
the expansion of their enterprises? Should the funds be channelled to those
sectors of the economy which would make an immediate contribution to
economic growth? Is the financing of the social and health infrastructure a
priority use of the funds?
In relation to the Korean pension policy, these issues are very important
and controversial in the policy-making process. The social insurance
policymakers differ among themselves on use of the reserve funds. The
planners on the economic side would like to see these funds used for
investment in economic development projects according to planned
priorities and, as a rule, turned over to the national treasury. Social security
administrators, on the other hand, are primarily concerned with the
protection of the reserve funds for present and future beneficiaries-that is,
their safety, the maintenance of their purchasing power, and the highest
possible yield compatible with liquidity and safety.2§ Some may feel that
programmes designed to benefit low-income groups—such as housing,
education, health, and sickness insurance-are those that need support. On
the other hand, trade unions and similar organisations often attempt to limit
investment of reserve funds to projects that would benefit the insured
workers immediately( such as consumer credit, mortgage credit, subsidised
housing etc) on the basis that reserve funds are nothing but a repository of
the savings of the contributors.
According to these conflicting viewpoints, the use of reserve funds should
be based on four principles, namely security, yield, liquidity, and contribution
to economic development. This principles would certainly be accepted but
the problem remains of defining what is of 'social and economic utility.'
In the majority of nations, a substantial part of reserve funds is invested in
domestic financial or physical assets. In the Japanese case, for example, the
investment is available for "social purposes," including 20 percent for local
29 Paul Fisher( 1968), Ibid^, p. 256.
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improvements, of their social purposes, about 25 percent goes to housing,
13 percent to developing small businesses, and over 11 percent to building
homes for the aged.30 However, the financial assets of social security
institutions in many developing countries are primarily invested in
government obligations. Even though channelling the funds through the
state may not be a guarantee towards development, the funds may increase
the pool available to the government, which can then be utilised for different
purposes in the public or private sector, according to national priorities in a
way that will increase productivity and taxable capacity. The physical assets
range from highly profitable investment in land, apartment buildings, resort
development and luxury and middle-class housing to hospitals and medical
facilities designed to assist related short-term social insurance programmes.
Examples of all these types of investment of social security funds are to be
found-and the list is by no means exhaustive. There is, of course, no one
answer as to how the funds should be invested and decisions as to their use
will depend on perceptions of what are the most urgent needs of the country
and on its approach to development.
As we mentioned already, the EPB's idea gave priority to economic
acceleration, while the MOHSA's idea laid stress on socio-political
palliation. These ideas were reflected in the two proposals respectively.
Long-range perspective of the MOHSA proposal was the same as the one
presented to the President on his annual visit to the MOHSA, except for
slight changes in the estimates of the reserved fund. The revised long-range
perspective was suggested in Table.
In relation to the means to utilize the reserve funds, the MOHSA's proposal
focused on safety and high returns by: a). Deposition as fund for public
finance; b). Undertaking credits which yield high return such as industrial
credit debenture; c). Deposition at the banks; d). Establishment and
operation of social welfare and medical facilities.
30 David E. Woodsworth(1977), Social Security and National Policy: Sweden, Yugoslavia and Japan.,
















1,000 or more- 330,000 10,906,000 7
1976 34,350,000 -500 or more 710,000 11,737,000 21.2
1978 35,310,000 -30 or more- 2,350,000 12,631,000 62.0
1980 36,240,000 Self-employed 4,350,000 13,593,000 146.8
On the other hand, the KDI suggest the following table and stressed the













1974 33,340,000 1,478,000 10,906,000 4.4% 32.7% 46.5
1976 34,350,000 1,712,000 11,737,000 5.0% 34.2% 181.6
1978 35,310,000 2,218,000 12,631,000 6.3% 35.8% 407.2
1980 36,240,000 2,463,000 13,593,000 6.8% 37.5% 728.9
31 Calculation of the reserve fund is based on Plan III.
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5.2. Preparation of the Draft Bill.
5.2.1. The First Outline.
The Working Committee had twelve meetings to review and examine the
two plans submitted for consideration. However, the Working Committee
decided only a few issues such as the coverage and the survivor pension
which were not so controversial. The main reason was that, as we
mentioned already, the structure of policy-making in Korea was culturally
and politically centralised to the high central government policy-makers.
Therefore, they did not have the final say. The Working Committee decided
to draw up a first outline of the pension system based on agreed items, but
also to report two different opinions which were not agreed upon among the
Committee members. The Committee decided to leave for the Vice-
Ministers' Meeting to choose between the different opinions.32
5.2.2. The Vice-Ministers' Meeting.
The first outline of the pension system was drawn up by the Committee and
sent to the Vice-Ministers' Meeting on 18 May, 1973. The Vice-Ministers'
Meeting was held with only those Vice-Ministers and other people who were
concerned with the pension programme under consideration.33 The
meeting was presided over by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
EPB.
At this Vice-Ministers' Meeting, the participants could not agree on
anything more than that what had been already agreed upon by the Working
Committee.34 The Vice-Minister of the Office of Government Administration
mentioned that five percent of the contribution rate from the beginning of a
enforcement would impose a heavy burden on both citizen and companies,
32 Interview with Jae-Sung Min.
33 The participants were: So-Yong Chung(Chief Economic Secretary for the President); Jae-Woo
Lee(Vice-Minister of the EPB); Ok-Kyu Cho(Vice Minister of the Finance); Jong-Kwan HongfVice-
Minister of the MOHSA); Mahn-Jae Kim(President of the KDI); Hee-Chang Kim(Director of the Office of
Labour Affairs); and Jong-Taek ChungfPolitical Secretary for the President).
34 The following subjects for debate are quoted from the Bureau of Welfare Pension(1974), Ibid., p. 31.
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so that it would be desirable to start with a low rate of contribution in the
early stage, and then increase the contribution rate step-by-step. The Vice-
Minister of EPB said that in matters connected with contribution rate, it would
be desirable to start with a low rate to pay due regard to foreign countries'
systems because subscribers would accept it as an additional burden. The
President of the KDI, on the other hand, maintained that once it was
institutionalised, it would be very difficult to increase the rate of contribution.
Therefore, even if it was too burdensome for subscribers, it would be
desirable to keep up five percent. The Vice-Minister of the MOHSA asserted
that the general principle of social insurance expenditure is a tripartite
allotment, i.e., government general revenues, and contributions from the
insured persons and their employers. In the case of many foreign countries,
government expenses bear a sizable sum of pension expenditure.
Therefore, the government must subsidize at least the administration cost.
The Chief Economic Secretary for the President suggested that they defer
their decision for a while and that they send some working-level people to
foreign countries to learn more about their systems. The Deputy Prime
Minister and Minister of EPB closed the meeting by instructing that;35
"
the pension system must be effective in 1974. Working-level
people should be sent to those foreign countries that are similar to
Korea in many ways such as Japan and other countries in
Southeast Asia, and they would observe and study those countries'
systems and choose the most adaptable system to Korea. On the
other hand, this first outline should be finalized after hearing
opinions from people who have professional knowledge, and , if
possible, representatives of the employed and employers, and other
from society ".
35 Ibid., p. 31.
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5.2.3. An Observation Trip and the Hearings.36
A. An Observation Trip Abroad of the Study Groups.
According to the instruction of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
EPB, two groups were formed on 30 May, 1973 and went on a trip abroad
until 20 June, 1973. One group which was composed of two people from the
Social Affairs Bureau of the MOHSA, one research fellow from the Social
Security Committee, one person from the Budget Bureau of the EPB, one
from the Security Insurance of the Ministry of Finance, went to Japan mainly
in order to learn the actual operation of the Social Security system there.
They visited the Ministry of Welfare, Ministry of Social Security, the university
of social security, a county pension section, insurance section, and the
Social Security Committee, and studied the Japanese experiences of the
Welfare Pension Insurance and National Pension Programmes.
The other group which was composed of the Director-General of the Social
Affairs Bureau of the MOHSA, and two people from the Economic
Coordination Bureau of the EPB went to the Southeast Asia area mainly in
order to observe policy aspects of social security systems in several
countries. They visited the Republic of China, the Philippines, and the Asia
Area Office of the International Labour Office in Bangkok, Thailand, and later
joined the group in Japan.
B. The Hearings.
As soon as the study groups returned from abroad, the Working Committee
held several hearings from 21 June, 1973 to 30 June, 1973, as decided at
the Vice-Ministers' Conference.37 Most of the hearings were held for about
two hours each. In the hearings, participants raised many questions. All
these questions are substantially the same as that of the public criticisms just
after the announcement of the draft bill. Therefore, we will examine all these
36 The following details rely heavily on the Bureau of Welfare Pension(1974), Footstep of the National
Welfare Pension. The MOHSA, Unpublished internal draft, pp. 32-39. In Korean.
37 Hearings for the Academic Circle(21 June); The Press(21 June); The Representative of the
Employers(22 June); The Representative of the Empioyees(22 June); The Economy-Science
Council(29 June); and The Social Security Committee(30 June).
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issues in the following section. Instead, here we will raise the most
controversial questions in argument and then examine the government's
responses. In most of the hearings, there was serious controversy on these
subjects:
(1). The motivation and direction of the pension programme: Whether or
not it was intended to mobilize domestic savings ?
(2). The coverage: A protective device for the temporary employees who
were hired for less than three months and who were disqualified from the
NWP scheme; and the raising of the lower limit with the employers paying
the contribution fee for the employee.
(3). The financing: Whether the government would subsidise to the
pension funds or not ?
(4). The benefits: A protective device for the pension benefits in time of the
changing wages, prices, or other economic variables; and benefits levels.
(5). The organization: Who would take charge of the management of the
pension scheme, the MOHSA or the EPB ?
(6). In relation to the other social security systems, especially, with the
Retirement Allowance system.
As a whole, most participants expressed negative feelings about the
prospect of the programme being designed for economic purposes rather
than for the purpose of the social welfare of citizens.
In responses to these issues, the Economic Coordinator of the EPB
answered that funds would be raised when the system was in operation, and
the purpose of the pension programme was social welfare, by which he
implicitly meant the overall enhancement of living standards by economic
development through heavy and chemical industries in this case which
would be made possible by the pension fund.38 He also said that the
participants should understand that the EPB took charge of the programme,
because (1) it had a large effect on the national economy and (2) the EPB
was in a position to coordinate between the other Ministries in the
government.39 On the other hand, in the hearing for the Social Security
Committee, the General-Director of the Social Affairs Bureau of the MOHSA
38 Working Committee(1973), Hearing Record for the Press, on 22 June, 1973.
39 Working Committee(1973), Hearing Record for the Representatives of the Employer and Employee,
on 22 June, 1973.
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replied that: "it would have been a matter of course that the MOHSA should
have taken the leading role, since it has to with the matter of social security.
The reason why the EPB participated was in order to be careful about the
economic aspects of the programme, and the EPB took the role of
coordination because when President Park received the working plans from
the KDI as well as from the MOHSA, he instructed that the pension system
should be established by coordinating the two working plans."40
5.2.4. Report to the Joint Policy Committee Meeting of
the Democratic Republican Party and You Chung
Hoe.41
As we mentioned in Chapter One, the political parties in Korea are less
instruments of interest aggregation than of policy dissemination and
propagation, as well as deliberation and legitimation. In order to tighten
cooperation between the government and ruling party with respect to these
latter functions, various formal mechanisms such as the government and
ruling DRP joint meeting are maintained between them. All conflicts of
political opinions are adjusted formally through these means.
The first outline of the pension plan was reported to the Joint Policy
Committee Meeting of the Democratic Republican Party and You-Chung
Hoe on 9 July, 1973. Ten members of both parties were present with the
Minister of Health and Social Affairs, Vice-Minister of the MOHSA, Vice-
Minister of the Planning and Coordinator of the EPB, the Economic
Coordinator of the EPB, and the Director-General of the Social Affairs
Bureau of the MOHSA. Although the participants were not against the NWP
programme itself, they raised several questions in arguments. However,
most of their suggestions were already presented in the hearings. For
example, Jae-Phil Ko, National Assemblyman, proposed that, to consider
Korea's actual circumstances, the government should invest in the public
assistance programmes to relieve the poor instead of the employees, and
Hee-Sup Chung, National Assemblyman, mentioned that the NWP
4® The MOHSA{1973), Minutes of the Meeting on the Basic Outline of the NWP Programme, 4 July,
1973.
41 Working Committee, Report on the Joint Policy Committee Meeting of the DRP and Youchunq Hoe,
On 9 July, 1973.
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programme should be run parallel with the National Health Insurance. In
relation to the finance, vice-chairman of the policy committee of the DRP,
Mahn-Sup Lee, claimed that the employees' level of contribution exemption
of pension should be raised as much as the level of inhibitants' tax
exemption(8,000 won). In addition, he expressed the concern that the term
"to secure domestic capital necessary for economic development" as the
basic direction of the pension system could arouse unnecessary
misunderstanding. Finally, one participant, Myong-Gun Park, said that it
would be better if the planning process was open up to public for discussion
without excessive security precautions.
With regard to these issues, the government's immediate responses were
not known to the general public. When we examine the final draft bill, these
suggestions were not much effect on the NWP policy-making. In this fashion,
however, the party functions as an additional conduit through which the
NWP policy was disseminated to a wider elite, and, through media
coverage, popular audiance.
5.3. The Draft Bill.
5.3.1. The Announcement of the Draft Bill.
Having taken into consideration the comments and suggestions made by
the participats at the various hearings and meetings, the Second Outline
was prepared by the Working Committee at the Vice-Ministers' Conference
and presented to the Economic Ministers' Conference on 30 July, 1973.
However, the contents of the second outline did not much reflect the results
of the trips and hearings. One of the main reasons was that the government
planners held the hearings simply to get some frame of reference for their
decision at the Vice-Ministers' level from the people who had so-called
professional knowledge about social security or who were to be affected by
the pension programme. They were not interested in arguing the purpose
and intention of the pension programme.42 |n other words, in Korean
politics, interest groups had been treated by the government as mobilizers of
42 Nam-Jin Jun(1980), Ibid,, p. 121.
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public support for already-determined government policy, not as agents
representing the interests of their groups.
The establishment of the National Welfare Pension programme was
introduced first to the general public by the Deputy Minister and Minister of
Economic Planning Board on 20th of September, 1973. Meanwhile, the
background and content of the NWP programme was explained by the
Minister of Health and Social Affairs, Hyong-Ho, Lee(see, Appendix 2). No
sooner was the programme introduced and explained to the general public
than the Working Committee was dismissed. The Office of Planning and
Coordination which was subordinate to the Office of Prime Minister took
charge of the program.
5.3.2. The Response of the Public.
In response to the programme, there was an outburst of criticism from the
general public. Public opinion was reflected primarily through the
newspapers.Newspapers discussed the pension scheme in the editorial
articles. Considering the Korean media had undergone an unprecedented
trial over the issue of the freedom of press since the military coup in 1961,
more seriously since the Yushin Reform in 1972, the newspapers' criticism
was a surprising event. The main issues were as follows:
(1). In relation to the purpose: a). The government should explain the
purpose of the NWP programme-whether this scheme was for the domestic
saving or not(Hankook 11bo); b). The NWP programme just emphasized the
mobilizing domestic savings(Jungang); c). The Unemployment pension and
the Disability pension were much more efficient than the Old Age pension in
relation to the national goal, that is, the establishment of a state on the basis
of industries(Chosun).
(2). In relation to the coverage: a). The age 18 for the qualification should
be raised(Dong-A); b). The age of under 18 for the qualification of the
43 Dong-A II Bo(22 Sept., 26 Sept.), Cho Sun II Bo(22 Sept.), Seoul Shin Mon(21 Sept.), Joong Ang II
Bo(21 Sept.), Han Kuk II Bo(21 Sept.), Kyong Hwang Shin Mon(21 Sept.). For full details, see the
interest groups activities in the following section.
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Survivor Pension should be changed(Jungang); c). The lower limit for the
qualification should be raised to the level of income tax exemption! Ibid ); d).
Women should be exempted because most of Korean women ceased work
just after their marriage.
(3). In relation to the financing: a). The NWP programme should be a
tripartite contribution.The government contribution would not impose
additional financial difficulties, because the reserve funds would be invested
as treasury loans and investments to the heavy and chemical
industries(Dong-A & Kyonghyang); b). The contribution for the NWP gave
the impression to the general public of a pseudo-tax(Kyonghyang); c). The
NWP system left government contribution out of consideration in comparison
with the Civil Servants Pension scheme and the Military Personnel Pension
scheme(Hankook); d). The government should consider supplementary
measures for the early retirees and the temporarily unemployed(Dong-A); e).
The contribution rate was too high( Ibid ).
(4). In relation to the benefits: a). The benefits should be based on the real
living expenses and the sliding system(Hankook); b). The pension benefits
should be paid right after the pensioners' retirement. The age of 60 for the
benefits allowance was inconsistent with the actual(Jungang & Chosun); c).
The amount of benefits were much lower than that of a deposit in the
commercial banks as a fixed credit(Chosun); d). The NWP system was
unfavourable to the low income class! Ibid ); e). The scope of the benefits did
not cover the short-term contingencies such as sickness and
unemployment! Ibid ); f). The women who stopped working before the age of
55 should be paid right after the pensioner's retirement(Dong-A); g). The
NWP system did not give the pensioners the opportunity to choose their
benefits in comparison with the Civil Servants Pension
scheme(Kyonghyang).
(5). Others: a). The contribution rate and benefit of the NWP should be the
same as that of the Civil Servants Pension(Jungang); b). The government
should consider supplementary measures for the early retirees and the
temporary unemployeds(Dong-A).
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In the mean time, the Chosun llbo gave the opportunity to the policy
makers to explain the government's policy on 29th of September, 1973. Dr.
Chong-Kee Park was on the defensive and made the government's position
clear. He stated that: (1). The ultimate purpose of the NWP programme was
to secure of workers' life, so that the others were only accompanying effects;
(2). The principle of the NWP was based on social insurance, hence the
lump-sum payments was against the fundamental principle; (3). The NWP
would not obtain excellent results in a short time. Therefore, the NWP should
be amended and supplemented step-by-step over a long period of time;(4).
The introduction of Unemployment Insurance was impossible of attainment
in view of the realities of the Korean situation, because Korea did not have
well-developed labour exchanges and labour markets. Instead of
Unemployment Insurance, the government would introduce Medical
Insurance as soon as possible; (5). The Weighted Benefit Formula was
applied as a method of assessment for the NWP benefits, so that the low
income worker would have much more benefits(maximum 70%) than that of
the high income worker(minimum 24.3%); (6). The government contribution
would come back to a burden of tax payers, especially the employers.
5.3.3. The Government's Counter Measures.
The Office of Planning and Coordination analyzed public opinions and
concluded that the following were the reasons and causes of the negative
opinions.44
(1). The problem of the purpose of the programme: The general public
regarded the purpose of the programme as a means of mobilizing domestic
capital. This was because the EPB took charge of the process of planning
the system in spite of the fact that social security was under the jurisdiction of
the MOHSA.
(2). The problem of the organizational structure: The involvement of the
Office of National Tax Administration created a negative impression on the
general public.
(3). The problem of the rate of contribution: The rate of the contribution fee
was considered rather burdensome to both the employers and the
employees.
44 MOHSA, Bureau of Welfare Pension(1974), "Footstep of the pp.79-80.
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(4). The problem of press reporting: The reporting of the press resulted in
negative reactions from the general public. The reporting was suspected
because the press themselves were employers so that they were to be
affected by the new pension system in their business. This suspicion was in
spite of impartial reporting.
(5). Problem with other pension programmes: The general public
confused the NWP with the Civil Servants Pension and Military Personnel
Pension programmes which were in effect pension plus retirement
allowance systems.
The Office of Planning and Coordination attributed the negative public
opinions to the fact that the real reasons for the programme were not
revealed initially in a positive way and they felt that the content of the
programme should be made known more widely and publicly. They
suggested that the Prime Minister should see to the latter.
A. The Public Relations Task Committee.
The Prime Minister, therefore, instructed on 28 September, 1973, that a
public relations Task Committee for the NWP programme be established.
The Prime Minister also instructed the Office of Planning and Coordination to
readjust the contents of the basic outline in spite of the elucidation of a policy
of non-modification of the basic outline by the Minister of Health and Social
Affairs one day earlier. The Public Relations Task Committee consisted of
Vice-Ministers of the EPB, MOHSA, Culture and Public Information, and
President of the KDI.
The Committee held four meetings and drew up the activities as follows: 45
(1). Contribution of special commentaries to major newspapers.
(2). Round-table talks and spot announcements on radio and T.V.
(3). Printed Materials:
1). 20,000 copies of public relations material titled " Road to the Welfare
Society".
2). 300,000 copies of explanatory material entitled " To Make Tomorrow
Happy".
3). 200,000 copies of three catchwords, and
ibid, p. 80.
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4). 200,000 copies of poster.
The Committee also held meetings with the representatives of the
Federation of Korean Industries and the Federation of Labour Unions on 8
October, 1973, and with the presidents of the universities and influential
people in the press on 31 October, 1973.
B. The Results of the Reassessment.
In response to the Prime Minister, the Office of Planning and Coordination
arranged a meeting with the Ministers of EPB, MOHSA, the Second Minister
without Portfolio, and the president of the KDI. They analysed public
opinions and revised the basic outline beginning on 1 October, 1973. The
details of readjustment were as follows:
(1). The rate of contribution which the employees had to pay was lowered
by one percent from 4 percent to 3 percent as a result of a request made by
ruling party on 5th of October, 1973.
(2). A lump-sum refund for women who stopped working before the age of
55 may be paid one year after stopping working. If the subscriber does not
apply lump-sum refund, the basic annual pension would be paid as planned
in the basic outline.
(3). The qualification period for Disability and Survivor Pensions was
lowered from 3 years of contribution to one year. The survivor pension was
raised from 30 percent of the basic annual pension to 50 percent for
disabled or dependent children.
(4). The upper limit of the average standard monthly compensation was
raised from 150,000 won to 200,000 won in order to include higher income
level.
(5). The lower limit was raised from 7,000 won to 15,000 won and those
between 7,000 won and 15,000 won per month were made voluntary
subscribers, instead of the employers paying the contribution fee for those
earning under 7,000 won which was originally proposed.
(6). The rate of tax exemption of pension was raised from 50 percent to 100
percent.
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However, they could not accept of some requests offered by the general
public, for the following reasons:
Suggestions rejected Reasons
The government should contribute donation
or pension at a fixed rate.
1. It will increase tax burden.
2. The dependent people were not taken
care of by the government so that the
government could not subsidize the income-
earning people first.
3. The financial burden to the government
would be grave as the pensions are
increased in the future.
The Medical Insurance and Unemployment
Insurance should be put into operation
before the NWP programme.
1. The Medical Insurance requires a great
deal of finance.
2. The Unemployment Insurance could not
be put into operation because of the
inadequacy of conditions such as labour
market and employment rate.
There should be a choice between lump¬
sum refund upon retirement or the pension.
1. The idea is in contrast to the purpose of
the NWP programme.
2. A lump-sum refund does not secure
retirees' living.
3. There is Retirement Allowance system
regulated by the Labour Standard Law.
The ages between retirement and eligibility
for pensions should be the same.
1. It is against the purpose of old age
security.
2. The period of paying out pensions will be
lengthened.
3. The retirement age would be raised in the
future.
The age of qualification should be raised
from 18 to 20.
1. The age of eighteen is the legal age for
labour.
2. Earlier subscription is beneficial to the
subscriber.
248
The burden on business should be relieved. 1. The 4% of donation did not hinder on the
production cost.46
2. Even if there is a little burden, the
business activity would be thriving by the
enhancement of labour production as a
result of the pension programme.
Measures to maintain value of the currency
should be discussed.
1. The benefits will be decided by average
incomes.
2. The benefits will be readjusted by price
fluctuation sliding system).
Representatives of the employers and
employees should participate in the
management of the pension system and
fund.
1. The deliberation committee.
2. The Trust Fund Management Committee.
5.3.4. The Final Draft Bill.
The working plan of the programme with only minor revisions which
reflected part of public opinion was laid again before the Economic
Ministers' Conference on 15 October, 1973, and approved by the
Conference. The prospect of the reserve fund and the organizational
structure, however, remained intact.
The working plan was reported to the Prime Minister, and President Park
afterwards on 30 October, 1973. The President took account of public
opinion on the low-income class people. Therefore, he directed that the level
of contribution fee exemption status should be raised from 7,500 won to
46 According to one estimation, the possible burden of imposing the contribution to employers would
not be so serious for most employers who would be subject to participate in the pension programme at a
initial stage. If 5 % wage bill is charged the contribution of the employers to the programme, their
contribution would effect only less than 1 % of net sales or manufacturing costs for four-fifths of the
industries. If only 3 % of employers' wage bill is charged as the contribution the net effect would be less
than 0.6 % of net sales or manufacturing costs. However, the contribution for pension programme would
directly be affected to the operations of the institutions because the proportion of wage and salary
payments to total operating expenses has been very high in compared to the one for manufacturing and
mining industries. See, Seung-Yun Lee et.al.,(1971). Ibid., pp. 55-57.
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8,000 won and those earning between 8,000 won and 15,000 won per
month should pay only 2% of the average standard contribution fee.
The National Welfare Pension Bill and the National Welfare Pension
Special Accounting Bill were submitted to the Cabinet Council on 7th of
November, 1973 which passed them unanimously and sent them to the
National Assembly on 17 November, 1973. When the NWP bill was passed
by the Cabinet Council, the then current opinion, by and large, reported with
good intentions4^ because public opinion was reflected in the bill.
The opposition party, on the other hand, opposed the NWP bill because
the NWP programme gave an impression as a means of mobilizing domestic
capital for heavy and chemical industries rather than for the purpose of
social welfare of the working people. The opposition party declared that the
bill would be defeated during the deliberation in the National Assembly.
5.4. Deliberation of the National Assembly.
The Health and Social Affairs Committee of the National Assembly began
to discuss the bill on 20 November, 1973. The bill was passed with minor
revisions on 27 November, 1973. The Assembly plenary session passed
the bill on 1 December, 1973.
5.4.1. Deliberation of the Health and Social Affairs Committee.
The NWP bill and the NWP Special Accounting bill were submitted to the
88th National Assembly and the bills were presented to the Health and
Social Affairs Standing Committee on 20th of November, 1973. The NWP
bill was discussed during 21-27, November, 1973( 7 days ). The Committee
members had five sessions of discussion.
In the opening session, the Committee received the proposed explanation
from the Minister of Health and Social Affairs on 21st of November, 1973.
47 Kyonghyang Shin Mon(8 Nov.), Dong-A II Bo(9 Nov.), Seoul Kyong Jae(9 Nov.), Shin-A II Bo(8 Nov.),
Joung-Ang II Bo(8 Nov.), Han Kuk II Bo(9 Nov.).
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The Committee members received a report of the preliminary screening from
the legislative researcher the following day. In the second session, the
Committee received a petition from the press to be exempted from the NWP
coverage because the press was preparing its own pension scheme. The
legislative researcher, however, recommended turning down the petition
because the scheme contained no mention of the Disability pension and the
Survivor pension even though it was nearly the same as the Old Age
pension programme. The chairman of the Committee, Jae-Phil, Ko,
emphasized in his concluding remarks that:4**
To pass a draft budget for the coming year within the legal
deadline, the Committee is restricted by time. Furthermore, the
negotiations between the ruling party and the opposition party
agreed to finish the Committee's discussion tomorrow. The details
shall be discussed by the composed subcommittee. For
consideration of this scheme, we will hold a hearing tomorrow".
In accordance with the National Assembly Law, the Committee invited 18
persons including the academic fields, press, employer, and employee to
hold a hearing on the evening of 23rd of November, 1973. The chairman of
the committee said in his opening remarks:4^
"
I am sorry that we are holding a hearing instead of a public open
hearing as prescribed in the National Assembly Law this evening,
because we do not have enough time for it This hearing is
scheduled for four hours but we have only three hours by setting
aside one hour for dinner. Therefore, you people would want to
speak about only six items that we had already asked you to in
advance when we contacted you for invitation. These are (1) the
rates of contribution fee and pensions, (2) the question of
government financing, (3) the problem with the low-income class,
(4) the organizational structure, (5) the relationship between the
NWP programme and the Medical Insurance and the
unemployment systems, and (6) the question of the balance
between the NWP programme and the Civil Servants and Military
Personnel Insurance".
48 National Assembly, Record on the Health and Social Affairs Committee! 88th ). See nos10. p.10-11.
49 National Assembly, Committee on Health and Social Affairs, Hearing Record on the National Welfare
Pension Bill, on 23 November, 1973.
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In the third session, only one Assemblyman, Myong-kee, Chun, put several
questions to the Minister of Health and Social Affairs on 24th of November.
In the beginning, he mentioned that the opposition party was opposed to the
pension scheme in principle because it was designed for the mobilization of
domestic capital for heavy and chemical industries. He added that he was in
favour of this scheme personally, however. Like other assemblymen, his
main concern was the problem of government financing. The Minister of
Health and Social Affairs replied to his question that the government was
willing to subsidize 1 percent for those whose income bracket was in
between more than 8,000 won per month and less than 15,000 won per
month. The chairman recommended that it would be better if they heard
answers from the related Cabinet members later, who were not present, for
more confident answers. Therefore, the Minister of EPB and the Minister of
Finance would be requested to attend the next session.50
In conclusion, the chairman mentioned that the Committee's discussion
was limited in terms of time and other circumstances, because the Special
Committee on Account and Budget was examining the budget for the
coming year and the pension fund was already in the budget for the coming
year as income. So they had to pass the law first so that the Special
Committee would pass their budget.
In the 4th and 5th sessions during 26-27 November, too, many committee
members wanted the government to subsidize a part of the contribution fee
for those whose income bracket was less than 15,000 won per month. The
two minority conferees, Kun-Soo, Kim and Myong-Kee, Chun, asked for 2
percent out of 3 percent that they were supported to pay. The majority
conferees, on the other hand, supported the government's offer of one
percent. This matter and others came to a vote. The minority had 2 favour
votes out of 9, and the majority had 7 votes for their proposal. Therefore, the
Committee decided that the government should subsidize 1 percent out of 3
percent which those under 15,000 won per month were supposed to pay.51
50 However, the answer never came in subsequent meetings.
51 Ibid. See. no 16. PP.324-331.
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All parties and the representatives from the executive branch agreed to
revise the following subordinate topics which had been deliberated upon.52
First, the proposed plan by the executive branch for the role of the
government in terms of finance was that the government will provide
administrative cost only. However, the Committee agreed to insert a clause "
the government will contribute to the fund " because it will have to finance
the fund when it go into the red anyway in about 40 years and to make sure
that the government pays the pensions in the future even if it goes into red.
Secondly, the proposal stated that those who are eligible for Disability or
Survivor pensions have to choose either the pensions or any other
compensations for which they might be eligible provided by other laws. The
Committee agreed not to relate the pensions to other compensation,
because all the compensations are not really sufficient in amount.
Thirdly, the Committee struck out the clause that the Old Age pensions
could be withheld in cause that the subscriber owes tax to the government.
The reason was that the pension was intended to secure supplement the
minimum standard of living in old age, disability, and death.
Finally, the period of time that the claimant could appeal for a decision was
extended from 2 months to 3 months.
5.4.2. The Assembly Plenary Session.
The bill was brought up for discussion in the Assembly Plenary Session on
1st of December, 1973. There were two members to speak about the
programme, one each from the ruling party and the opposition party. After
two assemblymen, Sam-Bong, Kim and Soo-Whan, Kim, spoke for and
against, the bill came to a vote by a standing vote. Out of 145 present, 102
votes were in favour of the bill and 34 were against and these came from the
opposition party. After having passed the National Welfare Pension Bill,
another bill, the National Investment Fund Bill was also passed, which was
basically designed to accommodate the use of the reserve fund from the
pension programme and this deliberated upon by the Finance Committee of
the National Assembly53.
52 Ibid.. See. 9-15 on the National Welfare Pension Bill deliberation.
53 Ibid., p. 13.
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The National Welfare Pension Bill was signed into law by the President on
4th of January, 1974, and become effective on the same day as had been
scheduled a year before.
5.4.3. Conclusion.
As we have seen above, the final form of the NWP Law was very slightly
revised as a result of politics among government officials, political parties,
representatives of various groups and individuals. However, there were a
clear limitation as to how much the bargaining could be accomplished. The
government had already made its final choice in terms of original purpose of
the pension programme. The government was willing to yield concession
only where it would not hurt the essence of the intentions. Even though the
opposition party acknowledged publicly that they were opposed to the
programme, the minority members did not have the strength to prevail
against the ruling party.
5.5. The Role of Interest Groups.
There is a tendency to consider interest-group influence in policy as a
peculiarly modern phenomenon. A historical study of old-age pensions
makes clear that, although there may currently be a more formal
institutionalization of interest organisations( as there is also in parties and
government departments), the existence of consultation, bargaining, and
accumulation with the 'nonpolitical' interests has been of persisting
importance throughout the development of social policy. However, as we
examined in previous chapters, interest groups in Korea were of no
importance in the political process because the political and socio-economic
environments in the 1970's were unfavourable to Korean interest groups.
Ostensibly, the regime advocated democratic and pluralistic interaction
between the state and the society, allowing, in theory, the existence of the
institutions through which various social segments could represent and
articulate their distinct interests. In practice, however, the relative freedom of
action of social groups, especially that of politically important social groups,
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was often limited. As we have seen it, one major reason for this was that the
regime was often concerned with its vulnerability in the face of a potential
increase in the political power of interest groups that could possibly be
mobilized by the political opposition in its efforts to challenge the power
base of the regime. The political elite, furthermore, has claimed that interest
groups were bumblers, opportunists, and more a thorn than an aid to the
elite in modernizing the society, and hence unworthy to share policy
making. 54 Therefore, rather than allowing the free play of group politics in
political processes, organizations of major private institutions were
frequently penetrated; the behavioural patterns of each social group reflect
to a large extent the "behavioural guidelines" defined by the top; and hence
the relative freedom of action of these groups was greatly restricted. Finally,
one characteristics of the Korean interest group activities was that the
bureaucracy was the main focal point of the interest group activity, rather
than the legislature or political parties.
Even though the NWP programme might have a great deal of effect on
their distinct interests, interest groups played virtually no role in the initial
process of, to borrow Barrington Moore's expression, "revolution from
above."55 However, we will identify how the discussion on the NWP system
was carried out by analyzing the discussion process activities with the
emphasis on the interest group's activities. Among the interest groups, we
will select four groups which are relevant to the NWP policy-making process.
They are the general public, the FKTU, the FKI, and the media.
5.5.1. The General Public.
As for the NWP program, most common people were indifferent to the plan
for the following reasons.
First, the term social security was still almost totally unfamiliar to average
Koreans in both theory and practice. The sort of social security programmes
as understood in the West were nonexistent in Korea. In a strict sense, social
security programmes in terms of protecting the welfare of people, had,
54 Norman Jacobs(1985). Ibid., p. 63.
55 Barrington Moore, Jr(1967), Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the
Making of the Modern World. Beacon Press, Boston.
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therefore, no place in this country. Only a limited number of people falling
under special categories were subject to pensions and other support from
the government.
Secondly, historically, Koreans have a trend of mutual distrust of
insurance. They knew by experience that such a long-term insurance did not
keep up with value of currency. Inflationary expectation has been embedded
in the attitudes of all citizens.
Last and most importantly, the participation of the whole population in the
process was prohibited and social consciousness was not developed. They
were, indeed, too overawed by the authority to express their views.
However, the leaders of public opinion, whether they were citizens'
delegators or not, were citizen's delegators or not, were concerned about
the NWP scheme. They took every opportunity to make their opinions known
to the government.56
5.5.2. The Federation of Korean Trade Unions(FKTU).
As we mentioned before, the Korean Labour Unions had traditionally been
subordinate to the authority. This situation grew worse since the Yushin
Reforms in 1972. Right after the Yushin Reform, the FKTU submitted the
"proposals on the Labour Unions' Constitutional Improvement on the basic
of the Yushin and on the Policy Direction," reaffirmed that it would, among
other actions, make itself ready to "actively and collectively cooperate with
the government policy as a strong cell unit of the leading force of the
nation."57 |n this context, the arena for policy formation in the NWP
programme was restricted only by the limited functions performed by the
FKTU.
Most of the FKTU opinions were reflected primarily through the official
statements and the participation in the hearings. When the study groups
returned from abroad, the Working Committee held several hearings. At this
time, as we mentioned before, four union members were invited to the
56 See. Chapter five in this thesis, pp.57-58.
57 Sang-Woo Lee(1986), The 18 Years of the Park Regime. Seoul, Korea: The Dong-A llbo Sa. p. 365.
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hearing and made seven items of comprehensive recommendations to the
government.
The FKTU, again advised government to remember that the premise of the
NWP programme was income redistribution on 26th of June, 1973.
The recommendations were: (1). The contribution rate should be five
percent for the employer and three percent for the employee: (2). The
government should subsidize the contribution fee for the under living-wage
subscribers and the administrative expenditures: (3). The contribution fees
and benefits should be exempted from taxation; (4). The benefits should be
readjusted by a sliding system to keep real benefits; (5). The average
monthly income for the benefit rates should be calculated by the last year's
average income at the time a given worker's retires;(6). The existing rate of
the Retirement Allowance should not be adjusted downward; (7). The
Special Committee for Pension Fund Operation should be established and
the fund should be maintained as a special account.
In the mean time, the relationship between the NWP programme and the
Retirement Allowance scheme was becoming a hot issue in the then current
opinion. Some companies, on the one hand, intended to adjust downward
the rate of Retirement Allowance, whilst, on the other hand, especially
government-owned enterprises, demanded collective-bargaining
rearrangements to eliminate progressive rates. The Federation of Korean
Industries, too, held a hearing in connection with this issue on 6th of July,
1973. In this situation, the FKTU had to explain its own views, so it issued a
statement on its own opinions on 26th of July, 1973. The contents of the
FKTU's statement were as follows: (1). The Supreme Court's precedent, on
30th of December, 1969, verified the retirement allowance which was
provided under article 28 of the Labour Standard Law, as a deferred wage;
(2). If enterprises refuse payment of vested bond, retirement allowance, or
intend to readjust downward of the rate, they just deny the NWP system itself
on the same principle;(3). These demands were unjust to infringe on the
workers' right of private property;(4). To consider with Korea's low wages
and low level of social security system, workers were very difficult to
maintain their existence even if the NWP and Retirement Allowance were
added up; (5). Most Korean companies specified compulsory retirement age
between 45 and 55, and the NWP benefits should be payable to retired
workers at age 60. Therefore, the retirement allowance should be very
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important for the retirees to rely upon during this age gap years;(6). If the
NWP programme had a bad effect upon the existing Retirement Allowance
system, the FKTU would oppose the NWP programme.
Finally, when the Chairman of the Health and Social Affairs Committee of
the National Assembly, Jae-Pil Koh, held a hearing on the evening of 23rd of
November, 1973, the Vice-Chairman of the FKTU, Young-Jae Yoon, made
three issues of the FKTU's opinion clear that: First, the lower limits of the
average standard monthly contribution should be fix minimum wages;
Secondly, the rate of contribution when income was less than 15,000 won
should be lowered, and than, government or enterprise would raise their
contribution rate as a substitute;Finally, the employers' contribution should
not have a bad effect upon the wage increase.
5.5.3. The Federation of Korean Industries(FKI).
Like the FKTU, the FKI was established by government order and with
support, and operated dependently of the government. As soon as the
Yushin Reforms were launched along with the Heavy and Chemical
industries in 1973, the FKI declared that the forthcoming organizational
activities would be instrumental in promoting the new heavy and chemical
project, together with the "Yushin tasks" enunciated by the president.58
Even though interest groups had been treated as mobilizers of public
support for already-determined government policies, the FKI had a slightly
different position in relation to the Korean national goal, namely, economic
development. In Korean politics, as we mentioned already, the government
and the FKI had the same policies. Therefore, if not given resultant
dependence of business corporations on the government, for example, it
was unlikely that the FKI had enough political power to oppose the will of the
government. In this context, the FKI exercised its influence over the NWP
policy making process.
As for the NWP programme, the FKI opinions were reflected primarily
through hearings.
58 See the Federation of Korean Industries, The Twenty-Year History of the FKI. Seoul, Korea,
pp. 462. 464.
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Firstly, as we have explained already, the FKI participated in the Working
Committee's hearing and made five proposals.
Secondly, the FKI invited several experts, including the academics and
industrialists, to hold a hearing on 6th of July, 1973. At that time, the FKI
made four recommendations to the government. These recommendations
were: (1). Before the NWP programme, unreliable parts of the Retirement
Allowance system and the Industrial Accident Compensation Law should be
amended, and then the Medical Insurance should be put into operation; (2).
The FKI were not hostile to the introduction of the NWP programme itself.
However, the FKI doubted very much whether the NWP was designed for the
mobilization of domestic capital; (3). The Retirement Allowance system
should be amended to relieve the employers' financial burden and to assert
the employees' right with a contribution; (4). So far, this rule that the
retirement allowance fund should be reserved within the company holds
good for company saving and employment.
In addition, the FKI and thirty-one allied organizations made a
recommendation to the government on 24th of September, 1973 about
social security policy in general, and the NWP programme.59 in the
beginning, these groups mentioned that they were not hostile to the purpose
of the NWP programme, but they disclosed their intention to look at the
social security policy from a long-term point of view. Their recommendations
were: (1). The purpose of NWP should be for the enhancement of social
security, not for the domestic saving scheme; (2). Before the NWP scheme,
the government should consider how to execute various welfare schemes
under the Labour Standard Law, and how to improve the Medical Insurance
Scheme;(3). The contribution rate should start with a low rate of contribution
in the early stage(2% was recommended), and then, increase the
contribution rate step-by-step; (4). The contribution and policy making
institution should be a tripartite principle; (5). The lower limit of qualification
should be raised to the level of income tax exemption; (6). The NWP benefits
should be paralleled with that of the Civil Servants Pension scheme and the
link between the NWP and the existing social security programmes should
be emphasised; (7). The reserved funds should be invested in the heavy
and chemical industry and in other industries.
59 The Federation of Korean lndustries(1973), A Bulletin of the Federation of Korean Industries. Seoul,
Korea, pp. 3-6.
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5.5.4. The Mass Media.
Many papers deal with media-governmental agenda relations. The
relations are discussed in the context of the media's role as an intermediary
between the public and governmental agendas. Cobb, Ross, and Ross
discuss media-governmental relations from a comparative perspective and
suggest three models: the outside initiative model, the mobilization model,
and the inside access model.60
The outside initiative model sets out issues arising in nongovernmental
groups and expanding to reach the public agenda and finally the formal
agenda. The media is assumed to have a great role in the issue expansion
process from issue initiators to the public agenda and then to the formal
agenda. In the mobilization model, issues are initiated inside government,
and, consequently, achieve formal agenda status almost automatically. But
successful implementation sometimes requires that these issues be placed
on a public agenda as well. When the governmental agenda is to be
expanded to the public agenda, the media intervene in the issue expansion
process from the governmental to the public agenda. The third model is the
inside access model in which issues arise within the government and their
supporters do not try to expand them to the general public. In this model, the
media is assumed not to take any role.
The outside initiative model assumes the impact of the media on the
governmental decision-makers, whereas the mobilization model presumes
the influence of the governmental agenda on the media's agenda. They
assert that "agenda access is expected to vary with patterns of
stratification."®1 That is, the social, political and cultural characteristics of the
society determine which of the three models predominates. Judging from the
Korean situation which we mentioned already, the mobilization model is
more valid in explaining the Korean media-governmental relations. As a
result, their roles were limited to affect the NWP policy-making as a source of
policy ideas and information as well as a source of political pressures, even
though the newspapers discussed the NWP programme in an editorial
article and held social gatherings on the progress of the policy.
60 Roger W. Cobb, Jennie-Keith Ross and Marc Howard Ross(1976), "Agenda Building as a
Comparative Political Process," American Political Science Review. Vol. 70. pp. 126-138.
61 ibid., p. 137.
260
5.6. Conclusion.
The NWP as enacted embodied several technical inadequacies.
First, according to the NWP Law, only small numbers of people will be
covered. They are: firstly, persons earning at least 15,000 won in monthly
wages and salaries who are automatically covered, and secondly, persons
employed by firms with 30 workers or more who would be initially covered
by the system unless specifically excluded by the law.
Secondly, the NWP programme is a mandatory provision for economic
contingencies, financed out of contributions on a quid pro quo basis. It is
financed by extra budgetary funds raised by payroll taxes on covered wages
and salaries. Employees are required to pay 3 percent tax on their monthly
earnings up to a maximum amount of 200,000 won. Each employer, in turn,
pays taxes at the rate of 4 percent on the first 200,000 won paid monthly to
each of his employees. The NWP system sets the ceiling on the amount of
annual earnings to be taxed and this also serves as a ceiling on the earning
base used in the computation of the pension benefits. In other words, payroll
taxes are not paid on all earnings from covered work; they are paid on
earnings only up to 200,000 won a month. Benefits are likewise based on
maximum earnings.
Thirdly, the system is financed solely through contributions by employees
and employers, without subsidy from the general revenues of the
government except for the 1 percent for those whose income bracket is more
than 8,000 won and less than 15,000 won per month and for the
administrative expenses of the system. This one percent government
subsidy was finally obtained after due deliberation in the National Assembly
as a result of strong criticism.
Finally, Even though the NWP programme was the first major breach in the
traditional approach to poor relief in Korea, it may reasonably be argued that
the appropriate functions of a NWP scheme are very different from those of
an insurance scheme; the continued use of the term "National Welfare
Pension" can only lead to confusion for the following reasons; firstly,
according to the NWP programme, only a small number of people benefited.
Only those employed in larger industrial enterprises were normally protected
against the risk of industrial injury. Therefore, the programme can not
adequately protect ordinary people against the contingencies which
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threaten their incomes nor have they replaced the traditional system of care
which is being subjected to the strains of social change in Korea; secondly,
the NWP scheme would not provide an adequate pension for the significant
portion of the population with high risks.
This reflects the dual-purposes of the law: socio-political palliation and
economic acceleration. For these purposes, the two agencies, the MOHSA
and the KDI/EPB, made proposals. However, these two proposals were
different substantially because of the different intentions of the plan. The
EPB's plan gave priority to economic acceleration, while the MOHSA's plan
laid stress on socio-economic palliation. In this chapter, we have tried to
examine how the differences were embodied in the NWP policy-making
process. This was because the conflict between these two views was
fundamental and continued, progress in one direction must be seen to be
counter-balanced by moves in the other. The policy-making process which
led to the formation of the NWP scheme tell us little about social security
policy-making in general. Nevertheless, it highlights a number of features
worth exploring in future studies of policy-making in Korea.
(1). This study demonstrates that the President and his staff were
predominant in the policy-making process and that the lively debate among
the key bureaucratic actors rarely happened. In fact, as we demonstrated
throughout the study, in major decisions, the President's understanding of
matters became in and of itself official policies, irrespective of policy
recommendations and suggestions that might be coming from various levels
in the government. Given these features, the NWP programme was
formulated from the President and his staff's policy guidelines, rather than on
a welfare ideology or rationality.
(2). Since the President and his staff defined the situation and established
the broad policy guidelines, the policy-making arena was open to only a few
executive members and technoctats. Two fundamental structures were
composed to carry out the President's will.
First, the MOHSA and the EPB/KDI ran the central planning network.
However, in the actual policy-making process, the MOHSA set up the NWP
policy-making strategy within the control function of the EPB, which was
headed by the powerful Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the EPB
maintaining close contacts with the President. It must be noticed that the
EPB's policy analysts and bureaucrats, who are responsible for socio-
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economic planning, do not have close relationships with client groups,
especially with the labour and poor citizens. As a planning board and an
idea bank, the EPB and the KDI have played staff roles which do not need
support from the public as much as they do from the power elite. On the
other hand, the MOHSA which is the major governmental agencies
responsible for social policy and programme, are known to have little power
in policy planning. As a result, the policy-makers adopted more the KDI's
proposal than the MOHSA proposal, even though some items such as the
organizational structure, were set on a kind of combination of the two
proposals.
Secondly, in the course of the policy-making process, the Blue House was
very influential. As we mentioned before, the power structure of the Park
regime consisted of two poles; the Blue House and the KCIA on the one
side, and the ruling party and National Assembly on the other. The
Presidential staff at the Blue House enjoyed unchallenged status under
President Park. Major government policies were discussed and finalised in
the Blue House where presidential staff members chaired various policy
discussions with senior bureaucrats. All the reports of ministers were
reviewed by those staff members before they were brought to the President
for final approval. During this process, many views and policy perspectives
of ministers were revised and supplemented in line with the preferences of
the Blue House staff. In the NWP policy-making process, we observed the
presidential secretariat frequently intervening and exercising influence over
decision-making. For this reason, it was natural that the controversial issues
were not settled at the lower levels.
(3).Popular participation is often required as a key factor in welfare policy¬
making. In this study, however, it seems clear that the government of Korea
is the unitary decision maker because there were no outside policy
entrepreneurs in the policy-making process. One of the main reason was
that Korean politics, whether in its constitutional forms or political processes,
tended to increase authority of central and executive institutions, and moved
away from pluralistic power systems. Moreover, the importance of
independent groups of professionals in affecting the outcome of pension
programme was clearly underestimated by policy-makers.
(4). This study demonstrates that, in the Korean political environment, the
person who proposed the idea of the pension policy to the President and his
staff would have a direct effect on how this policy would be deliberated
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upon. Originally, as we mentioned in Chapter Four, the president of the KDI
proposed the idea of a social security pension scheme to the President of
Korea. At this time, the KDI estimated that the scheme could mobilize about
100 billion won in less than two years. The government, on the other hand,
needed urgent measures that could mobilize domestic savings so that it
could move ahead with the HC industrialization. The policy-makers'
autonomy was further restricted because of this precondition. To mobilise
the reserve funds as much as possible, the coverage was restricted to
certain categories of workers, the government subsidy was given a limit and
the benefit level was fixed low. Only the organisational structure was settled
on a kind of combination of the two proposals. Accordingly, the MOHSA
would take charge of overall administration and management of the
programme by creating the Welfare Pension Bureau, but the Office of
National Tax Administration would collect contribution fees. However, this
arrangement still left economic planners able to get easy access to the
reserve funds for economic purposes, because it would be kept out of reach
of the MOHSA who would have liked to invest it in social welfare facilities.
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Chapter 6. The Development of Policy, 1974-1985.
The NWP programme, enacted into iaw on 1st of December, 1973, was
originally scheduled to become effective 1st of January, 1974. However, the
President's Emergency Decree of 14th of January, 1974 provided temporary
tax reductions for low income earners and postponed for a year the
implementation of the newly adopted social security programme, 1 and then
a year later, the government again decided to delay implementation of the
pension system in view of the continuing adverse economic conditions and
financial difficulties of wage and salary earners at that time. Since then,
several attempts were made to implement this scheme without any major
success. It was not until 1988, after the amended law passed in 1986, that a
National Pension system was really implemented by the Korean
government.
In this chapter, we will examine the development of the pension policy
during the period of 1974-1985. We will focus on the postponement of the
NWP programme in relation to the Korean national development strategies.
As we mentioned previously, policy-making in the NWP programme did not
take place as an independent happening, rather directly related to the goals
of the other national policies. Therefore, we will find the clues to the
postponement by examining the other national policies at the time.
In the first section, we will examine the "missing link"2 between policy¬
making and policy implementation, that is, the reasons why the pension
scheme was postponed in 1974, even though its necessity had been
affirmed. For this purpose, we will analyze the background of the President's
Emergency Decree which was the main reason for the postponement of the
NWP programme according to the government's formal announcement, and
then examine the actual missing links.
In the second section, we will scrutinize the government's social welfare
policy during this period. Even though the NWP programme was still
postponed, several welfare programmes were enacted such as the Medical
Insurance in 1977, the Welfare Law for the Aged in 1981, and the Welfare
Law for the Children in 1982. In this section,however, we will focus on the
1 Chong-Kee Park(1975), Social Security in Korea, Ibid., p.56.
2 Erwin C. Hargrove(1975), The Missing Link: The Study of Implementation of Social Policy, Washington
D, C.,: Urban Institute.
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background of the Medical Insurance scheme, and especially, why the need
for Medical Insurance captured the Korean government's attention in 1976
instead of the NWP programme.
In the third section, we will explore the development of the NWP scheme
during this period of 1974-85. The general question here is: what social,
economic, and political environments affected the postponement of the NWP
programme for such a long period? We are anticipate that these will reveal
why the pension plan was postponed for such a long period. During this
period, Korea had two republics: the Fourth(1972-1979) and the Fifth( 1980-
1988) republics.
In the final section, we will analyze the role of interest groups during this
period.
6.1. The Postponement of the NWP Programme in 1974.
The NWP programme, as mentioned above, was postponed by the
"Special Statement on Economic Emergency Measures for Stabilization of
the People's Life" of 14th of January, 1974. Why the NWP programme was
destined to be postponed before it could be implemented^—just like the
Medical Insurance scheme in 1962, which was postponed untill 1977 ?
There were several possible reasons, viz, economic recession, oil crisis,
inflation, statutory problems, bureaucratic incompetence, and the activity of
interest group's which were serious matters of anxiety to the Korean
government at that time. However, we will focus on the President's
Emergency Decree which was motivated by the oil crisis in 1973, and the
industrial restructuring strategy and political strifes which ran through the
process of HC policy making.
3 Legally, the NWP program was in operation for 14 days. However, we will reckon the NWP scheme was
not implemented because no action was taken during this time.
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6.1.1. The Special Statement on Economic Emergency
Measures for Stabilization of the People's Life:
Emergency Decree No. 3.
A. Background of the Special Measure.
In his statement, President Park mentioned two elements of the special
measure.^ First, recession coupled with inflation had been intensifying
throughout the world, and in addition there has recently been a reduction in
the supply of raw materials due to the worsening scarcity and the rising
prices of energy, grains, metals and oil products. Secondly, even though the
President has been pondering various measures from many different angles
for successful national reforms with renewed confidence and courage, some
undesible individuals and elements had, however, resorted to seditious and
anti-reform activities to such an extent as to undermine the national security.
They failed to understand correctly the circumstances in which the nation
stood.
The first factor is quite clear. Korea was seriously affected by the world¬
wide oil crisis which was triggered by Arab nations' crude oil export
embargo against the United States on 17th of October, 1973. Korea's crude
oil import prices were raised from $2.80 per barrel to $4.26 on an average,
that is, about $200 million more a year.5 In order to tide over the oil shock,
the government had to take some necessary measure. However, the second
factor is quite equivocal. Because we do not know exactly what the
President mentioned in a sense, and how it is connected with his economic
emergency decree? Therefore, we will examine, in the following section, the
concrete meanings in relation to the other controversial issue, i.e., the
economic restructuring strategy.
B. The Decision-Making Process.
Under the Yushin constitution, the major characters of policy formation
were: a), extreme executive dominance and centralization within society, but
4 Hapdong News Agency(1974), Korea Annual 1974. p. 348.
5 Hapdong News Agency(1974), Korea Annual 1974. Seoul, Korea, p. 103.
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relative decentralisation of the planning function within state bureaucracy;
b). 'speed and flexibility' according to the rapidly changing international
situation; c). excessive particularism, pragmatism, and favouritism towards
big business.6 When the check and balances of a multipolar political
system are rejected in favour of the tightly focused hierarchical structure
already described, there are potential benefits in the speed and coherence
of policy-making in a rapidly changing environment. The policy-making
process of this measure was a typical example of the above characteristics.
In respond to these unpredictable and dramatically changing international
situations, the emergency measure was formulated under a stringent time
restriction. While the oil price increase was initiated in October, the
paramount dimensions of the problem were not apparent for more than a
month. In late December, the Blue House economic secretariat began an
intensive effort to produce a policy response. Conducted in secrecy, their
work was closely guarded, involving only a few technocrats from KDI and
selected government bureaucrats. At the ministerial level, it is said that only
the Minister of Finance was aware of the project.7 One of the important
characteristics was that the EPB was excluded from the formation of the
Counter Measure Commission(Dae Chaek Wee). Excluding the EPB, which
had taken major roles in economic policy-making, the Blue House began to
make the principal decisions in this Commission. Though the Office of
National Tax Administration and Customs Duties were to be seriously
affected by the outcome, these Offices were not deeply involved. This
Commission involving a few technocrats worked in a suite of hotel rooms for
three weeks, and produced a Presidential Emergency Decree on 14th of
January.8
Without much influence from business and from state institutions in the
policy formulating process and its implementation, the decision was a
uniquely sophisticated one, combining a respect for efficiency with a
concern for allocating equity. In addition, this measure became the
6 Jones and Sakong(1980), Ibid,, pp. 58-66.
7 Ibid., p. 61.
8 On newspaper illustrates that situation in detail. See, Seoul Kyongje Shinmun, 16 January, 1974.
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centerpiece of Korea's energy policy.9 The main features of the Decree
were as follows. 10
(1). To relieve the tax burden of low-income workers: a). Exemptions on a
large scale will be accorded in wage earners' income tax, business income
tax, and residence tax from January to December, 1974; b). The
implementation of the NWP fund and the Private School Teachers' Pension
would be postponed for one year.
(2). To minimize the rise in the fares of buses and other means of
transportation, transit tax reduction or exemptions would be granted.
(3). To increase the income of farming households and to maintain the rice
price at an optimum level, the government purchase price for the grain
harvested in 1973 would be raised 500 won per bag. The amounts to be
purchased by the government would be greatly increased. The government
will pay the increased portion of the price for rice already purchased.
(4). To guarantee employment opportunities for the needy, a fund of
10,000 million won would be secured for emergency employment measures.
(5). The government would support small and medium businesses with a
special low-interest fund of 30,000 million won. It would take the necessary
budgetary measures for such assistance.
(6). A system would be implemented under which priority would be given
to payment of wages. Severe punishment would be applied to employers to
prevent them from delaying the payment of wages, dismissing employees
unreasonably, and imposing unfavouring working conditions on employees.
(7). The exemption base would be raised in property tax. Levies will be
increased on admission to places of luxury entertainment, on jewelry,
television sets, refrigerators, liquors, luxurious dwelling and private
passenger cars.
(8). Tax rates on gasoline would be raised as part of the effort to save oil.
(9). The implementation of a plan to raise the salary of government
employees and to readjust the related pay scale system would be advanced.
The plan would be carried out effectively in February.
(10). The government ministries and agencies concerned have been
instructed to implement the following in connection with the aforementioned
measure: a). To reduce the government budget by 50,000 million won,
9 Edward S. Mason, et.al., (1980), The Economic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea.
Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, p. 261.
10 Hapdong News Aoencv(1974). Ibid, pp. 349-350.
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withhold the execution of the curtailed portion, and to maintain a balanced
financial structure; b). To maintain stability in the price and supply of rice,
barley and coal briquettes so as to solve the basic food and fuel problems of
the people; c). To actively support programmes for increasing food
production, developing coal and other raw materials within Korea, and to
find substitute energy resources; d). To narrow the scope of customs duty
exemptions and reductions, and to take other necessary import curbs to
reduce imported materials and improve the nation's balance of payments;
e). To control bank loans on a selective basis, in such a way as to curb
unproductive lending and make more funds available for the private sector
for reasonable operation of businesses, as well as the supply of raw
materials; f). To manage the interest payment on deposits with flexibility, and
take other necessary measures for the protection of depositors; g). To
establish and enforce an overall price measure, including curbs on total
commodity demands, and the strengthening of necessary administrative
action and stringently to control the concerning and hoarding of
commodities, illegal price raising, tax evasion, misappropriation of business
funds, and other improper commercial activities.
As we have seen from the content of the above, the NWP programme was
postponed by this economic emergency measure to relieve the tax burden of
low-income workers. At this stage, the question arises of why the newly
enacted NWP scheme was included in this economic measure? In other
words, what was the intention of policy-makers, especially the President
himself and some of his special secretaries in relation to the NWP
programme? Even though we gave consideration to the burden of low-
income workers and an inflation which would erode the finance of the NWP
scheme at this time, the inclusion of the NWP programme was illogical in
view of the purpose of the NWP scheme which we mentioned in Chapter
Four. Therefore, we will search for other essential reasons why the NWP
programme was destined to be postponed. Probably, the second factor of
the background of this measure will be suggestive of the ultimate causes.
Because the second factor is closely related to the Korean national
development strategies, namely, the economic restructuring strategy.
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6.1.2. Reorganization of Industrial Structure:
HC Industrialization.
As examined in Chapter Four, the problems of recession, international
environments, and its negative impacts on the society were perceived to
require another round of industrialization via a major reorganisation of the
industrial structure. Under these circumstances, the EPB announced two
points concerning a new mode of industrialization strategy. First, the EPB
emphasized the necessity to build import-substituting HC industries.
Secondly, the EPB suggested that the government should opt for a 'civilian-
initiated' mode of industrialization, giving more freedom of economic action
to the society. The government, among other things, would from then on
emphasize growth, stabilization, and social welfare together, rather than
single-mindedly focusing on growth alone, as it had in the past. Under these
overarching schemes, light industries and HC industries would gradually
work hand-in-hand in spurring another round of industrial growth.
The decisions by the EPB, though unnoticed were complicated, Park's
"agonies" to manage the crisis situation imposed on his export politics, but
would not be sustained for long. Likewise the invigorated influence of the
social segments and of the economic bureaucrats in the policy-making
arenas would not be sustained.
At this stage, the crucial question is why the economic planners' reform
packages were destined to evaporate before they could be implemented.
More specifically, in spite of the EPB's pronouncement, only a few months
before the unfolding of the "industrial policy revolution" in 1973, that it would
gradually promote HC industries as import substitutors and moderate export
promoters in some branches of HC industries, why did the state
announcement suggest that the government would immediately and
massively foster all branches of HC industries as major exporters?
As we shall investigate in this section, behind such alterations, there were
inherent dilemmas for the chief executive in following the economic
planners' consensus for economic reforms at a time when his export policies
were in trouble. For one thing, the EPB's final consensus on the promotion of
HC industries was to the effect that it would gradually promote HC industries,
271
but only where Korea had a comparative advantage in cheap labour. The
rational behind this gradual policy was that a massive approach for HC
industrialization in Korea was premature in light of the fact that there existed
only a handful of nascent HC industries and that the promotion of HC
industries required enormous capital. While making sense economically,
however, such a gradual approach would directly conflict with Park's
political imperative. In other words, in the wake of the deepening industrial
distortion as well as the deep recession, contributing to the upsurge of anti-
Park sociopolitical forces, Park was in desperate need of finding a dramatic
approach for HC promotion as a solution for each item. Therefore, if Park
were to follow the EPB-type of alternative, he had to leave his impending
political necessity of rejuvenating the economy largely intact, especially in
the short-run.
For another thing, the EPB suggested that the government would opt for a
"civilian-initiated" mode of industrialization, giving more freedom of action to
the society. However, if this had been the case, Park would have had to face
even harder-to-accept problematics.
Firstly, upholding liberal principles for the operation of the economy would
have meant that Park had to get the government out of running the economy.
Yet, if the government had followed this course, this might have resulted in
the wholesale rejection of Park's fundamental belief in the export-first
strategy based on state centralization rather than liberal principles. Clearly,
Park would have little enthusiasm to do so.
Secondly, and closely related to the first, the liberal principle for economic
operations required, at least theoretically, the abnegation or significant
reduction of a series of tightly staged export-promotion measures, which
hitherto had helped business maximize its export sales. Yet, if the
government had to reduce the level of state intervention for export
promotion, a highly probable though not entirely certain scenario would be
that Korea's export sales would not rapidly increase as they had previously.
By the same token, the EPB's suggestion for liberalization would bring an
additional difficulty for Park, when considering the labour issue in terms of
continued export increases. While the liberalization would certainly be
helpful for Park's short-term political interest, greater freedom given to labour
by way of the "civilian-initiated" mode also might not guarantee continued
export success.
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Finally, if these scenarios were to be the reality and, as a consequence,
various social groups acquired more freedom and that exports decreased as
a result of liberalization, such a condition might well pave the way for Park's
political opposition to identify their diatribes against Park's entire political-
economic programme and potentially further vitiating Park's already-
beleaguered authority to manage the state.
To sum up, for these obvious reasons, Park would not let the EPB solutions
materialize. Facing these inherent fissures between the EPB solutions and
his political imperatives, Park then opted for the suggestions by a new
strategic group, the Oh Group.11 This group, which was directly formed by
Park in the wake of the growing necessity for building defense industries,
suggested a version of HC industrial promotion different from that of the
EPB. Whereas the EPB's scheme for promoting HC industries
recommended that HC industries be exclusively import substitutes and
evolving export promoters! especially where Korea had comparative
advantages), the new plan developed by the Oh Group strongly argued for
the export-oriented nature of the HC industries starting from scratch. Further,
while the EPB called for a civilian-initiated form of economic operation, in
light of the then-current economic problems, the Oh Group saw the problem
differently. Given the exigency of national security as well as the economic
problems, the HC project could not be promoted by giving too much freedom
to individual firms, many of which were building and implementing HC
industries. The major contents of the HC plans as developed and put
forward by the Oh Group were in sharp conflict with the previous HC industry
policies developed by economic planners in the EPB. Yet, given the
enormous benefits that might accrue for Park in pursuing the Oh Group's
ideas, any such conflict would not arise. The Oh group's ideas, which by and
large were Park's own ideas, were particularly appealing to the President,
mainly because of their call for stepped-up state intervention in industry. This
would enable Park to better deal with all the results of the export policies,
and dictated a greater role for the state.
11 Mr. Won-Chul, Oh was the Second Economy Secretariat to the President at that time. He had served
previously in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry(1961 -1971). Just before his new position in the
Blue House, he was the Chief Assistant to the Vice Minister of Manufacturing Industry of the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry. In this position, Mr. Oh specialized in HC industries, as the need to promote
them rose for the reasons discussed in Chapter Four.
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Stressing the urgency of building HC industries for both industrial and
security reasons, Park would effectively go beyond the EPB consensus on
the piecemeal HC promotion and on the liberalization which, if pursued,
might well have activated the influence of the civil society as well as of the
state. In achieving such tasks, HC promotion, Park categorically, stressed,
would play an essential role. Thus, guided by such logic, Park, regardless of
his prior long-term strategy, would place HC industrialization at the core of
his new one. In this way, the emergence of the movement toward
liberalization in the locus of state decision was put to rest without refractory
protestations from any quarters.
In this process, one characteristic feature was the sudden rise of a new
state institution called the HC Industry Promotion Council(hereafter HCIPC).
The Council, composed of the Prime Minister and Ministers of various
industry-related ministries, would discuss and formalize various plans that
were being formulated by its special task force, the Planning Office of the
HCIPC. Previously, setting up an industrial strategy was the responsibility of
the official planning institution, the EPB, which , in collaboration with other
economic ministries, ran the central planning network. Yet, since the chief
executive defined the situation and felt that a new special task force was
necessary to promote the HC industry project the Planning Office became, at
a stroke, a de jure yet powerful workhouse for HC industry promotion, even
before it formally became the state institution. In consequence, the EPB and
other state institutions concerned with economic affairs were to facilitate the
HC project within the control function of the Planning Office, which had few
members but was headed by powerful Presidential Secretariats maintaining
close contacts with the President. In other words, economic decision-making
was short-circuited through the Planning Office to the President, frequently
by-passing the EPB. The EPB had little control over private businessmen's
access to the Second Economic Secretary or their direct access to the
President.12
It follows from the foregoing that one crucial question is why the NWP
programme was eliminated in this industrial reorganisation process? We
can infer several possible reasons.
12 Byung-Sun Choi(1989), "The Changing Conception of Industrial Policymaking in Korea," The Korean
Journal of Policy Studies, Vol. 4. p. 20.
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Firstly, under the Park regime, a single value become a constraint upon
goal-diversification. As Heilbroner pointed out economic development was
not primarily an economic process in Korea but a social and political
process. 13 President Park realized that economic development was the key
to its own political success as well as to the establishment of political stability
and as the means for overcoming negativism and frustration in the country.
The government, therefore, renewed its commitment to economic
development and sought political, economic and industrial reforms
conducive to economic growth. Once again, Park's strong drive motivated
the bureaucracy to formulate administratively planned "economic growth",
and urged the administrative elite to put all their efforts into the effective
implementation of a planned economy. In these circumstances, all the
administrative tasks in every executive branch became fully geared and with
top priority to HC industrialization. This was well manifested by President
Park's declaration in the beginning of 1974 that "regardless of such a
serious international challenge as the oil crisis of 1973, the Yushin authority
appeared to be ready to embark on a new course of export-led HC
industrialization."14
This situation also explains why the NWP programme has deliberately
been postponed. Along with the development of new industrial restructuring
strategy, the NWP programme was destined to be postpone not because the
government had to concentrate its attention on the new HC industries, but
because the government needed strong social control to be secure from
social demands and pressures arising from issues of distribution. They did
this by dissolving any organized sources of opposition to the state's
economic policies and by neutralising any challenge to the central authority.
The top government officials worried that the implementation of the NWP
programme would only stimulates the people's expectations.
Secondly, there were not available any comprehensive or integrative
developmental models by which political leaders could harmonize
economic, social and technical changes at the level of national development
planning. Because of the traditional development strategies had been
fashioned in Korea in a monolithic and rigidified way, any sincere attempt to
13 Heilbroner, R.(1963), The Great Ascent, New York: Harper and Row, p. 24.
14Chung-Hee Park, "The New Year's Presidential Press Conference," The Office of the Presidential
Secretariats, op.cit., pp.222-223.
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change the concepts and strategies of national development was in itself of
grave political significance.
Thirdly, the postponement of the NWP programme was due to the
objections of interest groups, composed of big corporations, which mobilized
their political power and utilized the state to bar the implementation.
Although the industry groups did not have enough political power to oppose
the will of the government, as we mentioned before, the government had to
listen to the business community because the maintenance and the
legitimacy of Park's regime hinged on economic development, that is, the
new HC industrialization. The industry groups objected persistently to the
implementation of the NWP programme. For example, the statement of
Korean Employers' Federation asserted that:
"At present, the Korean economy is in adversity. Since the oil crisis
in 1973, Korean economy did not overcome a recession and this
difficulty will continue for the next one or two years. The immediate
task that all Koreans should concentrate on the situation is the
present mass unemployment.... Even though we are not against
the NWP programme itself, the programme which will be
implemented on 1st of January, 1975, should be postponed one
more year.""!5
Their logical was that financing such a payroll tax would cause
considerable problems if it resulted in an increase in the unit cost of labour. It
would raise domestic prices, increase the relative cost of labour, and
probably affect the growth of employment, which would be highly
undesirable at Korea's present stage of development. Furthermore, instead
of a NWP system, industry groups were advocating a medical insurance
system for their workers, largely because the latter is both less costly than a
NWP programme and also helpful for the maintenance of healthy workers.
Finally, even though there is no concrete evidence to prove conclusively
which interpretation is more relevant, it seems that in the view of top
government officials, under the circumstantial evidence which the industrial
strategy was changed, the implementation of the NWP programme would
only stimulate the people's expectations without providing a sufficient
financial yield. Originally, the KDI estimated that the scheme could mobilize
about 100 billion won in less than two years. However, the provincial
reserve fund was decreased according to the policy-making process and
15 See, the KEF(1974), The Statement on the Extension of NWP Postponement, September.
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finally, was estimated at 23.3 billion won for the year of 1974. It had not
come up to the government's expectation, so that the NWP programme
disappeared from top policy-makers' sight.
Compared to light industry, the development of the HC industries needed
the mobilization of far larger amounts of capital and technology with more
complex forms of processing. The only financial source available to the new
industrial strategy was foreign capital inflow through the governmental
approval and guarantees. As a result, in June, 1973, it was announced that
the government would encourage foreign capital~a critical component of
Korean industrialization—in promoting new HC industries, while foreign
capital channelled into the light industries would be restricted.16 |n the
following month, the EPB provided the Long-Term Plan for Inducing Foreign
Capital, assigning 10,032 million won worth of foreign capital for HC industry
promotion. Furthermore, in order to mobilize domestic funds for the HC
industry promotion, the Ministry of Finance announced in August that it
would establish the National Investment Fund, which would not only issue
national bonds but also mobilize public employee pension funds and a
substantial portion of private savings at regular banking institutions.17
In conclusion, the NWP programme was initiated with dual-purposes:
socio-economic palliation and economic acceleration. However, the
programme was postponed by the political strifes among policy-makers in
the process of the formation of industrial restructuring strategy. For all the
above reasons, the oil crisis of 1973 made a plausible excuse to postpone
the NWP programme. This observation supports the suspicion that the NWP
policy-making was aimed primarily for political propaganda, with very little
intention of promotion and implementation of the programme. The
government seemed to use the NWP programme as an instrument for social
control. Interestingly, the NWP scheme was initiated and developed during
the preparation of the Yushin constitution under martial law.
16 Sumiya Mikio(1983), The Korean Economy. The Hanul Press, Seoul, Korea, p. 302. Korean.
17 The Jaegye Press(1973), "The national Investment Fund Law for the Promotion of HC lndustry:lts
Purport and Problem", Jaeqye Wanqae, October, pp. 18-23. In Korean.
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6.2. The Government Policy Switch: Implementation of the
Medical Insurance Program.
In the previous section, we analyzed the reasons why the NWP
programme was postponed in 1974. Even though the negative
environments were much improved thereafter, it was not until 1988, after the
amended law passed in 1986, that a National Pension system was really
implemented by the Korean government. Nevertheless, several other social
welfare programmes such as, the Medical Insurance Scheme in 1977, the
Welfare Law for the Aged in 1981, and the Welfare Law for the Children in
1982, were implemented during this period.
In this section, therefore, we will mainly focus on the background and
development of the Medical Insurance scheme of 1976, because the
Medical Insurance programme competed with the NWP programme in policy
priorities, and further because the development of the medical insurance
scheme had an effect on the implementation of the NWP programme.
Originally, the Medical Insurance Law was enacted in 1963. However, it
remained as a voluntary pilot project rather than a medical insurance
programme for the following reasons: First, the government, which had given
priority to economic and industrial development, believed that
implementation of the programmes would stagnate economic development:
second, the scarcity of medical resources at that time stood in the way;
finally, the programme's implementation would lead to better health and
could be expected to result in a faster rate of population growth than that
which Korea had already seen. As a result, the NWP programme took
precedence over the medical insurance scheme because a part of the
reserves expected to be accumulated under the NWP programme could be
utilized to invest in hospitals and other medical facilities in rural and local
communities.18
It was drastically changed again. The Medical Insurance programme was
introduced in 1977. It was reported that the original Fourth Five-Year
Economic and Social Development Plan(1977-1981) did not contain this
scheme, but President Park abruptly ordered the introduction of the medical
insurance as one means of social security.19 Furthermore, President Park
18 Chong-Kee Park(1975), ibid, p. 50.
19 Hapdong News Agency. Korea Annual 1978. pp. 38-40.
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stressed the importance of expanding the accessibility of health care
services to the poor by stating that health care is the "fourth basic necessity
of life" along with food, clothing, and shelter.20 Therefore, it will be useful to
examine the reasons for the government's social security policy switch^"!;
why did the need for medical insurance attract the Korean government's
attention in 1976 instead of the NWP programme ?
6.2.1. The Background of the Medical Insurance programme
of 1976.
Since the MOHSA established the Social Security Committee in 1962, the
Committee drafted the medical insurance system to be introduced to the
legislature in 1963. The Committee originally planned the medical insurance
programme as having a comprehensive and compulsory basis. However,
the Medical Insurance Law of 1963 did not propose a system of
"compulsory" medical care insurance for several reasons as we mentioned
above.22 Only eleven government-authorized pilot insurance programmes,
therefore, were created until 1976.23 in 1970, a law laying down compulsory
medical insurance for civil servants, military personnel, and industrial
workers was approved but not implemented, because of the same reasons.
The general question here is that why did the need for medical insurance
attract the Korean government's attention in 1976? In other words, why did
the medical insurance system have a priority over other social policies
although the action for medical insurance appeared to be ill-prepared?
The development of new policies can be explained in terms of the effects
of specific social pressures on the government. In this perspective, the
20 Chong-Kee Park(1980), "The Organization, Financing, and Cost of Health Care," in Chong-Kee
Park(ed.), Human Resources and Social Development in Korea, Korea Development Institute, p. 97.
21 Some of my interviewees disagreed to use the terminology "policy switch", mainly because they
argued that the implementation of the medical insurance scheme was a return to the MOHSA's original
plan. However, one interviewee, Yong-Moon Kim who was in charge of Pension System Division,
MOHSA at that time, strongly agreed that it was obvious policy switch because the medical insurance
was implemented by President Park's personal will. He added that the MOHSA concentrated their
attention on the implementation of NWP programme during the Fourth Five-Year Plan. I will follow the Mr.
Kim's opinion.
22 For more details, see. Joon-Kyu Sohn(1983), Ibid,, pp. 114-119.
23 Chong-Kee Park(1980), ibid., p. 122.
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emergence of social policies is the government's intention to cope with the
political, economic, and social pressures through its strategic choices. The
development of the Korean medical insurance policy also seems to be the
unique and complex result of political, economic and social conflict in the
country. In order to analyze this complex process, it is necessary to identify
the social and political forces that led to the emergence of the medical
insurance policy.
Firstly, as Starr pointed out, the proponents of social insurance also
expected that it would increase industrial productivity by creating a healthier
labour force.24 The success of Korean industrialization created an increase
in demand for industrial labour. During the 1970's, the quality and stability of
the labour force had became more problematic, as the form of the principal
industries was transformed from light industries to HC industries. Once
workers are no longer easily interchangeable, the maintenance of those
who have acquired skills becomes a matter of social concern. The
significance of this factor in the development of medical insurance in Korea
is also evident from other political developments. Due to the postponement
of the NWP in 1973, the policy-makers agreed to consider an alternative
policy choice as a central social welfare policy. Furthermore, instead of a
NWP programme, employers were advocating a medical insurance system
for their workers largely because medical insurance is helpful for the
maintenance of healthy workers.
Secondly, as reflected in documents, reports and pieces of legislation, the
emergence of the medical insurance policy in Korea is found to have been
influenced by the economic and political structures of the country.25 until
the 1970's, the implementation of compulsory health insurance was halted
mainly by the political priority of "economic development." The economic
development of the country in the 1960's and early 1970's was believed to
rest upon industrialization, and thus it was reasonable for the state to give a
priority to health resource allocation to its industrial workers.
Thirdly, another important political factor in the situation of Korea was
related to external conflicts and international pressures. Dialogue between
24 Paul Starr(1982), The Social Transformation of American Medicine. New York:Basic Books, Inc.
Publishers, p. 239.
25 Sung-Nam Cho(1986), "The Impact of Medical Insurance on Health Care Delivery in a Developing
Country:A Case Study of the Medical Insurance System in Korea." A paper presented in the Dept. of
Sociology. Univ. of Hawaii.
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North and South Korea was initiated during the 1970's. In order to assure a
favourable comparison between the conditions of the two different Korean
populations, the South Korean government felt the need to pay attention to
the social welfare of the population in addition to economic development.
Since North Korea was admitted to the World Health Organization(WHO) on
17th of May, 1973, the North Korean delegation to the WHO took every
opportunity to criticize South Korea's medical situation. This was reported to
the President of South Korea, and, as a result, President Park ordered the
introduction of the medical insurance programme. 26 Moreover, during the
1970's, several development agencies, such as the United Nations, World
Bank, and International Labour Organization, urged their member states to
pay attention to the broader welfare implications of economic
development.27 These international expectations created additional new
pressures on the Korean government.
Fourthly, the medical insurance programme had been postponed for
sixteen years, so that the government and policy makers felt a sense of
pressure from the general public to implement this scheme.
Fifthly, an attempt to explain why government adopted the medical
insurance policy must take into account not only these wider social,
economic, and political considerations, but also developments within
medicare itself. The organization of health care delivery was noticeably
underdeveloped in Korea. Group practice was almost nonexistent. The bulk
of health service was supplied through the mechanism of the free market
with an eye for profit and was largely confined to the major urban centres.28
The medical services were sold almost exclusively to the middle- and upper-
income classes who could afford to pay for them. The poorer segment of the
population had little in the way of health care available to them, except on a
public assistance basis in general hospitals run by the city governments.
Even there, the opportunities for free treatment were extremely limited. Such
hospitals were often inadequate because of insufficient financing and the
quality of medical services provided was far from satisfactory.29 With the
26 Interview with Professor Ok-Ryun Moon.
27 Margaret Hardiman and James Midgley( 1982), The Social Dimensions of Development: Social Policy
and Planning in the Third World. John Willey & Sons Ltd.
28 In comparison with the nation's population resident in urban areas(48%), almost 83% of physicians
and 87% of the medical facilities were concentrated in urban areas. See, EPB(1976), Preliminary
Outline of the Fourth Five-Year Economic Development plan, Seoul. April, p. 207.
29 Chong-Kee Park(1980), Ibid., p. 107.
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rapid rise in medical care costs, the ability to afford adequate medical care
was no longer a problem only for the poor. Therefore, political pressure on
the state increased as the cost of medical care went beyond the financial
means of much of population, coupled with a general belief that health care
should be a major concern of society. During the mid-1970's, frequent
deplorable events became public knowledge. Patients in critical conditions
were being denied medical treatment because of lack of sufficient money to
pay for their treatment or the deposit for hospitalization.30 At this time,
several hospital directors were arrested and the mass media focused social
attention on this problem. As a result, President Park promised medical
benefits for the poor and working class. 31
Finally, a new national health planning strategy was incorporated in the
inauguration in 1975 of a USAID-supported low-cost health delivery
demonstration project in three remote rural communities. The Community
Primary Health Care Demonstration Project had two major purposes.32
First, to establish the capability within the government to plan, conduct and
evaluate low-cost integrated health delivery projects directed primarily
toward low-income rural families. Second, to demonstrate successfully a
multi-county low-cost integrated health care delivery system that was
replicable in other parts of Korea. The loan agreement created the Korea
Health Development Institute(KHDI) which was charged with the actual
implementation of the demonstration project and also called for a systematic
evaluation of the health demonstration project by the National Health
Secretariat established within the Korea Development lnstitute(NHS/KDI). In
order to carry out this field demonstration project and to test new ways of
delivering primary health care to lower-income groups, the Korea Health
Development Institute was established in April 1976.
As a consequence, the government became concerned about health
problems which had remained unrecognized and unattended to despite the
urgent need to solve them, not only because of poverty, but also because of
a lack of knowledge, health consciousness and health concern among the
people and the government.33
30 John-Kyu Sohn(1983), Ibid., p. 140.
31 Interview with Prof. Ok-Ryun Moon and Prof. John-Kyu Sohn.
32 Chong-Kee Park and Ha-Cheong Yeon(1981), Recent Developments in Health Care System in Korea.
KDI Monograph 8106. pp. 19-20.
33 Interview with Jae-Sung Min who was a head of the NHS/KDI at that time.
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To sum up, the medical insurance system in Korea was implemented as a
response to various sources and degrees of social-political pressures. From
this discussion, it would be impossible to identify one main reason why the
medical insurance policy in Korea was implemented in 1977. Rather,
various environmental pressures were convergent, and the state function
was one of responding to these various demands through social welfare
policies.
6.2.2. The Development of Medical Insurance System.
In these circumstances on 22nd of December, 1976, the government
enacted Law Number 2942 which drastically amended the original Medical
Insurance Law of 1963. The ultimate objective of this programme was to
improve national health and enhance social security by facilitating access to
medical care in the event of illness, injury, childbirth, or death.34 |n order to
make use of the available medical resources, the law established a new
social insurance scheme aimed at pooling the resources of a wider segment
of the population. With the enactment of this law, the government of Korea
has taken a major step towards enhancing the welfare and the productivity
of its people.
The new law establishes a two-part medical insurance programme
including: The first part(Class I) which covers workers and their dependents
in large companies( in 1976 defined as 500 or more employees), and
participation is compulsory. The second part(Class II) which is a voluntary
community-based insurance plan for the self-employed and others, e.g.,
farmers and family workers. In addition to the 1977 medical insurance
provisions, the government also adopted a medical assistance
programme(medicare) to serve the poor eligible for public assistance. This is
wholly government-financed and administered.
The first choice to be made in designing any social insurance programme
concerns the extent of population coverage. The experience of foreign
See, Article 1 of the Medical Insurance Law of 1976.
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countries indicated that the initial efforts of medical insurance schemes are
often directed toward covering the less fortunate groups of workers.35 |n
Japan, for example, health insurance originally covered manual workers
with earnings below a certain income level, working in specified industries
for firms with five or more workers. The scheme was gradually extended to
cover employees with earnings above this income limit.36 |n the Korean
case, however, the compulsory medical insurance scheme initially covers
persons employed by firms with 500 workers or more. Workers in
establishments that employ fewer than 500 workers or more, therefore, may
be insured voluntary with the approval of the MOHSA. In this event, at least
two-thirds of the employees of the firm must consent to form a voluntary
association. In view of the fact that the workers employed by small marginal
firms are more likely to be medically indigent than those in large
establishments, the extension of health protection to them and their families
is most urgent. It was against the basic principle of social justice to create an
elite group consisting exclusively of the employees of the larger firms. The
Medical Insurance Law of 1976 provides voluntary coverage for self-
employed workers such as shop owners, casual workers, domestic workers,
and day labourers(Class II insured).37 As of 5th of July, 1977, however, no
voluntary medical insurance associations had been organized for self-
employed and other workers.
As a result of the general dissatisfaction caused by the limited coverage,
pressure was applied to upgrade the coverage and hence the government
decided to tie itself down to the medical insurance programme. As a result,
the NWP programme was naturally neglected by the government. As we can
see in Table 6-1 and 6-2, the medical insurance programme has made
much progress since it was implemented in 1977, gradually expanding its
coverage. In 1979, the scope of Class I was extended to employees and
their dependents in firms with 300 employees or more. In the same year,
compulsory medical insurance programmes for governmental employees,
including public school teachers and military personnel, and for private
school teachers were launched. Two years later, the insurance system
35 Chong-Kee Park(1980), [bid., p. 126.
36 Social Insurance Agency(1976), Outline of Social Insurance in Japan. Tokyo.
37 See, Articles 6 & 19 of the Medical Insurance Law of 1976.
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began to cover employees of companies hiring 100 or more and in 1983, it
embraced employees of plants with 16 or more employees.
Table 6-1: Key Dates in Development of Korean Medical
Insurance System.
Dates Events
1963 Enactment of the Medical Insurance Act.
1970 Amendment of the Medical Insurance Act.
1976 Amendment of the Medical Insurance Act.
1977 (1). Implementation of compulsory medical insurance for
workers in large establishments employing 500 or more
workers.
(2). Enactment of the Medical Protection Act(Medical care for
the poor under the Public Assistance Law).
1979 (1). Medical insurance for civil servants and school teachers.
(2). Medical insurance for the workers in firms employing 300 or
more.
1981 (1). Medical insurance for the workers in firms employing 100 or
more.
(2). Medical insurance for 3 experimental districts of agricultural
and fishery villages(Hongcheon, Okgoo, & Koonwi).
1982 District medical insurance for 3 additional experimental
districts(Kanghwa, Boun, & Mokpo).
1983 Medical insurance for the workers in firms employing 16 or
more.
1988 Medical insurance for the residents of farming and fishery
villages.
1989 Medical insurance for the urban poor.
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Table 6-2: Population Coverage of Social Security Medical Care









1977 36,436 3,212 2,095 14.5
1978 37,019 3,883 2,095 16.1
1979 37,605 7,791 2,314 26.4
1980 38,124 9,111 2,142 29.5
1981 38,723 11,407 3,728 39.1
1982 39,331 13,611 3,728 44.1
1983 39,951 15,577 3,728 48.3
1984 40,578 16,755 3,259 49.3
1985 41,209 17,886 3,259 51.3
1986 41,569 19,361 4,386 57.1
1987 42,082 21,257 4,386 60.9
1990 100.0
The system, however, has drawn criticism from many rural residents and
poor urbanities as it has mostly benefited the "haves". Although the
government has subsidized medical care for the poor under the social
assistance programme, many rural residents and less well-off urbanites
have been denied the low-cost medical services. As a result, Class II
coverage was made compulsory in 1981, but only in three demonstration
counties. Based on experience from this pilot project, the government was
planning to expand this demonstration to nine counties by 1985 and
decided to extend the application of the medical insurance system to all rural
residents in 1988 and to the poor urbanites in 1989. The nationwide medical
insurance system was achieved 12 years after a medical insurance system
was introduced in 1977.
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6.3. The Development of NWP Programme, 1974-1985.
As we mentioned before, the NWP programme was enacted on 1st of
December, 1973, and the Implementation Decree was passed by the
Cabinet Council on 28th of December, 1973. The government, on the other
hand, got everything in readiness for the coming into force of the NWP
programme with the establishment of the Bureau of National Pension in the
MOHSA and the Bureau of Pension Collection in the Office of National Tax
Administration. However, the NWP programme was called off for one year
under the President's Emergency Decree of 14th of January, 1974, and then
the plan was postponed one year again because of "insufficient economic
and social conditions." At this time, the government revised the contribution
rate from 7-8 percent to 5-7 percent paying regard to the national economic
conditions. In 1975, the government revised the NWP Law and laid down the
implementation of the programme as provided by a Presidential Decree.
Finally, a NWP programme was actually implemented in 1988 after the
amended law passed in 1986.
In this section, therefore, we will examine the development of the NWP
programme during this period of 1974-1985. We will focus on the pension
policy in relation to the Korean national development strategies, and political
and socio-economic environments. As we have examined already, the
pension policy did not take place as an independent happening, rather it
was directly related to the goals of the national development strategy. The
NWP programme was established deliberately in such a way that its
postponement also could be consistent with the national development
strategy. For this purpose, we will divide this period into two categories
because Korea had two republics during this period: the Fourth( 1972-79)
and the Fifth( 1980-88) republics.
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6.3.1. The Development of NWP Programme
Under the Fourth( Yushin) Republic, 1974-1979.
A. The Political and Socio-Economic Context.
(1). The Political Process.
As we examined before, the authoritarian Yushin regime could be
characterized by two aspects.
The first characteristic was that there was a gap between the well-
developed administrative institutions and the underdeveloped political
institutions and social pressure groups which could serve as a link between
the state and civil society. On the basis of an authoritarian rule, political
stability was achieved not through political mobilization of party politics but
through bureaucratic administration and the exclusion of the politically
activated sector. Bureaucratic expansion took place in the coercive
institutions in which military officers, whether active or retired, dominated
and in the economic bureaucracy in which civilian technocrats played the
crucial role with the strong backing of the President. To penetrate the state
bureaucracy, the Park regime established a new recruitment policy which
created a special recruitment for middle-class public officials^ fr0m the
military officer's rank by reducing the proportion of university graduates in
those posts since 1976. Every year since 1976 100 officers were turned into
civilian bureaucrats. This is an important factor in militarizing the state
bureaucracy39. As a result, state management could hold more power
within the state bureaucracy. As a consequence of this bureaucratic
approach, the survival of the authoritarian regime depended upon the
efficient functioning of the state bureaucracy in promoting economic
development. Throughout the Yushin period, depoliticization was attempted
in order to replace competitive party politics with "well-developed"
bureaucratic rule in the pursuit of rapid economic growth and national
security.
38 This rank is class III B before 1980 and class V after the 1980 reform. It is the highest one at which
applicants can apply through open competition.
39 More details, see C.I. Eugene Kim(1978), "The Value Congruity between ROK Civilian and Former
Military Elites." Asian Survey, Vol.18 No.8. pp. 838-846.
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The second characteristic was the struggle between the Yushin regime
and the antagonists. The Yushin system created tremendous strains within
the Korean society. After one year of the Yushin Reform the Korean society
mobilized again and numerous political protests against the Yushin
constitution occurred. When political channels did not sufficiently develop for
transmitting the demands of various socio-economic groups to the regime,
the political system faced political strains which could not be resolved by
normal democratic procedures. Symptoms of the political strains appeared
in the increasing political protests toward the end of the Park's Yushin era. In
response to the growing challenge to the Yushin regime, the Park
government adopted three measures to control the NDP and other
opposition forces.
The first measure was the suppression of freedom of the Press in a way
that isolated the opposition forces from the general public.
In the second measure to control the opposition forces, on 22nd of January
1975, President Park announced that his government would call another
national referendum on 22nd of February to decide whether or not the
Yushin constitution would be retained 40
Finally, as the protests continued, the Park government relied on the
emergency measures. The regime declared martial law four times and
ordered four garrison decrees, in which the army took over all responsibility
for public order from the police. Particularly since 1974, the Park regime
imposed nine Presidential Emergency Decrees with the common purpose of
illegalizing all political activity against the regime where violators were
arrested and court-martialed under the investigation of the KCIA. These
emergency measures were of basically two sorts: measures to correct the
social and economic ills that have often resulted from the Park regime's
particular developmental strategy; and politically repressive measures.41
Moreover, the National Assembly passed three controversial wartime
security laws which were designed to cope with threats from North Korea in
the wake of the collapse of South Vietnam. The most controversial of these
laws was the "Public Security Law" which would place under government
surveillance and possibly internment those convicted once of violating the
anti-communist and national security laws or other security-related laws.
40 Dong-A llbo, 22 January, 1975.
41 C.I. Eugene Kim(1978), "Emergency, Development, and Human Rights: South Korea." Asian Survey.
Vol.18 No.4. pp. 370-371.
289
Another security law provided for the organization of a civil defence corps of
males between 17 and 50 years. Thus university students were organized
into a paramilitary defence corps and military training was compulsory in
high schools and colleges. The last of the laws was defence tax law to
collect an additional $400 million annually to augment the defence budget.
With this series of laws, Park had made efforts to put the nation on a war
footing.
As a result of this political process, President Park was more confident in
his Yushin regime than ever before. He perceived that the system had taken
root and that a nearly absolute Presidency was secure. President Park, who
served his 16th year as the country's chief executive in 1978, was re-elected
for another six-year term on 6th of July, nearly six months in advance of his
inauguration in late December. All but one of the 2,583 delegates of the
National Conference for Unification voted for Park.
However, the 1978 National Assembly election proved an opportunity to
challenge the Yushin regime by criticizing the high rates of inflation and the
economic mismanagement of the HCIP. The election results were alarming
for the ruling elite, even though Park was able to continue his control of the
National Assembly by combining the Yujonghoe with the DRP. The NDP, the
major opposition party, received more votes than the DRP for the first time
during the DRP rule since 1963, chalking up 34.7 percent to 30.9 percent.
The urban-opposition alignment worked again, yielding 41.9 percent of the
vote to the NDP, while the DRP received only 26.7 percent in the major
urban cities.42 Because of the election system which provided for the
election of two representatives in each constituency, the ruling party was
able to win 68 of the 154 contested seats, with 61 going to the opposition
NDP, 3 to the Unification Party, and 22 to independents.42 Control of the
Assembly by the President was assured through his right to appoint 77
Assembly members under the Yushin constitution. The voters were not in a
revolutionary mood. The elections lacked major policy debates because the
Yushin constitution and the ninth emergency decree had limited the voicing
42 For the analysis of the elections, see, C.I. Eugene Kim(1979), "Significance of Korea's 10th National
Assembly Election," Asian Survey, Vol.19 No.5. pp.523-532.
43 Sung-Joo Han(1979), "South Korea 1978: The Growing Security Dilemma." Asian Survey. Vol.19
No.1. p. 47.
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of each candidate's views. The voters also knew that the result of the
elections would not involve any power transition. Nevertheless, a majority of
the voters clearly expressed a desire for change, discontent with an
apparent rubber-stamp assembly and the abuse of power by the executive.
In addition, the growth-oriented economic policy emphasizing export
products inevitably produced side effects. Although the government had
been able to manage these side effects and effectively surmount various
economic crises before, the situation began to deteriorate in 1978. The
emphasis on exports produced a shortage of consumer goods which was
exacerbated by increasing demands brought about by rising wages and the
advance in living standards. Price controls imposed on producers of
consumer goods discouraged the manufactures. Meanwhile, the inflation
became a serious problem. According to a Bank of Korea report, consumer
prices rose only 14.4 percent in 1978, but most observers agreed that the
actual rate was near 30 percent.44
Aside from the very visible social unrest caused by political suppression
and economic recession, the opposition camp had reason to become
bolden in 1979 in its criticism of the government. The NDP's newly elected
president Young-Sam Kim in 1979 launched a series of political assaults
against the Park regime. As a result of the confrontation with the regime, the
NDP became involved in a very politically important incident. The ruling DRP
and the Fraternity for Revitalizing Reforms ousted Kim from the National
Assembly. This incident resulted in a large-scale uprising in Kim's native
region. The Park government declared martial law in the city and placed it
under military control. On the next day, student demonstrations continued in
the adjacent city, Masan. The government also placed the city under
"garrison decree" under which the army took overall responsibility for public
order. With the political situation so volatile, President Park's ruling circle
was divided between the hard-liners and those who took a more conciliatory
stance in dealing with the student and civilian uprisings.45 At the meeting
attended by President Park, Chi-Chol Cha, Chae-Kyu Kim and Kyu-Won
Kim(President's chief of staff) in the KCIA compound during the night of 26th
44 Chong-Sik Lee(1980), "South Korea 1979: Confrontation, Assassination, and Transition." Asian
Survey. Vol. 20 No. 1. p. 65.
4® Kap-Je Cho(1985), "The Behind the Scenes struggles between Chae-Kyu Kim, and Chi-Chol Cha."
Wolgan Chosun, May. p. 224. In Korean
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of October, President Park and Cha made charges against Chae-Kyu Kim
for his policy failures in handling the political situations. Finally, Chae-Kyu
Kim shot President Park and Cha to death, and Korea was thrown into a
uncertain period of transition.
B. Economic Process.
The major policy concern of the Yushin regime was to sustain and
accelerate rapid economic growth while managing negative aspects of the
earlier industrialization and the lagging development of the rural economy.
The economic policies of the 1974-1979, which were specified in the Third
and Fourth Five-Year Plans, did not deviate from the basic economic growth
strategy of the sixties, that is, capitalist industrialization through promoting
exports. As we have examined in previous chapters, the stage of the
"deepening of industrialization" in late 1960s and early 1970s started with
the vigorous adjustment strategies of the government which aimed at
promoting the strategic industries. After the formulation of a new economic
policy, i.e., the HC industrialization, the Yushin elite attempted to accelerated
the export-led industrialization through upgrading and diversifying exports,
and furthering vertical integration of the domestic economic structure. As a
consequence, there was substantial growth in the HC industries over the
period of 1976 to 1979. The ratio of the HC industrial projects increased
steadily from 35.2 percent in 1972 to 40.2 percent in 1979. The export-
oriented aspect of HC industrialization can be noted in its increasing ratio of
the total exports which increased from 11.6 percent in 1972 to 37.1 percent
in 1979.
With the HC industrialization plan, the big domestic business
conglomerates (Chaebol) were given exclusive opportunities to undertake
the industrial projects of the plan. The government supported the transition
from light to HC industries by means of allocating large sums of foreign and
domestic credit with low interest rates to these preferred big business
domestic capitalists in the targeted sector.46 The close working relations
46 Policy loans allocated for the HC industries accounted for 45.1 % of the total bank loans during the
period of 1972 to 1976, and it increased to 50.2 % during the period of 1977 to 1980. See Business
Korea, May 1985. p. 17.
292
between government and domestic industrial capital which had been
developed in the early period of industrialization were clearly manifested in
the process of implementing the HCIP. In this environment, the new
industrial associations were formed to facilitate coordination between the
state agencies and private firms, such as the Korea Machine Tool
Association, the Korean Society for the Advancement of Machine Industry,
and the Korea Shipbuilding Industry Cooperatives.47 Industrial associations
frequently submitted their proposals for industrial policies for their respective
industry either by invitation or on their own initiative, and they also helped
responsible state agencies in conducting industrial surveys, devising
Korean Industrial Standards and enforcing governmental regulations.48
Interactions between government officials and the business community on
the basis of seemingly hierarchical relations were supplemented by the
cross-cutting interpersonal networks between the business elite and the
bureaucrats, on the one hand, and the co-opting of the bureaucrats into the
business community after they retired, on the other hand. The close contact
of the business elite with the presidential economic advisers and high-
ranking economic bureaucrats was institutionalized in such arrangements
as the Monthly Export Promotion Meeting and Industrial Policy Committees.
The function of such intermediary organizations was crucial in keeping the
economic bureaucrats informed of detailed market and industry information.
Consequently, the economic concentration in the hands of the few
chaebols rapidly increased as they took advantage of the government's
generous incentives in financing and taxation. While the GDP annual growth
rate was 10.5 percent during the period of 1973 to 1979, that of the top ten
chaebol groups increased rapidly, recording 28 percent. Also, the top ten
chaebol groups expanded to 165 companies in 1978 from 80 in 1973.4^
The dominance of the chaebol was most apparent in the manufacturing
sector. They accounted for 74.7 percent of value-added in the sector in
1975, 85 percent in the transport equipment industry and 65 percent in
electronics.50
47 Dong-A Almanac, 1974. p. 222.
48 Kwang-Suk Kim(1985), Industrial Policy and Industrialization In South Korea: 1962-1982. KDI.
49 Dong-A llbo, 5 April, 1985.
50 The EPB(1980), Statistical Report on Manufacturing. Seoul.
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However, a series of socio-political crises were initiated by political issues
but also stimulated partially by underlying economic problems, which were a
consequence of the extreme export-led development strategy. Statistics
reveal the seriousness of Korea's economic problems in the late 1970s.
Because of a slowdown in the world economy and its weaker competitive
position, Korea's real exports declined. These developments reduced real
GNP growth to 7.1 percent in 1979, in contrast to an average annual rate of
12.3 percent achieved in the previous three years, and increased
unemployment. Korea's implicit GNP deflator increased by 20.4 percent, its
wholesale price index by 18.8 percent, and its consumer price index by 18.3
percent, all higher than in 1978.51 The unexpected problem was the
doubling of oil prices during 1979. On average, the price Korea paid for its
oil imports in 1979 was 42 percent higher than in 1978. Rising import prices
and declining real exports also widened the balance of payments deficit.
The current account deficit rose to US $4.2 billion in 1979 and the basic
balance showed a deficit of US $1.75 billion.52 in addition, the "big push"
on the HC industries since the mid-1970s meant serious neglect of other
industrial sectors like lighter manufactures, which accounted for a much
larger share of total employment. 80 percent of total investment in
manufacturing went to these sectors with the direct state initiative in 1977-
1979, while 64 percent of total investment in manufacturing was targeted to
these sectors over the course of the Fourth Five-Year Plan. Incidentally, the
big push on HC industries resulted in a number of distortions that were to
have important political implications. First, the big push altered labour's
power in the market in the short-run and resulted in an acute labour
shortage and wage increases in late 1970s. A second consequence of the
big push was industrial concentration, which was a self-conscious
component of the strategy of industrial deepening.
An effort to adjust existing development strategy was conducted under the
new EPB leadership of Deputy Prime Minister Hyon-Whak Shin, who had
long experience as a politician as well as a businessman, plus the
substitution of Duck-Woo Nam, a professor-turned-technocrat with an
expansionist approach, in December 1978. Shin drew on a group of young
51 Samuel P. S. Ho(1981), "South Korea and Taiwan: Development Prospects and Problems in the
1980s." Asian Survey, Vol. 21 No. 12. p. 1184.
52 Ibid.
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economists of monetarist leanings who had offered the most sophisticated
and wide-ranging critique of past policy: Kyung-Sik Kang, Suk-Jun Suh, Ki-
Hwan Kim, and Jae-lk Kim. Within a month of Shin's EPB leadership, the
economic cabinet issued a critical report, entitled "New Strategy for the
1980s: For Structural Transformation." The new strategy consisted of four
major policies: (1). comparative advantage would be emphasized over
industrial targeting and import substitution; (2). a transition would be effected
to a private sector-led economy; (3). social development would be given
new emphasis; and (4). in general, state intervention would be reduced and
market forces given a wider play. In order to cope with HC industry, the
government launched a rationalization programme for HC industry. The
main features of this programme were: (1). existing firms producing
automobile, power plant, and construction equipment were encouraged to
merge or to specialize in manufacturing a given product line; (2). bank
financing for purchasing domestic machinery equipment was to be
increased to a level equal to financing imported equipment.53
This new strategy, however, could not get consensus within the state
bureaucracies. The EPB, the Ministry of Finance and the state-run banking
community were favourable to stabilization measures, while the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry, the Blue House, and the private sector, especially,
chaebol, who demanded an increased commitment of resources, opposed it.
The World Bank and IMF also strongly recommended a stabilization policy in
this process. Although Park himself reluctantly approved it, it could not be
implemented in full until his death.
(3). Social Conditions.
The development of a highly inequitable society often produces significant
social and political consequences. In the context of Korea, one of the most
striking features of the capitalist industrialization may be seen in the socio¬
economic structure characterized by a high concentration of wealth and
privilege in a small segment of the population. The Korean state, since 1961,
followed the growth maximization policy through industrialization in order to
accentuate the capital accumulation. The pursuit of that policy, while
53 Seoul Kyongje Shinmun. 15 September, 1980.
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seeming to be an economically rational course of capital accumulation in the
context of a late developing economy, resulted in a variety of social
dysfunction. The growth maximization policy paid little attention to the
question of distribution and equity. Equality should be sacrificed temporarily
in order to achieve rapid economic growth.54 This policy orientation can be
easily identified in the official title of the five-year plan. The Korean
government changed it, from a Fourth Plan( 1977-1981), into the Five-Year
Economic and Social Development Plan to which, among other things,
policy concerns for distribution and equity were added. Changes in policy
objectives, however, did not bring about substantial changes in the
development strategies adopted in the previous plans. President Park,
during his long tenure, had continuously insisted that all would move
forward together and that no man should take comfort in prosperity while
others were in poverty. Despite such a rhetorical emphasis on the balanced
development, the "growth-first-distribution-later" policy has benefited certain
sectors of the Korean society much more than others and, some might
argue, at the expense of, others. Throughout the period of industrialization,
the new middle class expanded mainly in urban areas. As a main
beneficiary of rapid economic growth, the new middle class supported
political stability and sustained economic growth. As far as economic good
times continued, they were satisfied with the new material well-being, while
being politically deactivated.55
The policy emphasized the industrial sector to the neglect of the
agricultural sub-structure. This state policy was primarily responsible for
urban-rural income inequality and massive migration from rural areas to
urban centres. The state also put an emphasis on large firms rather than
medium and small firms by adopting "a policy of financial repression cum
concentration."56 The emphasis on large capital created a small number of
chaebol groups, while, in turn, caused the rise of the big bourgeoisie. The
wealth has been increasingly concentrated in their hands. The emerging
working class has been forced to tolerate the perennial low wage rate in
order for the big bourgeoisie to take advantage of the export-led
54 Hyun-Chin Lim(1985), Dependent Development in Korea. 1963-1979. Seoul: Seoul National
University, p. 120.
55 Ul-Byoung Chang(1985), "Democratization and the Middle Class," People. Seoul, pp. 47-48.
56 Ibid., p. 123.
296
industrialization based on the comparative advantage of cheap labour.
These and other policies have contributed to the deepening of social
inequality in Korean society, which, together with overall political repression,
engendered a growing sociopolitical discontent.
Against this strong ruling coalition and its penetrated policy networks
under the Yushin constitution, the domestic social activists also accumulated
their resisting powers to the Park regime. Unlike 1960s, the Korean society
evolved into a serious dual structure between the state running
organizations and the autonomous real organizations of the social force like
labour, students, and opposition politicians.
Labour forces in 1970s showed some significant development: (1). Against
the state sponsored FKTU, the Korean labourers organized themselves into
their own autonomous organization promoting class consciousness and
thereby increasing conflicts between FKTU and these autonomous labour
organizations. Even though the FKTU was a formal organization of labour
movement in the 1970s, its activities were extremely controlled by the state.
A ruling DRP member represented the limited interests of labour officially,
but the majority of workers were not satisfied with that organization; (2).
Churches and students were actively involved in cultivating the class
consciousness of the workers and their activities; (3). The ratio of female
workers dramatically increased according to industrial demand in industries
such as textile and electronics, and their labour activities tended to become
radical.57
Against these social forces, the Korean state became more rigid in its state
structure rather than becoming flexible to accommodate them. All these
extremes between the Yushin regime and the social forces produced a dual
structure in the Korean society.
57 The influx of women into the work force aggravated the number of labour disputes in the 1970s. One
such dispute, the YH labour dispute of 1979, contributed to the fall of the Park regime.
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B. The Development of the NWP Scheme
Under the Fourth Republic.
Now, we will examine the development of NWP scheme during the Yushin
regime. In other words, how the NWP scheme was processed under the
above political, and socio-economic environments. For the proper
examination in this section, we will focus on the development of NWP
programme within the context of Korea's development plan: the Fourth Five-
Year Economic and Social Development Plan( 1977-81). This plan was the
only one which was formulated under the Yushin Constitution.
The Fourth Plan provided for the systematic promotion of social
development which would in turn increase the long-term growth potential of
the economy. With the development ideals of growth, equity, and efficiency,
the basic objectives of this plan were: a), to build an economic structure for
self-sustaining growth; b). to increase equity in income distribution through
social development; and c). to improve technology and efficiency of the
economy, competing in HC industries.58 This policy orientation can be
identified in the official title of the five-year plan. The Korean government
changed it, from a Fourth Five-Year Plan, into the Five -Year Economic and
Social Development Plan to which, among other things, policy concerns for
distribution and equity were added. This change was caused by the fact that
many government officials and planners began to agree that equitable
redistribution of income was an important issue of Korean development. A
more equitable distribution of opportunities and income has become a more
prominent objective of socio-economic development policy in Korea. In this
atmosphere, the Fourth Five-Year Plan emphasised a firm comprehensive
social security programme. In order to achieve this object, the plan
mentioned that "new laws will be enacted and existing social security
legislation will be revised.59
The programmes and policy instruments to achieve this social policy
were;60 (1). The foundation and implementation of a medical insurance
programme: a new Medical Insurance programme was to be introduced in
58 The EPB(1976), The Fourth Five-Year Economic Development Plan, 1977-1981. Seoul: The
Government of Republic of Korea, p. 10.
59 Ibid. p. 85.
60 Ibid., pp. 85-86.
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1977 to provide medical benefits to employed workers and self-employed;
(2). Implementation of a NWP programme: under the NWP programme, all
residents between the ages of 18 and 60 were to be protected against the
long-term risks associated with old age, disability, and death; (3). Extension
of Industrial Accident Insurance: participation in the Industrial Accident
Insurance would be compulsory for all establishments employing more than
5 workers; (4). Expansion of Public Assistance; and (5). Reinforcement of
Social Welfare Services.
In relation to the NWP programme, the MOHSA's proposal for the Fourth
Five-Year Plan was as follows:®1
Firstly, the scope of coverage should be expanded on a step-by-step basis.
In the first stage of implementation, the NWP programme should apply to
firms employing more than 200 workers between 1977 and 1979. The
coverage should be expanded so that workers employed by firms with 30
persons or more should be covered between 1979 and 1980, and finally,
those in enterprises with 10 persons or more employees should be covered
by 1981.
Secondly, the contribution rate should be reduced. The current
contribution rate of 7 percent(employer:4%, employee:3%) may overburden
both the employer and the employee. The government thus decided to
increase the contribution rate step-by-step from 5 percent(employer:3%,
employee:2%) in the early stage of implementation and then to have it
gradually raised to 0.5 percent every five years.
Thirdly, the "On-Line" system should be established for the utility of
pension administration during the plan period.
Fourthly, the present organizational structure is a dual system: the Bureau
of National Pension in the MOHSA should manage the general affairs, while
the Office of National Tax Administration should collect the contribution.
Therefore, the organization should be unified for the administrative
normalization and utility.
Finally, under the present National Investment Fund Act, the pension fund
should be invested in corporate bonds or deposited in the bank. However,
this regulation should be changed and some of the funds should be invested
61 The Social Security Committee(1976), The Present Condition of Social Security System in Korea.
The MOHSA, Republic of Korea, pp. 346-445. In Korean.
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in public interested-related projects, such as loan projects and welfare
programmes.
On the other hand, the KDI report which was published in 1978 under the
title: "Long-term Prospects for Economic and Social Development 1977-
1991," also mentioned that "social security expenditures currently account
for only 4 to 5 percent of total government expenditure in Korea, compared
with 30 to 40 percent in many advanced industrial countries. Even compared
with other countries at similar stages of development, Korea devotes a
relatively smaller share of its public resources for various social security
programmes."62 Therefore, "the NWP program should be put into effect
during 1979"63 because a social insurance approach should be major
focus of our social security programmes in the future.
As we have seen above, political and socio-economic environments in
Korea gave most opportunity for implementing the NWP programme in the
late 1970s. The environments at that time were nearly the same as the
situations which prevailed in the early 1970s when the NWP programme
was initiated on the political agenda for the first time. In this situation,
restlessness prevailed among the people, so that the government needed
some appealing policies to gain public opinion. As a result, the newly
appointed Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the EPB, Hyon-Whak Shin,
in 1978, readjusted the existing development strategy itself, that is, instead
of government-led, export-oriented development strategies, the new strategy
emphasized such policies as comparative advantage, import substitution,
private sector-led, and social development. Since the Medical Insurance
programme was implemented in 1977, the NWP programme was
deliberated as a social development policy without much policy arguments.
When President Park made an annual visit to the EPB in January, 1979,
the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the EPB reported to the President
on the enforcement of the NWP programme from 1980. Meanwhile, the
Minister of Health and Social Affairs, Song-Choi Hong, also informed the
President of the continuing scrutiny of the implementation of a NWP
62 The KDI(1978), Long-Term Prospects for Economic and Social Development 1977-1991. Republic of
Korea, p. 167.
63 Ibid., p. 168.
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programme when President Park visited to the MOHSA in February, 1979.
To reply these recommendations, President Park only instructed that the
MOHSA, without giving a concrete form to the enforcement plan, should
conduct research into the operational process in advanced countries as
compared with the real state of affairs in Korea.64 park had some hesitation
in accepting the recommendations like other new policies mainly for two
reasons. One of the reasons which underlies the search for alternatives to
the NWP is the alarm with which the President and his staff view the financial
difficulties social security systems in the industrialized countries faced at that
time.®5
In particular, President Park, as a Japanese policy believer, must have
been influenced by the Japanese welfare crisis. Unlike other industrialized
countries, the Japanese government played a minimal role in virtually all
aspects of social welfare. In most problem areas, the private sector, families,
communities, and employers bore the major financial or organizational
burdens of welfare.55 However, the social security systems underwent a
fundamental structural change during the early 1970s, when major
improvements in health insurance and public pension programmes were
undertaken. When drawing up the budget for the fiscal year 1973, the
Japanese government had announced that the year would be "year one of
the welfare era." Indeed, the year 1973 saw such an improvement in the
system that appeared to be no idle boast. In the areas of medical care, the
proportion of a dependent's medical expenses defrayed by insurance under
the National Health Scheme was increased from 50 percent to 70 percent.
An annual ceiling was also placed on the sum that a patient could be made
to pay out of his own pocket. A further innovation at this time was the
introduction of free medical care for the aged, i.e., aged seventy and over.5^
64 The MOHSA(1987), AStudvonthe Social Security System in Korea--With Special Emphasis on the
National Pension System. Republic of Korea, p. 37.
65 Paul Fisher(1987), "Social Security in Korea in the Eighties," In II Sakong(ed.), Human Resources
and Social Development Issues. Essays on Korea's Fifth Five-Year Plan. Vol. II, Korea Development
Institute, p. 220.
66 Pempel, T.J.(1982), Policy and Politics in Japan, Tempel University Press, p. 144.
67 National Health Insurance bears 70 percent of the medical costs for elderly persons and 30 percent
is funded by central and local governments from general revenue. See, Shinya Hoshino(1988),
"Perspective of the Japanese Welfare State," In Robert Morris(ed.), Testing the Limits of Social
Welfare: International Perspectives on Social Changes in Nine Countries. Brandeis University Press.
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In the field of pensions, there were massive increases in benefit levels in
both the main schemes, i.e., the Welfare Pension Insurance^ and the
National Pension Scheme. Even more significant was the introduction of
indexation.69 The main factors of such significant improvements were:70
(1). The Japanese economy had arrived at a stage at which it could allocate
resources for purposes not directly related to productivity increases; (2). The
surge of welfare-oriented policies in local governments; (3). The fiscal
condition was exceptionally favourable.
However, there is always a slip between the cup and the lip. By the end of
1973, just when the government had committed itself to these extensive
changes, the economic situation changed dramatically. The oil shock had
occurred, and Japan's era of rapid economic growth had come to an end. In
real terms Japan's GNP experienced a negative growth in the fiscal year
1974. Furthermore, the need to prepare for the higher proportion of elderly
people in the population has come to be recognized more seriously as their
numbers have in fact increased. As a result, the budget deficit was bound to
increase, because it was difficult to cut expenditure, especially social
security expenditure. The share of borrowing in total revenue for the national
budget rose from 11.3 percent in 1974 to 25.3 percent in 1975.71 An
increase in social security spending was the most important contributor to
the increase in the deficit. With this background, Prime Minister Miki, who
had come to power a little over a year earlier promising "to rectify the
inequities in Japanese society," was harping on a different theme by the
beginning of 1975. He warned that "the government is neither a magician
p. 253.
68 With the introduction of an index-linked benefit formula, the Welfare Pension Insurance scheme
raised the old-age benefit drastically in 1973, paying 60 % of the past average annual earnings without
bonus( about 45 % with bonus) in real terms. This percentage was for a 'model' retiree with an average
wage earned for all contributing years. On the sliding scale, benefits vary depending on income, from 42
% for the richest pensioner to more than 100 % for the poorest. See, Noriyuki Takayama(1982),
"Japan," In Jean-Jacgues Rosa(ed.), The World Crisis in Social Security. Transaction Books, p. 75.
69 From 1974 all pensions were to be raised annually to keep pace with inflation, except in years where
the Consumer Price Index had risen by less than 5 percent over the past twelve months.
79Yukio Noguchi(1986), "Overcommitment in Pensions: The Japanese Experience," In Richard Rose
and Rei Shiratori(Eds-), The Welfare State East and West. Oxford University Press, p. 178.
71 Yukio Noguchi(1986), |bjd^ p. 179.
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nor a Santa Claus. Benefits have got to be paid for."72 For the Prime
Minister to make this sort of statement was easy; it was to prove far less easy
to convince the public of the severity of the problems. In this sense, the next
several years saw the unfolding of political and publicity battles.
Under these circumstances, President Park could not but hesitate to give a
definite answer. This was because he knew that the NWP programme, like
other Korean policies, was modelled on the Japanese two pension
schemes, i.e., the Welfare Pension Insurance and the National Pension
Scheme.On the other hand, throughout the world as he understand it, most
social welfare efforts have involved programmes that, once begun, have
been difficult to eliminate or reduce. Furthermore, the question that haunted
the President and his staff was whether a full-scale commitment to the NWP
programme would undercut long-term economic goals.
Another reason was that the Korean business groups were strongly
opposed to the implementation of NWP programme. When the KDI
publicized the "Long-Term Prospect for Economic and Social Development,
1977-1991," and the new economic cabinet under Shin's EPB leadership
reported under the title: "The Strategy for the 1980s: For Structural
Transformation." in early 1979, the business associations adopted all the
means in their power to defer the NWP programme.73 This was because
they became aware of the government's intention that the NWP programme
would be implemented in late 1979. They kept in contact with the
government authorities, while they appealed to public opinion. There was
little known about the first means they adopted. In my estimation, however,
the businessmen made use of the industrial associations which were formed
to facilitate coordination between the state agencies and private firms, and
the Blue House expanded meeting for export promotion which would be
directly chaired by the chief executive himself. Since the business groups,
especially the big business conglomerates(Chaebol), were bound up with
72 Asahi Shinbum, 25 January 1975. Quoted from Martin Collick(1988), "Social Policy: Pressures and
Responses," In Stockwin, J.H.H. et.al., Dynamic and Immobilist Politics in Japan, The MacMillan Press
LTD., p. 216.
73 Interview with Hoon-Sik Kim, who was among the working-level officials in the Korea Employers'
Federation.
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his regime, president Park was in a delicate situation to reject their
demands.
To sum up, President Park found himself in a dilemma: If the NWP
programme was implemented, the result could be expanding public
expenditures, less flexibility in the selection of economic goals, and a
fundamental change in the government's essential priorities. Yet failure to
move in such a direction might eventually reduce the political support for his
regime, a reduction which could well result in many of the same
consequences. Therefore, the NWP programme of the Fourth Plan was
doomed to continuous postponement until Park's death on 26th of
December, 1979.
6.3.2. The Development of NWP Scheme
under the Fifth Republic.
A. The Political and Socio-Economic Context.
(1). The Political Process.
Since President Park had concentrated virtually all political power around
himself, his assassination created a political vacuum. Immediately after
Park's death, nation-wide martial law was declared and Premier Kyu-Ha
Choy was elected President in December, 1979 by the "rubber stamp
electoral college," the NCU. However, contrary to the Korean people's
expectations for democracy, Lt. General Chun, who had been the
Commander of the Korean Defence Security Command since 1979,
established another military regime with another military coup on 17th of
May, 1980. Having suppressed the Kwangju uprising with brute force/4
Chun further tightened his grip on the government bureaucracy. On 31st of
May, the Special Committee for National Security Measures(SCNSM), that
is, the "KUK-PO-WI" in Korean, was created as the Junta Council for the
ostensible purpose of "aiding the President in directing and supervising
74 During this incident more than two hundred citizens and students were killed. This incident was too
serious for the Chun regime to handle and legitimate itself during its last seven years' rule.
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martial law affairs and to examine national policies."75 In effect, the affairs
of state were to be controlled by the 31-member Standing Committee of the
Special Committee(SCSC),76 headed by Chun himself. In the process of
Chun's power consolidation, these committees were, in any event, to have
the absolute authority to pass laws and make all decisions affecting the state
until a new National Assembly came into being. Further, Chun created the
National Security Legislative Council(NSLC) including 81 members with
core military generals to prepare a new constitution and enact all laws until
the new National Assembly took place on 30th of June, 1981. A basic legal
mechanism was established to consolidate Chun's military power-base by
means of repressing labour activities, student protests, social unrest, the
press, and political opposition. A new labour law was adopted that banned
industrial unions and regional labour federations. This measure and other
restrictions led to a 30 percent drop in union membership and severely
weakened the ability of the unions to organize. A new press law was
adopted, putting the media under strict government control; the National
Security and Anti-Communist Laws used to imprison dissidents in the 1970s
were combined to institutionalize the worst decrees of the Park era.
After seizing power, on the other hand, Chun moved swiftly to refashion
Korea in the image of a "new society." In the weeks following the 17th of May
Coup, thousands of people suspected of subversive thought and activities
were arrested, dismissed from their jobs, or sent to "purification'camps run
by the military. A total of 711 journalists were expelled from their positions,
while several hundred labour leaders were purged from the labour
movement or dismissed from their jobs. In addition, Chun moved to purify
Park's old political system, on one hand, and to establish his power base, on
the other. Chun reduced the power of the KCIA, renamed it the Agency for
National Security Planning(ANSP), and transferred some of its power to the
Defence Security Command. Chun ordered 567 political leaders and former
party officials to cease political activities for eight years. This order applied to
Young-Sam Kim, Dae-Jung Kim, and Jong-Pil Kim who were most
prominent politicians in the "Spring of Seoul" in 1980. He disbanded all
75 Dong-A llbo 1 June, 1980.
76 This Committee was almost similar to the Park's Supreme Council for National Reconstruction in
1961.
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political parties of the Fourth Republic, purged their leaders, and ordered a
multi-party system for the Fifth Republic.
According to a new constitution, basically on the same lines as the Yushin
constitution with indirect presidential election, Chun was formally
inaugurated as President of the Fifth Republic on 3rd of March, 1981. This
was preceded by a national referendum for a new constitution on 23rd of
October, 1980 and followed by a general election for a new National
Assembly on 25th of March, 1981. After consolidating his power, Chun
appointed his military followers to positions within the state bureaucracy,
such as the cabinet and the presidential mansion, the National Assembly,
and the ruling Democratic Justice Party(DJP). Chun's inaugural address
outlined four goals; (1). to domesticate democracy to fit uniquely Korean
conditions; (2). to bring about a true welfare state; (3). to establish a just
society; and (4). to revitalize the national spirit through educational reforms
and the promotion of Korean cultural norms. In addition to these goals of the
"new era," Chun proclaimed national emancipation from; (1). the perennial
threat of war from the north; (2). poverty; and (3). political oppression and
the abuse of power/7
As the slogan of "economic miracle" as propounded by the non-democratic
security-centred system of Yushin was not any more acceptable to the
Koreans, the Chun regime emphasized "welfare and justice" as its state
goals rather than "anti-communism" and "economic development." A
"liberalization" policy was implemented to improve the economic and social
conditions( except political life) by ending a 35 years old curfew and
removing several regulations on foreign travel and administration. The state
adopted "economic liberalization and stabilization" rather than "command
over the economy."
Despite these formal goals and slogans, the actual operation of the Chun
regime was far from achieving them and continued the repression of the
political activities of the opposition members before the 1985 national
election. The National Assembly election in 1985 was the turning point in the
Fifth Republic's political process. Under the Chun regime, the National
77 The Office of Presidential Secretariate!981). The Collection of Speeches by President Doo-Hwan
Chun. Seoul, pp. 45-53. 342-349. In Korean.
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Assembly continued to be relegated to the position of ratifier, rather than
initiator of policy, with its substantive functions barely exceeding those of a
debating society.78 Yet the election for the National Assembly held on 12th
of February, 1985, the second under Chun's rule, produced results that
stunned all observers and may well turn out to be a significant milestone in
Korea's tortuous path to democracy. Just before the National Assembly
elections, President Chun lifted a ban on political activities for 84 persons.
That marked the third time in four years that former politicians were removed
from Chun's blacklist, which, when first drawn up in 1980, had contained
567 names. Fourteen persons, however, still remained on the list; they
included such political heavyweights as the "three Kims" and Hu-Rak Lee.
Nevertheless, the newly liberated politicians included at least 26 former
opposition members of the National Assembly and 18 persons who had
served in leadership positions of former opposition parties. These opposition
politicians became the nucleus of the New Korea Democratic Party(NKDP),
which made its debut on 18th of January. Despite their different factional
affiliations, the NKDP members were united in their opposition to Chun's
rule and in their strong commitment to democracy.79 Their personal
convictions combined with a strategic imperative—i.e., the need clearly to
differentiate the NKDP from the established opposition parties-to produce
militant rhetoric at the outset.
The outcome of the election was most surprising of all. The DJP retained
its predominant position by polling the largest number of votes-35.3
percent; that was only a fraction of a percentage point lower than its 1981
record. But the NKDP, barely a month old, had managed to outperform both
of the established opposition parties, and its share of the popular
vote(29.2%) was only 6 percent point lower than that of the DJP.
Furthermore, the NKDP outperformed the DJP in urban areas by a wide
margin. In the five largest cities^O, which accounted for 42 percent of all the
78 B.C. Koh(1985), "The 1985 Parliamentary Election in South Korea."
Asian Survey, Vol. 25 No. 9 p. 883.
79 The new party which was formed belied its multi-factional background. Its chartered members were
divided into two broad groups: those who were affiliated with the Consultative Group for Promotion of
Democracy and those who were not. See, Dong-A llbo, 18 January, 1985.
80 Seoul, Pusan, Taegu, Inchon, and Kwangju.
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votes cast in the election, the NKDP led the DJP by a ratio of better than 4 to
3.
Politically, the NKDP's emergence as the number one opposition party
would have far reaching effects:**"I Firstly and foremost, the Chun
government would face an outspoken opposition for the first time in four
years both in and out of the National Assembly; it would have a "challenge"
instead of a "sparring partner." Secondly, the unexpected strength of the
NKDP in the election helped to transform Korea into a de facto two-party
system. The voters who supported NKDP candidates in effect repudiated not
merely the Chun government and his party but the established opposition
parties as well. The DKP was handed a humiliating rebuke, from which it
was powerless to recover. Most of the newly elected DKP assemblymen
switched their allegiance from the DKP to the NKDP.82 Thirdly, as a result of
this, the role of the National Assembly was certain to change; it would no
longer function as a ratifier of predetermined policy and a mere debating
society, but would assert the right to shape policy and to hold the
government accountable for its actions. Having broken the one-third barrier,
the NKDP has secured the right unilaterally to convene the Assembly and to
initiate a motion to dismiss a cabinet member. It had also acquired the power
to prevent the passage of any proposal for constitutional revision the ruling
party might submit. Finally, the series of conciliatory measures that followed
in the wake of the election suggest that the Chun regime would not and
could not conduct its business as usual but must adopt to the winds of
change. One of these measures was the lifting of a ban on political activity
for 14 persons, thus dismantling the blacklist altogether. Another sign of
conciliation was the continuation of relatively free reporting in the Press.
Lastly, contacts between leaders of the ruling party and those of the NKDP
became increasingly frequent.
Unlike the previous Korean constitution, the Fifth Republic constitution
limited the presidential tenure of office to a single seven-year term.
President Chun, therefore, was due to conclude his term of office before 3rd
of March, 1988, whereupon a new President was to be elected. What the
anti-government opposition forces were demanding was a new sixth
constitution to be implemented before the expiration of President Chun's
81 B.C. Koh(1985), Ibjd, pp. 895-896.
82 See, Dong-A llbo, 3-4 April, 1985.
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term of office) which would use a new popular direct presidential election
method. When President Chun and his government refused to yield to their
demands, opposition forces pressed the issue with mass appeal tactics such
as popular petition drives and rallies. Under mounting pressure from political
dissidents, however, the Chun government was gradually forced into a
compromise agreement with opposition forces to create a committee within
the National Assembly charged with producing a new draft constitution
before the conclusion of the Autumn session of the National Assembly in
1986. As a matter of fact, such a committee, known as the Special
Constitution Revision Committee, was organized on 24th of June. However,
the Special Committee were unable to produce a draft constitution.
Consequently, Korean politics were thrown into a uncertain situation.
(2). Economic Process.
According to the basic goals of the Chun regime which sought to establish
a "new society" of "welfare and Justice", the Chun government readjusted its
development strategy very fundamentally by adopting two major shifts. The
first one was its emphasis on social development, as the formal title of the
long-term plan itself was renamed to the Fifth Five-Year Plan of Economic
and Social Development, 1982-1986. Although this shift was proposed
previously in late 1970s, however, its actual shift was made in the early
1980s under the Chun regime. Second, and more importantly, the basic
development strategy was shifted from one of rapid growth with inflation to
continuous, stable growth with price stabilization.
The Chun administration inherited from the previous Park government
many economic problems in 1979, including a phenomenal inflation of 44
percent, an unemployment rate of 5.7 percent, the huge investments in HC
industries, heavy defence burdens, and so on. In addition, political instability
following Park's death and the rise of the Chun regime itself caused a 5.7
percent decline in the GNP in 1980( the first such drop since 1956). Under
these circumstances, the Chun regime attempted to cope with two difficult
economic problems, namely, how to contain inflation in the face of rising oil
prices, and how to prevent a further deterioration in the balance of payments
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when the export market was weak and import costs were rising.83 The
Chun regime moved boldly and announced: (1). a wage guideline that
called for holding nominal wage increases to 15 percent during 1980; (2). a
20 percent devaluation, from 484 to 582 won per US $; (3). a continuation of
its tight monetary policy; (4). an increase in nominal interests rates, ranging
from 3 to 6 percentage points; and (5). its decision to allow oil-related
domestic prices to reflect the full increase in the import price of oil.84 jo
promote economic recovery, on the other hand, Chun's economic move was
to recall the technocrats responsible for the rapid economic growth under
Park.85 He appointed a former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of EPB,
Duck-Woo Nam as Prime Minister, and named the former president of the
Bank of Korea, Byong-Hyon Shin, as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
the EPB. In 1981, these technocrats wanted to prepare Korea for an
economic "second Take-off." Since past economic growth was due primarily
to the high performance of exports, the technocrats once again placed heavy
emphasis on exports. To a certain extent, increased export activities were
responsible for the modest growth in 1981. The wide-range economic policy
reforms the Korean government has implemented since 1981 have three
interrelated objectives: (1). continued high growth; (2). price stability; and
(3). improvement in income distribution.
The policy that the Chun government has chosen to achieve these
objectives was to make greater use of the market mechanism and the
advantage of a fully open economy, which were significantly different from
that of the Park regime in 1970s. The reform efforts were directed towards
promoting competition in all sectors of the domestic economy and
liberalizing Korea's external policies. What the government hoped to
achieve was clear. However, a crucial component of the government
stabilization programme, met bitter resistance. For example, wage disputes
turned into riots. In the meantime, the highly leveraged Korean firms,
squeezed by tight credit and a weak export market, began to lay off workers.
With unemployment rising and inflation unabated, labour unrest became
widespread and added to the political and social tension in the country.
83 Samuel P.S. Ho, Ibid., p. 1185.
84 For more details, see, EPB(1980), Economic Management Plan in 1980. February,
85 Dae-Sook Suh(1982), "South Korea in 1981: The First Year of the Fifth Republic." Asian Survey.
Vol. 22 No. 1 p. 112.
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In this situation, the Fifth Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social
Development, 1982-1986, was formulated. The plan was the core of the
Chun regime's development strategy. The plan projected an average annual
growth of 7.5 percent over the next five years from 1982 as it envisages the
GNP rising from the current level of U.S. $60 billion to U.S. $90 billion by
1986, and the rise of per-capita GNP from the current level of $1,500 to
$2,000 by 1986. It also included "a shift toward increased social
development and improved income distribution." The strategy for achieving
this ambitious economic goal included: (1). stabilizing economy; (2).
liberalizing and privatizing the economy from government control; and (3).
increasing social development benefits. The tactic for implementing these
strategies was to concentrate on restructuring the economy during the first
two years and to launch the "second take-off" of the economy in 1983.
During the first two years of the plan period, policy focused on the resolution
of the structural problems that accompanied rapid economic growth in the
past. Domestic prices have become quite stable in recent years, reflecting
the nation's positive response to the highest priority placed on price stability.
By building upon such stability, Korea has successfully managed to increase
its exports steadily. This, in turn, has enabled the Korean economy to regain
a high rate of growth, although the world economy has not yet fully
recovered.
With a self-confidence, the Chun regime readjusted the Fifth Plan. The
Revised Fifth Five-Year Plan(1984-86) was intended to readjust policies in
ways which reflect recent changes at home and abroad: " Since the principal
goals of the original plan have been achieved earlier than we had projected,
this revised plan, rather than being oriented to quantitative targets,
emphasizes institutional reforms and structural improvements that should be
made in order to strengthen the nation's growth potential. In every corner of
this plan, efforts would be found which try to make a major shift in the style of
economic management toward relying more on competition and the
mechanism of the market and to solve the problems of imbalance. "86 While
retaining the basic emphasis on stability, efficiency, and balance, the revised
plan sets the following priorities: Firstly, while maintaining economic stability,
the basis for developing a self-reliant economy would be strengthened;
86 EPBCI983). The Revised Fifth Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan, 1984-1986.
Republic of Korea, p. !!!.
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Secondly, the development of technology-oriented industries would be
spurred in order to raise the nation's level of technology closer to those of
the industrialized countries and thus to enable Korean industries to compete
better in the world market. Thirdly, social overhead capital and other public
facilities would be expanded and upgraded, and social development
projects would be enlarged in order to enhance the quality of life. Finally,
governmental functions would be carried out in such a way as to best meet
changing socio-economic conditions, and administrative practices would be
improved to enhance the quality of service as well as credibility.
(3). Social Conditions.
One of the proud slogans of president Chun's Fifth Republic was that he
would uphold "justice" and uproot corruption. Chun even named his political
party the DJP, making a stern promise to eradicate corrupt practices from
politics. However, a series of financial scandals, which had all the political
trimmings of influence peddling and had political ties that ultimately led to
the family of President Chun himself, damaged this slogan. Political
influence was the key to the Lee-Jang scandal, the Myongsong scandal^
and the Yongdong scandal.88 For example, the Lee-Jang scandal involved
Yong-ja Chang and her third husband, Chul-Hi Lee. Chang, related to
President Chun's wife, was a curb money market operator who manipulated
nearly $ 1 billion, approximately 17 percent of Korea's entire money supply.
She made cash loans on the curb market to industrial firms, demanding
many times the value of the loans in promissory notes and promising in turn
that the notes would not be resold or discounted on the market. In this way
Chang, who made the first loan of $3 million in the Spring of 1981, was able
87 The Myongsong Corporation, a real estate developer, amassed huge assets($200 million) in three
years by means of financial fraud, bribery, and tax evasion. Ja-Jung Yun and 15 other government and
bank officials, together with the Myongsong leaders, were indicted. Yun was alleged to have helped the
illicit Myongsong operations while serving as Minister of Construction in the first Chun cabinet. The
government prosecutors took great pains to deny any implications of President Chun's father-in-law in
the scandal.
88 The government arrested the president and 18 other officials of the Chohung Bank in connection with
this scandal, i.e. illegally extending a bank payment guarantee to the Yongdong Development
Corporation and its subsidiary, while floating $230 million worth of commercial papers.
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to amass the staggering sum of $988 million in notes by April 1982. By the
time the papers and notes were sorted out, it became obvious that Chang
had blazed a trial a mile wide through the curb money market. Two large
industrial companies were declared bankrupt and a total of twenty-nine
people were indicted.
The public at large showed a degree of cynicism about the slogans of
"justice", "democracy" and "welfare Society" for which the party stood. An
opposition legislator asked: "why is it that under the government which
claims to be the most powerful one and to attach the highest priority to the
establishment of a just society, we have seen so many big scandals and
external crises of the worst kind ?"89 The public questioned whether their
government was willing or able to detect and uproot economic and social
injustices. More seriously, they tended to suspect that there might be a
systematic collusion between economic and political irregularity. No matter
how diligently and honestly they worked, they were constantly left in a state
of bewilderment. They were uncertain about the moral fibre of their political
and economic system, and they lost a sense of normality and balance in
their private and public affairs. With their frustrations unresolved, they could
only hope that they would be able to start a little more peaceful, democratic,
and prosperous life in the future.
B. The Development of NWP Scheme Under the Fifth Republic,
1980-1985.
(1). Policy Debates.
The Chun regime of Fifth Republic learned a good lesson from the
previous Park Regime, that is, a one side adherence to rapid growth could
not alleviate social frictions. Therefore, apart from the Park's state goals, i.e.,
"economic development" and "anti-communism", the Chun regime
emphasized "welfare and justice" as its basic goals.
89 Dong-A llbo, 25 October, 1983.
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In connection with the preparation of the Fifth Plan, the government
organized the Economic and Social Policy Council. The Council which was
supervised by the KDI had ten classified meetings from April to August,
1980. The Social Security Group of the Council, at first, examined the then
prevailing conditions of social security in Korea, and then raised specific
recommendations to the government. In relation to the NWP programme, the
Group had to solve these two problems:^ (1). Whether the pension scheme
for workers was needed or not; (2). If needed, how the NWP programme
should be readjusted in relation to the new socio-economic environments.
The Group members were on the whole of the same opinion. They
concluded that the NWP programme should be implemented for the
expansion of pension coverage to the workers. They agreed that some
items, such as the connection with the Retirement Allowance system,
benefits level and contents, coverage and its method, fund management and
the means to utilize the fund, should be revised in a more realistic way.91
Among the group members, however, there were some split opinions in
connection with the implementation timing. Professor Jong-ln Kim argued
that, except for the Medical Insurance programme, all pension programmes
under consideration seemed like a plausible excuse for the Fifth Five-Year
Plan. He argued that the government should concentrate on the
normalization of the existing Medical Insurance programme (which is full of
inconsistencies), and then other pension programmes should be
considered as a long-term plan in relation to the development of the Medical
Insurance plan.92 On the other hand, Joung-Hyun Whang, the
representative of the Korean Employers' Association, insisted that the
unemployment Insurance programme should be implemented prior to the
NWP programme. This was their consistent opinion. He emphasized that the
implementation of the unemployment Insurance scheme would systematize
the Korean labour market and improve productivity.93
At this time, Paul Fisher, foreign adviser and the NWP proposer in the early
1970s, examined the NWP programme as a whole and adhered to his
90 The KDI(1980), The Economic and Social Policy Council for the Formation of Fifth Five-Year Plan-
Discussion Materials and Contents. September.p. 438..In Korean.
91 ibid. p. 418.
92 Ibid., p. 455.
93 Ibid., p. 458.
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opinion that even if the Korean government implemented the scheme, it
would not be confronted with the serious problems which most advanced
countries have faced with welfare crises.94 In relation to the implementation
of the NWP programme, however, he presented several policy
suggestions .95
Firstly, the early implementation of the NWP programme should be
considered because of the population trends and the rise of disabled in
accidents not related to work. However, early implementation does not
necessarily have to proceed en bloc. Certain items could be phased in over
a period of time as long as such a policy does not destroy the integrity of the
system. 96
Secondly, some contents of the NWP Law should be improved: (1). The
abolition of Class II voluntary insurance and its incorporation into the
compulsory Class I insurance coverage should be given early consideration;
(2). All income limits in the Act should be revised and would be better
expressed in a percentage of the average wage in a preceding year.
Therefore, they should be set at a level which extends compulsory coverage
to those workers in most need of the protection of the law; (3). The minimum
entrance age should be raised to 21 years. This is because most men in the
age group 18-20 were serving in the armed forces, while most women get
married at that age without returning to work, and would hence never
acquire the necessary 20-year credit for the benefit.
Finally, he emphasized the importance of support from the public, and
leaders of industry and labour.
In this process, the social development plan for the Fifth Five-Year
Economic and Social Development, 1982-1986 was formulated. The plan,
once again, contained the implementation of the NWP programme on a
step-by-step basis in addition to the expansion of the Medical Insurance
coverage from 33 percent point in 1980 to 57 percent in 1986. However,
many people were in doubt whether the government really intended to
implement the programme or not, having regard to the economic situation at
that time as we mentioned already. Although the Korean economy
94 Paul Fisher(1980), Korea: Social Security in Korea in the Eighties. Seoul: The KDI, Consultant Paper
Series No. 14. pp. 34-40.
95 Ibid., pp. 41-47.
96 Ibid., p. 228.
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recovered enough to achieve a better performance than most other
industrialized economics in 1982, it fell far short of the projected target of the
Fifth Plan, which envisaged a 7.6 percent annual growth rate. World trade in
1982 did not expand as anticipated, and Korea's export trade was stagnant,
with a 4.8 percent growth rate in 1982. Korea's foreign debt in 1982 was the
largest in Asia and the fourth largest in the world.97 The less than sanguine
economic performance and the worldwide economic recession forced the
Chun regime to reassess its major goals and to readjust the targets of the
Fifth Plan. To reflect these and similar changes, the EPB set up a task force,
consisting of eighteen separate teams working within different areas of the
government, to reevaluate the goals of plan. As a result of this reassessment
the Chun government adjusted the priorities and projections of economic
performance for the Plan's remaining three-year period to 1986.
The Revised Fifth Five-Year Plan of 1983 postponed the NWP again to
next five-year plan. Instead, during the period of postponement the
government should complete the preparations for the implementation of
NWP programme. At this time the government was worried that if the current
ceiling on benefits and the contribution rate were not changed, the pension
funds would soon be exhausted. Therefore, the contribution rate and benefit
level should be closely coordinated.98 To this end, the Revised Plan
decided that a planning group would be formed composed of
representatives from the concerned administrative agencies and the
research community to study this issue during the plan period. The planning
group were to analyze changes that had taken place since the NWP Law
was enacted in 1973. They were to focus on potential pension system
problems, such as those that have imposed a serious financial burden on
the advanced countries.99 After these preliminaries, the research team were
to develop a self-financing programme which meet the needs of the public in
an affordable way. They were also to devise to a means of coordinating the
pension programme with the Retirement Allowance programme and other
97 External debt was estimated at US $ 37.3 billion in 1982 and projected to reach between US $ 64.5
and US $ 49.0 billion by the end of 1986, and debt service ratio in 1982 reached a record 14.9 percent.
See, Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 August, 1983. pp. 40-41.
98 The EPB(1983), The Revised Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan, 1984-1986.
Republic of Korea, p. 105.
"ibid., pp. 105-106.
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related programmes. This would pave the way for the implementation of the
NWP program on a step-by-step basis. 100
At this time, on the other hand, the MOHSA readjusted their own plan and
divided the development of the pension programme into three stages. 101
(1). The First Staae( 1986-1991): (a). The pension programme should be
implemented in 1986. The coverage of this system should be applicable to
firms employing more than 30 workers in the first stage, and then should be
expanded into those in enterprises with 10 or more employees by 1989; (b).
Together with the implementation of pension programme, the Retirement
Allowance System should be amended from compulsory to voluntary
regulation and then should be consistent with the pension programme. This
is because the Retirement Allowance System imposes a heavy burden on
the small and medium size companies as well as not giving effective
protection to the employees. However, the Retirement Allowance should be
guaranteed by law in case the employee is dismissed against his will within
10 years; (c). In the early stage of implementation, the contribution rate
should be set at 5 percent of monthly income and then should be increased
gradually to 1 percent every 3 years and finally 8 percent after 1995; (d). To
simplify the complicated administrative system of social security, the NWP
programme and other special pension schemes such as the Civil Servant
Pension, the Military Personnel and the Private School Teachers' Pension
should be combined into the National Pension System and one central
administration, for instance, the Bureau of National Pension in the MOHSA,
should operate all the different insurance schemes. Unless the system was
fundamentally reformed, no matter how efficient the administrators may be,
the programme could not be executed effectively. However, there was the
problem of the relationship between the various parts of the system. Not only
did the levels of contribution and benefits vary widely between the different
schemes, but the legal jurisdictions were different. Therefore, in the initial
year, the dual fund system— the NWP Fund and the Special Pension Fund
which is unified by the independent special pension funds— should be
maintained.
100 Ibid.
101 Kwang-Chan Lee(1984), A Study on the Implementation of NWP Program,
The Social Security Committee, The MOHSA. pp. 35-39.
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(2). The Second Staae(1992-1996): To keep the coordination and balance
of the differences between the NWP programme and special pension
schemes, the preparatory work should be concluded by 1994, and then the
dual systems should be completely unified as a National Pension
Programme by 1995. At the same time, the scope of coverage should be
gradually expanded to the employee and the self-employed during this
period.
(3). The Third Staged997-2001): The compulsory coverage should be
expanded by 2001 to cover all employees as well as a certain level of the
self-employed. Moreover, the contribution of the self-employed whose
income is below the minimum standard should be exempted and, instead,
the government should subsidize for his contribution.
(2). The Establishment of Preparatory Committee.
In accordance with the Revised Fifth Five-Year Plan proposal, the
Preparatory Committee for the NWP programme was established on 16th of
August, 1984. The purposes of the preparatory committee, therefore, were to
deliberate and coordinate collectively on the essential issues with regard to
the enforcement of the pension programme. The organization of the
committee was a three-layer system: the Preparatory Committee, the
Working-level Coordinating Committee, and Working-level Groups. The
Preparatory Committee was composed of the Minister of Health and Social
Affairs as a chairman, Deputy Ministers of seven related Departments,102
two delegates from the Employers' and the Employees' Associations, and
five commissioners. The second Committee was made up of the Assistant
Deputy Minister of the EPB as a chairman, the Chiefs of Planning and
Management of six related Departments, five representatives from the
Employer's and the Employee's Association, and six commissioners. The
third Committee was divided into two sub-groups: the First Working-level
Group was composed of the Director of Social Insurance Bureau as a group
leader, civil servants of related Departments, and pension experts. The
Second Working-level Group was composed of the Director of Economic
102 seven departments are: EPB, Finance, Defense, Education, Labour, MOHSA, and Government
Administration.
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Planning Bureau as group leader, civil servants of related Departments, and
pension experts.
Even though the organization of the Preparatory Committee was
enormous, the Committee was little more than a name except for several
working-level talks. They only examined the national pension model and
entrusted the KDI with the socio-economic effects of the NWP
implementation. 103
6.4. The Role of Interest Groups.
All voluntary actors except the business groups were insignificant during
this period. This was because, as we mentioned already, the socio-political
environments did not allow their activities under the bureaucratic-
authoritarian regimes. Since the NWP programme was excluded from the
political issue, the urgent matter of concern and interest for the Press was
political democracy. The FKTU, at this time, was attacked on the both sides,
i.e., by the government and labour itself. As we mentioned already,
government and business leaders effectively resisted most union-formation,
and numerous legal restrictions and overt repression of labour mark the
entire period. On the other hand, the FKTU lost it credit with labour. Against
the state sponsored FKTU, the Korean labourers organized their own
autonomous organizations promoting class consciousness and thereby
increasing conflicts between FKTU and these autonomous labour
organizations. On account of the internal friction, the labour unions remained
a nominal organization, even when unionization increased dramatically in
the late 1970s and mid-1980s. Therefore, the FKTU had no incentive to take
their battle against the business groups' statements and the government's
new policies even though these were directly connected with the labourers'
interests.
Exceptionally, the business organizations looked after their own interests
under the patronage of the government. The large domestic business
conglomerates(chaebol) were major participants in, and beneficiaries of, the
103 The MOHSA(1987), Ibid., p. 38.
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new strategy of transforming the economic structure from light to HC
industries. However, unlike the Japanese conglomerates(zaibatsu), the
Korean chaebols were indifferent to their workers' welfare even though the
growth process was similar.
In the Japanese case, at first, the paternalistic industrialists began to
experiment with the idea of a company pension within the company to
promote the workers' loyalty to their company.Therefore employers—both
public and private—increasingly provided for the needs of their own workers,
either directly, or by encouraging them in self-help through mutual aid
associations and so on.104 Then, the government intervened and
compelled the private and public sectors to adopt social insurance schemes
in order to promote national unity and conserve national resources.105
Since the Zaibatsu decisions were bound to have a major effect on the
economy as a whole, party leaders and top officials were inclined to listen to
their views. In the meantime, when government policy promised to have
general advantages for the country the Zaibatsu actively supported it. They
realized that the government shared the same goals as they did and officials
of Zaibatsu felt that what was good for business was good for the country. As
a result, most of the important administrative groundwork for the Japanese
social policy of today was established during the tumultuous decades of
unrest and reactionary ultra-nationalism that preceded the Pacific War.
On the contrary, the Korean chaebols have a different way of thinking in
relation to social policy. Even though they sought to pattern their country's
development on the experience of Japan, this emulation did not extend to
copying Japanese efforts in social policy. Because many Korean
businessmen worried about the Japanese situation, like many other
industrialized countries, the relative proportion of government activies in the
economy has increased significantly, mainly as a result of the growth of
social security expenditure.106
In relation to the NWP programme, they, the business associations,
adopted all the means in their power to defer the NWP programme. They
104 Martin Collick(1988), ibid., p. 205.
105 Richard Rose and Rei Shiratori(1986), "Introduction: Welfare in Society: Three Worlds or One?" In
Richard Rose and Rei Shiratori(Eds.), Ibid., p. 6.
106 Yukio Noguchi(1986), "Overcommitment in Pension: The Japanese Experience," in Richard Rose
and Rei ShiratorifEds.) The Welfare State East and West. Oxford University Press, p. 180.
320
kept in contact with the government authorities, while they appealed to
public opinion. They issued statements of their point of view.
At first, the Korea Employers' Federation presented a statement under the
title: "The Statement about the Introduction of NWP Programme," in May,
1979. The statement raised the following five points at issue:
Firstly, the then present economic condition in Korea was much worse than
that of the year of 1973 when the NWP programme was enacted.
Secondly, from a social security policy point of view, the unemployment
insurance scheme was much more urgent than the NWP programme for the
following reasons: (1). The sharp fluctuation of industrial structure brought
about decaying industries. Therefore, some systematic measures which
were guaranteed job-conversions and re-employment for the workers of
those companies' were urgently needed; (2). To obtain the desired results of
"The Employment Security Network" which was under consideration by the
Office of Labour Affairs, the job training programme and the unemployment
insurance programme should be combined as a Tripartite system; and (3).
Nowadays, it is much more realistic that the government should guarantee a
stable source of income for the people who are underemployed or
frictionally unemployed than the NWP programme which is a kind of saving
scheme to protect income earners against future adversities.
Thirdly, the early introduction of the NWP programme would act so as to
reduce the workers' disposable income. As for the workers, stabilization of
their livelihood and wage increases were the most urgent. In view of the then
current income levels and inflation, the NWP programme would find difficulty
in meeting with the workers' approval because of the increase of the
immediate burden for the security 20 years hence.
Fourthly, as regards the people as a whole, the present NWP programme
would be contrary to the principle of equity for the following reasons: (1).
According to the Article 28 of the Labour Standards Law, companies with 30
or more employees were required to implement the Retirement Allowance
scheme. The benefits at the international level were however far better than
those of the NWP programme; (2). Except for the Retirement Allowance
system, these workers are benefited by the Medical Insurance and the
Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance. In comparison with the self-
employed, the farmer and the fisherman, and the small company workers
who are excepted from these programmes, the company workers already
receive enormous welfare benefits. Therefore, if the NWP programme were
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to be implemented for these workers, it would be contrary to the principle of
social security.
Finally, When we look at the population structure, the NWP programme
which provides for the workers' old age, was not so pressing for the
following reasons; (1). For the present, the ratio of the old age population(60
or more) is no more than 4 percent; (2). The ratio of the old age population
will expand to 7.8 percent in 1991. When we consider the development of
pension programmes in advanced countries from the population structure
point of view, Korea will reach the early stage just at that time.
For the above reasons, the statement proposed that the NWP programme
should be postponed at least two or three years until the essential
prerequisites such as the price stabilization and the improvement of income
levels were sufficient.
In the meantime, the Korea Employers' Federation invited professor Gi-Do
Woo to a symposium on "The Basic Direction of the Social Security System
and the NWP Programme-In Relation to the Policy Priority" on 18th of May,
1979. At this symposium, Professor Woo spoke for the view of the business
associations. The main points of his submission were as follows: (1). During
the transition period of the Korean economy and inflationary spiral, the NWP
plan should not materialise; (2). Why should the NWP programme take
priority over the unemployment insurance scheme?; (3). The present
Retirement Allowance System which is threatening the industrial existence
was incompatible with the NWP programme.
The following day, the Federation of Korean Industries also presented the
same view point on behalf of the Korea Employers' Federation. 107
In relation to the implementation of the NWP programme, one of the main
matters of concern and interest of the business groups was the matter
connected with the Retirement Allowance system. As Paul Fisher
commented: "the amendment or elimination of Article 28 of the Labour
Standards Law and renegotiation of the existing retirement undertaking
should be a condition for the employers' consent to the implementation of
107 gee the Federation of Korean Industriesf1979). Annual Report on the FKI's Activities, pp. 212-215.
In Korean.
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the NWP programme."108 Article 28 requires the employer to establish a
Retirement Allowance System "Which provides at least 30 days average
wage for each year of continuous service" to workers with at least one year
of service. The problem is that the Labour Standards Law does not require
the employer to set any funds aside or to reinsure his contingent liabilities.
As a consequence, many cases of default have occurred. To make matters
worse, the employers suffer from a self-inflicted problem. Under the
leadership of banks and government-owned enterprises, they agreed in a
period of rapid growth of their firms, of low wages, and labour shortages to
grant the workers a retirement allowance based not on the statutory one-
month pay for each year served, but on a steadily increasing number of
months of wages for each succeeding year of service. According to the
memorial of Korean business associations, 46.7 percent of the member firms
apply progressive rates, according to the duration of service for the
calculation of the severance lump-sum. Such promises create difficulties for
firms under different economic and labour market conditions( some of them
facing the retirement of an appreciable number of long-service workers at
any one time), that are compelled to pay a lump sum based on inflated
wages. In these circumstances, without the amendment of the Retirement
Allowance system, the business groups could not consent to the
implementation of the NWP program. In this connection, the five related
business associations109 presented a written opinion under the title: "The
Introduction of NWP Program" in July, 1979. They urged the amendment of
the Retirement Allowance System and suggested the following solutions:
(1). The parts of old-age and unemployment insurance under the
Retirement Allowance System(the legal lowest limit under the Article 28)
should be substituted for the NWP programme.
(2). The portion of meritorious compensation under the Retirement
Allowance System(the progressive portion above the legal lowest limit
under the Labour Standards Law) should be a matter for companies
themselves as a part of the labour management.
108 pau| Fisher(1987), "Social Security in Korea in 1980," in II Sakong(ed.) Human Resources and
Social Development. Essays on Korea's Fifth Five-Year Plan. Vol. II, KDI. p. 216.
109 The five associations are: The Korea Employers' Association, The Federation of Korean Industries,
The Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry, The Korean Traders Association, and The Korean
Federation of Small Business.
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(3). The Retirement Allowance which is already guaranteed should be paid
by the company. The terms of payment should be as follows: 1). The amount
of Retirement Allowances should be the rate of secured reserve for
retirement allowance until the introduction of the NWP programme multiplied
by the average income at the time of retirement: 2). As an interim measure,
the Labour Standards Law and the Tax Law should provide for the
intermediate liquidation, and if needed, the company should put the
retirement allowance to practical use by mutual agreement: 3). When the
company pay out a retirement allowance, the payment of shares or company
bond should be fostered by reason of the relief of the company's financial
difficulty as well as the contribution of the employee's stock ownership and
amassment of the workers' wealth. The other suggestions are nearly the
same as that of the previous suggestions and only added a fifth wheels to a
well-assorted stock.
On the other hand, the Ministry of Labour under the supervision of the KEF
invited several related institutions and experts, to a symposium on "The
Improvement of Retirement Allowance System," held on 23rd of April, 1984.
At this symposium, the Executive Director of KEP, Jung-Hyun Whang,
expressed the following seven items of business associations' views:
Firstly, Article 28 of the Employment Standard Act should be operated
flexibly. Thus, the payment of a retirement allowance should be left to the
employer's discretion in case of the employee who is compulsory retired
because of a reduction in personnel and also in case of the voluntary retired
employee who has been employed for less than three years.
Secondly, in the case of a period of military service or suspension from
service at his own initiative, a certain ratio(e.g. 5%) of the relevant period
should be included in the length of the worker's service which is the basis of
his retirement allowance assessment.
Thirdly, when a worker after having served a certain period of time(e.g. 5-
10 years) wishes an intermediate pay-out for a real necessity such as a
housing purchase, it should be allowed by mutual agreement.
Fourthly, a special deduction for retirement allowance should be promoted
and the retirement allowance should be exempted from taxation.
Fifthly, allowing for the retirement allowance as a deferred liability, the
accumulative limit of appropriation should be rationalized and the total
amount should be admitted as a company expenditure.
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Sixthly, to guarantee the retirement allowance by the small and medium
enterprises, friendly societies should be established.
Finally, when the NWP programme is implemented, the retirement
allowance system should be amended to merge with it. If the NWP
programme were implemented without amendment of the retirement
allowance system, a heavy financial burden would be imposed on the
business groups. Therefore, the present retirement allowance system should
be amended to a voluntary system and be conducive to meritorious
compensation for the long-service employee.
However, the Secretary General of FKTU, Young-Jun Lee, made the
Labour Unions' position clear with a different opinion. Even though the
Labour Unions raised several points, the unions were unwilling to lose
Article 28 of the Employment Standard Act and the pension agreements they
had negotiated, which represented a major tangible benefit they obtained for
their membership. Therefore, he asserted that the present retirement
allowance system should continue to exist without regard to the NWP or the
employment insurance system.Consequently, the solution of the retirement
allowance disagreement is a precondition of the NWP being implemented.
6.5. Conclusion.
In this chapter, we examined the development of the NWP programme
during the period of 1974-1985. We focused on the postponement of the
NWP programme in relation to the Korean national development strategy
and political, and socio-economic environments. On examination, this
chapter demonstrates that several reasons were compounded by the NWP
postponement.
Firstly, even though the pension policy was initiated with a dual-purpose,
that is, a socio-economic palliation and an economic acceleration, the
programme was postponed by the political strife among policy-makers in the
process of the formation of industrial restructuring strategy. As we have seen
in Chapter Four, the MOHSA took up the study of pension policy since the
early 1960s. However, study of pension policy began in earnest in the early
1970s, when the economic policy-makers came to understand that this
policy need not work at cross purposes with the objectives of development
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planning and, further, integrated with the development plan, could in effect
help these objectives. On becoming aware of this, the KDI suggested the
pension policy to the President and included the policy to the industrial
restructuring strategies. However, President Park and his staffs could not
accept the EPB's restructuring proposals. As a result, the EPB which had
taken a major role in national development policy-making, was excluded
from the policy-making process of the reorganization of the industrial
structure and the economic emergency measures which were the main
policy measures leading to the postponement of the NWP scheme. In this
process, the NWP programme was postponed in the early 1974.
Secondly, Korean policy-makers could not maintain a consistent social
security policy. As we have examined in section two, the original
government policy priority was that the NWP programme took precedence
over the medical insurance scheme even though the latter was enacted in
1963. This is because a part of the reserve funds under the NWP scheme
could be utilized to invest in hospitals and other medical facilities in rural
and local communities .1 it was drastically changed again in the mid-
1970s. Further, it was reported that the original Fourth Five-Year Plan did not
contain this scheme, but President Park abruptly ordered the introduction of
the medical insurance as one means of social security. As a result, the NWP
scheme was naturally neglected by the government. We can explain two
aspects of this phenomenon. First, as a government agency with the
jurisdiction over social security, the MOHSA was politically weak, not only in
the broad area of Korean politics but also in their respective political camps.
In addition, the Korean bureaucrat was seen as pre-eminently responsive to
political authority, especially that of the President. As a result, the MOHSA
could not adhere to its policy. The second reason is that, in an authoritarian
organization, policy shifts do not take place through a series of relatively
small changes; instead, policy moves in leaps and bounds and changes
occur in grand style.111 Innovation results from a sudden burst of decision.
Therefore, any new Minister does not develop and carry out the programmes
which his predecessor initiated incrementally and pushed continuously. This
tendency was especially conspicuous at the ministerial level. As we can see
from Table 6-3, the average tenure of the Minister of Health and Social
110 chong-Kee Park(1975), ibjd,, p. 50.
111 Lindblom, C.E.(1959), "The Science of Muddling Through," Public Administration Review, Vol. 19
pp. 84-86.
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Affairs Department during the last ten years was about one and a half years
too short. Every time the Minister changed, the basic policy of the outgoing
Minister was also changed.
Table 6-3: Tenure of Minister of Health and Social Affairs( 1973-85).
Name Tenure
Kyong-Ho Lee June 1973 - Dec. 1973.
Chae-Pil Ko Dec. 1973 - Dec. 1975.
Hyun-Hwak Shin Dec. 1975 - Dec. 1978.
Song-Choi Hong Dec. 1978 - Dec. 1979.
lee-Chong Chin Dec. 1979 - Sept. 1980.
Myoung-Ki Chon Sept. 1980 - May 1982.
Chong-Rye Kim May 1982 - Feb. 1985.
Thirdly, the Korean governments and policy-makers confused the ends
with the means in the development strategy. The evolution in thinking
regarding the means and ends of development are obviously pertinent to
any discussion of the role of social security in the on-going process of social
and economic change in Korea. Efforts to raise levels of living were to be
seen as both the objective of development and also its instrument. The
improvements in the quality of living were important objectives in themselves
and were not to be seen as merely aids to higher economic output. Looked
at from this perspective, economic growth could be regarded as the
instrument and better living standards as the objective.112 Therefore, the
ultimate objective of development must be to bring about sustained
improvement in the well-being of the individual and bestow benefits on all.
These objectives are both determining factors and results of development;
they should therefore be viewed as integrated parts of the same dynamic
process and call for a unified approach.112 These were the objectives and
the strategy as defined at the beginning of the Fourth Plan. The Korean
government changed it, from a Fourth Plan(1977-81), into the Five-Year
Economic and Social Development Plan to which, among other things,
112 See, Singer, H.W.(1968), "Social Factors in Development: An Overview With Special Emphasis on
Social Security," in E. M. Kassalow(Ed.), The Role of Social Security in Economic Development. U.S.
Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Research Report No. 27. p. 21.
113 U.N. Research Institute for Social Development: Social Development and the International
Development Strategy(1979). p. 2.
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policy concerns for distribution and equity were added. Changes in policy
objectives, however, did not bring about substantial changes in the
development strategies adopted in the previous plans for two reasons: (1). In
Korea, the planning and development of social security measures was far
from being fully integrated with the country's over-all plan which reflects the
particular nature and structure of social security schemes and tells little of
their significance in the life of the nation or of their relationship to
development. This is because economic pragmatism has been already
definitively superseded at the theoretical level; (2). The uncertainty within
government was another reason. To be sure, a social security scheme
requires considerable resources which are distributed in the form of benefits
and affect the operation of economic mechanisms. It follows that the
quantitative importance of social security is measured by the volume of its
income and expenditure in relation to the national product, and its qualitative
importance by the extent of the redistribution of the national product and the
size of the population benefiting from this redistribution. Consideration of
these factors immediately raise the question whether this amount of
resources and the increase in consumption which result from their
distribution does not adversely affect the formation and utilisation of capital
needed for economic development. Therefore, the Korean governments and
policy-makers could not deviate from the basic national development
strategy without being convinced that it would lead to sound economic
growth. To make matters worse, the social welfare crises in the advanced
countries especially Japan, added to the uncertainty of a new development
strategy.
The last reason was that a lack of democratization. As we have examined,
the Fourth and Fifth Republics were more or less a authoritarian regimes to
the extent that the military and their ruling coalitions constituted a dominant
institution in politics. This political environment retarded the implementation
of NWP programme. As Key and Lenski mentioned, democratic institutions
and ideology are very important to the development of social policy.114
Democratic institutions give rise to organised political competition. In light of
his analysis of the one-party factionalism common in the South America, Key
concluded that single-party politics preclude organised debate on issues,
114 Key V. O. Jr(1946), Southern Politics in State and Nation. New York:Knopf.and Lenski
Gerhard(1966), Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification. New York: McGraw-Hill.
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and lead instead to a politics of personality.115 Without competition
between organised political parties, the "have-nots" are left with no
mechanism for effective political engagement. Political parties compete
against one another within a territorial area for the right to govern, and the
party with the greatest support forms the governing team. The governing
party is made responsive to the electorate's wishes both by its having
secured enough support to have the right to govern, and by the prospect of
having to face re-election at some definite period in the future, when its
conduct in office will be judged by the electorate.11^ Without democratic
political institutions, however, this role of elections is unlikely to be fulfilled.
In the meantime, the new democratic ideology is significant because it
legitimates a major redistribution of political power and national resources in
favour of the majority. For Lenski, this increased political equality has led to
more social equality because the major electoral demand made on modern
political elites has been for a more equalitarian distribution of material
goods. Not only does a democratic reform of government respect the
autonomy of persons, it provides the incentive for self-development and civic
responsibility. Moreover, democracy allows scope for the free competition of
ideas in the solution to collective problems, and this is likely to enhance a
society's problem-solving capacity. Moreover, democracy provides a set of
procedures in which there is recognition of the equality of persons.
Common arguments about the deleterious effects of authoritarian regimes
in Korea parallel these perspective. The constitutions of the Fourth and Fifth
Republics provided for an indirect election of the President and the
legislative role of the National Assembly was greatly subordinated to the
President. Fearing the uncertainty of the outcome of democratic competition,
it abolished the already limited democratic institutions and procedures.
Therefore, an election was no more than a formal act and political
competition was nonexistent in the Korean political process. As a result, the
main goal of the parties in Korea was to mobilise the population for policy
objectives set by the party leadership rather than to bring together the
diverse interests of the mass. The power bloc launched bureaucratic
authoritarianism preemptively to exclude the popular masses from
participating in the distributional struggle. In this political environment,
115 Key V.Q., Ibid, p. 307.
116 Albert Weale(1983), Political Theory and Social Policy, The Macmillan Press Ltd. p. 179.
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interest groups played a secondary role in the politics of the NWP
programme. The general public were not organised at all: they did not force
their plight on to the political agenda, and policy did not change in response
to their demands. The urgent matter of concern and interest to the Labour
Unions was political democracy. According to the interest group theory,
democracy is important since it provides existing groups with
institutionalised means to influence government policy. Without
democratisation, political channels could not be sufficiently developed for
transmitting the demands of the Labour Unions to the regime. Only business
groups were involved in the central issues of socio-economic management,
and this had a powerful indirect impact on the postponement of the NWP
programme. Nonetheless, a pattern of direct bargaining between the
government and business organisations over the NWP policy did not
emerge in this period.
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Chapter 7. The Revised National Pension
Programme, 1986.
7.1. A Point of Discussion.
As we have seen in the previous chapter, welfare policies did not
adequately meet the growing need for distributional equity among various
strata of the population during the first half of the 1980s, even though the
Chun regime emphasized "welfare and justice" as its basic goals. Because
of the need to strengthen the foundations of economic stability, fiscal policy
was not fully able to carry out its welfare function. In the latter part of the
1980s, the nation would reach a historic turning point in its drive to enter the
ranks of the advanced countries and self-propelled growth. The government,
therefore, should tried to improve the functioning of the social and economic
sectors on the basis of equality and efficiency, enabling the energies of the
people to be channelled without waste. The government should also tried to
expand the welfare system so that it can meet the demands of social
conditions and the needs of the people, particularly of disadvantaged
groups, and thus advance overall public interest.1
In this situation, the Sixth Five-Year Plan was formulated. The basic
objective of the plan was aimed primarily at building an advanced economy
on a foundation of efficiency and equity and promoting national welfare.
These objectives represent the first phase of laying a foundation for the
nation to achieve the goal of an industrially advanced state in the 21st
century. The background of the Sixth Five-Year Plan was that the Korean
government was confident that economic development and the socio¬
economic environments were matured to the necessary condition.
Encouraged by this situation, the government in September 1986
announced a major welfare improvement measure, a basic plan to expand
social welfare programmes and to improve income distribution during the
latter part of the 1980s.
In this chapter, therefore, we will examine the development that pension
policy; and how the NWP programme was readjusted in relation to the new
socio-economic environments. In the first section, therefore, we will focus on
1 Government of the Republic of Korea(1986), The Sixth Five-Year Economic and Social Development
Plan, 1987-1991.. p. 14.
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the background of a re-emergence of pension policy as a political agenda.
The tendency for the re-emergence of a pension programme was a
reflection of socio-economic environments and the support of political elites
for this development strategy. The newly developing, dependent nature of
Korea's economy placed major constraints and limitation on the
development of a social security policy. During most of the life of the
programme, social security policy has been directed by the options and
constraints imposed by the national economic situation. Therefore, we offer
an interpretation of this development which stresses the conditioning roles of
socio-economic developments, the diffusion influence, and the key impetus
for policy development in the needs and priorities of the state. According to
this analysis, the growing preoccupation of key political elites with the
industrialization effort and increasing state activism, combined with the need
to coopt labour dissidents, prompt the implementation of the National
Pension Programme. In the second section, we then turn to a discussion of
the policy-making process of the Revised Pension Programme between the
president's announcement on 11th of August 1986 and the enactment of the
Revised National Pension Act on 31th of December 1986. The third,
concluding section provides a summery analysis of the major arguments
and findings presented in this chapter.
7.2. Re-emergence of the Pension Scheme as a Political
Agenda.
When drawing up the Sixth Five-Year Plan in 1986, once again, the
pension programme emerged on the policy agenda. This was a carry over
from the evaluation of the Fifth Five-Year Plan.2 As the preceding chapter
has shown, the Korean government set the establishment of a welfare
society as one of its national objectives and has since being pursuing a
welfare policy to distribute the fruits of growth equally among the people
during the plan period. This policy has paid off in some areas, but the tight
fiscal policy designed to solidify the foundation for price stabilization has
resulted in insufficient financial support for welfare programmes.
Consequently, the need to narrow income gaps and improve the welfare of
2 The Government of Republic of Korea(1986), The Sixth Five-Year Economic and Social Development
Plan, 1987-1991. pp. 7-15.
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the low-income people could not be sufficiently achieved.
The Sixth Five-Year Plan, therefore, would aim primarily at building an
advanced economy on a foundation of efficiency and equity and promoting
national welfare.3 In this regard, the agencies concerned with the pension
programme became active and proposed tentative revised pension
programmes which were based on a review of the changes in the socio¬
economic conditions of Korea. The specific contents of these proposals will
be listed in the Appendix Three. The main related agencies agreed with the
implementation of the pension programme during the Sixth Five-Year Plan
period, but there were substantial differences among them. In order to adjust
these different contents, the related agencies' conference was held with
those government agencies and other research institutions which were
related with the pension programme under consideration.
They were: (1). The MOHSA ( Vice-Minister,Soo-ll Choi; Director of Social
Affairs Bureau, Duk-Jo Chung ); (2). The EPB ( Director of Financial Bureau,
Chang-Yul Lim ); (3). The Minister of Labour ( Director of Labour Standard,
Byong-lk Han ); and (4). The KDI ( Vice-President, Sang-Mok Suh; Research
Commissioner, Jae-Sung Min ).
The items on the agenda of this conference were as follows.
(1). The Contribution Rate: a). 2.5 to 10 percent of average monthly
income; b). The contribution rate should be increased step-by-step from
2.5% for the four years beginning in 1988, 5% and 7.5% for the next four
years respectively, and finally 10% after 2000.
(2). The Readjustment of Retirement Allowance System: Two different
options were deliberated and suggested(see, the KDI proposal in the
Appendix Three).
(3). The Organizational Structure: The Pension Corporation should be
established.
(4). The Survey of Public Opinion: The opinion of the government hearing ,
academic circle, allied institutions and the press was to be collected on the
12th of June, 1986.
(5). The Publicity Activity: The government would invite the MOHSA
correspondents and editoral writers and explain the content of pension
programme on 11th of June, 1986.
3ibid., p. 26.
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As decided at the conference of these related agencies, the KDI invited the
associations including the government, press, employee and employer, and
the academic fields, to hold a hearing on 12th of June 1986. In the hearing,
the KDI announced the results of its research on "The Master Plan and
Economic and Social Effects of the National Pension Scheme." which was
entrusted by the Preparatory Committee in 1984. The KDI, then, put various
participants' opinions together and made a recommendation to the
government to enact the pension programme from 1988. In this hearing, the
participants also had the same view, only they were concerned about the
contribution rate and the coordination with the Retirement Allowance
System.
Even though some unsettled controversial points remained, the
implementation of the pension programme was an established fact during
the Sixth Five-Year Plan period. The only question was when the
programme would be implemented. After a while, this question was solved
by the president. At the annual summertime News Conference on 11th of
August, 1986, President Chun disclosed that:4
"The ultimate reason why we all work so hard at our jobs is that
we want to enhance the welfare of all citizens. I have already
instructed the government party and the administration to work
out plans to attain that goal by 1989 at the latest. Details of the
plans will be announced shortly. Plans are also being made to
have a law enacted so that a minimum wage system can go into
effect by 1988 at the latest. At the same time, a comprehensive
package of policies is being developed with the aim of more
rapidly improving the economic status of the urban poor. Actually,
a law was enacted in 1974 to set up a national pension system
but its implementation was frustrated by wild inflation.5 That was
because the real value of the money that could be placed in the
pension fund would have been halved in only three to four years
since inflation was running at an annual rate 20 percent.
Accordingly, it made little sense to save money for use 20 to 30
years later. But now that prices are stable and the economy is
4 Newsreview, 16 August 1986. p. 9.
5 Most of government documents mentioned that the postponement of NWP program was caused by
the high inflation which would cause pension fund insolvency.
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strong, it should be possible to put a national pension fund into
operation by 1988 at the latest."
Thereafter, the government, on 1st of September, announced formally
that;6
"a national pension system would go into force in 1988 along with
a minimum wage scheme to promote the welfare of the general
public. In 1989, the medical insurance benefits would be available
to all people, said the announcement. Since socio-economic
conditions have changed since the time of the NWP programme
was enacted in 1973, the existing pension law should be revised
and updated prior to its implementation."
Therefore, we will analyze the policy environments that the Korean
government decided were the necessary conditions for the implementation
of the National Pension programme. For this, we will examine the current
policy environments, because social security as a strategic element of socio¬
economic policy can not be studied without reference to the political, and
socio-economic background.7
7.2.1. Political Conditions.
This period also served as a political vortex^.
First, unlike the previous Korean constitution, the fifth constitution limited
the presidential tenure of office to a single seven-year term. Running against
the political clock of President Chun's expiring seven-year term in February
1988, events moved briskly. This situation created an optimistic policy¬
making atmosphere, since President Chun had come to the finish of his term
therefore had to finish his public pledges, such as the ideal of a welfare
state.
Secondly, political turmoil in Korea was based on the problems associated
with lagging distribution of the already increased wealth after pursuing a
6 Newsreview, 6 September 1986. p. 4.
7 Eveline M. Burns(19561. Social Security and Social Policy, New York: McGraw-Hill Co., p. 269.
8 The term is borrowed from Gregory Henderson(1969). Korea: the Politics of the Vortex. Cambridge,
M.A.: Harvard University University.
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consistent policy giving priority to economic development planning over
other goals. The inadequate provision of workers' benefits and the prevalent
non-compliance with laws and collective contracts governing these benefits,
had been the source of numerous and prolonged work stoppages and
strikes in Korea, and had generally exacerbated tensions between workers
and government. The reduction of these labour disputes and an improved
system of benefits were seen as mechanisms to highten the productivity and
output of the industrial labour force. While the economy is looking up, the
basic research question of whether industrialization and the existence of
problem pressures are sufficient to cause the development of social welfare
is better answered with the recognition that the government is acting as an
intermediate variable either to nullify or to boost the development and to
decide the direction of that development. In this context, the social insurance
system becomes a more important issue which secures a minimum standard
of living for all the people.
Thirdly, there are differences of interest and opinion within the government.
This is because a functional division of responsibility takes the situation of a
single social group and divides it up between a number of departments and
agencies. In some situations, therefore, separate government departments
may be treated as interest groups with a degree of autonomy pursuing their
own line. This patterning of the administrative structure was clearly evident
with regard to the postponement of the NWP programme during the period of
the 1974-1985. However, this policy environment within the government
changed at the beginning of 1986. The new EPB leadership of Deputy Prime
Minister, Man-Jae Kim, who was a former president of KDI when the NWP
programme was enacted in 1973, plus the Minister of Health and Social
Affairs, Hae-Won Lee who had long experience as a professor as well as a
politician, were enthusiastic about the implementation of the pension
programme. According to Dr. Chong-Kee Park, especially, Dr. Kim (when he
had an informal talk with experts) expressed his opinion that he would, by all
means, implement the pension programme during his term of office.9
Through the deputy Prime minister's support, therefore, cross-departmental
cooperation was facilitated and the MOHSA and other relevant research
institutions such as the KDI took a positive attitude towards preparing for the
pension programme.
Finally, since, President Chun came to power, many people interested in
9 Interview with Dr. Chong-Kee Park and Dr. Man-Jae Kim.
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social security organized academic research institutions, for example, the
Academic Association of Social Policy in 1981 and the Korea Institute for
Welfare Policy in 1982 and so on, and brought the welfare issue to the
forefront of social concerns. Presumably, this trend received impetus from
the Chun regime's state goals which were "welfare and justice." At any rate,
this was quite unexpected, since associations for studying social problems,
socialism, and the like had no chance for growth because of the
government's policy of dissolation and the prevention of gatherings and
publication. Among these institutions, the Academic Associaltion of Social
Policy perhaps could stand out as the most influential intellectual
organization. The association led by scholars has infused the idea of social
security system into the government as well as the people. For this purpose,
the association has published "The Korean Journal of Social Policy," while
continually holding academic conferences on social policy. These
institutions played an effective part as pressure groups as well as furnished
information to the government, so that the government had to listen to some
of these vital findings.
7.2.2. Economic conditions.
For the Korean economy, 1986 was a landmark year for several aspects.
First, Korea recorded its first trade surplus in modern economic
history.Several factors contributed to this remarkable economic
performance. Korea's industrial competitiveness was strengthened as a
result of consistent government efforts to stabilize prices and to increase
manufacturing productivity. Moreover, since the mid-1980s, the world
economy has been experiencing rapid changes with regard to the exchange
rates, 11 international interest rate12 and oil price.13 Owing to the downward
trends of those three variables, the so-called, "three blessing", Korea
achieved high rates of economic growth in 1986 as their export rose rapidly,
10 The current account, which had suffered chronic deficits, ran a significant surplus of US $4.6 billion.
11 The dollar which began to soften in March 1985, was depreciated on average 26.5% against the
currencies of other major industrialized countries in 1986. See,EPB(1987), Economy Survey. Annual
Report of the Korean Economy. Republic of Korea, p. 3.
12 At the end of 1986, the U.S. prime rate and the Eurodollar interest rates stood at 7.5% and 6.4% per
annum, respectively, a decline of 1.5 to 2.0% point from the previous year. See, EPB(19871. Ibid.
12 During 1986, oil prices verged US$15 a barrel, down sharply from about US$28 in the previous year.
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helped by the strong Japanese Yen and other favourable world economic
conditions.14 As a result, the government could pursue a flexible monetary
and credit policy to provide adequate financial resources for the vigorous
growth of the socio-economic development. Furthermore, Korea's external
debt, which had continuously increased, began to decline as repayments of
foreign loans grew substantially.
Secondly, increased GNP per capita from $396 in 1973 to $2,000 in 1985
has been signalling the stability of both industrial workers and business
firms to pay pension premiums. The experiences of advanced countries
show that the introduction of social security pension systems is essential for
the continued stable growth of a capitalist economic system. Despite her
growing economic status, Korea seemed rather late in introducing a national
pension system necessary for social stabilization.
Thirdly, as we can see in Table 7-1, inflation, which was previously one of
the major obstacles to the implementation of the pension programme, has
stabilized considerably since around 1982. In 1973 when the NWP Act was
enacted, the average annual inflation rate was about 15 percent. During
1986, however, the wholesale price index actually fell 1.5 percent, while the
consumer price index inched up 2.8 percent.
Table 7-1. Trends of Inflation, 1972-1986. (Unit: %).
1972 1973 1975 1980 1982 1985 1986
Wholesale 8.4 15.1 19.6 38.9 4.7 0.9 -1.5
Consumer 9.1 8.5 23.8 28.7 7.3 2.5 2.8
Sources: EPB, Statistical Handbook, Each Year and EPB(1987). Ibid., p. 30.
Since single-digit inflation in 1982, Korea has been able to maintain price
stability for five consecutive years. With success in curbing the annual
inflation rate to 3-4 percent by 1982, the foundation for implementing
pension systems began to solidify about the mid-1980s.15
Fourthly, the people's income levels have steadily improved thanks to the
nation's remarkable economic growth, as we can see in Table 7-2. Further,
thanks to the government's sustained effort to stabilize prices, real wages of
14 In 1986, the Korean economy grew 12.3% in real terms.
15 Jae-Sung Min & Byong-Ho Tchoe(1989). Korea's Pension System and Major Policy Issues,,
KDI Working Paper No. 8920. p. 6.
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workers rose at an annual average rate of 7 percent between 1982 and
1986, despite the low national wages rised in the period.
Table 7-2. Wage Increase by Year, 1974-1986. (Rate of Increase: %).
1974 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986
Normal wage 31.9 35.0 23.4 15.8 8.7 8.2
Increase rate of
Consumer price
26.6 16.4 28.7 7.3 2.3 2.8
Real wage 5.3 18.6 -4.1 7.9 6.3 5.8
Sources: EPB(1986), The Sixth Five-Year Economic & Social Development Plan, 1987-
1991,Republic of Korea., p. 42; EPB(1987), Economic Survev(1987). Ibid., p. 48; EPB,
Korea: Statistical Handbook, Each Year.
Fifthly, the employment structure has changed rapidly. As we can see in
Table 7-3, employment in agriculture, forestry and fisheries shows
decreasing trends, compared with 50.0 percent in 1973, 45.9 percent in
1975, 34.0 percent in 1980 and 23.6 percent in 1986. The secondary and
tertiary industries, instead, rose steadily. Thus, the secondary industry at
25.9 percent, up 1.4 percent from 1985, exceeds the primary industry's
share of 23.6 percent for the first time in the history of Korea. With the
development of the country towards an industrialized society, wage earners
account for most of the employed population. It is now very important to
guarantee workers and salary earners a secure livelihood after their
retirement, or after their careers are cut short by unexpected accidents.
Table 7-3. Employment by Industrial Sector, 1973-1986. ( Unit: % ).
Primary Sector Secondary Sector Tertiary Sector
1973 50.0 16.3 33.7
1975 45.9 19.1 35.0
1980 34.0 22.6 43.4
1983 29.7 23.3 49.0
1985 24.9 24.5 50.6
1986 23.6 25.9 50.5
Sources: EPB, Korea: Statistical Handbook, Each Year.
EPB(1987),_|bid., p. 42.
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Finally, the national savings ratio reached 32.6 percent in 1986, up
considerably from the previous year's 28.6 percent. By contrast, the foreign
savings ratio shifted from a positive 3.1 percent in 1985 to a negative 2.7
percent in 1986. This meant that Korea was now able to sufficiently finance
its investments with its domestic funds for the first time since the country
began its economic development in the early 1960s.
7.2.3. Social Conditions.
The social conditions also were an appropriate and timely reason for
Korea to implement the pension programme.
First, the social security system is closely related to the demographic
structure. The demographic structure began to change, showing a relatively
rapid increase in the population of the aged compared to that found in more
advanced countries, as we can see in Table 7-4. The population of Korea is
predicted to reach 48.0 million by the year 2,000 and achieve zero growth
rate at about 53.1 million by 2030. By the end of 1986, the proportion of the
population aged 60 or above was 6.8 percent in Korea. This is estimated to
increase to 10.0 percent in the year 2000 and 25.0 percent in 2040 due to
the increase in life expectancy resulting from medical developments as well
as a zero birth rate. An increase in the proportion of the aged affects both the
intensity of the pressure to make some provision for this group and also the
real economic cost of doing so. 16 |n addition, with the prolonged life
expectancy and rapid decline of the fertility rate, the ratio of older people in
Korea will rapidly increase in comparison to that of industrialized countries
as table 7-5 shows.
Table7-4: Age Projections, 1973-2040. (In thousand).
1973 1986 2000 2040
Total population(A) 34,103 41,569 48,017 53,180
Elderly 60 and over(B) 1,775 2,825 4,781 13,295
B/A(%) 5.2 6.8 10.0 25.0
Dependency rate* 10.4 9.3 6.7 3.2
*: Ratio of population aged 15-59 to population aged 60 and over. Source: KDI estimates,
Bureau of Statistics of EPB. Quoted from Min & Tchoe(1987). Ibid, p.2
16 Eveline M. Burns, op.cit.. p. 271.
340
Table7-5:Share of the Over 65 Age Group of the Population. (In Year).
Share of the over 65 aae aroup
5% 12%
Elapsed years
Korea 1993 2020 29
Japan 1950 1990 40
U.S.A. 1925 1990 65
France 1790 1965 175
Sources: Bureau of Statistics of EPB; Japan's Ministry of Welfare(1985), White Paper on
Welfare. Quoted from Min & Tchoe(1987). Ibid, p. 2.
Secondly, as for the age structure of the working population, the baby-boom
generation of the 1950s began to enter the labour market in the mid-1980s,
signifying the need for a mature pension system by the time they became
aged. Otherwise, various constraints on social policy measures may appear.
Such a system is also needed to maximize accommodation of this over¬
sized generation through expanding the years of pension contribution(See,
Table 7-6).
Table 7-6: Demographic Structure from the Year of the Implementation
of the National Pension. (In %).
Year of implementation 1988 1993 2000
Share of insured persons* 74.2 72.7 68.9
Share of pensioners at maturity* 23.8 26.8 28.3
Notes:*: Ratio of population aged 15-44 to population aged 15 and over of males.
**: "At maturity" means that 40 years have elapsed since the year of
implementation, and the share of pensioners indicates the ratio of
population aged 60 and over to population aged 15 and over of males.Quoted from
Min & Tchoe. Ibid., p. 7.
Thirdly, the proportion of the nuclear family has increased following
urbanization with economic growth, population migrations between
industrial sectors as well as regions, and the increase of wage and salary
workers. As Table 7-7 shows, the one-fourth of the total households lived
with three generations or more under one roof in 1966 while only one-sixth
did so in 1980. In other words, the nuclear family was becoming more
popular.
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Table 7-7. Composition of Household by 1rype, 1966-1985. (Unit: %).
One-
generation(A)
Two(B) Three(C) Four(D) A+B:C+D
1966 5.7 67.7 24.0 2.6 2.76:1
1970 6.8 70.0 22.1 1.1 2.31:1
1975 6.7 68.0 19.2 0.9 3.97:1
1980 8.4 69.5 16.7 0.5 4.81:1
1985* 9.5 67.0 14.9 - -
Sources: EPB(1985), Social Indicators in Korea. *: Dong-A llbo, 10 November, 1987.
At the present, however, about 75 percent of the aged have no means of
supporting themselves and are dependent upon their children. Accelerated
urbanization during industrialization and increase of nuclear families have
eroded the traditional social institutions supporting the elderly, creating a
major social problem(See, Table 7-8).
Table7-8: Income Sources of the E derly. In percent*).
Korea Japan Thailand U.S.A. U.K. France
Earning from
work
21.8 41.0 42.1 27.3 11.6 5.1
Public
pension
1.7 64.6 4.1 82.1 87.7 74.9
Private
pension
- 8.4 0.4 27.1 35.5 49.3
Withdrawal
from savings
3.5 11.4 6.9 22.0 15.2 6.9
Yield from
property
5.5 15.6 8.3 45.1 13.1 11.9
Support from
family




2.0 1.7 0.5 3.3 13.6 4.3
Others 3.6 4.8 5.2 8.2 5.7 4.7
Note: *: Percentages are double discounted.
Source: Korea Survey(Gallup) Polis( 1984). Life Style and Value System of the Aged in
Korea., p. 163.
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Therefore, the changing role of the family system inevitably affects social
security policy.
Finally, the rapid process of industrialization and urbanization have
increased the risks of income loss by raising the rate of accidents and
introducing new types of occupational diseases and environmental
pollution(See, Table 7-9).
Table 7-9: Trends of Work Injury and Traffic Accident, 1973-1985.




















Sources: Ministry of Labour and Ministry of Transportation.
7.2.4. Diffusion Influence.
Diffusion influence was also very much in evidence. With the proliferation
of social security policies throughout the world and with the increasing
association of this policy with progressive government, the continued
absence of a national pension programme in Korea became a source of
some embarrassment to Korean policy-makers. Judging from reports made
by the MOHSA and the KDI, the policy-makers indicate their discomfort at
the growing isolation of Korea from this international policy making trend.
Among the 40 countries whose GNP per capita exceeded $2,000 in 1985,
only three countries, namely Korea and two oil-producing countries, Oman
and The United Arab Emirates, had failed to implement social security
pension systems.17 Further, with the 1988 Seoul Olympics as the
showpiece, the Korean government made a display of her national fortunes.
Due to their concerning about a their international image, the Chun
government had to re-initiate a pension programme.
17 World Bank(1985), World Development Report.
U.S.Department of Health and Human Services(1985). Social Security Programs Throughout the
World.
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7.3. The Policy-Making Process.
7.3.1. The First Outline: The Conference of Interested
Organizations.
After the President's announcement, the MOHSA, as a government agency
with jurisdiction over social security, gave an impetus to the examination of
how the existing NWP programme should be readjusted in relation to the
new environments. As it is already mentioned, the three related agencies
made a study of pension programmes and proposed their own programmes.
However, there were some divergencies in these proposals. Therefore, the
MOHSA invited the related agencies^ to a conference to be held on 23rd of
August, 1986, to adjust these differences.
At the conference, some of the differences were smoothly solved, but
others were not agreed upon. The main issues of this conference were
matters connected with the Retirement Allowance System and the
contribution ratio between employee and employer. 19 In particular, there
was a serious controversy between the KFE and the FKTU on the
amendment of the Retirement Allowance System. The Korea Employers'
Federation(KEF) insisted on the amendment of the system simultaneously
with the implementation of the pension programme, but the FKTU
maintained that the pension programme should be implemented with the
same contribution rate(2.5% each) between employer and employee in the
early stage of implementation without the amendment of the Retirement
Allowance System; such amendment should be considered subsequently as
a long-term policy.
Meanwhile, the academic circle suggested a compromise proposal
through re-construction of the notion of the Retirement Allowance System,
comprising 50% as a deferred income and 50% as a reward for meritorious
service. As a result, the following two alternative proposals were adopted.
18 The participants were: (1). The MOHSA( Vice-Minister, Director of Planning and Management Office
and Director of Social Insurance Bureau); (2). The EPB( Director of Economic Planning Bureau ); (3).
The Ministry of Labour( Director of Labour Standard Bureau ); (4). The KDI( Vice-President and Chief
Research Commissioner ); (5). The Korean Institute for Population and Health( Vice-President, Hung-
Dal Lim ); (6). The FKTU( Secretary-General, Young-Jun Lee ); (7). The KEF( Vice-President, Nung-Sun
Yoon ); and (8). Academic Circlef Prof. Rae-Young Park and Prof. Soo-Sik Shin ).
19 The Pension Planning Division( 1987 ), The Administrative Diaries. The Bureau of Welfare Pension,
The MOHSA. p. 20.
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A. The First Proposal ( The Academic Circle's Proposal ).
Year 1988 1992 1998
Employee 1.0% 2.0% 3.0%
Employer 1.0 2.0 3.0
From Retirement Allowance Reserve 1.0 2.0 3.0
Total 3.0% 6.0% 9.0%
B. The Second Proposal.
Year 1988 1992 1996 2000
Employee 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0
Employer 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
From Retirement Allowance
Reserve - 1.5 3.0 4.5
Total 2.5% 5.0% 7.5% 10.0%
After the conference, the MOHSA decided to draw up a first outline of the
pension programme with reference to the other proposals and the comments
and suggestions made by participants at the hearing and conferences. For
this, the MOHSA drew a comparison between its own proposal and the EPB
(The KDI ) proposal which was submitted for the Six Five-Year Plan.
The controversial issues between the MOHSA and the EPB proposals
were the matters connected with the assessment methods of the pension
account, benefit levels, lump-sum refunds, and utilization of the pension
funds.
A. Assessment Methods of the Pension Account: The pension benefits are
composed of a basic amount(A) and an additional amount(B). However, the
assessment method of the additional amount were different between the two
proposals. The benefit levels covered by the EPB proposal were lower than
that of the MOHSA proposal.
The MOHSA Proposal The EPB Proposal
The additional amount should be calculated
at the average standard monthly income for
the immediately past three years.
*Method: 2.4A + B( 2.4+ 0.01n) (1+0.04n)
the average standard monthly
income during the whole insured term.
"Method: 2.4 ( A+B ) (1+0.05n).
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B. The Benefit Levels:
The Monthly Benefit
Levels
(1). Based on the average
wage workers(270,000
Won):





(2). Based on the above
average wage workers:^
* 410,000 Won and
contributed for 30 years:
* 1,000,000 Won and
contributed for 30 years:
The MOHSA Proposal The EPB Proposal











47.3 %. 37.9 %.
C.The Qualification of the Lump-Sum Refund:
The MOHSA Proposal. The EPB Proposal.
Persons whose insured term is less
than 10 years, and when they reach the
age of 60.
Persons whose insured term is less than 15
years, and when they loose their insured status
for more than one year.
20 The benefit levels of the MOHSA proposal should be relatively higher than that of the EPB proposal.
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D. The Organization and Utilization of the Pension Fund:






* Executive Secretary2 ^
* Minister of the MOHSA.
* Director of the National
Pension Bureau.
* Minister of the EPB.
* Director of the Economic
Planning Bureau.
(2). The Method of Fund
Employment:22
To prevent the encroachment
on pension funds from other
departments, the funds
should be utilized for the
investment.
With the object of the utilization
of pension funds for economic
development capital or
industrial investment, the
pension funds should b e
utilized as interbank deposits,
trust cash funds and the
purchase of profitable
securities.
(3). The Utilization of
Pension Fund:
A part of the pension funds
should be utilized at a low rate
of interest in promoting the
welfare of the insured.
In this case, the other
departments concerned will
present a claim for the use of
the pension funds for their own
projects.
Subsequently, the Division Chief of Pension Planning of the MOHSA as a
head of the working group, made a report on the interim findings to his
superiors^ 0n 8th and 10th of September, 1986 respectively. In these
reports, he proposed to adopt the EPB's proposals on the whole, except the
component authorities of the Committee for the National Pension Fund
Operation. In relation to the component authorities of the Committee for the
21 The Ministry of Finance also put up the Director of Financial Management Bureau to stand for the
Executive Secretary based on Article 8 of the National Investment Fund Act which prescribed that the
Ministry hasdvested rights over 80 % of the pension funds management.
22 In spite that the Ministry of Construction is not an allied Department, the Ministry planned the
utilization of the pension funds for the investment of public housing in the Sixth Five-Year Plan.
23 The participants were the Vice-Minister, Director of Planning and Management Office, and Director of
Social Insurance Bureau.
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National Pension Fund Operation, he suggested the following three possible
options and reported the relative merits and demerits of each of these
options.24
1) Jurisdiction The Merits. The Demerits.
2) Chairman
3) Members
(1). The First Option: a). Maximization of the a). Difficulty in coordination
1) The MOHSA increase to the fund. among the related
2) The Minister of MOHSA b). Facilitation in parallel Departments in relation to
3). The Vice-Ministers of related with other social security the utilization of the fund.
Departments( EPB, Finance, programmes.
MOHSA and Labour),
Representatives of employees
and employers and related
experts.
(2). The Second Option: a). A fair fund management. Difficulty in ensuring the
1). The National Pension b). Emergence from the government's positive
Corporation. government-leading assistance in connection
2). The President should impression. with the utilization of the
appointed on the c). Maximization of the fund.
recommendation of the Minister increase to the fund.
of MOHSA.




and employers and related
experts.
24 The Pension Planning Division! "1987 ), Ibid., pp. 25-26 and 30.
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(3). The Third Option: Easiness of investment to a). Based on the people's
1). The EPB. the essential economic misunderstanding i n
2). The Minister of EPB. projects. contradistinction to the basic
3). Representatives of the object of the pension
government, employers, programme.
employees and related experts. b). Impediment to the long-
term balance of revenues
and expenditures.
7.3.2. The Second Outline: The Conference of the Consultative
Committee.
Thereafter, the MOHSA confirmed a tentative plan and called a
consultative committee meeting on the 13th of September, 1986.25 During
the conference, the assessment methods of pension account and the
qualifications for a lump-sum refund were the main points at issues. The
arguments were as follows:
The Assessment Methods of
the Pension Account.





If the additional amount is calculated
at the average standard monthly
income during the whole insured
terms, there will be difficulty in
calculating the substantial values and
the computation itself will b e
complicated. Therefore, it should be
calculated at the average standard
monthly income for the last
immediate last three years.
If a lump-sum refund is paid one year
after disqualification, it will be conflict
with to the purpose of the pension
programme and will have an adverse
effect on the pension funds. Therefore,
it should be paid when the insured has
reached age 60. The refund for the
women insured, however, should be
paid one year after disqualification in
light of the Korea's special employment
structure.
25 The participants were: (1). The MOHSA( Vice-Minister, Director of Planning and Management
Office,Director of Social Insurance Bureau and Division Chief of Pension Planning)), (2). The EPB(
Director of Economic Planning Bureau), (3). The KDI( Chief Research Commissioner), (4). The Korean





If it is calculated at the average
standard monthly income for the
immediate last three years, there will
be several problems arising:
a). When the income level is
changed abruptly, the problem of
equity among the insured will arise.
b). The problem of wrongful
employment in order to take high
pension benefits will arise.
c). The personal productivity during
the insured period can not be
reflected in the pension benefits.
Therefore, it should be calculated at
the average standard monthly
income during the whole insured
term.
It should be paid one year after stopping
working for these reasons:
a). This was already decided by mutual
consent between employee and
employer in the process of coordination
between the pension programme and
the retirement allowance system.
b). This was already popularly known to
the general public.
c). The effect on the pension funds will
be at most 3 years because ninety-six






If it is calculated at the average
standard monthly income during the
whole insured term, the average
standard benefits will be lowered so
that the insured will be in difficulty in
providing against their old age.
It should be paid immediately after
disqualification in consideration of the
realistic conditions about labour.
As a result of the consultative committee meeting, the MOHSA had
decided to adopt the above two EPB proposals.
The last unsolved issue was the one concerning matters connected with
the Committee for the National Pension Fund Operation. Even though the
MOHSA consulted continuously with the EPB to solve this issue, the
MOHSA could not accomplish its proposal. So long as the EPB adhered to
its proposal, the MOHSA could not but take a compromising attitude. During
his fourth report to his superiors on the interim findings on 22nd of
September, 1986, therefore, the Division Chief of Pension Policy suggested
an alternative proposal namely that the Prime Minister should be the
Chairman of the Committee and Members of the Committee should be
composed of the related Ministers, representatives of employers and
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employees and related experts.26
7.3.3. The Draft Bill: The Competent Departments Conference.
The final MOHSA proposal was settled on the 30th of September, 1986
and the MOHSA informed the Blue House (the Second Minister Without
Portfolio) and the legislative examiner of the Health and Social Affairs
Committee in the National Assembly. The same day, the thirteen competent
departments conference was held to deliberate on the MOHSA proposal.27
In this conference, the participants discussed the MOHSA proposal article
by article and then the MOHSA put various views together. The contents of
the suggestions and their results will be shown in the Appendix Four .28
After it made out the Draft Bill, the MOHSA announced the legislation of
the National Pension Law in advance on 4th of December, 1986, and it
requested institutions or individuals with opposite views about the Draft bill
to present them in written form. Several institutions and individuals set forth
their opinions. Thereafter, the Draft Bill was submitted to a Cabinet Council
and passed on 14th of November after the partial modification of the
wording, suggested during the deliberations of the Vice-Ministers'
Conference on 22nd of October, the Joint Meeting of the Executive and the
Ruling Party on 23rd of October, the Economic Ministers' Conference on
24th of October, and the Office of Legislation on 7th of November, 1986.
Subsequently, the Draft Bill obtained the President's approval on 19th of
November and sent it to the National Assembly on 22nd of November, 1986.
28 The Pension Planning Division(1987), Ibid., p. 44.
27 The participating departments were the EPB, the MOHSA, the Government Administration, Home
Affairs, Finance, Justice, Defense, Education, Agriculture & Fishery, Commerce & Industry, Labour,
Transportation, and Communication.
28 The Pension Planning Division (1987), Ibid., pp. 53-57.
351
7.3.4. Deliberation of the National Assembly.
The National Pension Bill was submitted to the 131th National Assembly
and was laid the Bill before the Health and Social Affairs Committee on 27th
of November, 1986. However, the discussion was deferred to the next
meeting.
The Bill was substantially discussed at the 14th session of the Health and
Social Affairs Committee on 10th of December, 1986. First, the Committee
members received the proposed explanation from the Minister of Health and
Social Affairs and then the report of the preliminary screening from the
expert adviser.29
In the second place, the Committee had a question period. However, there
was no offensive movement taken by the outs against the government bill
because most of the opposition members were prevented by the
constitutional amendment debate from attending the Committee. Therefore,
only four committee members inquired about the substantial issues, such as
the questions of the scope of coverage (Si-Bong Chong), the coordination
with the Retirement Allowance System (Joung-Dong Kwon and Sung-Tae
Park), the position of the Chairman of the Committee for the National
Pension Fund Operation (Joung-Dong Kwon), the interest rate of the lump¬
sum refund (Jip Kim), and the Standard level for tax exemption and
reduction (Jip Kim).30
After questions and answers the Bill was put to the vote and the Committee
passed the Bill in its original form. Finally, the National Pension Bill was
passed in the Assembly Plenary Session on 17th of December, and was
promulgated on 31st of December, 1986. The Law will be in operation on 1st
of January, 1988.
29 National Assembly, Record on the Health and Social Affairs Committee (131th). See Nos. 14.
pp. 2-8.
30 National Assembly, Ibid., pp. 8-11.
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7.4. Conclusion.
In this chapter, we examined how the pension programme re-emerged on
the political agenda and then scrutinized the pension policy-making
process: how the programme was readjusted in relation to the new socio¬
economic environment.
In this analysis, we found that the government decision of pension policy
was a result of a matured socio-economic environment and the support of
political elites for this development strategy. At this time, the most crucial and
immediate cause for this initiation derived from the economic environment.
Economically, the year of 1986 was a landmark for the following aspects. (1).
Korea recorded its first trade surplus in modern economic history. As a
result, the government could pursue a flexible monetary and credit policy to
provide adequate financial resources for the vigorous growth of socio¬
economic development. This environment was very important because the
first two attempts at NWP implementation emerged and failed on the verge of
economic recession. (2). Increased GNP per capita from $396 in 1973 to
$2,000 in 1986 had been signaling the stability of both industrial workers
and business firms to pay pension contributions. (3). Inflation which was
previously one of the major obstacles to the implementation of the NWP
programme, had stabilised considerably since around 1982. In addition, the
interests, goals, and activities of the authoritarian government also created a
favourable environment for the pension policy. State activism to promote
long-term industrial peace and productivity and increase the stability of the
political and economic system was the primary impetus for the creation of a
national pension policy at the time.
After the President's news conference, the MOHSA, as a government
agency with jurisdiction over social security, gave an impetus to examine
how the existing NWP programme should be readjusted. Therefore, the
policy-making itself was not as complicated as that of the NWP scheme. As
has explained, the three related agencies proposed their own preliminary
pension programmes and these proposals were substantially different. The
controversial differences between the MOHSA and the EPB proposals were
the matters connected with the assessment methods of the pension account,
benefit levels, lump-sum refunds, and utilisation of the pension funds. On the
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other hand, the different issues between the FKTU and the FKI were matters
connected with the Retirement Allowance system and the contribution ratio
between the employer and the employee. Even though the MOHSA
consulted continuously with the EPB to resolve these controversial issues,
the MOHSA could not accomplish its proposal. In the end, the MOHSA's
endeavour ended in failure, so that most of the EPB's proposals were
adopted.
The National Pension Bill was discussed at the 14th session of the Health
and Social Affairs Committee. Even though the Committee had a question
period, there was no opposition because members were prevented by the
debate on constitutional amendment from attending the Committee.
Therefore, without much serious debate, the National Pension Bill was
passed in the Assembly Plenary Session on 17th of December, and was
promulgated on 31th of December, 1986.
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Chapter 8. Conclusions.
As we outlined in Chapter One, the purpose of this thesis has been to
examine the development of the National Pension Programme in Korea and
the factors related to its development within the context of its national
characteristics. After this examination of the development of the Korean
National Pension Programme, what can be said about the factors necessary
to construct a satisfactory explanation for the development of this state's
activities? In this concluding chapter, we will explain briefly what we
attempted to do in this study and what are implied as to the objectives of this
study.
8.1. Summary and Major Findings.
In Chapter Two, before turning to an assessment of the pension policy¬
making process, we examined the national characteristics of Korea and their
impacts on the social security policy development. We expected that this
attempt would help to make it clear how important the Korean national
characteristics were to this study and what is considered more specifically in
the context of pension policy-making. We found in Chapter Three that the
Confucian ideology underlies the government structure and relationship
between people so that it provides the value codes for the conduct of the
government, the people, and between the government and the people.
Confucian ideology emphasizes the hierarchical order, which defines the
relationship between government and the people and the relationship
between the head of the family and the family members. These relationships
have impeded development of social security policy in Korea. The
authoritarian rulers did not enable the people to express their needs and call
for social policy, so that the political leaders and bureaucrats upon whom
social policy development depended did not concern themselves with this
matter. Under the Confucian ideology, the 'Kubin' which means
safeguarding the poor, has dominated the basic ideology of the social
security system in Korea for a long time. As a result, the concept of 'welfare
right' has not spread through the majority of the population until recently.
355
However, the absence of public provision of welfare services for those in
need does not mean that they receive no care. Traditional Korean values
lead people to care for their elderly parents, disabled family members, or
poor relatives. In Korea, much care for the needy is still concentrated in the
private sector of the family and community. In terms of material possession,
Korean homes have already been modernized or are being modernized, but
the pattern of family life, with two or three generations living together, is not
modern as that term is understood in Europe or America.
Unlike other developing countries, the former colonists did not introduce
modernised social security systems, so that Korea was not influenced by the
diffusion effects during the Japanese and U.S. military occupation periods.
The modern Korean social security system emerged with the Korean War.
The war created huge needy populations in Korea: war orphans, widows,
refugees, and others. Furthermore, the war had a bad effect on the
development of social security policy in Korea. As Wilensky claims, heavy
military expenditures eventually slow down the development of the welfare
state because political energy and expert talent are taken away from the
domestic programme and economic resources are used up.1 Statistics show
that Korean military expenditure is extremely high in that it totalled 28.6
percent of the total government expenditures in 1988.2 This figure, when
viewed against Wilensky's hypothesis, suggests that Korea's heavy military
burden is an obvious obstacle on the road to welfare state.
Modern social security facilities in Korea developed out of this social
historical context to order to deal with these problems. Since the 1960s, this
early development of person social services-oriented welfare programmes
has been reshaped to a large scale social policy. However, inadequate
funding of the system exists because government policy priorities were
given to other areas such as defence and economic development planning.
In sum, an examination of the process of social security policy
development in Korea whose ideology, culture, and socio-economic
structure differs considerably from the West can be unique and fruitful for
theory development of contemporary comparative social policy.
The actual story of the policy-making process of the pension programme
was considered from Chapter Four to Chapter Seven. In these chapters we
1 Harold Wilenskv(1975). Ibid., pp. 70-85.
2 IMF( 1988), Government Finance Statistics Yearbook. Washington D.C., p. 40.
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examined the formulation of the pension schemes, beginning with the
description of the environments that the Korean government faced and
ending with the final enactment of the pension programme during the period
of 1973-1986. Throughout the policy-making process, we aimed at the
following issues. First, the issues to be examined throughout would be
where and how policies were initiated, brought to the attention of the
government, propelled forward to the point of commitment, or blocked and
quietly buried. Secondly, what were the roles of these four determinants in
effecting the decision? Finally, how key issues were managed— in other
words, what actually happened to certain issues in terms of compromise and
coalition between the different issues and agents? It describes that system in
detail, with chapters covering each of the major participants or leading
sources of influence on policy choices. Each chapter, therefore, assessed
the role and policy perspectives of a leading actor or cluster of actors related
by interest, ideology, or function.
In this research of the Korean national pension policy-making, our major
findings are as follows.
(1). The NWP programme of 1973 emerged as a political agenda with two-
purposes: socio-economic palliation and economic acceleration. In other
words, the pension policy was started with the policymakers' understanding
that a well designed social security programme would not only serve as a
desirable social goal but also an important economic objective.
(2). For these purposes, two agencies, the SSC/MOHSA and the KDI/EPB,
put forward their proposals. However, the two proposals were widely
different, since they were originally intended for different purposes. The
MOHSA's proposal laid emphasis on the former purpose, whereas the
EPB's proposal was geared primarily to the latter purpose. In addition, the
two proposals have shown that the ideological distinction was obvious. The
KDI's proposal was modelled after the social security system of the United
States with the consultation of many people from that country, while the
MOHSA's plan was modelled on the social insurance system of Japan. It is
therefore important to note that the prime purpose of their consultation was
to search for compromise or to reach an agreement in the policy-making
process. This means that central government departments, whilst often
being the target of external pressure groups, were playing pressure group
roles themselves. Thus, the conflict was set between the MOHSA and the
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EPB. As we have seen in Chapter Five, the NWP programme was made by a
relatively constricted and autonomous set of actors with a strong sense of
proprietorship in the programme. Among the preparatory groups, the
MOHSA set up the NWP policy-making strategy within the control function of
the EPB, which was headed by a powerful Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister of EPB who maintained close contact with the president. As a result,
even though the MOHSA had some power of influence as a government
agency with the jurisdiction over social security, it was doubtful whether
there existed any MOHSA's authority in the policy-making process. In the
NWP policy-making process, on the other hand, the role of pressure from
subordinate classes and other organized pressure groups associated with
them was not found because the political environment did not allow their
activities under the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime. Given these features,
the NWP programme was formulated on the guidelines of the president and
his staffs. Consequently, the policy-makers adopted more parts of the KDI's
proposals than of the MOHSA proposals, partly because the government
was against the high cost of the NWP programme and partly because the
government had hidden intentions that the reserves accumulated by the
pension scheme would be an important source of funds to finance part of
domestic investment. The examination of this study showed that elite
attitudes and political initiatives were key factors in determining whether or
not political coalitions for the new social security programme could be put
together.
(3). As we have seen in Chapter Six, the NWP programme was postponed
by the Economic Emergency Measures for Stabilisation of the People's Life
on 14th of January, 1973. This emergency measure was caused by the oil
crisis of 1973. In this study, however, we found that the oil crisis only gave
the government a plausible excuse for postponing the NWP programme as it
does not explain why the NWP programme was postponed several times
since then even though the economic environment had improved, and why
the Private School Teacher Pension programme was implemented in 1975
even though this plan was postponed for the same reason at the same time.
Therefore, I argued that the NWP programme was postponed by political
struggles among policy-makers in the process of the formation of the
industrial restructuring strategy. This is evidence that President Park did not
accept the EPB proposals for economic reform, and that the government
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would from then on emphasize growth, stabilization, and welfare together,
rather than single-mindedly focusing on growth alone, as it had in the past.
(4). The NWP programme was then further postponed several times even
though its necessity had been affirmed and the environments had improved.
It was not until 1988, after the amended law passed in 1986, that a National
Pension Programme was really implemented by the Korean government. As
we have examined in Chapter Six, one of the main reasons was that the
governments have been preoccupied with economic development while the
need for equitable redistribution was mainly neglected. The reasons for the
governments' reluctance to assume collective responsibility are not difficult
to understand. Excessive welfare spending leads to higher taxation, while in
turn retards the capital accumulation process and diverts income away from
investment in productive economic activities. In this respect, the concept of
the welfare state may have been seen by the Korean government as a
potential threat to the successful accomplishment of its major goal—national
development. Thus caught in the cross-currents of different values,
traditions, and political and economic situations, Korea seems to be drifting
away from the implementation of the NWP programme.
Since the late 1970s, many government officials and planners have begun
to agree that equitable redistribution of income was an important issue of
Korean development. In a long-term socio-economic policy prospects
prepared in 1977, the KDI, the government's leading policy agency,
proposed the following:^
"In Korea, under the prevailing conditions, distributive equity must
be considered as one of the top priority policy objectives to promote
the welfare of the people as well as to insure national unity."
Even the ruling conservative political party joined this trend in the late
1970s.4 In particular, the year of 1979 gave most opportunity for
implementing NWP programme in relation to the political and socio¬
economic environments in Korea. The environment at that time was nearly in
the same situation as that of the early 1970s when the NWP programme was
initiated as a political agenda for the first time. At this time, too, the
3 The KDI(1978), Long-Term Prospects for Economic and Social Development: 1977-1991. Seoul: the
KDI. p. 171.
4 See, Revitalizing Reforms Political Fraternity Association(1977), Tomorrow's Korea. Seoul: Yujong
Hoe.
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government needed some appeasing policies to gain public opinion. As a
result, when President Park made an annual visit to the EPB in January,
1979, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the EPB reported to the
president on the enforcement of the NWP programme as from 1980.
Meanwhile, the Minister of Health and Social Affairs also informed the
president of the continuing study of the implementation of a NWP
programme when he visited. In reply to these recommendations, once again,
President Park only instructed that the MOHSA, without giving a concrete
form to the enforcement plan, should conduct researches into the process of
operation in advanced countries in relation to the real state of affairs in
Korea. Park had hesitations in accepting the recommendations like other
new policies mainly for two reasons. One of the reasons which underlies the
search for alternatives to the NWP is the alarm with which the president and
his staff view the financial difficulties with in the social security systems that
the industrialised countries face at that time. The other reason is that the
Korean business groups were strongly opposed to the implementation of the
NWP programme if it was not coordinated with the Retirement Allowance
system. Since the business groups, especially big business conglomerates,
were bound up with his regime, President Park was in a delicate situation if
he rejected their demands. In sum, President Park fell into a dilemma: if the
NWP programme was implemented, the result could be the expansion of
public expenditures, less flexibility in the selection of economic goals, and a
fundamental change in the government's essential priorities. Yet failure to
move in such a direction might eventually reduce the political support for his
regime, a reduction which could well result in many of the same
consequences. Therefore the NWP programme of the Fourth Plan was
doomed to continuous postponement until Park's death on 26th of
December, 1979.
During the transitional period of Korean politics after the end of the Park
regime in 1979 all new political parties raised 'equity' along with
'democracy' as major campaign issues. By early 1980, Korea lived in a
situation under which 'social welfare' and 'social justice' were used as
symbolic slogans to summarize political goals and to justify the political
identity of the new regime. Thus, social policy seemed to have become one
of the political issues which no political group could ignore in the Korean
political scene of the 1980's.
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In spite of the fact that the Korean economy has been significantly growing
in terms of the GNP and per capita GNP during this period, and the
government's pronouncement that it would promote social development
since the mid-1970s, a change of policy direction has not occurred. The
Korean economy spends a smaller proportion of its growth product on social
welfare programmes than other countries with similar economic conditions.
In 1974, for example, the total expenditure on all social security programmes
in Korea amounted to only 0.65 percent of the GNP, whereas the average
ratio of social security expenditures over the GNP ranged from 1.2 percent in
the countries with the lowest per capita incomes, to 16.2 percent in those
countries with the highest. In 1985, only 1.1 percent of the GNP has been
spent for social welfare programmes, which was a significantly low level
compared with other countries. Therefore, it is noteworthy that the growth of
social security programmes in Korea is to some extent unrelated to the stage
and rate of economic development. This observation supports the suspicion
that the enactments of the social security programmes were aimed primarily
for political propaganda, with very little intention of promotion and
implementation of the programmes. It also supports the argument that the
government uses social security programmes as an instrument for social
control. During periods of political stability, when pressures for development
of social security programmes occur, the ruling elites, acting on the basis of
the Confucian political culture of subordination of the ruled and
authoritarianism of the ruler, purposely retain and reinforce traditional values
by introduction of the official ideology of loyalty to the nation, i.e. to preserve
the status quo. We can easily find government reports which emphasize
these values. For example, the Bureau of Social Welfare's essay argued
that;5
"Advanced industrial societies, though they enjoy material
affluence, may suffer from the problems of spiritual unrest, even
with well established welfare systems and the question is raised
as to the effect of social security programmes on the further
disintegration of the family..."
Therefore,
5 The Bureau of Social Welfare(1979), "Changing Family Patterns and Social Security Protection: The
Case of Korea," International Social Security Review. Vol. No. 1. p. 31.
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"When dealing with social security in Korea, the strategies should
try to maintain a balanced development between material and
spiritual aspects by promoting the traditional social values and
cultivating the merits of the traditional family system to supplement
the social security and welfare system."6
Changes in social security programmes occur when events threaten the
political system, and political elites introduce new social security
programmes or expand the scope of the current social security programmes.
In relation to the National Pension programme, the timing of initiation and
postponement support this social control theory. The NWP programme was
initiated and developed during the preparation of the Yushin Constitution
under the martial law. Thus the National Pension programme did not evolve
out of humanitarianism or compassion but as a response by ruling elites to
threats to social stability.
(5). The pension policy was finalized when the revised National Pension
Law was enacted in 1986. As we examined in Chapter Seven, the
government decision of pension policy was a reflection of matured socio¬
economic environments and the support of political elites for this
development strategy. In particular, the most crucial and proximate cause for
this trend derived from the economic environments and the interests, goals,
and activities of the authoritarian government. State activism to promote
long-term industrial peace and productivity and increase the stability of the
political and economic system was the primary impetus for the creation of a
national pension policy at the time.
8.2. Implications for the Four Approaches.
As noted in Chapter Two, this study has adopted four approaches to the
study of the pension policy development: the socio-economic development
approach; the pluralist approach; the authoritarian-corporatist approach; and
diffusion approach. We suggest that the approaches concerned have helped
to draw the guidelines which are expected to lead to a wider knowledge of
6 Ibid., p. 30.
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the development of social security policy in the developing countries, in
particular, Korea.
After this examination of the development of the Korean National Pension
Programme, what can be said about these four approaches necessary to
construct a satisfactory explanation for the development of this state's
activities ? More generally, what can be said about those approaches to the
Korean pension policy-making which are likely to prove fruitful for new
research ? If we found some relevant evidence to show that these
approaches are relevant to the development of social security policy in
Korea, then these approaches of development of social security would have
universal applicability. On the other hand, if we could not find sufficient
evidence, we would have try to find an alternative explanation for the
development of social security policy in Korea. In order to test the above
approaches and demonstrate the explanatory values of social policy
development in the developing countries in general, and in Korea in
particular, we will analyze the influences of the four key forces on the policy¬
making process of the Korean National Pension Programme. On the basis of
the analysis presented in Chapters 4-7, the following conclusions can be
drawn.
8.2.1. The Socio-Economic Development and the Rise of
the National Pension Programme.
As we examined in Chapter Two, this approach suggests that a social
security programme emerged and expanded in the process of
industrialization. This proposition is most readily associated with the
functionalist theory of social welfare which stress on the dynamic impact of
the socio-economic changes and associated social problems that emerge
during the industrial transformation of societies. The theory posits that
economic growth increases the possibilities for choice, and these socio¬
economic changes and associated problems create political pressures for
the introduction of social security programmes and have a converging effect
in that emergent welfare institutions in different industrial societies share
common characteristics.
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However, the present study discovered that the relationship between
socio-economic development and the National Pension development was
ambiguous even though the socio-economic development process in
aggregated terms has led to creating favourable conditions for the adoption
of the programme for these reasons.
(1). In the Western countries which were the first to industrialize, the state
itself had little to do with the new forms of economic activity. When society
became convinced that the welfare of the industrial workers is too important
to be left to the vagaries of market forces, the idea of welfare programme
emerged. The idea of a welfare scheme in this context is a historical
alternative to laissez-faire government and incorporates the virtue of
government intervention to better equalize income distribution in favour of
the lower classes. However, the industrial development in Korea has not
been characterized by laissez-faire but by extensive government
intervention and the deliberate adoption of policies that would promote
industrialization. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that in this markedly
interventionist climate, political elites would formulate social policies that
were congruent with the overriding objective of industrialization and
economic progress.
(2). According the this approach, the social security system should
ameliorate the social contingencies. However, the legislation of the National
Pension scheme in Korea is by no means aiming to reduce their
development problems, e.g., poverty and inequality; but, on the contrary, to
bring more benefits in a rather subtle way to the upper and middle social
classes in the form of social stability and fiscal benefits.
(3). This approach does not explain why the extent of government
involvement in income redistribution and social security programmes has
been rather small by international standards even though Korea has
experienced outstandingly high rates of economic growth between 1960s
and 1980s, in fact, the share of social security in the total government budget
did not improve at all during this period. Therefore, it is impossible to
understand it without reference to the major role of government policy in
planning the nature of economic growth and aiming for economic
equilibrium.
(4). Finally, the socio-economic development process concurrently taking
place in Korea had not led to a total transformation and differentiation in the
social, economic, and political elements of social structure. Only in the
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aspects of industrialisation and rapid urbanisation has the socio-economic
development process brought about a transformation in economic
production and over-population in urban areas. The political system of
Korea has appeared to be far from democratic. This development has
resulted from the traditionally apathetic Korean attitude towards politics. The
social structure at large has still appeared to be a family-bound network,
through the family structure has been transformed from an extended pattern
into a stem or nuclear type as a result of urbanisation. Those accounts of the
direction and mechanisms of the socio-economic development process in
the developing countries in general in Chapter Two have thereby
substantiated our first general approach. In logical terms, if an analogous
relationship of the socio-economic process between the developed and
developing countries has not been supported and established, then any
social development approach cannot be generalised from one country to
another. In the same vein, social welfare development approach carved out
of the experience of welfare-advanced states can not directly account for the
development of welfare services in the developing countries without
modification.
8.2.2. The Relationship between the Pluralist approach
and the Rise of National Pension Policy.
As the enumeration of approaches of welfare studies suggested in Chapter
Two, the pluralist approach of social security policy development has
emphasized the existence and prevalence of pressure groups on the
formulation of social welfare policies. Pluralist theory attempted to explain
government intervention in the legislation and implementation of social
welfare programmes in terms of the pressures emanating from political
differentiation in the course of industrialisation. The main tenet of pluralist
theory is that it stressed the formation of pressure groups and the manner in
which policies are formed as the outcome of a lobbying process. It is
suggested, then, that the development of the labour movement and the
existence of the working class parties and trade unions as pressure groups
has led to the emergence of a modern welfare state. As we have seen in this
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study, the application of pluralist notions to the Korean pension policy¬
making context was open to several serious questions.
(1). The authoritarian Korean government was never a neutral arbiter as
pluralism suggests. The pension policy-making took place within an unequal
distribution of power among the government, labour unions, and the
business organisations. The top-down approach was rooted in the
paternalistic tradition of Korean society and also in the prevailing nature of
the authoritarian system of the government bureaucracy, particularly after
the military coup of 1961. In addition, an elite system formed under
dictatorial conditions was characterised by subordination, submission, and
passiveness. With the characteristics of the system of elites in a society with
a resultant monolithic power structure, the governing elites alone decide and
allocate all the major kinds of values in the society. No organisations or
other groups were permitted to challenge or act against this elite group nor
allowed even to exist if they stood against those in power, although select
high status groups, such as the business organisations who had solid
interlocking relationship with key political elites, might be able to effectively
press their claims and secure desired political outcomes. However,
occupational organisations such as labour unions did not have this political
capacity. Instead, they show workers' organisations as fundamentally bound
to the political regime through control over legal recognition. This permits
extensive regime control of the activities of unions. Thus, these pressure
groups were hardly in a position to make autonomous demands for social
security protection or secure implementation and expansion of existing
social security policies. This increasingly prominent interpretation of Korean
politics, therefore, issues a serious challenge to the pressure group politics
approach. Based on these views, the state can not be expected to be a
major instrument for redistribution against the will of the economically
dominant class. It can be argued that the political pluralism of national
pension policy-making was only a surface appearance, concealing a
compromise of competing social values, and the state welfare is a set of
policies to meet the long-term interests of the upper or upper-middle social
classes.
(2). The most important factor in pluralism was widespread individual-in-
group participation in politics. In fact, however, contemporary study revealed
that only a small minority of citizens and interest groups were involved. This
is because the Korean bureaucratic elite, a bureaucracy that clearly did not
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conform to democratic forms, warrants consideration as an effective
instrument in faciliating economic and social development objectives.
(3). Implicit in pluralism is the assumption that individuals and groups
complete freely in the political marketplace and that the outcome of the
policy process is the result of the parallelogram of forces involved in politics.
Therefore, elections are at the very least a way of keeping the score. That is,
elections permit the weighing of the political strengths of various groups and,
in a rough and imprecise manner, the relating of mass opinions to the policy
outputs of politics. However, in Korea there was virtually no relationship
between the electoral game and the policy-making game. The former merely
determined what the strength of the forces in National Assembly would be.
(4). In sum, any interpretation of social security policy development in
Korea such as the product of autonomous pressure group demands and the
articulation of workers' interests should be viewed with a certain scepticism.
It is only conceivable that the evolution of social security policy in certain
industrialised countries such as Britain or Latin American countries may be
best explained in this manner.
8.2.3. The Authoritarian-Corporatist Approach and the National
Pension Policy Development.
According to this approach, the state may not be a mere passive receiver
of pressures from groups. It may also exercise its own initiatives by using
social security as the instrument to co-opt, neutralize, and control those
groups in order to maintain some sort of social order. In attempt to overcome
a perceived threat from so-called populist movements or from political
mobilisation by popular sectors, some regimes have created a government
structure which exclude these groups as a primary element in achieving
'order' and 'social peace.' This approach, therefore, stresses the linkage
between policy development and the modern authoritarian regime, and is
central to the state-centred model. This approach was very helpful in
explaining how and why the Korean governments interested in formulating
the National Pension programme.
The central motivation for the adoption of the National Pension programme
came less from these economic trends and characteristics than from the
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needs and interests of a key political elite. As we have examined previously,
beginning around 1962, the Korean political elite, dominated by the Chief
Executive, began to actively promote rapid industrialisation. Park assumed
economic development as the key to his own political success as well as to
the establishment of political stability and as the means for overcoming
negativism and frustration in the country. Therefore, he renewed his
leadership commitments to economic development and attempted political,
economic and industrial reforms conducive to economic growth. In this
situation, the regime became increasingly involved in the active promotion
and protection of domestic industrial expansion. In order to encourage
investment, the regime acted to restrain the labour movement and to divert
an increased portion of the national income into capital investments and
returns. While there was little open opposition to these government policies,
the potential for hostile labour reaction could not be entirely dismissed.
President Park and Chun, therefore, were faced with two problems—the
problem of continued labour control and the problem of continued industrial
development. The National Pension programme was then a dual-edged
sword to attack both problems. On the one hand, this policy initiative allowed
the President to offer workers a greater symbolic participation in the benefits
of regime-sponsored industrialisation. Heightened labour support for the
regime and the cooptation of potential labour dissenters were anticipated
effects of the measure. The timing of emergence, postponement, and
reemergence of national pension policy afford a proof that the government
used the programme as a instrument for social control. The enactment was
the response to political unrest caused by the Yushin Coup in 1972. After
overcoming political crisis, however, the implementation was postponed on
the basis of the priority of economic development. Given the priority of the
national goal of economic development, any national policy was expected to
adapt to this goal. During the end of 1970s and mid-1980s, the government
was again threatened with political unrest by the economic recession and
civil rights movement. The result of this political unrest was the government's
promise of implementation of the National Pension Programme in 1988.
On the other hand, this policy was seen as a device for increasing
productivity and pacifying the workforce. With the regularization of this
aspect of work-management relations, the way was smoothed for further
industrial development. Furthermore, the accumulated capital reserves
which this programme would produce would constitute new resources for
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social and economic infrastructural development. This programme,
therefore, would also allow the state to further promote the industrialisation
effort. With these considerations in mind, a state decision in favour of
pension policy adoption was made, and directions were given for the
drafting of a formal proposal. A small group of selected bureaucrats was
charged with the development of this proposal, and this task was basically
left in their hands. After a preliminary draft was presented, the symbolic
participation of the relevant sectors was solicited. However, as the policy¬
making records show, the substantive contribution of these sectors to the
proposal was minimal, but this gesture gave the measure a populist
coloration. Therefore, this research provides much substance to an
Authoritarian-Corporatist interpretation of social security policy development
in Korea in the period covered by my research. This study illustrates the link-
-either directly or indirectly- between authoritarian-corporatism and social
policy. This approach is clearly relevant to many other developing countries.
Social security policy in many developing countries flows from paternalistic
authoritarian leaders attempting to diffuse labour agitation and protect the
status quo.
8.2.4. The Diffusion Influences and the National Pension
Policy Development.
As enumerated in Chapter Two, a few comparative studies of social
security development have suggested that the development process of
social welfare schemes is a diffusion one which takes place along two axes:
hierarchical as well as spatial. The present study has revealed that the
diffusion approach has to some extent had its feasibility in accounting for the
rise of the Pension programme in Korea. The diffusion process has taken
place in the following aspects by means of colonisation as well as
international impact. The development of the National Pension programme
has been responsive more to the impact of international organisations than
to traditional colonial legacies. Unlike other developing countries, the
influence of colonialism was not so influential in Korean case, partly
because the Japanese did not introduce any social security system in Korea
and partly because Korea did not have diplomatic relation with Japan until
1965. During the 1960s the recommendations adopted by the UN had been
used to justify the proposals for a multi-risk programme. In the early 1970s,
the Regional Conference of the International Council on Social Welfare
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which was held in Seoul and some foreign advisers such as Paul Fisher had
effect on the development of the Korean pension policy. On the other hand,
international welfare crisis in the 1970s exerted a negative influence on the
policy-makers. For example, when the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
EPB and the Minister of Health and Social Affairs reported to the president
on the enforcement of the NWP programme in 1979 the president hesitated
to accept the recommendation because of the financial difficulties social
security systems in the industrialised countries faced at that time. In the
1980s, with the proliferation of social security policy in the world, and with
the increasing association of this policy with progressive government, the
continued absence of a national social security programme in Korea
became a source of some embarrassment to Korean leaders. Among the 40
countries whose GNP per capita exceeded $2,000 in 1985, only three
countries, namely Korea and two oil-producing countries, Oman and the
United Arab Emirates, failed to implement social security pension systems.
Furthermore, taking the 1988 Seoul Olympics opportunity, the Korean
government made a display of her national fortunes. Government statements
indicate their discomfort at the growing isolation of Korea from this
international policy-making current. Thus, the association of a national social
security programme with the modern state, and the proliferation of these
programmes in the world heightened the feeling among policy-makers that
Korea should participate in this growing international movement. This
analysis indicates that diffusion exerted a rather limited influence during the
period characterised by authoritarian-corporatism but, following the
liberalisation of Korean society, is now of much greater importance. The
influence of diffusion on Korean pension development is therefore not the
same as Midgley and MacPherson hypothesise for developing societies.
Until recently it hardly operated at all, but it now operates through the
concern of policymakers in Korea not to be out-of-step with other newly
industrialised countries.
8.3. Concluding Remarks.
As Dreze and Sen have claimed7, there are two contrasting approaches to
the removal of precarious living conditions: the Growth-Mediated Security
and the Support-Led Security. In this study, we examined a typical 'growth-
mediated security' approach. Let us return to the literature on the
7 Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen(1989). Ibid., pp. 179-202.
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development of social security policy in the developing countries which we
started: are there lessons to be learned from the explanation which has
been constructed about the development of social security policy in Korea ?
I believe there are, for two reasons. First, the dynamics of economic
development in Korea between 1960 and 1986. Second, there has been, in
fact, serious detractors questioning the viability of this avenues of action.
As we have seen, the growth rate of the GNP per capita in Korea over the
last few decades has by any standard been a highly impressive one. Some
forty or so years ago, no one would have predicted such future success.
Then, war raged in the peninsula and much of the physical intrastructure
was being destroyed. The two newly created Korean states were hopelessly
and irreconcilably split and just to ward off even greater disaster and
suffering had to rely on external military support and massive international
assistance. When it joined the IMF in 1955, its per capita Gross National
Product( in current dollars) was only $65; by 1987 it was $2,818 ranked
above average on the international income scale.
Observers, seeing Korea rise from a pre-industrialised society into a
modern industrial nation-like a phoenix from the ashes of the Korean war-
have termed the success "the miracle of the Han River."8
Although Korea, with successful pursuit of growth-mediated security, has
experienced extraordinarily low rates of unemployment by the standards of
developing economies, it has been at the cost of lagging social
development. The pie has been increased but it has not been shared
evenly. The gap between rich and poor has increased, and problems of
poverty have not been solved. According to the Department of Finance, the
total amount of sales of 30 conglomerates was equivalent to 60 percent of
the GNP in 1985.9 Moreover, the EPB released a report that the annual
income of the top ten percentile was ten times greater than the income of the
bottom ten percent of the population in 1988.10 However, poverty is also
part of life for industrial workers through whom the tremendous economic
growth has been achieved. In 1987, the average monthly wage in the
manufacturing sector reached only 67.4 percent of the minimum cost of
8 C. A. Buss(1982), The United States and the Republic of Korea, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press,
p. 28.
9 Hankook Ilbo, 12 September 1982.
10 Chosun Ilbo, 16 November 1989.
371
living for a family of four as suggested by the FKTU, itself a huge
improvement on the past two decades.11 Furthermore, firms that pay
workers less than 100,000 won(approximately $120 U.S.) constitute 40.3
percent of the manufacturing sector, a fact which suggests that low-paid
workers are concentrated in the smaller companies in the industry. The
reality of inadequate wages becomes even more pointed when one
considers that the manufacturing labourer works an average of 54 hours per
week.12 These phenomena are only a reflection of the poverty suffered by
the working poor; it is easy to imagine the unbearable poverty of the self-
employed and the unemployed in a nation in which the redistributive system
of social security is extremely limited.
In response to emerging needs and public pressures, the Korean
government has maintained that the development of a welfare state has
been one of its major goals since 1981. The government sporadically
announced its willingness to reduce inequalities in income distribution and
expand the scope of social services. As a result, many social security
programmes were introduced and expanded. However, there seems to be
little sign of progress in alleviating the social problems of Korean
industrialization and in halting and reversing the rapidly increasing social
inequalities. One of the main reason is that, as we mentioned already, the
social security system in Korea primarily caters through occupational welfare
to the needs of those who are already have secure jobs and steady incomes
and excludes those who need social security protection the most. Of the
present situation in Korea it might be said that outward appearance seems
to be good and even good-looking because of its successful growth-oriented
economic development. But as long as the large majority of farmers, who
have contributed significantly to this successful growth, continue to be poor
and are not able to share the benefits in a much more equitable manner
than in the past, Korea will still have serious problems. Recent political
turmoil in Korea is based on the problems associated with this lagging
distribution of the already increased wealth, having pursued a consistent
policy giving priority to economic development planning over social policy
development.
11 Ministry of Labour! 1988), Yearbook of Labour Statistics. Seoul: Moonwonsa, p. 178. In Korean.
'2 Hankook Ilbo, 17 March 1985.
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Because of the political salience of continuing inequalities in income and
wealth distribution, the future of the National Pension programme will be
very important for the future of the welfare state in Korea. This is particularly
because of the likely gradual extension of the National Pension scheme, as
we have seen in the development of the Medical Insurance programme. This
extension is likely to be through the coverage of additional groups of
persons, including extension to new classes of undertakings either by
industry or according to the number of persons they employ.
However, it is very difficult to estimate the future of the National Pension
programme because there is a considerable time lag between the
introduction of a new programme and the increase in actual outlays. This is
particularly so in Korea because the pension programme has such a short
history. Yet, we can predict that the initial limitation of the scope of the
pension scheme and the principle of extending it gradually, will arouse
some contriversies in the future. This is because, since President Rho's
proposal on political reform on 29th of June 1987, Korea is undergoing a
spectacular transformation as measured by any one of a number of
yardsticks. People are demanding democracy. Economically, Korea has
managed to transform itself from an assembly economy to a high quality
export producer. And socially, it now confronts a host of new but completely
unwelcome economic problems associated with rapidly rising living
standards and even more rapidly rising expectations, as attested to by
labour demands. Authoritarian-Corporatism no longer provides the basis for
policy development.
These political and socio-economic transformations will have various
influences upon the evolution of the National Pension policy in the future, for
many reasons. First of all, as we mentioned already, most salient in the
historical development of the welfare state is its promotion of democratic
values. Now that a new President has been elected by popular support in
1988, it is generally conceded that the furtherance of political democracy in
Korean society is not only the crucial factor in the development of political
and social stability, but such democratization will also give strong impetus to
the development of the National Pension policy for which Korean society
has been yearning. Furthermore, this aspect of change necessary for
promoting the government's direct intervention in the sphere of social
welfare will be closely related to the issue of encouraging the participation of
traditionally neglected segments of society in the current political arena. In
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the case of the Medical Insurance, for example, the Korean government
introduced a subsidy for contributions by the lower classes because of
university students and social activists campaigning in 1989. Further
participation in the National Pension programme by the disadvantaged
segment of society is similarly essential. Furthermore, until 29th of June,
1987, Korean trade unions were docile. In the three months following Mr.
Roh's speech, however, there were 3,300 strikes, and 1,400 new unions
were formed. All unions are now pushing hard for their members' welfare. In
this process, average annual wage increases during 1988 and 1989
exceeded 20 percent, surpassing labour productivity for the same period.13
Therefore, the emergence of a reform movement within the Korean unions
may be perceived as a positive development necessitating state intervention
in the area of the National Pension policy. Moreover, the pluralist model
seems to be emerging with the evolution of interest groups. This will be
important for the development of the National Pension programme. Finally,
according to the KDI projection, the Korean economy is expected to sustain
its growth at the average annual rate of about 7 percent until the year
2000.14
However, it would be naive to imagine that the coverage of National
Pension policy in the future is likely to improve dramatically. The widening of
coverage can become possible only when the government subsidises
relatively low income persons' contribution. As we have seen already,
however, policy-makers will not be inclined to envisage a welfare society
based on heavily public welfare spending, a lesson learned from more
advanced market economies. Therefore, the social insurance system, which
is expected to expand in the future, will have to be based mainly on the
principle of cost-sharing by beneficiaries.
In sum, if significant progress is to be made in the National Pension
programme in Korea then greater priority will have to be accorded to social
welfare expenditures. Then direct and indirect subsidies will extend National
Pension policy development.
Although every country has to follow its own path to modernization and
development, all countries can learn from each other's experiences. They
can learn either what to avoid as being totally out of character and beyond
13 Chosun Ilbo, 1 December, 1989.
14 KDI(1986), Korea Year 2000, Summary Report. Seoul: The KDI.
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realization or what might be worth copying and adopting to local conditions.
Therefore, if any developing country wants to learn by Korean experience,
the instruction is that economic development appears to be a necessary
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Appendix 2: The Contents of the National Welfare
Pension Draft Bill.
1. The Basic Directions.
(1). To enhance the morale of the working people by removing anxiety and
threat from old age, disability, and death.
(2). To accomplish equal allotment of the benefits of economic
development by maintaining people's minimum living standard after they
complete their efforts and services in the process of economic development
and reach an old age.
(3) To start the social security system and to stimulate economic
development by securing investment capital through expansion of
employment opportunity and social welfare facilities.
2. Qualifications of Subscribers.
(1). Nationals of the Republic of Korea aged 18 years through 60 years( 55
for women, miners, and seamen ).
(2). Compulsory subscription is a general rule, but at the beginning of the
programme's operation voluntary subscription will be in effect because of
the heavy administrative burden that there would be if there was full
compulsory subscription.
1). Compulsory subscription: The employees of business enterprises and
organizations employing more than thirty people, but beginning in 1977
coverage will be extended to those employed the business and enterprises
and organizations with ten or more employed.
2). Voluntary subscription: The employees of businesses and
organizations excluded from the compulsory subscription, self-employed(
owners of workshops or offices, farmers, and fishermen ), and foreigners
employed in domestic corporations.
3). Exclusion from the subscription: Temporary workers, civil servants and
military personnel, and private school teachers.1
1 Private school teachers were planned to be covered by the Private School Teachers' Pension
program. Interview with Jae-Sung, Min.
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(3). Voluntary subscribers such as employees of business enterprises and
organizations with less than nine people, self-employed, and employees in
the field of farming and fishery will be gradually included in compulsory
subscription category as the system becomes mature.
3. Finance.
(1). The employed: a). Employees: 4 percent of their standard monthly
earnings as a monthly subscription fee; b). Employers: 4 percent of the
standard monthly earnings as donation and employers will contribute the
subscription fee of those whose standard monthly earning is less than one-
half of tax exemption limit( 7,500 won per month ).
(2).The self-emoloved( Voluntary subscribers ): Self-employed will pay a
monthly subscription fee determined by presidential decree, because it is
difficult to determine separate income levels.
(3). The government: Government will meet the administrative
management cost.
(4). Standard monthly earning: a). It is established to simplify collection
and payment operation: lower limit, 7,000 won per month; upper limit,
150,000 won per month; b). It will be adjusted as needed.
(5). Support in tax system: a). Amendment to tax law for 50 percent
deductible for the annuities; b). Donation of the employer will be treated as
loss in the corporation tax law; c). The effect of deduction of tax: 5,616 million
won( 1974: 878 million won).
4. Benefits.
(1). Old Age pension.
1). Qualifications: a). When subscribers reach age 60, and they have
paid the subscription fee for more than 20 years; b). A reduced pension for
those who have paid for between 10 to 20 years; c). A lump-sum refund
which is the sum of the subscription fee plus special additional pension will
be paid to those who have paid between 5(2 for women) and less than 10
years when they reach age 60(55 for women); d). A lump-sum refund which
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is the sum of the subscription fee will be paid to those who have subscribed
for less than 2 years(2 for women).
e). Interim Measures: As of 1974, for those who are aged between 41 and
55, if they subscribe for more than 10 years, the basic annual pension will be
paid, and if they subscribe between 5 and 10 years, reduced pension will be
paid.
2). Payment Methods:
a). Benefit level: Average 40 percent of the average monthly wages for the
past immediate 3 years(25%-70%); 70 percent is the maximum.
b). Benefit computation: The basic pension=equal allotment+proportional
allotment.
Equal allotment: 1% of the average monthly wages of the whole labour
multiplied by the number of months of subscription if the subscription period
is less than 240 months, it will be reckoned up for 240 months).
Proportional allotment: 1 % of the average monthly standard compensation
for the past immediate 3 years multiplied by the number of months of
subscription.
c). Adjustment of benefits: Benefits will be adjusted according to the
increase of wage and living standard as determined by the implementation
decree.
d). Additional Pensions: a). It will be paid to those who have subscribed for
more than 20 years up to 30 years; b). When claimants continue working
after 60 years of age, 40 percent to 80 percent of the basic old age pensions
will be paid between ages of 60 and 64, and 100 percent of the basic old
age pensions will be paid after 65 regardless of the employment status.
(2). Disability Pension.
1). Qualifications: a). The subscription period should be more than 3
years; b). The subscribers have to have paid the subscription fee until before
the past immediate 3 months.
2). Benefit Methods: Graduated benefits based on the basic old age
pension according to the degree of disability.
a). 1st degree disability(80% loss of earning ability): 100% of the basic
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pension.
b). 2nd degree disability(60% loss of earning ability): 50% of the basic
pension.
c). 3rd degree disability(40% loss of earning ability): 30% of the basic
pension.
d). When the NWP is in competition with Industrial Accident Compensation
or any other compensation scheme in terms of benefit payment, the claimant
should choose one from among them.
(3). Survivor Pension.
1). Qualifications: a). When the subscriber who has paid for more than
3 years dies; b). When the subscriber has paid until before the past
immediate 3 months; c). When the claimants of old age pension, and 1st and
2nd degree disability pensions dies.
2). Benefit Methods:
a). Benefits for spouse: 1). Payment will be made only to the spouse when
spouse and children have survived; 2). At the amount of 50% of the old age
basic pension for age 50 and older spouse; 3). At the amount of 50% of the
old age basic pension for those aged less than 50 for 5 years. But when the
spouse is disabled, or takes care of parents over 60 years of age or
dependent children under 18( no age limit for disabled children), the
payment will be made continuously.
b). Benefits for disabled or dependent children under age 18(when both
parents have died): 1). 30% of the basic pensions; 2). If more than one child
survived, 10% will be paid to each child.
5. Policy Effects.
(1). Establishment of the basic social security system.
(2). Attainment of income redistribution.
(3). Enhancement of national solidarity.
(4). Possibility of diverting reserve funds to economic development,
especially for an expansion of welfare facilities.
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Appendix 3: The Three Proposals.
1. The MOHSA Proposal.
The MOHSA submitted the new plan to the Sixth Five-Year Plan on 19th of
September and 10th of October, 1985 respectively. The basic directions and
contents of the new programme briefed by the MOHSA were as follows: 1
(1). The Basic Directions: 1). From the standpoint of the three-tired security
system, the public pension programme should be minimized as an income
security system. As a substitute, the pension programme should be
supplemented by enterprise and individual efforts; 2). In many advanced
countries, the creation of a pension system has resulted in an enormous
fiscal burden. In view of these experiences, the pension programme in
Korea should be moulded to maintain a long-term balance of revenues and
expenditures; 3). The pension programme should be structured in ways that
will enhance equitable income redistribution; 4). The pension programme
should promote social welfare in connection and coordination with related
programmes; 5). The pension programme should be planned to cope with
the increasing elderly and the social risks; 6). The pension programme
should be modelled to go with the population policy as well as the
preservation of the traditional family system and public morals.
(2). Appropriate Time for Implementation.
The MOHSA assumed a vague attitude in relation to the data of
enforcement. The MOHSA only presented three alternative proposals: 1).
The first option: 1987; 2). The second option: 1988; 3). The third option:
1989.
(3). The Scope of Coverage.
The MOHSA suggested that all employed persons aged between 18 and
60 were to be covered under the plan. In the early stage of implementation,
however, work places having 10 or more employees should be covered due
to the ready availability of their wage statements. The system should
eventually be expanded to cover all work places and workers. The self-
employed, including farmers and fishermen, should be insured on a
1 The Bureau of National Pension(1985), The Outline of NWP Programme. The MOHSA., 19 July, and
The National Pension Programme for the Sixth Five-Year Plan. 10 October.
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voluntarily basis according to the average income level of wage earners.
Beneficiaries of already-existing pension programmes such as civil servants,
military personnel and private school teachers should be excluded from the
pension programme.
(4). The Source of Finance.
1). The source of funds for the pension programme should be raised by
matching contributions from workers and their employers. The employees
should contribute 3 percent of the monthly earnings as a monthly
contribution and their employers should contribute 4 percent. However, a
different contribution rate should be applicable for low-income earners. In
addition, a fixed rate of contribution 1%) should be reserved as a special
reserve fund for the unemployment insurance.
2). The self-employed should contribute a fixed amount of money in
proportion to their earnings. For the lower income earners a rate of
contribution should be subsidied by government.
3). The government should contribute some portions of contribution rate
for the self-employed whose income is below the minimum standard, and
the administrative costs.
4). The employers' contributions should be treated as loss in the
corporation tax law, and the contributions and benefits of the employee and
the self-employed should be exempted from the income tax.
(5). Benefits.
1). Payment Methods:
a). Benefit level: Average 40 percent of the average monthly wages for
the past immediate 3 years.
b). The basic pension: The amount of the pension is composed of two
parts: an equal distribution part (the average monthly wage of the whole
labour for the past immediate 3 years multiplied by the number of months of
contribution) and income proportional part (the average monthly standard
contribution for the past immediate 3 years multiplied by the number of
months of contribution).
c). Additional pension: Fixed sum ( 1+ the rate of wage increase for the
last three years).
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2). Kinds of Benefits:
Benefit Type Qualifications Benefits
Old-Age
Pension
Insured for 20 years or more.
Age of 60(from age 55 in the
case of special occupations)












Age 40-60 who are not able to
meet the requirement of
benefits at the initial stage of
implementation of pension
programme.
(Special case). When the
insured contribute a
certain amount of





Insured for 3 years or more as
of the day of first medical
examination.
Benefits are determined
by the degree o f
disability:
a). 1st degree: 115% of
basic pension plus
additional pension.
b). 2nd degree: 70% ...
c). 3rd degree: 35%...
(But, the additional
pension should be given




When anyone of the following
persons dies:
a). Person insured for 3 years
or more, or former insured
person who insured 10 years or
more.
b). Person entitled to the old-
age pension or the disability
pension of the 2nd degree or
higher.





The person whose insured term
is 3 years or more, and then
unemployed involuntarily more
than 3 months.
70% of basic pension
plus additional pension




a). Person whose insured term
is less than 10 years and who
has lost insured status for more
than one year(for women) or
reaches the age of 60.
b). Insured person whose
insured terms is less than 3
years upon death.
c). Former insured person has
died before 60 years old.
Sum of contributions by






additional pension should be
benefited when the insured are
60 years old in case of the 3rd
degree).
c). Survivor pensioner.
The fixed sum( 1+ the
rate of wage increase for
the last immediate 3
years).
(6). Organizational Structure.
The MOHSA proposed three alternative options: 1). The first option: The
government should take charge of the pension operations; 2). The second
option: The establishment of the Korean Pension Corporation; 3). The third
option: The application of Medical Insurance organization.
(7). Utilization of the Pension Fund.
The objectives for the operation of National Pension funds should be the
maximization of returns rates and long-term stability. It should also be
invested in public interest-related projects such as housing fund loans and
recreation facilities for the pensioners.
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2. The EPB Proposal.
The EPB also made its own pension plan for the Six Five-Year Plan. The
contents of the pension programme was as follows:^
(1). The Basic Directions: 1). The benefits should be sufficient to guarantee
the basic minimum standard of living; 2). The pension programme should be
planned to preserve a long-term financial balance in revenues and
expenditures; 3). The contribution should be gradually increased to avoid
imposing an excessive burden on the Korean economy; 4). The pension
programme should expand its support to the low-income group through
enhancing a redistribution function; 5). The pension programme should
contribute to the economic development through increasing savings and
developing financial markets.
(2). Appropriate Time for Implementation: January 1988.
(3). The Scope of Coverage.
All workers between the ages of 18 and 60 should be eligible for the
system. In the early stages of enforcement, these workers at workplaces with
10 or more employees should automatically be eligible. Farmers, fishermen,
the self-employed, and low-income workers should be encouraged to
participate at their own discretion.
(4). The Source of Finance.
1). The sources of funds should be accumulated through contributions
made by employers and employees and through interest earned on the
money deposited in the fund. Subsidiary the money that the government has
subsidised for administrative costs should be included.
2). To meet the preconditions that the system guarantees the basic living
costs of pensioners and that a long-term balance in revenues and
expenditures be maintained, the contribution rate should be more than 10
percent for both the employer and the employee. Currently, however, it is felt
that a contribution rate of 10 percent may overburden both sides. Therefore,
the rate of contribution should begin at 5 percent in the early stage of
implementation and then should gradually be raised to level off at 10
percent by the year 2000.
2 The EPBC1986T The National Pension System. Republic of Korea.March, In Korean.
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3). The contribution rate should be charged at the ratio of 40 to 60 percent
between the employee and the employer.
4). A part of the Retirement Allowance fund should be included in the
pension fund to ease the employer's contributional burden.
(5). Benefits.
1). Payment Methods:
a). The calculation of benefits should incorporate the principle of income
redistribution. Benefits are composed of a basic amount and an additional
amount. The basic amount is related to the average monthly remuneration of
all insured persons and the average amount of the monthly standard
remuneration of insured individuals. The additional pension amount varies
according to the type and number of dependents. The total amount of
benefits should not exceed 100 percent of the last monthly remuneration of
the insured.
b). The calculation of old-age benefits should be incorporated with 20
percent of the average monthly remuneration of all insured persons and 20
percent of the average amount of the monthly standard remuneration of
insured individuals.
c). For the worker who has contributed for more than 20 years, he will be
paid additional benefits equivalent to 5 percent of his average monthly
income for an additional 12 months' contribution.
d). The level of benefits should be adjusted by the consumer price index.
2). Kinds of Benefits:
a). Benefits under the pension programme should be in four categories;
Old-Age pension, Disability pension, Survivor pension and Lump-Sum
Refund for those cancelling contracts midway. The basic old-age pension is
payable at age 60 to persons with at least 20 years of contributions.
b). The early reduced old-age pension should be paid upon request at age
55 to persons with at least 15 years of contributions.
c). An old-age pension for active seniors is payable at age 65 if the insured
person continues to work.
d). A special old-age pension should be paid to those between 45 and 60
years old who are not able to meet the requirements of benefits at the initial
stage of implementation of the pension programme.
387
e). The pension should be reduced for persons with 15-20 years of
coverage.
f). If a person with at least one year of coverage becomes disabled as a
result of sickness or injury, a disability pension is payable in accordance
with the degree of disability. In this case, the pension should be equivalent
to 40-80 percent of the old-age pension.
g). For persons with at least one insured year and pensioners, a survivor
pension ranging from 40 to 60 percent of the old-age pension should be
paid to the spouse or children under 18 years old.
h). A lump-sum refund is payable upon request of the insured whose
insured term is less than 15 years, and when he loses his insured status for
more than one year. The refund should be the total of the contributions of
both the employee and his employer at a fixed rate of interests.
(6). Organizational Structure.
a). As to the organising the Fund's operation, the government should
establish the Office of National Pension or authorise a public corporation
under the protenction of government.
b). The present various social security organizations should be unified
into a comprehensive central agency.
c). The administrative centre should utilize the existing related
organizations such as post office, bank, medical insurance organization and
industrial accident compensation insurance organization, to reduce
administrative costs.
d). The computerization between central and local organizations should
be established for the management of pension systems.
(7). The Utilization of Pension Fund.
1). The basic principle: The management of pension funds should be
focused on safety, high returns, enhancement of public interest, long-term
stability and increase in benefits for pensioners. Therefore, the employment
of funds should be shared between the private and public sectors.
2). The organizational system: A Committee for National Pension Fund
Operation should be organized. The committee should consist of
representatives from the government, labour, management, and experts in
this field. The committee should provide guidelines for fund operation with
regard to the following matters:
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a). The ratio of fund assets to be used for public and private sector projects.
b). The creation of a trust body for the management of profitable projects.
c). The supervision and investigation of fund management.
3). The operational method:
a). When the government or public enterprise appropriate the pension
funds for public sector projects, they can issue government or public bonds.
In this case, the profits should be higher than that of one-year time deposits
at city banks.
b). When the funds are utilized at a low rate of interest in promoting the
welfare of the insured, the financial agencies should be applied. In such a
case, the government should compensate for the gap in interest rates.
c). In principle, the fund should be invested diversely among the trust
financial agencies such as the insurance companies and the trust bank, to
the sound development of the banking and financial markets.
4). The utilization of pension fund for the insured: Part of the pension
funds for the public sector projects should be utilized to the contributors'
direct benefit. For this purpose: a). The fund should be invested for financing
construction of houses for low-income households; b). The fund should be
invested for the essentially required expenses such as the education and
marriage; c). The insured should loan out a rehabilitation fund by offering his
pension as a security.
3. The KDI Proposal.
At the request of the Preparatory Committee and the MOHSA, the KDI
began to work out a blueprint for the pension program. After studying the
welfare system of foreign countries such as West Germany, Britain, the U.S.
and Japan, and the long-term financial prospects and socio-economic
effects, the KDI formed its vision of the pension system in June 1986.3 The
KDI report was composed of two parts. In the first part, the KDI analyzed the
development of pension systems in the major advanced countries, the
necessity of a pension programme in Korea and the components of the
related systems. They then suggested a master plan for the pension
3 Jae-Sung Min et.al.,(1986), Master Plan and Economic and Social Effects of the National Pension
Scheme. The KDI, September. In Korean.
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programme. In the second part, the KDI attempted to show the socio¬
economic effects. In conclusion, the report mentioned that the present study
is only preliminary and may be followed by a series of studies culminating in
the final choices and implementation.
The contents of the KDI's proposals are briefly as follows.
(1). Major Objectives.
Based on a review of the changes in the socio-economic conditions of
Korea, the experiences of advanced welfare states, and Korea's ability to
pay contributions, it is desirable to develop a National Pension system which
can retain the following objectives and characteristics: 1). The system should
be able to pay pensioners, either the aged or those who have lost their
ability to earn income, at least enough to meet the national minimum level of
living costs; 2). The system should be modelled to maintain a long-term
balance of revenues and expenditures; 3). The system should adjust
contributions gradually to minimize possible shock to the national economy.
It should link contributions to benefits as much as possible so that a solid
foundation for the system can be established; 4). The system should
contribute to promoting equity by redistributing income to stabilize the living
standards of low-income classes; 5). The system should contain
mechanisms to guarantee the profitability, stability, and public interest of the
funds accumulated before maturity.
(2). Scope of Coverage: 1). All employed persons aged between 18 and
60 should be covered under the programme. Initially,however, only work
places having 10 or more employees should be covered due to the ready
availibility of their wage statements; 2). The self-employed, including farmers
and fishermen, should be insured on a voluntary basis; 3). Beneficiaries of
already-existing pension programmes such as for civil servants, military
personnel and private school teachers should be excluded from this
programme.
(3). Sources of Funds: 1). The sources of funds for the pension programme
consisted of contributions from employees and employers, government
subsidy for administrative costs, and interest accruing on the accumulated
fund. To meet the preconditions that the system only guarantee the basic
living costs of pensioners and that a long-term balance in revenues and
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expenditures will be maintained, contributions should be more than 10
percent for both employers and employees. Currently, however, it is felt that
contribution of 10 percent may be too burdensome. Therefore, the
contribution rate should be increased step-by-step from 2.5 percent in the
early stage of implementation to 10 percent by 2000.
2). The contribution rate should be charged at the ratio of 40 to 60 percent
between the employee and the employer. However, a part of the Retirement
Allowance Reserve should be included in the pension fund allowing for the
employer's contributional burden. To this end, the KDI suggested two plans.
Table: Schedule of Contribution Rates. (In percent).
1988-91 1992-95 1996-99 2000-
Total 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0
Employee 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0
Employer 1.5 3.0 4.5 6.0
(The First Plan)
From Retirement
Allowance Reserve 1.5 3.0 4.5 6.0
(The Second
Plan)
Employer 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
From Retirement
Allowance Reserve 1.5 3.0 4.5
(4). Benefits: 1). There are four kinds of benefits under the pension
schemes; old-age pension, disability pension, survivor pension and lump¬
sum refund. The basic old-age pension is to be paid to those who turn 60
and have been insured for 20 years or more. If they have been insured for
20 years, the benefits will be on average 40 percent of the last monthly
remuneration paid to the insured; 2). The amount of the pension is
composed of two parts: an equal distribution part( average monthly
remuneration of all insured persons in the year preceding the year of the
pension payment) and income proportion part ( the average standard
monthly income during the aggregate insured term of the insured person).
The total amount of benefits can not exceed 100 percent of the last monthly
remuneration of the insured; 3). If the insured continue to work beyond 60
391
years oid, they should receive amounts equivalent to 50 to 100 percent of
their last monthly income; 4). An early reduced old-age pension should be
paid upon request to those who retire at the age of 55; 5). A reduced old-age
pension should be paid to those who have been insured for 15 to 20 years;
6). When the insured whose insured term is one year or more are disabled
due to accidents or diseases, the disability pension equivalent to 60 to 100
percent of the old-age pension should be paid according to the degree of
disability; 7). If the insured die after one year or more of contribution, 40 to 60
percent of the old-age pension should be paid to their spouse or children
under 18 years old; 8). A lump-sum refund should be payable upon request
of the insured whose insured term is less than 15 years. The refund should
be the total of the contributions by both the insured and his employer at a
fixed rate of interest.
(5). Organizational Structure: 1). The government should establish the
independent public corporation under the protection of government; 2). The
administrative affairs should utilize the existing related organizations to
reduce of administrative costs; 3). The government should establish the
National Pension Fund Management Committee. The committee members
should include representatives from the government, labour, management,
and experts in this field.
(6). Co-ordination of the Related Systems.
1). The Retirement Allowance System: The fund of present Retirement
Allowance runs parallel with the required legal minimum rate( 8.3% of
worker's monthly remuneration) and the autonomous progressive rate.
Therefore, the legal rate should be transferred to the public programmes
such as the pension programme or the unemployment insurance; on the
other hand, the autonomous progressive rate should be developed
voluntarily and independently as a company's own retirement allowance
system. However, the transfer should be fulfilled on a step-by-step basis,
because the sweeping changes simultaneously with the implementation of a
pension programme would be a great shock to the pension subscribers as
well as the employers.
2). The Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance: As for the
relationship between the pension programme and the industrial accident
compensation insurance system, the two systems should be separately
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developed concerning the disparity in purpose and maturity. However, a
clear criteria should be worked out to avoid double benefits being given
under the two schemes if an insured person becomes disabled or dies.
Therefore, when the insured acquires both benefits claims at the same time
and applies for the industrial accident compensation insurance, the pension
benefits should be readjusted and a lump-sum refund should be payable
according to the contributions as a interim measure.
3). The Special Pension System: The three pension schemes for civil
servants, military personnel, and private school teachers have already been
independently established. Therefore, conflicts in contributions and pension
benefits are predictable for those whose change in employment results in a
transfer between schemes. However, measures to adjust the contributions
and pension benefits between schemes should be worked out.
(7). The Socio-Economic Effects.
1). The Effects on Savings and Financial Markets: The rising level of
savings expected to be mobilized by the pension programme can be
explained by the fact that during the initial period benefit payments will
absorb only a small fraction of the contributions, leaving a large surplus
because the pension scheme will be operated by a fund accumulation
method. When the pension programme becomes effective in 1988, the
system will have in effect, to raise the domestic savings ratio by 0.3 to 0.55
percent by mid-1990s. In addition, the pension programme should contribute
to the development of financial business through an increase of long-term
financial savings.
2). The Redistribution of Income: The formula for computing benefits
under the pension programme has a "double layer" approach which
combines both the universal fixed-amount pension and the earnings-related
pension. Therefore, the high replacement rate for low income-earners and
the minimum benefit-the universal fixed amount portion of the pension-can
be interpreted as a guarantee of a minimum floor of income. Another aspect
of this redistributive impact of the pension programme is indicated by its old-
age benefits structure which is heavily weighted in favor of those with low
earnings records. In other words, benefits are relatively larger for those with
low earnings than for those with high earnings.
3). The Effect on Labour Market: a). The old-age pension for active
seniors should minimize the falling of early retirement; b). The transference
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of employer's contributions from the Retirement Allowance System to the
pension programme should minimize the employment reduction; c).
However, the second plan for fund accumulation should effect the labour
market in a larger way than the first plan.
4). The Effect on Social Stability: a). The introduction of a pension
programme should contribute to the alleviation of social tensions and the
inadequacy of welfare demands; b). The pension programme should
positively cope with the trends towards ageing society and nuclear family; c).
The pension programme should build up a collective responsibility through
dispersion of social risks to the whole nation; d). The pension programme
should raise a social equity through income redistribution.
(8). Conclusion.
Consequently, the introduction of a pension programme will contribute to
social stability as well as economic development. As for the age structure of
the working population, the baby-boom generation began to enter the labour
market in the early 1980s, signifying the need for early implementation.
Allowing for the preparatory works such as a survey of public opinion and
the build-up of an administrative structure, the pension programme should
be implemented from 1988.
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Appendix 4: The Contents of the Suggestions for the
Revised Pension Programme and Their
Outcome.
The MOHSA Proposal. Suggestions
(Organizations).
Outcome.
The Sphere of Workplace:
"Workplace" is defined as the
workshops or offices which




This will be amended to
"the workshops or offices
which regularly employ
more than 5 employees."
The Voluntary Application: When
more than two thirds of the
workers request participate in the
pension fund, their employer
must apply to the Ministry of
MOHSA for the application of this
law.
"employees and their
employer should apply to




This will be amended to
"the voluntary provision."
The Officials: The Minister of
MOHSA shall appoint the Chief
Director, the Executive Director
and the Standing Auditor.
The President shall appoint




The President shall appoint
the Chief Director on the
recommendation of the
Minister of MOHSA.
However, the Minister of
MOHSA shall appoint the
Executive Director and the
Standing Auditor.
The Commissioning of Service:
Provision of the services shall be
delegated to the medical
insurance organization, the Post






The suggestion should be
adopted.
The Assessment of the Basic
Pension: The basic pension shall
be calculated at the average
standard monthly income during
the insured term.
The law should make it




The suggestion should be
adopted.
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The exemption from Taxes, etc:
A pension paid under this law
shall be exempt from taxes and
other charges by the central and
provincial governments in
accordance with the Tax
Exemption and Reduction
Control Law and the regulations
of provincial governments.
This article should be
eliminated because the Tax
Law already deals with it.
(The Minister of Finance).
The suggestion should be
rejected because the







The Old-Age Pension for Active
Seniors; Those aged 60 to 65
who have been insured for more
than 20 years and those over age
65 who have been insured for
more than 15 years but less than
20 years shall be paid a certain
amount of pension while they are
employed by way of
compensation.
The second condition that
"those over age 65 who
have been insured for
more than 15 years but less
than 20 years" should be
eliminated.(The EPB).
The extension of the
insured term should be
encouraged to raise their
income security after
disqualification. The
insured who are eligible for




expires, may continue to
contribute till 65 years old.
The Early Reduced Old-Age
Pension: Those who have been
insured for more than 20 years,
those who have been insured for
more than 15 years but less than
20 years, and those whose age is
55 or over and those who have
not a job with some remuneration
shall be paid a certain amount of
pension.
The second condition that
"those who have been
insured for more than 15
years but less than 20
years" should be
eliminated(The EPB).
The suggestion should be
adopted.
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The Ceiling on Old-Age Pension:
The old-age pension shall not
exceed 100 % of the standard
monthly income in the year
before the first year of pension
payment as calculated on the
basis of the average standard
monthly income during the whole
insured term.
The old-age pension shall
not exceed 100 % of the
standard monthly income
as calculated on the basis
of the average monthly
income in the year before
the first year of pension
payment (The EPB).
The old-age pension shall
not exceed 100 % of the
standard monthly income in
the year before the first
year of pension payment as
calculated on the basis of
the average standard
monthly income in the last
5 years of the insured term.
The Amount of Disability
Pension: The amount of
Disability pension shall be one of
the following amounts according
to disability class: a). 100 % of
the basic pension plus an
additional pension for class 1
disabilities; b). 80 % for
class 2...; c). 60 % for class
3...
The class 4 disabilities
should be added and 150
% of the basic pension




pension shall be paid for
slight injury.
The Amount of Lump-Sum
Refund: The sum of contribution
by the employee and the
employer and converted
retirement allowance reserve,
plus interest on the said sum.
The interest rate of
deposits at city banks
should be clarified by the
law.
(Ministry of Labour).
The interest rate of




The Contribution from the
Retirement Allowance System:
The amount of transference from
the Retirement Allowance
Reserves to the pension funds
shall be 7 days or more out of 30
days from 1993 to 1997, and
then 10 days or more out of 30
days after 1998.
a). The wordings "seven
days or more" and "ten
days or more" should be
revised to 2 % of average
monthly standard income
and 3 % of average
monthly monthly standard
income(The EPB).
b). The wordings "Seven
days or more" and "ten
days or more" should be
revised to the "seven days"




The Fine for Default: In case
employers fail to pay the
contribution, the MOHSA shall
collect fines for default computed
on the basis of 0.007 for average
100 won in arrears per day.
The rate of fine for default
should be stipulated by
Presidential Decree
(The EPB).
The suggestion should be
adopted.
The Employment of Pension
Fund: The Minister of MOHSA
shall invest a part of pension
funds for the contributors' and
the pensioners' welfare.
Besides the investment for
the contributors' and the
pensioners' welfare, the
pension funds should be
invested the public
enterprises (The EPB).
The suggestion should be
adopted.
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The Committee for National Chairman: The Minister of a). The Minister of EPB
Pension Fund Operation: EPB. shall be the Chairman and
a). Chairman: The Prime Minister. Members: The Chief the Minister of MOHSA
b). Members: The Ministers of Director of the National shall be the Vice-Chairman.
related departments, Pension Corporation b). The Chief Director shall
representatives of employers should be included (The be excluded from
and employees and related EPB). committee membership
experts (9-11 persons). because he is the only
head of an executive body
which is working based on
the established plan.
Instead, the Minister of the
Agriculture & Fishery
Department and the
Minister of the Commerce
& Industry Department shall
be included.
The Request for Examination a) may submit The suggestions should
and Re-examination of applications for be adopted.
Complaints: Those insured examination of such
having complaints about their complaints to the National
qualifications, standard monthly Pension Corporation.
contributions or pensions may b). Applications for
submit applications for examination shall be
examination of such complaints submitted in writing within
to the National Welfare Review 60 days from the day after
Committee, and may submit the notice of the original
applications to the Re¬ action is delivered or the
examination Committee it they applicant is informed of
are dissatified with the National such action
Welfare Pension Review (The Min. of Justice).
Committee.
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The Application for Examination: a) within two The suggestions shall be
Applications for examination shall months adopted.
be submitted in writing in b). The Review Committee
accordance with Presidential shall be established within
Decree within three months from the MOHSA in order to
the day after the notice of original conduct examination and
action is delivered or the re-examination.




be provided for under
Presidential Decree.
(The Min. of Justice).
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